This paper proposes a new perspective on the methodology of qualitative inquiry in ethics, especially the interaction between empirical work and theory development, and introduces standards to evaluate the quality of this inquiry and its findings. The kind of qualitative inquiry the authors are proposing brings to light what participants in practices of care and welfare do and refrain from doing, and what they undergo, in order to offer ‘stepping stones’, political-ethical insights that originate in the practice studied and enable (...) practitioners to deal with newly emerging moral issues. As the authors’ aim is to study real-life complexity of inevitably morally imprinted care processes, their empirical material typically consists of extensive and comprehensive descriptions of exemplary cases. For their research aim the number of cases is not decisive, as long as the rigorous analysis of the cases studied provides innovative theoretical insights into the practice studied. Another quality criterion of what they propose that should be called ‘N=N case studies’ is the approval the findings receive from the participants in the practice studied. (shrink)

Learning to work as a relational caring professional in healthcare and social welfare, is foremost a process of transformative learning, of Building, of professional subjectification. In this article we contribute to the design of such a process of formation by presenting a structured map of five domains of formational goals. It is mainly informed by many years of care-ethical research and training of professionals in healthcare and social work. The five formational domains are:Relational Caring Approach,Perception,Knowledge,Interpretation, andPractical Wisdom. The formation process, (...) described as the recurring detour of a continuing practice, requires ‘exposure’, in-depth learning and learning communities. Relational caring—care consequently resulting from and structured by relational thinking, exploring, and steering—requires ‘inquiry’ as a continuous learning process in practice. The process is ultimately aimed at fostering mature, competent, and practically wise professional caregivers who are able to relationally connect with and attune to care receivers, and adequately navigate existential, moral, and political-institutional tensions in relational caring in complex organizations in Late-Modern society. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic is a tragedy for those who have been hard hit worldwide. At the same time, it is also a test of concepts and practices of what good care is and requires, and how quality of care can be accounted for. In this paper, we present our Care-Ethical Model of Quality Enquiry and apply it to the case of residential care for older people in the Netherlands during the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead of thinking about care in healthcare and (...) social welfare as a set of separate care acts, we think about care as a complex practice of relational caring, crossed by other practices. Instead of thinking about professional caregivers as functionaries obeying external rules, we think about them as practically wise professionals. Instead of thinking about developing external quality criteria and systems, we think about cultivating reflective quality awareness. Instead of abstracting from societal forces that make care possible but also limit it, we acknowledge them and find ways to deal with them. Based on these critical insights, the CEMQUE model can be helpful to describe, interrogate, evaluate, and improve existing care practices. It has four entries: the care receiver considered from their humanness, the caregiver considered from their solicitude, the care facility considered from its habitability and the societal, institutional and scholarly context considered from the perspective of the good life, justice and decency. The crux is enabling all these different entries with all their different aspects to be taken into account. In Corona times this turns out to be more crucial than ever. (shrink)

Respect for personal autonomy and authenticity is a very important principle in late modern political and applied ethics. In the context of medicine and nursing, for example, a great deal of ethical research is devoted to this principle, both theoretical and empirical, raising many hotly debated questions, both conceptual – on the concepts of autonomy and authenticity – practical – on the application of the principle of respect for autonomy and authenticity – and methodological – on using empirical methods in (...) ethical research. In the present contribution I present two of the results of my doctoral research concerning personal autonomy and authenticity in the practice of personal pastoral care, using empirical methods.The first consists of a formulation of the goals of pastoral care as they were found in the cases analysed, the second of the different forms of personal autonomy and authenticity that were identified. Our primary aim is to argue for the importance of a) conducting empirical research into what is actually morally relevant and not just at the surface, and of b) assigning a privileged position in empirical ethical research to practices and the tacit knowing of advanced, reflective practitioners. (shrink)

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in (...) interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. (shrink)

In this chapter aimed at undergraduate philosophy students, I provide a brief and simple introduction to Kant's transcendental idealism and explain the argument of his First Antinomy.

This interdisciplinary work draws on research from psychology and behavioral economics to evaluate the plausibility of moral contract theory. In a compelling manner with implications for moral theory more broadly, the author's novel approach resolves a number of key contingencies in contractarianism and contractualism. Acting in accordance with principles that we could all agree to under certain conditions requires that agents are capable of taking up the perspectives of others. Research in social and developmental psychology shows just how challenging this (...) can be. The author discusses in detail what implications findings on perspective-taking have for contract theory. He concludes with cautious optimism that, despite our limitations, it lies within our power to become better at perspective-taking and to adopt a contractarian or contractualist mode of moral thinking. This does however require us to be much more attentive to the standpoints of others than we tend to be. Contract theorists also assume that agents can be moved to comply with principles that would be the object of agreement, with some arguing they can be so moved out of their own interest. The book show that, in contrast to the suspicion of many philosophers, this idea is largely supported by research on the dynamics of trust and our ability to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy others. Bringing a welcome dose of realism to the debate on contract theory, the author shows the value of assessing moral theories from an empirical perspective. (shrink)

According to the objection from positive duties, Kant's Formula of Universal Law is flawed because it cannot be used to derive any affirmative moral requirements. This paper offers a response to that objection and proposes a novel way to derive positive duties from Kant's formula. The Formula of Universal Law yields positive duties to adopt our own perfection and others’ happiness as ends because we could not rationally fail to will those ends as universal ends.

Deprivationism cannot accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death iff, and to the extent that, it is bad for us. Call this the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption. As such, either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does. I first argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false. I then attempt to figure out which facts our attitudes concerning death should track. I suggest that each person should have two distinct (...) attitudes toward death: one determined by agent’s reasonable expectations about when she will die and one determined by the amount of metaphysically possible good one reasonably believes death precludes. (shrink)

I defend the bold claim that self-described speciesists are not really speciesists. Of course, I do not deny that self-described speciesists would assent to generic speciesist claims (e.g. Humans matter more than animals). The conclusion I draw is more nuanced. My claim is that such generic speciesist beliefs are inconsistent with other, more deeply held, beliefs of self-described speciesists. Crucially, once these inconsistencies are made apparent, speciesists will reject the generic speciesist beliefs because they are absurd by the speciesists’ own (...) lights. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Originality of Descartes’s Conception of Analysis as DiscoveryBenoît TimmermansAccording to Descartes, his Meditations employ the method of analysis. This method of proof, says Descartes, “shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered methodically and as it were a priori.” 1 Such a definition of analysis poses a problem that seems to have attracted little attention among commentators until now, namely, why Descartes (...) considers analysis a method of discovery whereas the Scholastic tradition asserts just the contrary, that synthesis allows the discovery of new things, whereas analysis is a method for judging findings or verifying them a posteriori. What is more, the definition that Descartes gives of his analysis contains another divergence, this time brought up by the commentators, 2 for he curiously considers analysis an a priori movement and not an a posteriori movement as dictated by tradition.These issues are all the more important as the analytical method acquired particular prestige in the seventeenth century. This prestige concerned not only philosophy (Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, etc.) but science as well. Thus algebra lost some of its rough edges and gradually took on the name of “analysis.” 3 Descartes created a type of geometry that was soon dubbed “analytic,” and Leibniz developed his analysis infinitorum or differential and integral calculus. If the scientific revolution and the new philosophies that were associated with it attached so much importance to a method that had already been known in ancient Greece, was it not due to a change of the meaning of analysis or at least a rearranging of some of its functions? This is the question that we propose to [End Page 433] tackle while trying to determine to what extent Cartesian analysis breaks with the forms of analysis that preceded it. 4To do this we shall first examine the teachings of Scholastic philosophy concerning the connections between analysis and discovery in general and then study the logical possibilities of discovery through analysis that draw their inspiration from Aristotle’s Analytics and that were developed extensively by the School of Padua in the sixteenth century. Finally, we shall attempt to determine whether the mathematical definition of analysis derived from the works of Euclid and Pappus gives grounds for the correlation with discovery.The Link Between Analysis and Discovery According to the ScholasticsOne might well think that Descartes was completely unaware of the contradiction between his definition of analysis and the teachings of the Scholastics. Had not he always exhibited a true disdain for the latter? However, in September 1640, that is, four months before writing his text on analysis, Descartes began girding for the Jesuit Fathers’ objections to his Meditations. This involved looking for an “abstract of the whole of scholastic philosophy, this would save the time it would take to read their huge tomes.” 5 He finally found what he was looking for in the shops of Leiden, namely, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo’s Summa Philosophiae. There is reason to believe that Descartes read this opus with interest, for two months later he referred to it as “the best book of its kind ever made.” 6 Later he said that he would definitely have chosen the Summa Philosophiae as the basis for refuting the School’s doctrine if he had not given up such a project. 7 Now, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo’s Summa Philosophiae is categorical on the subject of analysis versus synthesis. Analysis of a definition “is perfectly compatible with the doctrines for teaching and learning; as for the other disciplines of discovery, the other method, that is the composite or synthetic method, must be used.” 8According to the Scholastic doctrine as stated by Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, analysis thus plays a part in the teaching of well-known things and in all processes of appraisal, assessment, or judgment. This is easy to explain if one considers that, etymologically, analysis breaks links (ana-luein), goes backward, or climbs back up from the consequences to the principles. Starting from an observation, proposition, or question, it wends its way back to the simplest, [End Page 434] surest items of knowledge that shed light on and verify said starting... (shrink)

In A Realist Theory of Science, Roy Bhaskar provides several transcendental arguments for critical realism – a position Bhaskar himself characterized as transcendental realism. Bhaskar provides an argument from perception and from the intelligibility of scientific experimentation, maintaining that transcendental realism is necessary for both. I argue that neither argument succeeds, and that transcendental idealism can better vindicate scientific practice than Bhaskar’s realism. Bhaskar’s arguments against the Kantian view fail, for they misrepresent the transcendental idealist position. I conclude that, if (...) they wish to retain their theoretical commitments, critical realists ought to be transcendental idealists. (shrink)

Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure. Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes and Seth, and why we think the two experiments end up with so different recommendations.

Kant famously claims that there is only a single supreme principle of morality: the Categorical Imperative. This claim is often treated with skepticism. After all, Kant proceeds to provide no fewer than six formulations of this purportedly single supreme principle—formulations which appear to differ significantly. But appearances can be deceptive. In this paper, I argue that Kant was right. There is only a single Categorical Imperative, and each of its formulations expresses the very same moral principle.

The rule of law offers legal certainty, laying down boundaries to the state's playing field. The precautionary approach stipulates that the absence of scientific certainty is no reason not to act to prevent harm. Here, uncertainty frames action. The precautionary approach potentially expands the state's playing field, and this expansion might well undermine the precepts of the rule of law. The certainty-uncertainty axis exposes a tension between the rule of law and the precautionary approach in what Ulrich Beck has termed (...) the world risk society in second modernity. It is this tension that is the focus of analysis in this article. (shrink)

I recently argued that critical realists ought to adopt transcendental idealism in favour of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. In response, Dustin McWherter presents two arguments against transcendental idealism: it is inferior to transcendental realism because it cannot account for the epistemic significance of experimentation, and it is internally inconsistent because it affirms the existence of things-in-themselves. This brief reply defends transcendental idealism against both objections.

According to the Phenomenal Unity Thesis (“PUT”) – most prominently defended by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers – necessarily, any set of phenomenal states of a subject at a time is phenomenally unified. The standard formulation of this thesis is unacceptably vague because it does not specify what it is to be a subject. In this paper, I first consider possible meanings for ‘subject’ as used in PUT and argue that every plausible candidate definition renders the thesis trivially true. I (...) consider and reject Tim Bayne’s proposal that ‘subject’ means ‘human being’. Then I argue, contra Bayne and Chalmers, that PUT is not incompatible with any major theory of consciousness, and contra Michael Tye, that split-brain patients do not provide evidence against PUT. I close by considering some nontrivial alternatives to PUT. (shrink)

While most people believe the best possible life they could lead would be an immortal one, so‐called “immortality curmudgeons” disagree. Following Bernard Williams, they argue that, at best, we have no prudential reason to live an immortal life, and at worst, an immortal life would necessarily be bad for creatures like us. In this article, we examine Bernard Williams' seminal argument against the desirability of immortality and the subsequent literature it spawned. We first reconstruct and motivate Williams' somewhat cryptic argument (...) in three parts. After that, we elucidate and motivate the three best (and most influential) counterarguments to Williams' seminal argument. Finally, we review, and critically examine, two further distinct arguments in favor of the anti‐immortality position. (shrink)

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale , through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings , through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering , in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of (...) the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine which scale best correlates with performance, and whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies. (shrink)

L’article rend compte d’un dispositif de la « clinique de la multiplicité » mis à la disposition notamment de familles dont la construction identitaire et le lien parent-enfant ont été mis à mal par un contexte de migration forcée. À travers l’exemple de la rencontre clinique d’une mère et de deux adolescents khmers dont l’histoire, marquée par le génocide de l’Angkar, a voulu effacer le noyau identitaire – constitué de tous les éléments de transmission qui font ce que l’on est (...) –, l’auteure montre qu’un « travail de migration » est nécessaire pour permettre à chacun, adolescents et parents, de passer d’un état d’être à un autre et de se reconnaître héritiers des différents mondes dont ils sont issus. La co-construction d’un récit fondateur permettra la restauration psychique en passant par la redéfinition symbolique de leur acte de naissance, sorte de mythe pourvoyeur de sens de leur existence. (shrink)

This brief essay responds to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bucklew v. Precythe. It contends that the argument relied upon by the Court in that decision, as well as in Glossip v. Gross, is either trivial or demonstrably invalid. Hence, this essay provides a nonmoral reason to oppose the Court’s recent capital punishment decisions. The Court’s position that petitioners seeking to challenge a method of execution must identify a readily available and feasible alternative execution protocol is untenable, and must (...) be revisited. (shrink)

In this historical contribution, we assess Duns Scotus’s analysis of atonement (Commentary on the Sentences bk. III). We also include a partial exploration of his analysis of penance (Sentences bk. IV), because certain topics which we tend to discuss within atonement-theory, for example the analysis of the virtue of punishment, pertained to the subject of penance for Scotus. In recent scholarship, Andrew Rosato has argued that Scotus adapted the Anselmian non-penal view of Christ’s substitutionary satisfaction to the penal understanding of (...) satisfaction operative in penance. In this contribution, however, we argue that Scotus’s understanding remained non-penal: his view of the atonement depends on meritorious supererogatory acts of love. Additionally, we harvest some valuable Scotistic insights for atonement-theory, some of them applicable to penal theories as well. (shrink)

A particularly important, pressing, philosophical question concerns whether Confederate monuments ought to be removed. More precisely, one may wonder whether a certain group, viz. the relevant government officials and members of the public who together can remove the Confederate monuments, are morally obligated to (of their own volition) remove them. Unfortunately, academic philosophers have largely ignored this question. This paper aims to help rectify this oversight by moral philosophers. In it, I argue that people have a moral obligation to remove (...) most, if not all, public Confederate monuments because of the unavoidable harm they inflict on undeserving persons. In the first section, I provide some relevant historical context. In the second section, I make my unique harm-based argument for the removal of Confederate monuments. In the third section, I consider and rebut five objections. (shrink)

Scotus’ theory of univocity is described: his exact definition of univocity and his view of transcendental concepts that are ‘simply simple’. These concepts are said to be univocally applied to God and creatures. Next, we describe Scotus’ views on univocity in ‘being’ and the precise meaning of the infinite and finite ‘mode’ of being. Finally, we apply these results to work of Heidegger and Marion. It appears that they had an insufficient grasp of the intricacies of Scotus’ theory of univocity (...) and that Marion’s religious phenomenology could have benefitted from these scotistic tools. (shrink)

With the aid of some Scotistic conceptual distinctions, I develop a way of meeting the apparent deterministic sway of neurobiology. I make a careful distinction between formal and material freedom. Formal freedom, the ability to will or not to will a certain state of affairs regardless of whether it can be effectuated, remains, even if our material freedom to effectuate it is hampered by neurobiological mechanisms. These conceptual findings are linked with contemporary empirical research on obsessive-compulsive disorder and the possibility (...) of volitional modulation of cerebral function. (shrink)

In this brief chapter aimed at undergraduates, I examine theories of punishment and provide an introduction to Kant's retributivism.

According to Kant, the supreme principle of morality is: “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). This principle has come to be known as the Formula of Universal Law (“FUL”). Few philosophers believe it succeeds. But, I argue, few philosophers have understood what FUL means. This dissertation offers a full defense of FUL. It is, in fact, the supreme principle of morality—and it can successfully (...) derive a viable theory of permissible action and virtuous willing. Kant was right. Chapter 1 considers FUL’s role in relation to Kant’s subsequent formulations of the Categorical Imperative and the broader architectonic of duty he sets up in the Metaphysics of Morals. I argue that Kant’s formulations are equivalent insofar as they are each expressions of the very same moral principle. And I suggest that FUL’s two tests correspond to Kant’s later distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue. Thus, FUL’s contradiction-in-conception test can be used to derive duties governing permissible action, and FUL’s contradiction-in-the-will test can be used to derive duties governing virtuous willing. This sets up the framework for the remainder of the dissertation. Chapters 2 and 3 together interpret and defend Kant’s account of permissible action. In Chapter 2, I argue that we should fundamentally reconceive of the nature and purpose of Kant’s permissibility criterion. Kant’s contemporary interpreters have adopted too psychologistic an account of the maxim. Kantian maxims have little to do with the motivating principles of actual agents. Relying on Kant’s historical context and his account of maxims in rational agency, I argue that FUL tests means-end principles which describe act-types. When its permissibility test is applied to such principles, it can viably derive general duties. Chapter 3 continues this positive account of Kant’s permissibility test and defends it from common objections. I argue that the contradiction-in-conception test rejects an act-type when it would be inconceivable for all rational agents to be directly governed by the type’s means-end imperative as a universal practical law. So understood, FUL condemns act-types because: (1) they are hypocritically self-serving, (2) they inflict agential harm on other agents, or (3) they inflict self-harm motivated by self-love. I defend FUL’s derivations against such act-types against common criticisms, such as that they are circular or overbroad. Turning to prominent objections against Kant’s account of permissible action, I then argue that FUL correctly rules out all and only impermissible actions. Moreover, its conclusions are both nuanced and normatively defensible. In Chapter 4, I turn to Kant’s virtue ethics. I begin by considering the demands of Kantian virtue. I argue that we should reject accounts on which duties of virtue are merely less restrictive duties governing permissible action. Instead, I argue, they represent genuinely virtue-ethical requirements to promote morally worthy ends, namely, the ends of our own perfection and others’ happiness. I show that all of Kant’s duties of virtue can ultimately be traced back to one of these required ends. Then, I argue that FUL’s contradiction-in-the-will test can successfully derive our positive obligation to set the ends of virtue. I conclude that FUL is successful not only as a standard of permissibility, but also as the supreme principle of virtue. (shrink)

_Youth in Education_ explores the multiple, interrelated social contexts that young people inhabit and navigate, and how educational institutions cope with increasing ethnic, cultural and ideological diversity. Schools, families and communities represent important settings in which young people must make successful transitions to adulthood, and the classroom often becomes a battleground in which these contexts and values interact. With contributions from the UK, Belgium, Germany and Canada, the chapters in this book explore rich examples from Europe and North America to (...) suggest strategies that can help to counter negative perceptions, processes of stigmatization and disengagement, instead prioritising peer support and cooperative learning to give pupils a renewed sense of worth. This book takes the growing ethno-cultural diversity in education systems to heart and studies the various related educational processes from a multidisciplinary and multi-method approach. It aims to offer more insight into underlying mechanisms that are often implicit, but can be important factors that positively or negatively influence educational trajectories and outcomes. It is essential reading for researchers, academics and postgraduate students in the fields of education, sociology, higher education, policy and politics, and social and cultural geography. (shrink)

Peter Singer argues that we’re obligated to donate our entire expendable income to aid organizations. One premiss of his argument is "If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so." Singer defends this by noting that commonsense morality requires us to save a child we find drowning in a shallow pond. I argue that Singer’s Drowning Child thought experiment doesn’t justify this premiss. I offer (...) my own Drowning Children thought experiment, which should reveal that commonsense morality entails that premiss two is actually false. (shrink)

Perhaps death’s badness is an illusion. Epicureans think so and argue that agents cannot be harmed by death when they’re alive nor when they’re dead. I argue that each version of Epicureanism faces a fatal dilemma: it is either committed to a demonstrably false view about the relationship between self-regarding reasons and well-being or it is involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism. I first provide principled reason to think that any viable view about the badness of death must (...) allow that agents have self-regarding reason to avoid death if doing so would increase their total well-being. I then show that Epicurean views which do not preserve this link are subject to reductio arguments and so should be rejected. After that, I show that the Epicurean views which accommodate this desideratum are involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism. (shrink)

According to actualism, an agent ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We argue that actualism makes a morally irrelevant distinction between certain counterfactuals, given that an agent sometimes has the same kind of control over their truth-value. We then offer a substantive revision to actualism that avoids this morally irrelevant distinction by focusing on a certain kind of control that is available (...) to an agent. Finally, we show how this revised view has two additional advantages over actualism. (shrink)

BackgroundThe introduction and wide application of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has triggered further evolution of routines in the practice of prenatal diagnosis. ‘Routinization’ of prenatal diagnosis however has been associated with hampered informed choice and eugenic attitudes or outcomes. It is viewed, at least in some countries, with great suspicion in both bioethics and public discourse. However, it is a heterogeneous phenomenon that needs to be scrutinized in the wider context of social practices of reproductive genetics. In different countries with (...) their different regulatory frameworks, different patterns of routines emerge that have different ethical implications.This paper discusses an ethics of routines informed by the perspectives of organizational sociology and psychology, where a routine is defined as a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent organizational actions that is carried out by multiple performers. We favour a process approach that debunks the view – which gives way to most of the concerns – that routines are always blindly performed. If this is so, routines are therefore not necessarily incompatible with responsible decision-making. Free and informed decision-making can, as we argue, be a key criterion for the ethical evaluation of testing routines. If free and informed decision-making by each pregnant woman is the objective, routines in prenatal testing may not be ethically problematic, but rather are defensible and helpful. We compare recent experiences of NIPT routines in the context of prenatal screening programmes in Germany, Israel and the Netherlands. Notable variation can be observed between these three countries (i) in the levels of routinization around NIPT, (ii) in the scope of routinization, and (iii) in public attitudes toward routinized prenatal testing.ConclusionAn ethics of routines in the field of prenatal diagnostics should incorporate and work with the necessary distinctions between levels and forms of routines, in order to develop sound criteria for their evaluation. (shrink)

The multifaceted work of the late Susan Leigh Star is explored through a selection of her writings and essays by friends and colleagues. Susan Leigh Star (1954–2010) was one of the most influential science studies scholars of the last several decades. In her work, Star highlighted the messy practices of discovering science, asking hard questions about the marginalizing as well as the liberating powers of science and technology. In the landmark work Sorting Things Out, Star and Geoffrey Bowker revealed the (...) social and ethical histories that are deeply embedded in classification systems. Star's most celebrated concept was the notion of boundary objects: representational forms—things or theories—that can be shared between different communities, with each holding its own understanding of the representation. Unfortunately, Leigh was unable to complete a work on the poetics of infrastructure that further developed the full range of her work. This volume collects articles by Star that set out some of her thinking on boundary objects, marginality, and infrastructure, together with essays by friends and colleagues from a range of disciplines—from philosophy of science to organization science—that testify to the wide-ranging influence of Star's work. Contributors Ellen Balka, Eevi E. Beck, Dick Boland, Geoffrey C. Bowker, Janet Ceja Alcalá, Adele E. Clarke, Les Gasser, James R. Griesemer, Gail Hornstein, John Leslie King, Cheris Kramarae, Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, Karen Ruhleder, Kjeld Schmidt, Brian Cantwell Smith, Susan Leigh Star, Anselm L. Strauss, Jane Summerton, Stefan Timmermans, Helen Verran, Nina Wakeford, Jutta Weber. (shrink)

The current challenges of implementing responsible innovation can in part be traced back to the assumptions behind the ways of thinking that ground the different pre-existing theories and approaches that are shared under the RI-umbrella. Achieving the ideals of RI, therefore not only requires a shift on an operational and systemic level but also at the paradigm-level. In order to develop a deeper understanding of this paradigm shift, this paper analyses the paradigm-level assumptions that are being brought forward by the (...) different conceptualizations of RI. To this purpose it deploys a pragmatic stance on paradigms that allows discerning ontological and axiological elements shared by the RI community and an accompanying critical hermeneutic research approach that enables the profiling of paradigmatic beliefs and assumptions of accounts of RI. The research surfaces the distance of four salient RI accounts from the currently dominant techno-economic innovation paradigm RI seeks to shift. With this, our contribution helps to raise the self-awareness of the RI community about their presuppositions and the paradigm level barriers and enablers to reaching the RI ideal. This insight is needed for a successful transition to responsible research and innovation practices. (shrink)