Rolf Gruner's article on the role of understanding in the social sciences casts rational understanding as the aim of the social sciences. Even though he opts for a non?controversial methodology for the social sciences, his view still commits the social sciences to seeking the reproduction of reality rather than the explanation of it.

The work of W.V.O. Quine is often held to folIow the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle in broad outline, but to diverge from it in crucial particulars. On the basis of recent reevaluations of the latter, I argue that the philosophical distance between Quine and the Vienna Circle is less than ordinarily thought, or, most importantly, than Quine himself admits.

The work of W.V.O. Quine is often held to folIow the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle in broad outline, but to diverge from it in crucial particulars. On the basis of recent reevaluations of the latter, I argue that the philosophical distance between Quine and the Vienna Circle is less than ordinarily thought, or, most importantly, than Quine himself admits.

Despite its basically syllogistic character, Richard Whately's Elements of logic presents the subject in a modern theoretical setting. Whately, for instance, regarded logic as an abstract science, and defined the syllogism as a purely formal device to be used as a means of determining the validity of all arguments. In this paper, I argue that such instances of abstractive ascent place Whately's theory in closer proximity to later 19th-century developments than to the work of his 17th-century predecessors. In addition to (...) discussing the theory itself, other sections deal with its historical setting, and various reactions to it. (shrink)

There is a classic problem which confronts any attempt to assign death a value. On the assumption that death is personal annihilation, death deprives evil of a requisite subject, for no misfortune can befall something which does not exist. Recent efforts to provide a reasonable basis for counting death as a bad thing have centered on an analysis of the loss of life's goods which it brings. So long as the analysis assumes that death is a simple state, loss can (...) be explained only by reference to a realm of possible things which exist after death. An alternative analysis of death is offered in which death is defined as a limit on life. That analysis provides a basis for evaluative judgements about death, while avoiding any commitment to post-mortem existence. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Dark Ages of Logic Kant and Whately Bernard Bolzano John Stuart Mill Boole, De Morgan, and Peirce Gottlob Frege The Austrian School Bertrand Russell.

One major part of Representing and Intervening is completely without blemish. In it we find Ian Hacking busy puncturing received opinions about science in his usual lucid and engaging style. If you think, for instance, that scientists decide what exists by passively observing the passing show, Hacking has news for you. Similarly, if you think that experiments exist just to test theories, or that science begins and ends with theories, or that within science as practised there is even any univocal (...) rendering of the term “theory”, you are equally on the verge of surprise. (shrink)

The high quality of the 20 papers in this collection is evidence that even in an area which has been repeatedly mined, there is always room for interesting, well presented thought.The authors represented include both philosophers and working scientists. Some are well known contributors to philosophical discussion, while the work of others will be less familiar to North American journal audiences.

This volume represents an important contribution to Peirce’s work in mathematics and formal logic. An internationally recognized group of scholars explores and extends understandings of Peirce’s most advanced work. The stimulating depth and originality of Peirce’s thought and the continuing relevance of his ideas are brought out by this major book.

This volume represents an important contribution to Peirce’s work in mathematics and formal logic. An internationally recognized group of scholars explores and extends understandings of Peirce’s most advanced work. The stimulating depth and originality of Peirce’s thought and the continuing relevance of his ideas are brought out by this major book.

Hirsch here takes up the semantically ascended descendant of an old metaphysical problem. In its earlier guise the problem was whether the world falls neatly into parts, so that science need only find the "joints," and carve away. As science became more sophisticated, however, it became more difficult to sustain the question in the purely substantival sense. Whether that question can even be meaningfully asked, however, does not matter, for one way or the other we at least have a language (...) whose words divide the world in what seems to be an inherently rational manner. (shrink)

Several quantitative techniques for choosing among data models are available. Among these are techniques based on algorithmic information theory, minimum description length theory, and the Akaike information criterion. All these techniques are designed to identify a single model of a data set as being the closest to the truth. I argue, using examples, that many data sets in science show multiple patterns, providing evidence for multiple phenomena. For any such data set, there is more than one data model that must (...) be considered close to the truth. I conclude that, since the established techniques for choosing among data models are unequipped to handle these cases, they cannot be regarded as adequate. ‡I presented a previous version of this paper at the 20th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vancouver, November 2006. I am grateful to the audience for constructive discussion. I thank Leiden University students Marjolein Eysink Smeets and Lenneke Schrier for suggesting the cortisol example, and Remko van der Geest for comments on a draft. †To contact the author, please write to: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Leiden, P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)