Donald F. Koch supplies the only extant complete transcription of the annual three-course sequence on ethics Dewey gave at the University of Chicago from 1894 to 1904. Koch argues that these lectures offer the best systematic, overall introduction to Dewey’s approach to moral philosophy and are the only account showing the unity of his views in nearly all phases of ethical inquiry. These lectures are the only work by Dewey to set forth a complete theory of moral (...) language. They offer a clear illustration of the central methodological questions in the development of a pragmatic instrumentalist ethic and the actual working out of the instrumentalist approach as distinct from simply presenting it as a conclusion. (shrink)

In _Lectures on Ethics, 1900–1901_,_ _Donald F. Koch supplies the only extant complete transcription of the annual three-course sequence on ethics John Dewey gave at the University of Chicago. In his introduction Koch argues that these lectures offer the best systematic, overall introduction to Dewey’s approach to moral philosophy and are the only account showing the unity of his views in nearly all phases of ethical inquiry. These lectures are the only work by Dewey to set forth a (...) complete theory of moral language. They offer a clear illustration of the central methodological questions in the development of a pragmatic instrumentalist ethic and the actual working out of the instrumentalist approach as distinct from simply presenting it as a conclusion. (shrink)

This paper contends that Heldke's recipe analogy can be reworked to help us deal with those who hold beliefs and practice activities that are contrary to our own. It draws upon the work of William James and John Dewey to develop a practical approach to such conflict situations.

In the lectures on the logic of ethics, he sets forth and defends the view that the "is" in a moral judgment such as "This is good" is a coordinating factor in an inquiry.

John Dewey delivered two sets of related lectures at the University of Chicago in the fall quarter 1895 and the spring quarter 1896. Designed for graduate students, the lectures show the birth of Dewey’s instrumentalist theory of inquiry in its application to ethical and political thinking. From 1891 through 1903, Dewey attempted to develop a revolutionary experimentalist approach to ethical inquiry designed to replace the more traditional ways of moral theorizing that relied on the fixed moral knowledge given in advance (...) of the situations in which they were applied. In the lectures on the logic of ethics, he sets forth and defends the view that the "is" in a moral judgment such as "This is good" is a coordinating factor in an inquiry. Although the subject matter of the lectures is highly technical, its significance is paramount. It provides the key to and opens the door for a theory that preserves the difference between strictly scientific inquiry and moral inquiry even while it provides a "scientific treatment" of the latter. The lectures on political ethics apply Dewey’s theory of inquiry to the logical problems created by three disciplines designated as politics, economics, and ethics, which appear to have separate and antagonistic subject matters. Politics is a quest for political power; economics is based on self-interest; ethical inquiry is about morality. These lectures carry on the experimental theory of inquiry developed in the previous lectures by explaining how the distinction between these subject matters can be developed without the antagonism. These lectures enable us to make much better sense of Dewey’s later works on moral and political topics. (shrink)

This paper contends that Heldke's recipe analogy can be reworked to help us deal with those who hold beliefs and practice activities that are contrary to our own. It draws upon the work of William James and John Dewey to develop a practical approach to such conflict situations.

Henry Sedgewick's The Methods of Ethics challenges comparison, as no other work in moral philosophy, with Aristotle's Ethics in the depth of its understanding of practical rationality, and in its architectural coherence it rivals the work of Kant. In this historical, rather than critical study, Professor Schneewind shows how Sidgewick's arguments and conclusions represent rational developments of the work of Sidgewick's predecessors, and brings out the nature and structure of the reasoning underlying his position.

How should pragmatists respond to and contribute to the resolution of one of America's greatest and most enduring problems? Given that the most important thinkers of the pragmatist movement—Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead—said little about the problem of race, how does their distinctly American way of thinking confront the hardship and brutality that characterizes the experience of many African Americans in this country? In 12 thoughtful and provocative essays, contemporary American pragmatists connect ideas with (...) action and theory with practice to come to terms with this seemingly intractable problem. Exploring themes such as racism and social change, the value of the concept of race, the role of education in ameliorating racism, and the place of democracy in dealing with the tragedy of race, the voices gathered in this volume consider how pragmatism can focus new attention on the problem of race. Contributors are Michael Eldridge, Eddie S. Glaude, Jr., Judith M. Green, D. Micah Hester, Donald F. Koch, Bill E. Lawson, David E. McClean, Gregory F. Pappas, Scott L. Pratt, Alfred E. Prettyman, John R. Shook, Paul C. Taylor, and Cornel West. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 489 right; and it will be of interest to students of modern aesthetics. But compared with Rudolf Makkreel's ground-breaking study, Dilthey, Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton, 1975), it is handicapped by an exasperating vagueness. This is mainly because Heinen does not go more deeply into Dilthey's profuse aesthetic writings from a historical perspective and on the basis of a commitment to an appropriate methodology. What we (...) get, instead, is a rather one-sided reflection on several important aspects of Dilthey's aesthetic writings. ROLF-DIETERHERRMANN University of Tennessee Young John Dewey: An Essay in American Intellectual History. By Nell Coughlan. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1975. Pp. xii + 187) The author's aim in this carefully researched volume is to examine the early development of Dewey's character, primarily as it is expressed in the changes in his philosophical development from the time he was a student at the University of Vermont until he left the University of Michigan to go to Chicago in 1894. The account is at its best in relating the common problems shared by Dewey, his teachers George Sylvester Morris and G. Stanley Hall and his younger colleague George Herbert Mead. All were conscientious men, concerned to develop an account of the world and of society that does not fall back on religion as a crutch, that could give some accounting of or even take advantage of new developments in empirical psychology yet still provide a role for the philosopher as a moral leader. Where in the America of the 1870s and 1880s could such a person turn? Aside from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, there was no place for the independent, secular philosopher in American colleges and universities. The safe clergyman was typically given employment; the free thinking agnostic was considered dangerous. Further, there was the problem of intellectual isolation. Coughlan brilliantly contrasts the tight knit intellectual community of Victorian England with the struggles of individual American thinkers, scattered around the United States, to find like-minded intellectual companionship. Morris tried to resolve these problems by embracing the idealism of T. H. Green and hoping for a full-time chair at Hopkins. Hall, who eventually got the chair, went into empirical psychology. His choice was safe and intellectually respectable but ignored moral matters. Mead and a young friend named Henry Castle went through a long struggle to develop a satisfactory world view. Castle never achieved success and died in a shipwreck at age 32. Mead's correspondence with Castle reveals that he endured a number of acute personal crises before becoming Dewey's colleague at Michigan and discovering the latter's newly developing "organic circuit" theory with all its implications for the development of social psychology. Dewey was the most successful of the lot. It would be easy to construe a scenario wherein the young Dewey became skeptical about Green's idealism and underwent an acute personal crisis at the prospect of a world no longer glued together by the universal mind. This apparently never happened. By his own account, Dewey's "drift" from idealism took fifteen years, 1and I suspect that this gradual disengagement served as an effective buffer against the shock of having to develop an experimental naturalism all of a sudden. At any rate, Coughlan gives the most thorough account available of the evolution of Dewey's thought during the Michigan years. Coughlan is on solid ground so long as he treats Dewey as a person who shared common intellectual problems with like-minded colleagues and teachers. But how can one reconstruct his personal life? The difficulties are real. Dewey's published writings of the period reveal little John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom, ed. Richard J. Bernstein (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 12. 490 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY of his personality. Indeed, one is moved to ask whether his personality was almost entirely submerged in his work. Colleagues, friends and students are no longer available to tell their story. There is little in the way of revealing personal correspondence that is available. Dewey was not inclined to reminisce.2 About all we have from him... (shrink)

We need guidance in interpreting and evaluating C. S. Peirce. The scope, complexity, and ongoing development of his extensive body of philosophical work call for the location of central themes and arguments. This collection of essays, originally published or written between 1966 and 1995, sets forth those themes that dominate Potter’s thought.

Engaging Eriugena, Eckhart and Cusanus contains two new essays and nine others published between 2005 and 2019. The essays explore Eriugena, Eckhart and Cusanus as bold thinkers deeply engaged with their times and culture. John Scottus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa are key figures in the medieval Christian Neoplatonic tradition. This book focuses on their engagement with practical, experiential issues and controversies. Eriugena revises Genesis' Adam and Eve narrative and makes sexual difference and overcoming it central to his (...) Periphyseon. Eckhart's Annunciation sermons urge his hearers to give birth to God's son within their lives, and he develops a distinctive approach to pain and suffering. His radical preaching on the Eucharist and mystical union was judged heretical, but was later taken up by Nicholas of Cusa. Coins and banking became key symbols in Cusanus' exploration of humanity as created in God's image, and he used mechanical clocks in reflecting on time and eternity. 'Engagement' also describes these thinkers' reception of their predecessors and how later readers appropriated their works. Eriugena struggled with the legacy of Augustine and the Greek Fathers. Eckhart's theology of suffering provoked varied responses from his students Henry Suso and Johannes Tauler, and the twentieth-century therapist Ursula Fleming. Cusanus provides the volume's lynchpin as two articles analyse his reading of Eriugena and Eckhart, and a third discusses how he deftly countered Johannes Wenck's accusations of heresy. The book will be of interest to students of Medieval Philosophy, Theology, Spirituality and their place within Cultural History. (shrink)

Emile Benvcniste may be used to introduce the topic. The French linguist begins an essay on “Euphemisms Ancient and Modern” with a paradox about the early Greek definitions of euphemism. “To speak words which augur well” is one meaning given, but another is “to maintain silence”. This initial contradiction is further compounded by yet a third expression, “to shout in triumph”. The dilemma is. however, easily dissolved. To speak words which augur well implies, for special occasions, an exhortation even to (...) shout triumphantly, “to assent by an, auspicious outcry”: it further implies, again depending on the circumstances, “to avoid words which augur ill”, hence, if necessary, to say nothing. As one definition explains “avoid all unlucky words during sacred rites: hence, as the surest mode of avoiding them, keep a religious silence” (original emphasis). Paradox terminates; we are merely dealing with “a euphemism for a euphemism” taking an expression of Benveniste out of context. (shrink)

Recognizing the growing interdependence of the European Union and the importance of codes of conduct in companies’ operations, this research examines the effect of a country’s culture on the implementation of a code of conduct in a European context. We examine whether the perceptions of an activity’s ethicality relates to elements found in company codes of conduct vary by country or according to Hofstede’s (1980, Culture’s Consequences (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA)) cultural constructs of: Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity/Femininity, Individualism, and Power (...) Distance. The 294 individuals, who participated in our study, were from 8 Western European countries. Their responses to our 13 scenarios indicate that differences in the perceptions of ethicality associate primarily with the participants’ country as opposed to their employer (i.e., accounting firm), employment level, or gender. The evidence also indicates that these country differences associate with Hofstede constructs of Individualism and Masculinity. (shrink)

Retractions have traditionally been reserved for correcting the scientific record and discouraging research misconduct. Nonetheless, the potential for actual societal harm resulting from accurately reported published scientific findings, so-called information hazards, has been the subject of several recent article retractions. As these instances increase, the extent of support for such decisions among the scientific community and lay public remains unclear. Undergraduates (Study 1) and federally funded researchers (Study 2) reported their support for retraction decisions described as due to misconduct, honest (...) errors, or potential information hazards. Participants supported retraction on the former two grounds more than the latter. Despite limited support, women remained more receptive to retractions based on information hazards. Activist tendencies additionally predicted undergraduate men’s receptivity. Receptivity toward retraction due to information hazards was unrelated to scientists’ engagement in activism, suggesting that formal scientific training affords researchers an ability to separate personal and professional values in scientific discourse. Findings could inform the development of educational materials that may aid less experienced scientists and the lay public in understanding retraction ethics. (shrink)

The current study sought to determine research scientists’ sensitivity to various justifications for engaging in behaviors typically considered to be questionable research practices by asking them to evaluate the appropriateness and ethical defensibility of each. Utilizing a within-subjects design, 107 National Institutes of Health principal investigators responded to an invitation to complete an online survey in which they read a series of research behaviors determined, in prior research, to either be ambiguous or unambiguous in their ethical defensibility. Additionally, each behavior (...) was paired with either an ostensibly sound or unsound reason for the behavior. Consistent with hypotheses, the results indicated that scientists perceived QRPs as more appropriate and defensible when paired with a justifiable motive relative to when paired with a clearly unethical motive, particularly for QRPs that are more ambiguous in their ethicality. In fact, ambiguous QRPs were perceived as categorically defensible when given a justifiable motive. This suggests scientists are sensitive to contextual factors related to QRPs’ appropriateness, which could inform how institutions develop appropriate training modules for research integrity. (shrink)

In these papers Duclow views the thought of Eriugena, Eckhart and Cusanus through the lens of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics. He highlights the interplay of creativity, symbolic expression and language, interpretation and silence as they comment on the mind's work in naming God. This work itself becomes mystical theology when negation opens into a silent awareness of God's presence, from which the Word once again 'speaks' within the mind. Comparative studies with Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius, Anselm and Hadewijch suggest the book's (...) wider implications for medieval philosophy and theology. (shrink)

‘Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.’—Hume, Treatise , I, iv, 7. Several years have elapsed since Professor Malcolm's astonishing revival of St Anselm's ontological argument . The first shock-wave of criticism has likewise passed, having been absorbed by now into the bound volumes of the periodical literature. This note is not intended to add much weight to the common conclusion of that impressive body of criticism, for, though interesting and important logical issues remain (...) to be discussed in connection with the ontological argument, there can be little doubt that it fails as a demonstration of God's existence. Nevertheless, there is one move made by Malcolm in his determined defence of Anselm which may have had unfortunate repercussions far beyond the reaches of philosophical theology. Perhaps a discussion of this one step in the argument will help to dispel some erroneous impressions. (shrink)

The knockdown argument, the logically impregnable position are rarities in philosophy. Indeed, there are some who might argue that no philosophical argument or position is immune from damaging criticism: what seems utterly convincing to one generation of philosophers is 1iable to be held up as a classic blunder by the next. Nevertheless, Hume's presentation of the problem of evil and his allied criticisms of a Christian-type theism have seemed conclusive to an impressive array of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers, and both (...) his efforts, consequently, might be regarded as likely exceptions to the principle of philosophical fallibility. But now, in a fairly recent article, Professor Nelson Pike has seen fit to challenge even these supposedly reliable cornerstones of our philosophical heritage. More recently still, Pike has included this article, unchanged, in an anthology which he has edited, and he has backed it up with an introductory note which reaffirms his challenge to Hume on evil. (shrink)