Abstract In The Descent of Man (1879), Charles Darwin proposed a speculative evolutionary explanation of extended benevolence—a human sympathetic capacity that extends to all nations, races, and even to all sentient beings. This essay draws on twenty-first century social science to show that Darwin’s explanation is correct in its broad outlines. Extended benevolence is manifested in institutions such as legal human rights and democracy, in behaviors such as social movements for human rights and the protection of nonhuman animals, and in (...) normative attitudes such as emancipative values and a commitment to promote the rights or welfare of animals. These phenomena can be substantially explained by cultural evolutionary forces that trace back to three components of what Darwin called the human “moral sense”: (1) sympathy, (2) our disposition to follow community rules or norms, and (3) our capacity to make normative judgments. Extended benevolence likely emerged with “workarounds,” including political ideologies, that established an inclusive sympathetic concern for sentient life. It likely became as widespread as it is now due to recently arisen socio-economic conditions that have created more opportunities for people to have contact with and take the perspective of a broader cross-section of humanity, as well as other species. (shrink)

Morally progressive social changes seem to have taken place with the onset of democratic governance, the abolition of slavery, the rise of gender equality, and other developments. This essay attempts to demonstrate that natural and objective moral facts are a plausible cause of some morally progressive social changes. Since this hypothesis is a version of naturalistic moral realism, I call it the Naturalist-Realist Hypothesis. To support the NRH, I argue that objective moral facts are natural facts pertaining to the impartial (...) promotion of well-being within a population of agents facing a social dilemma. I then describe a mechanism to explain how natural and objective moral facts so construed may cause some morally progressive social changes. I suggest that the NRH is a credible hypothesis because it is compatible with empirical findings from research on the evolution of moral cognition and on the sociology of mass political movements. (shrink)

Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do (...) it. Versions of moral naturalism that deny this claim would, if widely believed, disable some crucial practical uses of moral concepts. In particular, if the existence of normative reasons for action is taken to be dependent on agents’ desires, it would breed profound skepticism about the legitimacy of evaluating others’ actions from a moral point of view. Also, it would raise doubts about whether people ought to correct their own behavior in light of moral considerations. Following Richard Joyce, I take these consequences to indicate that the concept of a categorical reason is a “non-negotiable” part of moral concepts. (shrink)

This essay proposes and defends a descriptive definition of morality. Under this definition, a moral system is a system of rules, psychological states, and modes of character development that performs the function of enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation. I shall argue that the methodologies employed by two prominent moral psychologists to establish a descriptive definition of morality only serve to track patterns in people’s uses of moral terms. However, these methods at best reveal a nominal definition of morality, since moral (...) appraisers may be ignorant about the referents of their moral terms. I propose a real definition of morality that characterizes moral systems as a natural kind—more precisely, a copied kind. I explain what it takes for a moral system to satisfy this definition, and I identify the sorts of evidence needed to distinguish moral systems from value systems of other kinds. (shrink)

Moral motivation refers to the psychological causes that motivate or explain moral action. Moral action refers to action that complies with the requirements of morality. In this essay, I lay out alternative views on moral motivation, giving particular attention the way each view conceives of the explanatory link between practical reasoning and moral conduct. In trying to understand this link, philosophers look to moral judgment. The main rival accounts of the relationship between practical reasoning, moral judgment, and moral motivation can (...) be distinguished according to the way in which they respond to two questions: (1) Can a cognitive (i.e., belief-like) state produce in an agent a motivation at time t, without being accompanied by an affective (i.e., emotional or desire-like) state which exists prior to t? (2) Are moral judgments cognitive states or affective states? -/- I shall defend the Humean theory of motivation, or HTM, as the best account of moral motivation. HTM is often called the belief-desire model of action because it explains behavior by citing a combination of a desire for some end and a belief that a certain action is a means to satisfying that desire. The Humean answer to the first question above is that any process of practical reasoning which generates a motivation is necessarily linked to a non-cognitive state. Regarding the second question, Humeans are split between cognitivists and non-cognitivists. Anti-Humeans, on the other hand, hold that moral judgments express cognitive states, and that cognitive states can independently produce motivations via practical reasoning. -/- I offer two arguments in favor of HTM. First, I suggest that Humeanism meets one criterion of theory choice better than anti-Humeanism. This is the continuity constraint. Given that humans and non-humans evolved common ancestors, the continuity constraint advises us to prefer an account of human psychology which can explain how complex human traits evolved from simpler antecedents resembling the traits of non-human animals. Non-human primates, in particular, are capable of acting altruistically toward con-specifics. Altruistic behavior in primates can shed light on an evolutionary precursor to moral action in humans, since morally significant action often involves altruism. I maintain that a Humean theory of motivation offers the best explanation of altruistic behavior in non-human primates. Therefore, by the continuity constraint, HTM should be the preferred model of the psychological mechanisms underlying human moral motivation, unless empirical evidence strongly suggests otherwise. -/- To ward off the objection that anti-Humeanism is warranted due to the vast differences between humans and non-human primates, I offer a second argument for HTM. This is an argument from a criterion of theory choice called Morgan’s Canon. Morgan’s Canon is a standard of theoretical parsimony according to which a psychological mechanism should be attributed to an organism only if it’s the sole mechanism which can cause some behavior. I argue that HTM meets this criterion much better than anti-Humeanism. This is because the special psychological mechanisms which anti-Humeans postulate to explain moral action are not the sole mechanisms which could produce such action. Rather, the Humean belief-desire model could easily be recruited to explain moral action, as well as a broad variety of non-moral actions. (shrink)

In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus famously maintains that ideas of morality and justice are nothing more than an ideology indoctrinated in “the weaker” to benefit “the stronger.” This is Thrasymachus’s challenge to morality: the thesis that some social arrangements, including some moral norms, are products of ‘false consciousness.’ False consciousness occurs when a dominant social group shapes the beliefs and desires of a subordinate group in such a way that the subordinates act for the benefit of the dominants, (...) but against their own interests. In this paper, I grant that some moral norms emerge or persist because of false consciousness. However, I shall argue that these norms actually have the function of impartially promoting the interests of all persons in their range of application. Even if the actual effect of false consciousness norms is to benefit a powerful class while being harmful and discriminatory toward others, the true function of false consciousness norms is the intended effect that they were designed to have. And the crucial feature of false consciousness norms is that their designers—particularly subordinates—teach, preach, follow, and enforce them with the intention of promoting the mutual interests of everyone to whom the norms apply. (shrink)

This article defends a claim about the conditions under which agents possess normative reasons for action. According to this claim, an agent has a normative reason to φ only if it’s psychologically possible for that reason to motivate the agent to φ. The claim is called‘Williams’s explanatory constraint,’since it’s drawn from Bernard Williams’s work on the topic of practical reason. A two-premise‘master argument’ for Williams’s explanatory constraint is put forward. First, an agent has a normative reason to φ only if (...) that agent has the ability to φ for that reason. The second premise states that an agent has the ability to φ for a normative reason only if it’s psychologically possible for that reason to motivate the agent to φ. It is suggested that the ability to act for a normative reason involves the ability to act from a consequence-sensitive process of practical reasoning. Furthermore, normative reasons for action can motivate agents by being the objects of psychological states—particularly beliefs,desires, and intentions. In reply to the objection that normative reasons can never be objects of psychological states, I contend that all normative reasons are capable of being represented as the objects of psychological states. (shrink)

Normative reasons for action are facts or considerations that contribute to the justification of an action. Sometimes, normative reasons for action conflict: one reason may favor doing something, while another may favor not doing it. These conflicts can be so radical that it seems difficult, if not impossible, to judge which reason should ultimately guide one’s actions. According to a theory of practical rationality known as reasons pluralism, there are some radical cases of conflict among normative reasons for action in (...) which there can be no fact of the matter about what one ought to do. This is because normative reasons fall into a plurality of types, and normative reasons of different types are incommensurable with one another. However, reasons pluralism is compatible with a principle that would enable us to judge when a normative reason of one type overrides a normative reason of another type. I will argue that this “Override Principle” is a facet of practical wisdom—an intellectual virtue. Practical wisdom, as Aristotle construed it, involves the ability to order one’s ends into a coherent system that allows for the attainment of a good life. The Override Principle is sure to be one criterion by which those endowed with practical wisdom would order their ends. (shrink)

In The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin proposed a speculative evolutionary explanation of extended benevolence—a human sympathetic capacity that extends to all nations, races, and even to all sentient beings. This essay draws on twenty-first century social science to show that Darwin’s explanation is correct in its broad outlines. Extended benevolence is manifested in institutions such as legal human rights and democracy, in behaviors such as social movements for human rights and the protection of nonhuman animals, and in normative attitudes (...) such as emancipative values and a commitment to promote the rights or welfare of animals. These phenomena can be substantially explained by cultural evolutionary forces that trace back to three components of what Darwin called the human “moral sense”: sympathy, our disposition to follow community rules or norms, and our capacity to make normative judgments. Extended benevolence likely emerged with “workarounds,” including political ideologies, that established an inclusive sympathetic concern for sentient life. It likely became as widespread as it is now due to recently arisen socio-economic conditions that have created more opportunities for people to have contact with and take the perspective of a broader cross-section of humanity, as well as other species. (shrink)

People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? To address this (...) question, we tested the good true self theory against two potential boundary conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual differences in misanthropy—the tendency to view humans negatively—predict beliefs about the good true self in an American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in a good true self, even among individuals who have an explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true self-attributions across cultural groups, by comparing samples from an independent country and a diverse set of interdependent countries. Results indicated that the direction and magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy, suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the true self as morally good. (shrink)

The works of the early Greek philosophers are not only a fundamental source for understanding archaic Greek culture and the whole of ancient philosophy, but also a perennially fresh resource that has stimulated Western thought until the present day. This nine-volume edition presents all the major fragments from the sixth to the fourth centuries BC.

It is held by many philosophers that it is a consequence of epistemic contextualism that speakers are typically semantically blind, that is, typically unaware of the propositions semantically expressed by knowledge attributions. In his ?Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness? (this journal, 2009), Martin Montminy argues that semantic blindness is widespread in language, and not restricted to knowledge attributions, so it should not be considered problematic. I will argue that Montminy might be right about this, but that contextualists still face a (...) serious and related problem: that it is a consequence of epistemic contextualism that subjects are typically unaware of contents conveyed by knowledge attributions, independently of whether these are semantic or non-semantic contents. Even if semantic blindness is widespread in language, it does not seem that content unawareness of this sort is. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term “explanation” in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors’ claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also (...) provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label “understandable AI” to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following De Regt (2017) and Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent’s success in using the system. (shrink)

The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...) introduces and asseses the philosophical puzzles posed by things persisting through time. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem it explores the following key topics and debates: mereology and identity, including 'Leibniz's Law' the constitution view of identity the 'relative identity' argument concerning identity temporary identity four-dimensionalism, counterpart and mulitiple counterpart theory supervenience the problem of temporary intrinsics the necessity of identity presentism ontological and epistemological criteria for persistence and the difference between them. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessement of the metaphysics of identity. (shrink)

Rendre hommage à un auteur, ce n'est pas seulement célébrer ce qu'il fut mais c'est aussi alerter sur ce que son oeuvre apporte au présent et à l'avenir de la connaissance. C'est bien le sens donné à cet hommage à André-Jean Arnaud. Repenser le droit, c'était pou r cet auteur érudit : repenser les lieux, les conditions et les façons de l'étudier en dépassant les frontières géographiques en même temps que les frontières disciplinaires. En montrant en quoi André-Jean Arnaud fut, (...) hors des sentiers battus et des orthodoxies de la production et de la transmission des savoirs en la matière, un exceptionnel précurseur et l'infatigable artisan d'un nouveau régime de connaissance sur le droit, le présent ouvrage s'adresse à toutes celles et à tous ceux, enseignants, chercheurs, étudiants ou simples citoyens, pou r qui l'étude du droit permet de mieux comprendre ce que sont et ce que sont susceptibles de devenir nos sociétés. (shrink)

Recent attempts to develop and apply digital ethics principles to address the challenges of the digital transformation leave organisations with an operationalisation gap. To successfully implement such guidance, they must find ways to translate high-level ethics frameworks into practical methods and tools that match their specific workflows and needs. Here, we describe the development of a standardised risk assessment tool, the Principle-at-Risk Analysis (PaRA), as a means to close this operationalisation gap for a key level of the ethics infrastructure at (...) many organisations – the work of an interdisciplinary ethics panel. The PaRA tool serves to guide and harmonise the work of the Digital Ethics Advisory Panel at the multinational science and technology company Merck KGaA in alignment with the principles outlined in the company’s Code of Digital Ethics. We examine how such a tool can be used as part of a multifaceted approach to operationalise high-level principles at an organisational level and provide general requirements for its implementation. We showcase its application in an example case dealing with the comprehensibility of consent forms in a data-sharing context at Syntropy, a collaborative technology platform for clinical research. (shrink)

We compare various notions of algorithmic randomness. First we consider relativized randomness. A set is n-random if it is Martin-Löf random relative to ∅. We show that a set is 2-random if and only if there is a constant c such that infinitely many initial segments x of the set are c-incompressible: C ≥ |x|-c. The ‘only if' direction was obtained independently by Joseph Miller. This characterization can be extended to the case of time-bounded C-complexity. Next we prove some results (...) on lowness. Among other things, we characterize the 2-random sets as those 1-random sets that are low for Chaitin's Ω. Also, 2-random sets form minimal pairs with 2-generic sets. The r.e. low for Ω sets coincide with the r.e. K-trivial ones. Finally we show that the notions of Martin-Löf randomness, recursive randomness, and Schnorr randomness can be separated in every high degree while the same notions coincide in every non-high degree. We make some remarks about hyperimmune-free and PA-complete degrees. (shrink)

Mit seiner Theorie der vernünftigen Übereinkunft liefert André Olbrich die Grundlegung eines Kriteriums für moralische Urteile über richtig und falsch: Im Anschluss an klassische und moderne Vertragstheoretiker wird die Akzeptanz eines Urteils durch die Betroffenen zum obersten Rechtfertigungsmaßstab erhoben. Das vertragstheoretische Denken wird weiterentwickelt und konsequent als umfassende normative Theorie ausformuliert. Die Leserinnen und Leser erfahren, von welchem Standpunkt aus sich die Regeln unseres sozialen Miteinanders einer Kritik unterziehen lassen und auf welchen moralischen Grundlagen Recht und Politik aufbauen.

El uso de sistemas de machine learning en los procesos de selección laboral ha sido de gran utilidad para agilizarlos y volverlos más eficientes, pero al mismo tiempo ha generado problemas en términos de equidad, confiabilidad y transparencia. En este artículo comenzamos explicando los diferentes usos de la Inteligencia Artificial en los procesos de selección laboral en Estados Unidos. Presentamos los sesgos sexuales y raciales que han sido detectados en algunos de ellos y explicamos los obstáculos jurídicos y prácticos para (...) su detección y análisis. Un posible remedio jurídico a la discriminación algorítmica es el régimen de impacto diferencial sistémico utilizado en Estados Unidos. Usamos algunas características de este régimen para señalar los vacíos jurídicos frente a la discriminación en el acceso al empleo en el ámbito del derecho laboral colombiano, y ofrecemos algunas características generales que podría tener un régimen de esa naturaleza. (shrink)

Hegelians normally consider Hegel's philosophical system from two perspectives: metaphysics, interpreting this discipline as the central one to understand the work of the German philosopher, or non-metaphysics, being more relevant alternative interpretations that avoid it. This article presents a study on the senses of reflection. These senses can be extrinsic or absolute. These two senses are the backbones of the Hegelian system. Therefore, by means of a study of whether extrinsic and absolute reflection are notions that guide us towards metaphysical (...) or non-metaphysical readings, we try to give an answer to the debate between the possible interpretations of Hegel. (shrink)

Lo psíquico, que no la psicología como ciencia, es un tema poco tratado en la filosofía de Polo. En este escrito se busca dar explicación de qué es lo psíquico y cuál es su importancia. Se defiende que lo psíquico tiene dos condiciones reduccionistas implícitas que se constituyen a partir de la crisis de la filosofía de Hegel. La primera es creer que la realidad es reductible a la percepción individual. La segunda consiste en que el pensamiento ya esté determinado (...) preconceptualmente. (shrink)

André Tosel, décédé en mars 2017, était un philosophe engagé, attaché tout au long de son existence à faire vivre un marxisme critique puisant notamment dans le meilleur de la tradition italienne de ce courant de pensée ; il fut l'un des rares français à introduire et discuter les oeuvres majeures d'A. Labriola et surtout d'A. Gramsci, ainsi par ailleurs que celles de Vico dont il fut un fin connaisseur. Il consacra sa thèse de doctorat d'état aux rapports entre religion, (...) politique et philosophie chez Spinoza et contribua de façon décisive à de nouvelles lectures du philosophe en le mettant en miroir de Marx. Professeur de philosophie des universités de Besançon, Franche Comté, de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne et de Nice Sophia-Antipolis, dans lesquelles il occupa de nombreuses fonctions de directions administratives et scientifiques, il était un homme de collectif attaché à faire vivre le savoir, s'engageant dans la vie universitaire et politique, contribuant également de manière décisive au lancement et à l'animation de la revue Actuel Marx. Passionné par l'évolution des pensées contemporaines, il intervenait régulièrement dans des débats d'actualité, sous la forme de contributions dans L'Humanité ou dans des ouvrages destinés à un public large, tout particulièrement dans la dernière période sur les questions de sécularisation, de laïcité et de religion. Cet ouvrage entend lui rendre hommage en abordant les différentes facettes de son oeuvre, traversant un demi-siècle de vie intellectuelle. (shrink)

Diversität ist eines der zentralen Themen unserer Zeit. Sie durchdringt alle Lebensbereiche unserer Gesellschaften. Das Nachdenken über Diversität reicht von den Naturwissenschaften über die Geschichtswissenschaften, die Gesellschaftswissenschaften, die Philosophie bis zu den Künsten. Diversität ist zudem politisch und emotional beladen. Man denke an gesellschaftliche Minderheiten und ihre Rechte oder an das massive Artensterben unserer Tage. In diesem Buch wird nicht nur über Einzelaspekte von Diversität berichtet, es wird auch eine Synthese versucht. Drei einleitende Kapitel der HerausgeberInnen führen verständlich in komplexe (...) interdisziplinäre Problemzusammenhänge ein. Der Band versammelt 17 Beiträge namhafter Autorinnen und Autoren aus den Bereichen Kunst-, Kultur- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Medizin und Gesellschaftstheorie.00. (shrink)

La musique comme chemin d'existence et pour la penser... En effet, les moments d'intervention de la musique, de toutes les musiques, au fil des jours et au long de la vie ne manquent pas d'être signifiants. Ils instruisent autant sur la musique elle-même que sur la pensée et sur l'existence. Il serait prétentieux d'en produire une théorie générale. Toutefois, la voie de la chronique, jour après jour, aura tissé des fils permettant de s'attarder sur le sens, nécessairement ponctuel et subjectif (...) (chacun pourra substituer son écoute et ses pratiques propres), de l'Adieu en musique, des affinités qu'elle manifeste et peut-être révèle, de ses rapports avec telle image ou peinture, plus étonnamment avec la photographie, avec le son en général, la vérité ou encore le style. On verra aussi comment la musique s'entend dans le rêve et comment elle nous porte à considérer les animaux. Des oeuvres, des musiciens, et quelques philosophes et écrivains s'imposeront (Le Voyage d'Hiver, Le Boléro, Le Sacre du Printemps, Pelléas ; Haydn, Schubert, Mahler, Chostakovitch ; Descartes, Nietzsche, Adorno ; Goethe, Gerhard Meier, Sandor Maraï...). C'est pourtant davantage une vie dans la musique et par elle que la théorisation sur la musique qui inspire chacun des textes présentés ici. En s'efforçant de relever et de piquer leur objet, donc en le séparant et le thématisant staccato, peut-être la chance sera-t-elle donnée d'entrevoir l'existence dans sa continuité, legato. (shrink)

El pluralismo religioso trata de presentar lugares comunes en los que establecer diálogos entre diferentes religiones sin intención de persuadir. En esta investigación se aborda el pluralismo religioso en los periodos de Tubinga y Berna de Hegel. Esto es, en la filosofía del joven Hegel, periodo en el que se dedicó especialmente a la reflexión sobre la política y la religión. En este periodo, menos estudiado por la academia que su madurez, encontramos que hay al menos tres lugares comunes que (...) pueden facilitar el diálogo interreligioso: el sentimiento, la universalidad ética y la libertad. En esta investigación se presenta estos tres tópicos que Hegel descubre para el diálogo entre diferentes religiones para, finalmente, conectarlos con la discusión cronológicamente posterior sobre el pluralismo religioso. (shrink)

Pourquoi Averroès? Pourquoi Averroès juriste? Parce que dans le cadre du débat avec ceux qui soutiennent le caractère indubitable du texte sacré, Averroès affirme la primauté de la raison. Il a ainsi mis en avant le questionnement, le doute dans la recherche de la vérité. Ce doute toléré dans le cercle restreint des philosophes était inacceptable en droit (la charia) qui s'applique à tous les membres de la communauté des musulmans. D'où sa condamnation et son exil. La redécouverte de la (...) pensée d'Averroès pourrait permettre au monde arabo-musulman de s'extraire du chaos. (shrink)

On présente trop souvent Spinoza comme le créateur de l'un des systèmes conceptuels les plus arides de l'histoire de la pensée. Loin d'être un système de plus, il s'agit en fait d'un itinéraire existentiel, de l'effort d'un homme pour se libérer du malheur, de l'ignorance, de la souffrance, lot de tout homme venant en ce monde. Pour sortir de ce bourbier où la vie s'enlise, il faut prendre la décision ferme d'y voir enfin clair sur la nature des biens que (...) nous aimons et auxquels nou nous attachons car il y va de notre bonheur et de notre malheux. Pour y parvenir, 'il convient d'abord de trouver un moyen de guérir l'entendement' et de se consacrer entièrement à la mise en œuvre de cette guérison de soi. Ces pages, nées d'une libre méditation, ont pour seul but d'attirer l'attention sur un aspect de l'œuvre et de la vie d'un homme qui fut un Sage, et don't la voix demeure aussi vivante qu'au jour où elle s'éleva pour la première fois"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

En este libro, el autor traza un retrato histórico-conceptual del republicanismo que desmiente por completo la imagen con que se lo suele asociar: la de un discurso anticuado, conservador, que moraliza lo político. A contrapelo de esa visión, el autor desarrolla su argumentación a partir del análisis de cinco aspectos republicanos claves: "la libertad como no dominación, la virtud como soporte motivador y epistémico de la participación cívica, el debate como el elemento constitutivo de la política, la ley como la (...) otra cara de la libertad y la patria como el espacio particularista aunque estrictamente institucional de la república". (shrink)

Introduction : Gramsci, ce célèbre inconnu -- 1. Trois portaits de Gramsci en intellectuel politique -- 2. Quasi système et histoire dans les cahiers de prison -- 3. Antonio Gramsci : quel socialisme ? Quel communisme ? -- 4. La philosophie de la praxis entre conception du monde, religion, idéologie, sens commun -- 5. Survie et création en prison -- 6. L'hégémonie comme pédagogie: formation de la volonté collective et de la personnalité individuelle.

Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking -- thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to (...) be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other 'critical thinkers' to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs. (shrink)

Assurément, la lecture d'Origène par Erasme est d'abord un plaisir du texte. L'étude d'André Goin en éclaire les prolongements historico- théologiques. Erasme s'est d'abord employé à délivrer Origène de la "caverne des ombres" d'où de nombreux humanistes, dont Pic de la Mirandole, n'avaient pu le tirer. Avec son génie propre, et alliant l'audace calculée et l'enthousiasme sincère pour la spiritualité origienne, Erasme fait une exégèse subtile fondée sur un réemploi, massif et sélectif, de l'énorme matériau emprunté à Origène, une tentative (...) de dépassement des problèmes posés par l'orthodoxie d'Origène, et enfin, s'impose comme traducteur et éditeur d'Origène. (shrink)

This volume gathers contributions at the intersection of history and politics. The essays, covering such topics as diverse as Italian identity in the Tientsin concession, international refugee policies in the interwar period and after, and the myths and realities of the Ukranian-Russian encounter in independent Ukraine, show that history provides better grounding as well as a more suitable paradigm for the study of politics than economics or other hard sciences. All of the contributors have a common link - doctoral work (...) supervised and shaped by Professor Andre Liebich - but have since expanded widely in the world. Hence, the authors of this work at once share a common base and yet benefit from diverse viewpoints. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage s'inscrit dans la série des travaux que le Centre de Recherche Philosophique de l'Université de Lille III consacre à l'étude des cosmologies grecques. Après le système classique d'Empédocle et la réflexion critique d'Epicure à l'époque hellénistique, on s'intéresse ici à un penseur charnière, le dernier représentant de l' "ancienne physique".La notoriété de Diogène d'Apollonie est faible, au-delà du cercle restreint des spécialistes du Ve siècle grec. Ce tard venu n'a pas le renom d'Anaximandre ou d'Empédocle, ni celui de (...) Démocrite, dont il est contemporain. Et pourtant, sa pensée n'est pas seulement l'ultime avatar d'une lignée dont il serait au fond indigne. Elle représente au contraire une forme d'achèvement, offrant une solution possible, dans le cadre du paradigme cosmologique hérité, au problème, laissé ouvert par le système d'Anaxagore, du mode d'action de "l'intellect" (νούς) dans le monde. La pertinence et la spécificité de la démarche, qui induit une doctrine de l'immanence, ressortent clairement quand on la confronte avec la célèbre critique d'Anaxagore menée par Socrate au nom de la téléologie dans le Phédon de Platon, et qui signe l'arrêt de mort de la spéculation présocratique. (shrink)

La presente investigación trata de los conceptos de reflexión entre Kant y Hegel, y sobre cómo su tratamiento hegeliano conduce sus teorías del concepto y de la subjetividad. Partiendo de la diferencia entre inicio y principio de la filosofía propuesta por Hegel, trata de exponer su continuación y crítica del proyecto kantiano. Hegel delimitará, denunciará y expondrá las carencias teoréticas kantianas y, simultáneamente, propondrá la superación de estas mediante el movimiento inmanente de los objetos, aprehensible mediante la reflexión inmanente, que (...) termina por diluir la distinción kantiana entre razón y sujeto, y su escisión entre pensar y ser. (shrink)

The book forms a balanced structure in which the three conceptual pillars of Spinoza's natural law theory (individuality, natural laws, and power) are first analyzed from the viewpoint of his ontology and then from the viewpoint of his ...