In The Political Philosophy of Fénelon, Ryan Hanley argues that Fénelon was a realist who aimed to elevate and educate self-love—rather than resist it—in order to avoid tyranny. This roundtable article examines two of Fenelon’s arguments for how self-love, well-directed, could circumvent a king’s absolutist and tyrannical inclinations: 1) the king’s need to be loved and to love in turn, and 2) the relationship between faith and politics / church and state. Contrasting Fénelon with Machiavelli, I question whether the ruler’s (...) “need-love” for his people leaves him susceptible to forms of domination or at least, as Machiavelli warned, renders them politically weak. Given Hanley’s interest to recover Fénelon for the present day, I conclude by arguing that the thinker’s insights about the limiting role of well-directed self-love are inescapably tied to his critiques of absolutism. The same need-love of the people, I argue, cannot similarly check executive power under democracy. Nonetheless, Fénelon’s perspective remains valuable, as does Hanley’s project of recovery, since democracies continue to reckon with particular problems raised by self-love. (shrink)

In his defenses of empire, Alexis de Tocqueville emphasized the need to achieve grandeur for France, and his writings on Algeria have shaped our understanding of his political career. In pursuing empire abroad as a remedy for weak politics at home, scholars maintain that Tocqueville abandoned the participatory politics of Democracy in America. This essay argues, however, that the focus on Tocqueville’s international turn has obscured his interest in the greatness of domestic party politics. It demonstrates that Tocqueville championed a (...) version of grandeur tied to the latent energies of the lower classes and distinct from the Bonapartism and aristocratic nostalgia that characterized his thoughts on empire. This version of grandeur was a political reclamation of disagreement and debate that supported great party opposition to counter the malaise of bourgeois rule. The essay concludes by comparing Tocqueville’s attitude toward foreign others, whose freedoms had to be sacrificed to the cause of French nationalism, with his description of the lower classes within his own nation, whose inclusion in the franchise could foster great politics. This comparison enables us to draw modest lessons for interpreting political grandeur in the present day. (shrink)

Parliament the Mirror of the Nation is a fascinating study of diversity. It maps Victorian Britain’s diverse and divergent responses to the challenge of achieving a representative Parliament. These...

Le ricerche di Gianna Gigliotti mostrano come Kant – filosofo dell’esperienza in tutte le sue forme, teorico della conoscenza e dell’etica come conoscenza – abbia potuto essere interlocutore di correnti fondamentali della filosofia del diciannovesimo e del ventesimo secolo, e come i suoi testi siano ancora oggi stimolo fecondo per la ricerca storiografica. Attraverso la ricerca sui più importanti temi del neokantismo e della fenomenologia, i concetti di a priori e di trascendentale risultano essere stati una sfida decisiva per (...) il pensiero di Cohen, Natorp, Rickert, Husserl, Cassirer. E gli studi sulla genesi e gli sviluppi del neokantismo e della fenomenologia rivelano quanto il confronto con le opere di Kant, lette col massimo rigore storico e filologico, sia stato vitale per il pensiero contemporaneo. *** Die Forschungen Gianna Gigliottis zeigen, wie Kant – der Philosoph der Erfahrung in all ihren Formen, der Theoretiker des Wissens und der Ethik als Wissen – der Wegbereiter grundlegender Strömungen der Philosophie des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts sein konnte und wie seine Texte noch heute einen fruchtbaren Anreiz für die historiographische Forschung bilden. In der Erforschung der wichtigsten Themen des Neokantismus und der Phänomenologie zeigt sich, dass die Konzepte des Apriori und des Transzendentalen entscheidende Herausforderungen für das Denken Cohens, Natorps, Rickerts, Husserls und Cassirers darstellten. Überdies verdeutlichen die Studien über die Entstehung und Entwicklung des Neokantismus und der Phänomenologie die entscheidende Bedeutung der Werke Kants für das zeitgenössische Denken, im Vergleich gelesen mit größter historischer und philologischer Sorgfalt. (shrink)

What function does the highest good serve in our thinking and doing? I propose a new interpretation that sees its importance as fulfilling a contemplative need to construct a worldview.

Was Menschen heute an Religion interessiert und vielleicht sogar fasziniert, hat immer weniger mit Religion als einem System von Glaubensinhalten zu tun, sondern eher mit deren asthetischen, emotionalen oder praktischen Qualitaten. Der Religionspadagoge Rudolf Englert erkundet, welche Rolle die auf die Reflexion von religiosen Inhalten und Uberzeugungen spezialisierte Theologie in diesem Prozess noch spielen kann.

Summary The genealogy of observation as a philosophical term goes back to the ancient Greek astronomical and medical traditions, and the revival of the concept in the Renaissance also happened in the astronomical and medical context. This essay focuses primarily on the medical genealogy of the concept of observation. In ancient Greek culture, an elaboration of the concept of observation (tērēsis) first emerged in the Hellenistic age with the medical sect of the Empirics, to be further developed by the ancient (...) Sceptics. Basically unknown in the Middle Ages, the Empirics’ conceptualisation of tērēsis trickled back into Western medicine in the fourteenth century, but its meaning seems to have been fully recovered by European scholars only in the 1560s, concomitantly with the first Latin translation of the works of Sextus Empiricus. As a category originally associated with medical Scepticism, observatio was a new entry in early modern philosophy. Although the term gained wide currency in general scholarly usage in the seventeenth century, its assimilation into standard philosophical language was very slow. In fact, observatio does not even appear as an entry in the philosophical dictionaries until the eighteenth century—with one significant exception, the medical lexica, which featured the lemma, reporting its ancient Empiric definition, as early as 1564. (shrink)

In the early decades of the 20th century, women's access to the historical discipline followed fundamentally two paths. For the first time, some (a small minority) entered the profession as academic historians; others worked outside or on the margins of academia, pursuing their research interests as independent scholars. What did being an independent scholar mean for these women? Was it always a form of externally imposed marginalization? My paper argues that this is not the case. First of all, being an (...) independent scholar did not necessarily mean marginality. Some of these women scholars exerted a deep influence on 20th century historiography, and their work is still influential today. Quite apart from posthumous fame, moreover, it should be noted that the lack of academic affiliation did not necessarily preclude for some of these women the possibility of recognition and influence during their lives. Secondly, we should be careful not to assume that being an independent scholar was invariably an externally imposed marginalization. Some of these women scholars can be defined as ‘obligatory amateurs,’ because they were frustrated in their attempt to pursue an academic career. But others, in contrast, deliberately chose independent scholarship over an academic job, and can thus be defined ‘amateurs by choice.’ What was the motivation behind this choice? I argue that an important factor was the resilience of the amateur tradition in historical writing. The amateur tradition offered a strong counterbalance to women's marginality in academia and a source of positive values and models for their participation in the intellectual life. (shrink)

Kant’s accounts of the Highest Good and the moral argument for God and immortality are central features of his philosophy. But both involve lingering puzzles. In this entry, we first explore what the Highest Good is for Kant and the role it plays in a complete account of ethical life. We then focus on whether the Highest Good involves individuals only, or whether it also connects with Kant’s doctrines about the moral progress of the species. In conclusion, we look into (...) three ways of articulating the moral argument for God and immorality that take our commitment to the Highest Good as their point of departure. (shrink)

Kant and Fichte developed the concept of a worldview as a way of reflecting on experience as a whole. But what does it mean to form a worldview? And what role did it play in the German Idealist tradition? This paper seeks to answer these questions through a detailed analysis of the form of a philosophical worldview and its historical portent, both of which remain unexplored in the literature. The dearth of attention is partially to blame on Kant’s desultory development (...) of it, as well as its place in Fichte’s understudied lectures on religion. In this paper, I first reconstruct Kant’s conception as the starting point and then trace it to Fichte who went on to evolve it further. Fichte endorses the basic conceptual shape pioneered by Kant, namely, a reflective process of positing an idea and then checking the coherence of necessary judgments relative to it. However, Fichte came to realize that its philosophical function needed expanding. Beyond recognizing the possibility for alternative worldviews, Fichte further fleshed out how worldview creation could lead to human flourishing. The common feature between both thinkers is that the formation of a worldview aims to turn philosophy into a life-orienting exercise. (shrink)

Kant’s claim that we must postulate the immortality of the soul is polarizing. While much attention has been paid to two standard arguments in its defense (one moral-psychological, the other rational), I contend that a favorite argument of Kant’s from the apogee of his critical period, namely, the teleological argument, deserves renewed attention. This paper reconstructs it and exhibits what makes it unique (though not necessarily superior) in relation to the other arguments. In particular, its form (as third-personal or descriptive, (...) beginning from observations) and related force of assent (as a subjectively universal reflective judgment) set it apart from the other arguments. My goal is to establish that any engagement with Kant’s immortality postulate must include equal consideration of the teleological argument in order to be complete. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to investigate whether choosing the appropriate referring expression requires taking into account the hearer’s perspective, as is predicted under some versions of bidirectional Optimality Theory but is unexpected under other versions. We did this by comparing the results of 25 young and 25 elderly adults on an elicitation task based on eight different picture stories, and a comprehension task based on eight similar written stories. With respect to the elicitation task, we found that elderly (...) adults produce pronouns significantly more often than young adults when referring to the old topic in the presence of a new topic. With respect to the comprehension task, no significant differences were found between elderly and young adults. These results support the hypothesis that speakers optimize bidirectionally and take into account hearers when selecting a referring expression. If the use of a pronoun will lead to an unintended interpretation by the hearer, the speaker will use an unambiguous definite noun phrase instead. Because elderly adults are more limited in their processing capacities, as is indicated by their smaller working memory capacity, as speakers they will not always be able to reason about the hearer’s choices. As a result, they frequently produce non-recoverable pronouns. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states that ideas give us the rule for organizing experience and ideals serve as archetypes or standards against which one can measure copies. Further, he states that ideas and ideals can be practical. Understanding how precisely these concepts should function presents a challenging and understudied philosophical puzzle. I offer a reconstruction of how ideas and ideals might be practical in order to uphold, to my mind, a conceptually worthy distinction. A practical idea, I (...) argue, is best understood as a reference to the categorical imperative (and its various formulations), which guides conduct directly as a rule. A practical ideal, by contrast, I think is a substrate that serves two functions: one that (a) helps us gauge moral deficiencies and another that (b) reveals the potential for moral improvement. In response to well-grounded sceptical concerns, I argue that ideals are indirectly practical in that they ground the possibility to recognise moral states of affairs and be moral in the first place. (shrink)

Objective: To identify the frequency and nature of care conflict dilemmas that United States long-term care providers encounter, response strategies, and use of ethics resources to assist with dispute resolution. Design: An online cross-sectional survey was distributed to the Society for Post-Acute and Long-Term Care Medicine (AMDA). Results: Two-thirds of participants, primarily medical directors, have rejected surrogate instructions and 71% have managed family conflict. Conflict over treatment decisions and issues interpreting advance directives were frequently reported. Half of facilities lack a (...) formal dispute mediation policy. Only five respondents have called an ethics consult for assistance. Conclusion: Ethically tense care conflicts commonly arise in long-term and post-acute care facilities. Few facility procedures incorporate ethics resources into actual practice. Recommendations are made to create actionable policy, increase access to ethics services, and support staff skill development in order to improve the end-of-life care experiences for patients, families, and care facility staff. (shrink)

Partendo dall’idea che il vero punto di partenza della Critica del Giudizio non sia la questione del giudizio di gusto, o della bellezza, ma la questione delle facoltà dell’anima e del loro sistema, l’autrice ha cercato di stabilire un legame tra la fisionomia del giudizio di gusto e la fisionomia ulteriore e più nuova che sensibilità, intelletto e ragione acquisiscono nella Critica del Giudizio in rapporto alle due Critiche precedenti. Il sentimento del piacere e dispiacere deve essere interpretato come una (...) ulteriore funzione del giudicare, una ulteriore presupposizione trascendentale dell’esperienza, che prepara sia il lavoro dell’intelletto che conosce scientificamente, sia il lavoro della ragione che giudica eticamente. Questa condizione ulteriore, così peculiarmente soggettiva, comporta una nozione di soggettività tale da suggerire un sistema delle facoltà quale incrocio del piano costitutivo e di quello riflettente/riflessivo delle condizioni dell’esperienza. (shrink)

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with "bündiges" thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in (...) the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of "bündig," which is from the carpentry trade and has been forgotten, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs. (shrink)

L’interpretazione che Natorp ha dato della filosofia di Platone è prevalentemente considerata una paradossale forzatura entro la cornice del pensiero kantiano. Senza sfumare l’importanza del quadro di riferimento cui Natorp si attiene, e della versione continuistica della storia della ragione che lo caratterizza, il saggio intende tuttavia suggerire che alla fisionomia di questo quadro abbia contribuito, invece, proprio la diretta lettura dei testi platonici da parte di un Natorp che orgogliosamente si definisce un «filologo della scuola di Bonn». In particolare, (...) esaminando l’interpretazione del Teeteto, si mettono in luce sfumature significative della questione cruciale nel neokantismo marburghese circa il ruolo della sensibilità nella struttura della conoscenza. (shrink)

Kant uses ‘wish’ as a technical term to denote a strange species of desire. It is an instance in which someone wills an object that she simultaneously knows she cannot bring about. Or in more Kantian garb: it is an instance of the faculty of desire’s (or will’s) failing insofar as a desire (representation) cannot be the cause of the realization of its corresponding object in reality. As a result, Kant originally maintained it to be antithetical to morality, which deals (...) with ‘ought implies can’. However, Kant’s notion of wish is not static. On the contrary, I argue in this article that Kant re-evaluated the capacity to wish as (to some extent) causally efficacious and, further, of moral relevance. This re-evaluation has not been discussed in the literature, yet has been lurking in plain sight in a subtle but decisive shift evident in two versions of a footnote from the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (KU). (shrink)

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel states unequivocally that the category of “life” is a strictly logical, or pure, form of thinking. His treatment of actual life – i.e., that which empirically constitutes nature – arises first in his *Philosophy of Nature* when the logic is applied under the conditions of space and time. Nevertheless, many commentators find Hegel’s development of this category as a purely logical one especially difficult to accept. Indeed, they find this development only comprehensible as long (...) as one simultaneously assumes that Hegel breaks his promise to let the logic do the leading. However, if Hegel were to in fact allow the logical development to be led by biological analogies at this point, problems would ensue. Not only would it contradict his own speculative method, which should secure the necessity of the categories, but it would also endanger the ontological generality of the category of life itself. Beyond undermining his method and the logical integrity of the category, however, I will argue that such a reading makes the transition to the next category of “cognition” unintelligible and problematic. My aim in the first part of this paper is to argue how logical life can be read as a pure category. I then argue in the second part how my reconstruction makes the transition to cognition intelligible without resorting to profane or supernatural interpretations. (shrink)

The recent financial crisis has triggered an intense debate about the role of banks in society, presumably changing the criteria used in the evaluation of organizations. Against this backdrop, we investigate the changing role of banks’ organizational features in shaping different dimensions of banks’ organizational reputation. Using the media as an important evaluator, we measure the reputational dimension of visibility based on the frequency of newspaper articles and the reputational dimension of favorability based on the sentiment of newspaper articles. Drawing (...) on social judgment research for developing our hypotheses, we expect that organizational features such as financial performance and familiarity become more important determinants of organizational reputation in times of crisis. Our results support this expectation, suggesting stronger effects of these organizational features on the visibility and favorability of banks during a crisis. These findings provide novel empirical evidence on how the importance of drivers of organizational reputation changes in times of crisis and highlight areas for managerial attention. (shrink)