It has been said that all philosophy begins with a set of concerns and a set of intuitions. With this idea in mind, we ask: Would it be helpful to understand Mexican-American philosophy as a kind of philosophy that begins with the concerns and intuitions of the Mexican-American community? On this view, what distinguishes Mexican-American philosophy is the orientation from which the philosophical investigation proceeds. Such an orientation is shaped by the experiences and relationships that are characteristic of those who (...) identify as Mexican-American. We offer a list of concerns and intuitions that we suggest are widely held by the Mexican-American community. Focusing on questions surrounding linguistic assimilation in the U.S., we illustrate how beginning from these particular starting points might alter the way we think about philosophical issues. (shrink)

En el tercer milenio, en medio de una conciencia generalizada de crisis como resultado de los espectaculares cambios habidos en las dinámicas sociales, en las formas de relacionarse, en los perfiles de las ideologías y hasta en la disposición del hecho religioso, no es extraño que se asuma la vivencia de vacío abierto y lábil. Se han disociado las grandes "certezas" que han dirigido el desarrollo de la humanidad durante los últimos siglos -"la verdad os hará libres" se está transformando (...) en "la libertad os hará la verdad"-, se han disipado los límites y las referencias guía. Son las dinámicas emergentes, encriptadas y por lo general confusas las que vienen a ocupar ese vacío imponiendo sus propios códigos y reglas. Dinámicas que pueden generar desarrollo personal y scial, o, por el contrario, propiciar sufrimiento y vacío existencial. (shrink)

Although previous treatments of affective injustice have identified some particular types of affective injustice, the general concept of affective injustice remains unclear. This article proposes a novel articulation of this general concept, according to which affective injustice is defined as a state in which individuals or groups are deprived of “affective goods” which are owed to them. On this basis, I sketch an approach to the philosophical investigation of affective injustice that begins by establishing which affective goods are fundamental, and (...) then considers which subsidiary goods—such as freedoms, resources, opportunities, and forms of recognition—may be necessary for the provision of those fundamental affective goods. Drawing from and developing ideas in the extant literature, I argue that two such fundamental affective goods include subjective well-being and emotional aptness. I then show that by analyzing deprivations of the subsidiary goods that enable a person to pursue and attain subjective well-being and emotional aptness, it is possible to shed new light on the cases of affective injustice that have been described in the extant literature, while also identifying other kinds of cases that have not been theorized to the same extent. (shrink)

Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being in a (...) mood that illustrates the limitations of the colored lens metaphor and demonstrates the basic inadequacy of the perceptualist account of moods. I argue that when we are in a mood, it is common to experience a kind of "emotional disconnection" in which we perceive evaluative properties that would normally elicit strong emotional reactions from us, but nonetheless we find that, in our present mood, we remain emotionally numb to these perceptions. Such experiences of "seeing but not feeling" are difficult to understand from within the perceptualist paradigm. Building on the work of Martin Heidegger, I sketch an alternative, phenomenological analysis of moods that can better account for experiences of emotional disconnection. On this alternative account, being in a mood does not merely alter the content of our perceptions but, rather, alters the way we interpret the overall significance of what we perceive, relative to a certain situational context. (shrink)

What would it mean for an emotion to successfully “recognize” something about an object toward which it is directed? Although the notion of "emotional recognition" is central to Rick Furtak’s _Knowing Emotions_, the text does not provide an account of this concept that enables us to assess the extent to which a given emotional response is recognitive. This article draws from the text to articulate a novel account of emotional recognition. According to this account, emotional recognition can be assessed not (...) only in terms of the “accuracy” of an emotional construal in a strictly epistemological sense, but also in terms of the quasi-ethical ideal of responding emotionally to what we encounter in ways that are “specific,” “deep," and “balanced.". (shrink)

This essay discusses Jorge Portilla’s phenomenological analysis of values and freedom in his essay, “The Phenomenology of Relajo.” Portilla argues that genuine freedom requires seriousness and sincerity; it requires wholehearted participation in cultural practices that one finds truly valuable. To support his argument, Portilla examines the ways that values and freedom are undermined when cultural practices are disrupted and break down as a result of the antics of the so-called "relajiento," a kind of “class clown” figure in Mexican culture who (...) refuses to take anything seriously. Carlos Sánchez has criticized Portilla's rejection of the relajiento, suggesting that the relajiento’s disruptive behavior may be a liberatory act of defiance against the legacy of colonialism. I argue, however, that Portilla was right to see the relajiento’s behavior as counterproductive in the fight for liberation from oppression. (shrink)

Do moods have intentional objects? If so, what kinds of intentional objects might they have? Some theorists hold that moods are objectless affective states, not ‘about’ anything. Others argue that moods are directed toward a maximally general object like ‘the world’, and so they are about everything, in some sense. In this article, I advance a new theoretical account of the intentional object of moods. According to what I call the ‘present-situation view’, moods are directed toward, or about, the present (...) situation. In other words, a mood is essentially an interpretation of one’s current situational context. As such, our moods change over time in a way that tracks our changing sense of how things are going, here and now. This article aims to make the case that the present-situation view, so understood, offers unique theoretical resources to describe and explain how we experience moods and how they change over time, while also suggesting a helpful way to think about the functional role moods play in our broader cognitive architecture, and pointing toward promising directions for future research into the ways that moods can be experienced, managed, and shared. (shrink)

Hace ya varias décadas que Latinoamérica salió del colonialismo “centroeuropeo”, como lo llama Dussell; sin embargo, se mantiene una actitud de “colonialidad”, entendida como un proceso amplio de control hegemónico de imposición de conocimientos, prácticas y formas culturales en todos los campos de la vida social, al tiempo que se desprecian y desdeñan los valores autóctonos, los conocimientos ancestrales y populares que Boaventura de Sousa Santos denomina con la metáfora de “Las epistemologías del sur”; es decir, aquellas epistemologías de quienes (...) no han tenido voz ni voto en las decisiones trascendentales de la vida social, económica, política y cultural, como los desposeídos, los marginados de la sociedad, campesinos, indígenas, afrodescendientes, homosexuales, entre otros. Los responsables de esta actitud colonialista, no solamente han sido los gobiernos que, mediante convenios y tratados bilaterales y multilaterales con las potencias hegemónicas, financian proyectos de diversa índole e imponen sus criterios e intereses en los distintos campos de la economía, la política y la educación. Pero también la misma educación ha tenido su responsabilidad en este proceso. El conocimiento impartido en las universidades es hegemónico y colonizador, que llega de Europa y Norte América. Por esta razón, la ciencia y el conocimiento que se producen en estas regiones, debe construirse para su validez, con las epistemologías y las metodologías de estas potencias; mientras que los conocimientos culturales, populares y ancestrales, se consideran obstáculos epistemológicos que no pueden convivir e interactuar con la epistemología de la ciencia clásica. Es por esto que la Universidad también tiene que “decolonizar” sus saberes, para alcanzar un espacio transcultural que incluya todos aquellos conocimientos y cosmovisiones populares y tradicionales para que puedan ser tenidos como pares, en un diálogo de saberes dentro de los procesos de formación y aprendizaje. (shrink)

Some of the central questions that have been explored by Latin American and Latinx philosophers are questions of metaphilosophy. "Metaphilosophy" refers to philosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy itself. For example, we might ask: What is the purpose of doing philosophy? How does philosophy compare and contrast with other disciplines, such as science, theology, or literature? And what is the best way of categorizing the different kinds and traditions of philosophy? These are philosophical questions about philosophy as an activity (...) and as a discipline. In this chapter, we discuss some ways that Latin American and Latinx philosophers have addressed these and other metaphilosophical issues. Our focus will be on the following questions: What are the defining characteristics of Latin American philosophy and Latinx philosophy? Do they constitute distinctive traditions of philosophy, and if so, what is especially valuable about these traditions? (shrink)

​In the wake of the extremely divisive 2016 presidential election, many US Americans are feeling deeply unsettled by the sense that the basic norms that govern life in our society are in a state of flux. How might we best describe and analyze the experience of living in a society that is so divided, a society whose very normative structure seems to be disintegrating? What problematic behaviors might arise in this situation? And how might we continue to work for positive (...) social change without further disrupting the normative order of our society? In this paper, I explore some insights into these issues that can be found in the work of Mexican phenomenologist Jorge Portilla, whose fascinating essays on cultural politics are just beginning to be translated into English. Portilla lived at a time in which his society’s normative structure was also in a state of flux. He argues that this state of normative disintegration generates a widely shared sense of zozobra—a profound anxiety that is not a psychological state but a state of existence, and that tends to provoke a number of defensive reactions that may be familiar to us today. I argue that Portilla's analysis of zozobra is a valuable resource for navigating the contemporary world.​. (shrink)

The Disintegration of Community analyzes the social and cultural writings of Jorge Portilla (1919−1963) and demonstrates the continued relevance of his thought to contemporary debates on the politics of social and cultural identity, the nature of community, and the political role of affect and moods. Sánchez and Gallegos address questions as timely today as they were for Portilla: What drives the impulse toward political nationalism? What sustains the myths that organize our political lives? Under what conditions do communities disintegrate? (...) An appendix offers original English translations of three of Portilla's fascinating and hitherto untranslated essays, including Portilla's 1952 essay, "The Spiritual Crisis of the United States.". (shrink)

This chapter discusses some contributions that Mexican and Latinx phenomenologists have made to the critical phenomenology of home, i.e., the experience of “being at home in the world”—an experience that has always been both deeply cherished and bitterly contested. Tracing a line of thought that runs from the work of two Mexican phenomenologists in the 1940s and 1950s (Jorge Portilla and Emilio Uranga) to the work of two contemporary Latinx phenomenologists in the U.S. (Gloria Anzaldúa and Mariana Ortega), we find (...) a shared view that the Mexican and Latinx experience has been marked by zozobra, an anxious condition characterized by the inability to be at home in the world. However, these philosophers disagree about the source of this zozobra, and even whether zozobra is something that should overcome or embraced and celebrated. Reading these thinkers together, we learn that home is several things simultaneously: an essential foundation for human existence; an illusory ideal whose pursuit leads us to exclude vulnerable others and vulnerable parts of ourselves; and a site for the negotiation of the circumstances in which one finds oneself, in the tragic and beautiful hope of creating a life to call one’s own. (shrink)

Unpleasant emotions can be strongly “propulsive,” spurring us to make changes to our situation, perspective, values, and commitments. These changes are often positive, even crucial to our pursuit of the good life. But under what conditions are unpleasant emotions strongly propulsive? I argue that the source of affective propulsion should not be located in the mere unpleasantness of a given emotion, but, rather, in the emotional context in which the emotion arises. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s comparative analysis of “shallow” and (...) “deep” boredom, I claim that the propulsive quality of an emotion arises not from its intrinsic properties but from the ambivalence generated when two affective states simultaneously influence our sense-making activity in opposing ways. (shrink)

Las metáforas se usan en sociología para poder explicar el imaginario de un tema como el secreto. Son capaces de poner de manifiesto la clase de realidad a la que es asociada comúnmente. Así, si el secreto es considerado un objeto, puede ser compartido, si es un lugar, puede ser donde escondamos algo, por el contrario, si pensamos que el secreto es un ser vivo, puede crecer sin que podamos hacer nada al respecto. La lógica metafórica se impone a menudo (...) sobre el sentido original. En este artículo usamos el análisis sociometafórico propuesto por Emmánuel Lizcano a una serie de discursos provenientes de entrevistas y grupos de discusión. (shrink)

Abstract This paper reports the results obtained in an aid project designed to improve transport in the municipal area of Jocotán (Guatemala). The rural road network of an area occupied by indigenous people was analysed and a road chosen for repair using the labour-intensive method–something never done before in this area. The manpower required for the project was provided by the population that would benefit from the project; the involvement of outside contractors and businesses was avoided. All payment for labour (...) went into the pockets of the local people. The small earth movements made and the use of local materials guaranteed the project’s environmental sustainability, while the on-site training of the local community prepared its members for the continued maintenance of the road, thus investing the project with social sustainability. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-24 DOI 10.1007/s11948-011-9290-2 Authors Rodrigo Ares, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain José-María Fuentes, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Eutiquio Gallego, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Francisco Ayuga, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Ana-Isabel García, BIPREE Research Group, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Journal Science and Engineering Ethics Online ISSN 1471-5546 Print ISSN 1353-3452. (shrink)

En la España de los siglos XVI y XVII se desarrolla la Escolástica española. Un tiempo en el que las Universidades no contaban con programas oficiales de estudios y, por tanto, la enseñanza del Derecho era distinta en cada una de ellas. Asimismo, imperan dos corrientes doctrinales distintas: el humanismo jurídico y el mos italicus tardío. El estado de la ciencia jurídica de ese momento provoca que proliferen tratados didácticos para la enseñanza de Leyes. Uno de ellos, muy desatendido por (...) la historiografía jurídica, es Nueva Filosofía de la natvraleza del hombre, no conocida ni alcançada de los grandes filosofos antiguos, que analizamos en este trabajo en aras a contribuir con el estudio del Derecho de la Edad Moderna, pues su autor, Miguel Sabuco, se caracteriza por exponer el estado de la ciencia jurídica en ese momento y formular propuestas de mejora. (shrink)

In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to a popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.

This article examines some aspects of the natural philosophy of Juan Gallego de la Serna, royal physician to the Spanish kings Philip III and Philip IV. In his account of animal generation, Gallego criticizes widely accepted views: (1) the view that animal seeds are animated, and (2) the alternative view that animal seeds, even if not animated, possess active potencies sufficient for the development of animal souls. According to his view, animal seeds are purely material beings. This, of course, raises (...) the question of how living beings can arise from inanimate matter. Gallego is aware that two other thinkers who understood animal seeds as purely material beings, Duns Scotus and the Louvain-based physician Thomas Feyens, did not solve this problem. Gallego’s solution makes use of the notion of incomplete entities developed by the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez. While Suarez applies this notion to soul and body in order to explain why souls have a natural tendency towards organic bodies and organic bodies have a natural tendency towards souls, Gallego applies this notion to the natural tendency of animal seeds towards each other and towards further substances in their respective environment. In his view, this natural tendency of animal seeds to incorporate further substances explains that origin of material structures complex enough to constitute an animal soul. (shrink)

Latin American and Latinx philosophers have a long and rich history of deep engagement in public life through a variety of different projects and venues. This chapter offers a brief survey of the historical development and practice of philosophy in public life in Latin American and Latinx traditions. Because of their unique histories, it engages public philosophy in Mexico and Argentina separately. The chapter shows that a guiding thread in Argentinian public philosophy is a deep‐rooted concern about the threats created (...) by political and intellectual authoritarianism and strategies for pushing back against this oppression by developing emancipatory practices and democratic alternatives. This work runs through a long line of Argentinian philosophers from José Ingenieros and Alejandro Korn to María Lugones and Diana Maffía. Public philosophy is clearly a vibrant and ongoing enterprise in contemporary Mexico. Argentina also possesses a long and rich tradition of public philosophy. (shrink)

Filosofía y cultura novohispana -- Un tema de antropología filosófica : los indígenas americanos son seres humanos -- Humanismo novohispano -- Colofón : "Indio".

Though Indigenous women in Mexico have traditionally exhibited some of the highest levels of maternal mortality in the country—a fact that some authors have argued was an important reason to explain the EZLN uprising in 1994—there is some evidence that the rate of maternal mortality has fallen in Zapatista communities in the Chiapas Highlands in the last two decades, and that other health indicators have improved. In this article, we offer an account of the modest success that Zapatista communities have (...) achieved in improving their health levels. In particular, we argue that Zapatista women have implicitly used a form of feminist standpoint theory to diagnose the epistemic (and economic) injustice to which they have been traditionally subjected and to develop an epistemology of resistance that is manifested in actions such as becoming health promoters in their communities. We also argue that this epistemology of resistance is partially responsible for the improvement of health levels in their communities. Finally, on the basis of our discussion of the Zapatista case, we suggest that standpoint theory could play an important role in other healthcare settings involving oppressed minorities. (shrink)

Though it is held that some models in science have explanatory value, there is no conclusive agreement on what provides them with this value. One common view is that models have explanatory value vis-à-vis some target systems because they are developed using an abstraction process. Though I think this is correct, I believe it is not the whole picture. In this paper, I argue that, in addition to the well-known process of abstraction understood as an omission of features or information, (...) there is also a family of abstraction processes that involve aggregation of features or information and that these processes play an important role in endowing the models they are used to build with explanatory value. After offering a taxonomy of abstraction processes involving aggregation, I show by considering in detail several models drawn from different sciences that the abstraction processes involving aggregation that are used to build these models are responsible for their having explanatory value. (shrink)

Desde los inicios de la humanidad hasta finales de la Edad Media, la imagen del universo reflejaba una visión teológica, para girar en torno al hombre en el siglo XVI. Con la llegada de la revolución industrial, de la concepción cíclica del tiempo propugnada por el Humanismo se pasa a la idea moderna de progreso. Por último, se produce la evolución de la sociedad disciplinaria organizada en torno a la fábrica como lugar cerrado y en la que el individuo sabe (...) quien ostenta el poder, hasta la sociedad de control en la era tecnológica actual deslocalizada en empresas con individuos que tienen acceso a la información hasta cierto nivel. El hombre se sitúa en el panóptico y sabe que está siendo observado, convertido en una forma de entretenimiento voyeurístico y exhibicionista. La perversión del mundo informatizado en el que el optimismo ante la posibilidad de verlo todo, se contrapone al control de la información y a la vigilancia permanente. Esta deshumanización afecta también al terreno plástico, que pretende dar soluciones a través de un arte participativo con nuevos planteamientos, estéticas y soportes. Obras abiertas que deben ser ejecutadas, y no solo leídas. (shrink)

Studies have shown that a person can consciously believe that they value racial equality and desire not to perpetuate racial stigmas, but unwittingly exhibit racist attitudes and beliefs. In order to explain this discrepancy between conscious beliefs and behavior, scholars have turned their attention to unconscious racial prejudice. One approach that is gaining wide acceptance is the Implicit Bias Model, which appeals to distinct implicit and explicit cognitive processes, coupled with an account of the ways in which people unconsciously internalize (...) widespread stereotypes and stigmas. This article claims that although the Implicit Bias Model is in many respects useful, it leaves out a central aspect of unconscious racial prejudice: the underlying motivations and incentives for harboring racist attitudes and beliefs, which generate psychological resistances to knowing about or changing prejudices. A more complete account of unconscious racial prejudice can be developed by turning to theories of active ignorance, which contribute to what this article calls the Resistance Model. (shrink)