In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evolution and Creation—A Response to Michael Chaberek's Critique of Theistic EvolutionMariusz Tabaczek O.P.Translated by Monika Metlerska-ColerickIntroductionMichael Chaberek's critique of my "Afterword" to the Polish edition of Thomistic Evolution: A Catholic Approach to Understanding Evolution in the Light of Faith is essentially focused on three points. First of all, Chaberek questions my thesis supporting the compatibility of evolutionary theory with the Christian faith in creation. Secondly he discounts the (...) possibility of reconciling evolution with the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical tradition. Finally he provides arguments undermining the theory of evolution as the best scientific explanation for the diversity of species observable in the world.1 Because I do not undertake an analysis [End Page 255] of strictly biological problems in the "Afterword," in the present response I will concentrate on the first two points only.2 I trust that engaging in a discussion with Chaberek's views in this respect provides an opportunity to broaden and clarify my position regarding the issue which is the subject of our dispute. To begin with, I would like to stress that, in exploring the topic from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of philosophy and theology, I am moving in the sphere of possible interpretations and new approaches. Therefore, I do not treat the aforementioned tradition in an inflexible and dogmatic manner.3 [End Page 256]The Definition of CreationI should start my response to Chaberek's critique by invoking the definition of creation as elaborated by Aquinas. After all, it seems that the disagreement referred to in the present article focuses, to a large extent, on the comprehension of the divine act of creation. My views on this matter are not, in my estimation, a significant alteration of the teaching of St. Thomas. Rather, they are an attempt at drawing conclusions from some of his intuitions regarding creation, which appear in various sections of the body of his work.4According to St. Thomas, the word "creation" (creatio) has two crucial and inextricably linked meanings: (I) creation in an active sense (divine action) and (II) creation in a passive sense (receiving divine action). Within the scope of the first meaning, St. Thomas distinguishes between: (Ia) the primary act of creation, defined as bringing the entirety of being into existence out of nothing (ex nihilo), without any prior existing matter, and (Ib) maintaining contingent beings in their existence and essence. The consequence of (Ia) and (Ib) is contingent beings' full dependence on God regarding what they are and the fact that they are (exist), which determines the essence of creation in the passive sense (II).Regarding (Ia), St. Thomas—in a neo-Platonic vein, in support of the claim that nothingness cannot be the object of God's action in the act of creation—states that "we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation" (ST I, q 45, a. 1, corp.). It is worth adding here that, according to St. Thomas, the matter, which is the result of the act of creation, is not indefinite, as is assumed by Chaberek when he refers to creation as the bringing out of nothing "of a certain primordial matter of an indefinite form."5 On the contrary, Aquinas states explicitly that "primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under [End Page 257] distinct forms" (ST I, q. 66, a. 1, corp., ad 2), enumerating, at this point, the forms of the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire.In reference to (Ib), St. Thomas defines the divine act of maintaining contingent beings in existence and essence (in the fact that they are, as well as in what they are) as conservatio rerum. What is more, even though he emphasizes that "the preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence" (ST I, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4), Aquinas does not employ the currently popular concept of continual creation (creatio continua). It seems that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Afterword to the Polish Edition of Thomistic EvolutionA Catholic Approach to Understanding Evolution in the Light of Faith by Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, O.P., James Brent, O.P., Thomas Davenport, O.P., and John Baptist Ku, O.P.*Mariusz Tabaczek O.P.Translated by Monika Metlerska-Colerick[End Page 225]Thomistic Evolution: A Catholic Approach to Understanding Evolution in the Light of Faith, by Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, O.P., James Brent, O.P., Thomas Davenport, O.P., and (...) John Baptist Ku, O.P., is an intriguing attempt at a comprehensive approach to the question of theistic evolutionism from the perspective of Thomistic tradition. The breadth of the approach offered by the authors, starting with the problem of the relationship between reason and faith and subsequently reaching to the foundations of the philosophy of nature, natural theology, and theology of creation, as well as biblical exegesis, provides an appropriate introduction and background for the analysis of a thesis suggesting that it is possible for God to create new species of living organisms (including the Homo sapiens sapiens species) through the processes of evolution. The comprehensible manner in which the discussed questions are presented renders the book accessible to a wide audience.Although one should agree with the main thesis formulated by the authors of Thomistic Evolution regarding the possibility of God expressing his creative power through the emergence of new species of living beings by way of evolution, it also has to be noticed that the arguments they present do not always take fully into consideration certain significant difficulties that arise along the way and the resulting necessity to broaden and adjust the ideas of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition to present-day standards in order for it to engage in a dialogue with contemporary science. In the absence of such broadening and adjusting, one might arrive at an overly simplified view of things in which St. Thomas himself would easily come to agree with the main assumptions of theistic evolutionism. Our aim, thus, is to reveal a more profound level of the complexity of the debate regarding the Thomistic view of creation and evolution.St. Thomas and EvolutionismOn the one hand, Brent's intuition seems justified that the Thomistic definition of creation as being dependent on God in existence (depicted in chapter 7) is compatible with both the image of the world in which various kinds of species are immutable and the image of the world in which they are subject to change. On the other hand, we cannot forget that St. Thomas himself perceived forms of species as permanently fixed in the moment of the first member of a given species coming into existence and—consequently—not being subject to any future alterations. Hence, reproduction, according to Aquinas, serves as a continuation of species without the introduction of any significant variations: "Nature produces like from like. Now the thing generated is like its generator in [End Page 226] species and form. Therefore the form is produced by the action of the generator and not by creation" (De pot., q. 3, a. 8, sc 4).This quotation from Questiones disputatae de potentia points us towards the theological question of creation. Here, we must emphasize that, according to St. Thomas, at its origin, the world was perfect as to the number of created species. Hence, "something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species" (ST I, q. 118, a. 3, ad 2).1 It is true that Aquinas allowed for the arising of new animal species through putrefaction caused by the power of the sun, as well as through the crossbreeding of already existing species (see ST I, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3, a portion of which is quoted by Austriaco in chapter 24). However, the emergence of new forms of animal organisms in this way by no means implies or anticipates the theory of their descent from a common ancestor by way of evolutionary transformation. Nor is it a manifestation or expression of the most basic rules governing nature, but rather an exception and a departure from their regularity... (shrink)

Contrary to the commonly assumed opinion that Christianity sees pain as intrinsically evil – where evil is defined as the lack of something good – Aquinas defines pain not as a privation but rather a passion of the soul, i.e., an emotion that depends on sensual and/or intellective cognition of something evil, is good in itself, and may serve a purpose. This article offers a formalized version of the Thomistic definition of pain and related negative (unpleasant) emotions experienced by humans. (...) It also compares and contrasts this view with some contemporary scientific and philosophical models of pain. (shrink)

As a middle path between classical theism and pantheism, the panentheistic turn in the twentieth century has been described as a "quiet revolution." Today, in fact, many theologians hold that the world is "in" God (who, at the same time, is more than the world). Panentheism has been especially influential in the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences. Many have seen panentheism as compatible with emergentism, and thus have brought the two together in developing models of divine action that (...) do not abrogate the regularities of processes of the natural world. In Divine Action and Emergence, Mariusz Tabaczek argues that, as inspiring and intriguing as emergentist panentheism is, it requires deeper examination. He begins by looking at the wonder of emergence (which calls into question the overly reductionist attitude in natural science) and by reflecting philosophically on emergence theory in light of classical and new Aristotelianism. Moving in a theological direction, Tabaczek then offers a critical evaluation of emergentist panentheism and a constructive proposal for how to reinterpret the idea of divine action as inspired by the theory of emergence with reference to the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of God's action in the universe. Through a unique interdisciplinary approach that puts theology and the natural sciences into a dialogue through philosophy, Divine Action and Emergence offers a comprehensive evaluation of panentheism. It then puts forward an original reinterpretation of emergence theory, thus setting forth a constructive proposal for reinterpreting the concept of divine action that is currently espoused by emergence theory. It will appeal to scholars of theology and philosophy, those who work in the area of theology and science, those interested in emergence theory or panentheism, and finally those who are interested in the dialogue between the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition and contemporary philosophy and theology. (shrink)

A considerable group of contemporary philosophers and theologians—including those engaged in the science-theology dialogue, such as Barbour, Clayton, Davies, and Peacocke—supports panentheism, i.e., a theistic position which assumes that the world is in God, who is yet greater than everything he created. They see it as a balanced middle ground between the positions of classical theism and pantheism. In this article, I offer a presentation and a critical evaluation of the most fundamental principles of panentheism from the point of view (...) of classical theism. First, I list six main species of panentheism and the motivations of those who support it. In the second part, I analyze the three main difficulties concerning its ontological and theological principles, i.e., (1) the meaning of the preposition ‘in’ (_en_) in ‘pan_en_theism’; (2) the accuracy of panentheistic definition of divine immanence, and (3) the question of whether panentheism is successful in protecting God’s transcendence. I conclude that panentheism fails as a Christian theistic position. Nevertheless, it might still be valuable and play an important role in addressing the cognitive drama of the modern human beings, often seduced by secular (scientific) or spiritual naturalism, or pantheism. (shrink)

The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it (...) difficult to prove that higher-order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality. (shrink)

One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful to the rules of physicalism and physical causal closure, while defending the novelty and distinctiveness of emergents from their basal constituents, makes the argumentation of many proponents of emergentism lacking in coherency and precision. In this article I aim at answering the suggestion of (...) several thinkers to redefine emergence and downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation. In addition, I further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas’ understanding of divine action in terms of the same fourfold division of causes—bringing thus natural science, philosophy, and theology into creative and fruitful dialogue. (shrink)

The anti-reductionist character of the recent philosophy of biology and the dynamic development of the science of emergent properties prove that the time is ripe to reintroduce the thought of Aristotle, the first advocate of a “top-down” approach in life-sciences, back into the science/philosophy debate. His philosophy of nature provides profound insights particularly in the context of the contemporary science of evolution, which is still struggling with the questions of form, teleology, and the role of chance in evolutionary processes. However, (...) although Aristotle is referenced in the evolutionary debate, a thorough analysis of his theory of hylomorphism and the classical principle of causality which he proposes is still needed in this exchange. Such is the main concern of the first part of the present article which shows Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance as an open system, ready to incorporate new hypothesis of modern and contemporary science. The second part begins with the historical exploration of the trajectory from Darwin to Darwinism regarded as a metaphysical position. This exploration leads to an inquiry into the central topics of the present debate in the philosophy of evolutionary biology. It shows that Aristotle’s understanding of species, teleology, and chance – in the context of his fourfold notion of causality – has a considerable explanatory power which may enhance our understanding of the nature of evolutionary processes. This fact may inspire, in turn, a retrieval of the classical theology of divine action, based on Aristotelian metaphysics, in the science/theology dialogue. The aim of the present article is to prepare a philosophical ground for such project. (shrink)

Can Contemporary Science Inspire Philosophical and Theological Reflection on Causality? The cooperation between natural science, philosophy, and theology in an analysis of the causal structure and co-dependency of entities in the universe seems to be both legitimate and expected. It turns out, however, that in practice it oftentimes raises some tensions, questions and difficulties, leading to the development of alternative and in a sense competitive models of causality and of God’s action in the world. What is more, the attitude of (...) natural sciences since modernity, concentrated on gaining knowledge about natural phenomena to predict and control them, without trying to determine the nature of their ultimate causes, Humean criticism and rejection of the concept of causality as such, and concentration of analytic philosophers on the description of what accompanies phenomena classified as causal, leaving aside the question of the metaphysical status of causes and effects – they all seem to make impossible an interaction and mutual reference of contemporary science, philosophy, and theology in their reflection on the topic of causation. The main goal of this article is to defend the thesis about the possible and actual influence of scientific analysis of cause and effect relationships on the philosophical and theological reflection on causation, not only in the Middle Ages and Modernity, but also in contemporary thought. The presentation of the latest positions in the debate on divine action in the natural world will be followed by an argument in favor of the relevance of the model developed by philosophers and theologians representing the Thomistic school. (shrink)

Augustine’s use of the concept of rationes seminales in his interpretation of Genesis 1 and 2 enabled him to assert that although God created everything instantaneously, in the initial state of the universe all species were present in the potency of the primordial matter, to be actualized at the consecutive stages of the history of its transformations and development. Despite its interpretation as evolutionary in the writings of Mivart, Zahm, and Dorlodot, Augustine’s model did not, in fact, assume a gradual (...) transformation of one species into another – which became the main objection from the point of view of the advocates of Darwin’s theory of evolution. Moreover, the possibility (if not necessity) of direct divine interventions in the unfolding of rationes seminales made Augustine’s notion of creation even more inadequate in its encounter with modern biology and the philosophical reflection it inspires. This article critically analyzes Aquinas’s use of Augustine’s concept of rationes seminales and develops a constructive proposal of the Thomistic metaphysics of evolutionary transformism – based on Aquinas’s embracement of Aristotle’s moderate realism about universals, including species, grounded in hylomorphic metaphysics of substance. (shrink)

Many enthusiasts of theistic evolution willingly accept Aquinas’s distinction between primary and secondary causes, to describe theologically “the mechanics” of evolutionary transformism. However, their description of the character of secondary causes in relation to God’s creative action oftentimes lacks precision. To some extent, the situation within the Thomistic camp is similar when it comes to specifying the exact nature of secondary and instrumental causes at work in evolution. Is it right to ascribe all causation in evolution to creatures—acting as secondary (...) and instrumental causes? Is there any space for a more direct divine action in evolutionary transitions? This article offers a new model of explaining the complexity of the causal nexus in the origin of new biological species, including the human species, analyzed in reference to both the immanent and transcendent orders of causation. (shrink)

Hylomorphism and related to it classical concept of the human soul—understood as a substantial form of the human being—are traditionally supported and commented on by the followers of the Aristotelian-Thomistic thought, both in its classical and contemporary approach. At the same time, hylomorphism has recently found a new group of followers, coming from the circles of analytic metaphysics, unrelated to the classical school of thought. This article strives to answer the question of the relation of the new, analytic versions of (...) hylomorphism to its classical definition. Moreover, it also analyzes their application in the debate concerning the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind, as well as the question of their reference to the concept of the human soul. It seems that the mereological and structural reinterpretation of the material and the formal causes departs considerably from the classical definition of hylomorphism. Moreover, the suggestion of William Jaworski – who argues in favor of the new hylomorphism in the mind-body debate – to define mental phenomena as “structured manifestations of powers” belonging to the parts of human body, not only raises some serious metaphysical concerns, but also seems to leave no “space” for the classical concept of human soul. These difficulties notwithstanding, one should appreciate an attempt of the proponents of the new analytic hylomorphism at finding an alternative to the extreme positions of substance or property dualism and eliminative or reductionist materialism in the contemporary discussion concerning the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Many enthusiasts of theistic evolution willingly accept Aquinas’s distinction between primary and secondary causes, to describe theologically “the mechanics” of evolutionary transformism. However, their description of the character of secondary causes in relation to God’s creative action oftentimes lacks precision. To some extent, the situation within the Thomistic camp is similar when it comes to specifying the exact nature of secondary and instrumental causes at work in evolution. Is it right to ascribe all causation in evolution to creatures—acting as secondary (...) and instrumental causes? Is there any space for a more direct divine action in evolutionary transitions? This article offers a new model of explaining the complexity of the causal nexus in the origin of new biological species, including the human species, analyzed in reference to both the immanent and transcendent orders of causation. (shrink)

In theology there has never been any doubt that God can cause things to happen, but there has been a great deal of controversy about the precise nature of God’s causal activity in nature. The theory of divine concurrentism (both God, as primary cause, and creatures, as secondary causes, are engaged in causal processes), fostering the middle way between the anti-providential notion of natural causation and occasionalism (which attributes all causation to God), was questioned in the era of modern science (...) and philosophy. The restriction of divine action to the moment of the first creation in deism led to the agnostic and atheistic rejection of God as an ‘unnecessary hypothesis.’ Most theological responses to this crisis followed the restriction of causality to efficient causes, showing an implicit tendency to speak about the causation of God and creatures in univocal terms and trying to define the ‘causal joint’ between God and nature. A philosophical analysis of evolutionary biology, emergence, big bang cosmology, chaos theory, and quantum mechanics, however, has recently brought a retrieval of a broader understanding of causation, triggering a renewed interest in divine action. The topic of causality has raised interest among analytical philosophers as well. Those following the metaphysics of dispositions and manifestations acknowledge the neo-Aristotelian flavor of their analyses, which becomes, in turn, an incentive for a revival of the classical version of divine concurrentism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Teleology in Natural Theology and Theology of Nature:Classical Theism, Science-Oriented Panentheism, and Process TheismMariusz Tabaczek, O.P.IntroductionThe world is full of teleological dimensions. When we search for them, we can easily see that virtually any of the main aspects of our world can be taken as a particular case of teleology. Although this holds especially for living beings, the physicochemical world also exhibits many directional features that acquire a (...) special meaning when seen as necessary conditions for the existence of living beings. Directionality indicates the existence of tendencies toward goals, which is the hallmark of natural teleology.... It is not difficult to find examples of directionality and cooperativity. If we begin with the most elementary components of the world, we find out that subatomic particles and the four basic interactions behave according to well-known specific patterns and collaborate to build up successive levels of organization—atoms, molecules, macromolecules, and the bigger inorganic and organic beings. The entire construction of our world is the result of the deployment of tendencies that collaborate to make up unitary systems.1If Mariano Artigas is right in his assertion—and many seem to agree that he is2—it seems reasonable to ask about the ways in which the notion of [End Page 1179] teleology may inspire theology, especially in the context of the ongoing dialogue between science and theology. We may think about at least two possible answers to this question, in reference to two related, yet distinctive strategies pursued in theological reflection, (1) the approach of natural theology and (2) the approach of theology of nature. What brings them together is their close attention to nature and our attempts to understand it. Avoiding theological and spiritual escapism and dismissive detachment from nature and natural phenomena, both natural theology and theology of nature point toward their ultimate grounding in God. While doing so, both approaches strive to remain free from the errors of panpsychism, vitalism, and pantheism, thus enabling nature to be natural, available to a thorough and meaningful analysis and description at the level of the research pursued by natural sciences and philosophy of nature and of science. What differentiates these theological approaches are their starting and ending points.Natural theology departs from the observation of natural phenomena. In a search for their ultimate explanation, in reference to philosophy of nature and metaphysics, it arrives at the theological conclusion that only the existence of God offers a satisfying and conclusive answer to the human search for understanding and meaning of the reality that surrounds us. Consequently, one may say that natural phenomena, or at least some of their most fundamental aspects such as teleology, can be used as a basis for arguing in favor of the existence of God.The advantage of such an approach—notes Ian Barbour—is that "it starts from scientific data on which we might expect agreement despite cultural and religious differences."3 However, taken alone, it may reduce the notion of God to the God of philosophers, the unmoved mover, [End Page 1180] or even a deistic Creator, remote and not engaged in his relation to the created reality. Moreover, although we know many examples of people who actually did go through a conversion and discovered the existence of God following the path of natural theology, one might ask whether at least some of the arguments developed within it do not presuppose God's existence as rhetorical exercises for the expression of religious faith, compromising thus its principal commitment.In contrast to natural theology, theology of nature begins with a firm belief in God, based on historical revelation—codified in the Scriptures and reflected upon within theological Tradition—and religious experience (personal and communal). It applies this perspective as an explanatory tool, providing a definitive answer to the questions of origin and ultimate fulfillment of natural phenomena observed in the universe. Hence, while it would be rather strange to claim that the existence of God proves the existence of the natural world—which is better known to us (quoad nos) than the principles of theology—we may still argue that, from the point of view of theology of nature, our knowledge... (shrink)

This article readdresses the Przywara-Barth controversy concerning analogia entis. The main point of our analysis is the question of whether the concept of analogy presented by Erich Przywara was in line with the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic definition and use of analogy in theistic predication. First, we ask about Przywara’s strong conviction that analogy is primarily a metaphysical and not merely a grammatical doctrine. Secondly, after presenting the complexity of Aquinas’ notion of analogy, as well as the variety of opinions on this (...) subject among his commentators, we analyze the objectives of Przywara’s view of analogia entis, his grounding it in the terminology taken from the typology offered by Cajetan and juxtaposing analogia proportionalitatis and analogia atributionis, and his introduction of the concept of “a new ‘attributive analogy’” proceeding from above to below and sustaining the tension within analogia entis. We show that Przywara remained a faithful student and interpreter of Thomas, where this makes Barth’s accusation that the Catholic doctrine of analogia entis puts God and creatures on a common plane of being unjustified. (shrink)

This article readdresses the Przywara-Barth controversy concerning analogia entis. The main point of our analysis is the question of whether the concept of analogy presented by Erich Przywara was in line with the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic definition and use of analogy in theistic predication. First, we ask about Przywara’s strong conviction that analogy is primarily a metaphysical and not merely a grammatical doctrine. Secondly, after presenting the complexity of Aquinas’ notion of analogy, as well as the variety of opinions on this (...) subject among his commentators, we analyze the objectives of Przywara’s view of analogia entis, his grounding it in the terminology taken from the typology offered by Cajetan and juxtaposing analogia proportionalitatisand analogia atributionis, and his introduction of the concept of “a new ‘attributive analogy’”, proceeding form above to below and sustaining the tension within analogia entis. We show that Przywara remained a faithful student and interpreter of Thomas, which makes Barth’s accusation that the Catholic doctrine of analogia entisputs God and creatures on a common plane of being, unjustified. (shrink)

W odpowiedzi na tekst Michała Chaberka, będący polemiką z moim stanowiskiem w kwestii teistycznego ewolucjonizmu, zwracam uwagę na kilka kluczowych zagadnień dotyczących filozofii i teologii arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej w kontekście teorii ewolucji, oraz wykazuję pewne nieścisłości i błędy w argumentacji mojego adwersarza. Definiując kluczowe aspekty terminu „stworzenie” w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu podkreślam, że zmiany ewolucyjne należą do Boskiego gubernatio, a nie creatio. Przedstawiam także nieco bardziej wnikliwą analizę zagadnienia dotyczącego konieczności bezpośredniej Boskiej interwencji w powstaniu nowych gatunków. Przechodząc do zagadnień stricte (...) metafizycznych poruszam kwestie definicji substancjalizmu arystotelesowsko-tomistycznego, analogicznego charakteru statusu bycia substancją, oraz alternatywnej systematyki organizmów żywych zaproponowanej przez Chaberka. W dziedzinie teologii filozoficznej odpowiadam na pytanie o pochodzenie formy substancjalnej pierwszego przedstawiciela nowopowstałego gatunku, w odniesieniu do zagadnień dyspozycji materii i przypadłości substancji. Wracając do kwestii metafizycznych aspektów ewolucjonizmu, proponuję charakterystykę transformacji międzygatunkowej jako procesu, na który składa się wiele zmian substancjalnych i przypadłościowych. (shrink)

The ongoing debate on the Christian philosophical and theological approach to the theory of biological evolution is multifaceted. It refers to the biblical notion of creation, as well as to some strictly philosophical issues such as the difficulty in defining species and units of evolutionary transitions, the nature of chance, and the classical principle of proportionate causation. Moving toward theology, it refers to the distinction between creation and production, and to the notion of secondary causation of creatures in the origin (...) of new forms of organisms – contrasted with the classical assertion that creatures cannot create. (shrink)

The legitimacy of going back to the classical view of God’s action in the world based on the list of causes and understanding of chance in the works of Aristotle and Aquinas – in the context of contemporary science – seems to depend on whether there is a space for causal analysis within the current models of scientific explanation. This article offers a brief account of the path leading to negation and rediscovery of the importance of causality in scientific explanation (...) and reintroduces the semicausal position of the prominent philosopher of science, Mario Bunge, who treats causation as one of several categories of determination. The diversity of the categories he lists finds analogy in the commonly accepted pluralist approach to the search of the model which adequately describes the practice of scientific research. What is more, the same diversity of the categories of determination opens the way back to the classical Aristotle’s fourfold account of causation and his understanding of chance. This fact allows us, in turn, to defend the contemporary version of the classical notion of divine action against the accusation of methodical error in the form of imposing the notion of the ancient categories of causality on the results of contemporary scientific research, which notion, as some maintain, has little in common with the models of explanation currently accepted in natural sciences. (shrink)

Vacuum Genesis and Spontaneous Emergence of the Universe from Nothing in Reference to the Classical Notion of Causality and Creation ex nihilo The article discousses philosophical and theological reflections inspired by the cosmological model of the origin of the universe from quantum vacuum through quantum tunneling and the model presented by Hartle and Hawking. In the context of the thesis about the possibility of cosmogenesis ex nihilo without the need of God the creator, the question is being raised concerning the (...) ontological status of nothingness and of the laws of nature in the aforementioned models. After pointing to the fact that they do not imply an absolute nothingness in the philosophical sense, the main objectives of both models and philosophical-theological conclusions they inspire are interpreted in the light of the classical principles of potency and act, theory of causation and chance events in nature, elements of classical theology of creation and the classification of sciences in terms of various levels of abstraction, proposed by Aquinas. Noting the fact that some cosmologists cross methodological boundaries of their science, we emphasize the role and significance of their research in a deeper understanding of the philosophical aspects of the origins of the universe, especially the role of potency in the first stages of its existence and evolution. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Where Do Substantial Forms Come From?—A Critique of the Theistic Evolution of Mariusz Tabaczek*Michael Chaberek O.P. and Monika Metlerska-ColerickIntroductionThe question posed in the present article is whether it is possible to be a proponent of theistic evolution and, at the same time, of the metaphysical [End Page 239] principles elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas. The authors of Thomistic Evolution: a Catholic Approach to Understanding Evolution in the (...) Light of Faith, recently published in Polish, imply that Aquinas's doctrine was not only compatible with the idea of biological macroevolution, but also—on some level—endorsed it.1 In his "Afterword" to the above publication, Mariusz Tabaczek points out certain deficiencies in the argumentation provided by its authors, simultaneously underlining that he agrees with the book's principal thesis.I will not examine the book by the American Dominicans in this article because I have already addressed their arguments in full in my book entitled Aquinas and Evolution,2 where I demonstrated that it is impossible to be both a proponent of theistic evolution and a follower of the philosophical views proposed by St. Thomas. In his "Afterword," Tabaczek presents a contradictory thesis. He claims that being both of the above is possible, provided that one modifies St. Thomas's teaching in four "essential aspects." The very approach of this kind already raises doubts. After all, if St. Thomas's doctrine indeed needs to be modified in order to reconcile his thought with evolution, it suggests that, in fact, it cannot be reconciled with it. Therefore, perhaps the problem comes down to asking whether the four points of incompatibility indicated by Tabaczek really constitute an "essential" part of Aquinas's doctrine? If it is not the case, they might be omitted or modified. If, however, they relate to certain essential elements of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, disregarding them equals denying St. Thomas's teaching and, consequently, makes it impossible to reconcile it with theistic evolution.In order to settle the problem, I devote the first part of my article to determining whether the points presented by Tabaczek refer to the essential elements of Aquinas's discourse. In the second part of my text, however, I move to a more important point, namely the fact that theistic evolution encounters many more problems in the context of Thomistic metaphysics. Since I have already addressed this matter in several places,3 I limit the scope [End Page 240] of the second part of my article to only one such problem: the emergence of new substantial forms (new species) via the mechanism of evolution. Thus, the object of the present analysis is to examine whether the solution suggested by Tabaczek provides an explanation to the problem of the origin of new substantial forms in theistic evolution.Commentary on the Four Points of IncompatibilityAccording to Tabaczek, the teaching of St. Thomas can be reconciled with theistic evolution under the conditions of:(1) recognizing the possibility of the emergence of new species, that is, acknowledging that the perfection of the universe can increase every day not only in terms of the number of individual beings, but also as regards the number of species; (2) emphasizing the fact that God's initial act of creation is limited to the derivation of matter of the lowest degree of complexity out of nothing (ex nihilo); (3) recognizing the fact that the processes of chemical, biochemical, and biological evolution belong to the work of adornment (opus ornatus), whose subsequent stages spread out across the entire history of the universe and, therefore, are not limited to a finished and past time period; and finally (4) acknowledging that God's direct intervention in the creation of the first representatives of plant and animal species (with the exception of man) is not necessary.4Ad (1) and ad (3). Points 1 and 3 boil down to the same idea, since they are both concerned with the fact that evolution continues, whereas from the Christian perspective, the divine work of creation had already finished. Therefore, if one adopts theistic evolution, the Christian truth of God completing his creative work with the creation of man has to be rejected. The... (shrink)

A review of "Emergence: Towards a New Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science" By MARIUSZ TABACZEK.

The aim of the article is to explain the relationship between the ethical evaluation of scientific research involving personal data and the assessment of compliance with data protection law. The article presents the mutual relationship between the protection of personal data and scientific activity from a dogmatic perspective, the legal regulation of the processing of personal data in scientific research, and the so-called research exceptions that apply when data are processed for scientific research. It also covers the importance of meeting (...) the ethical requirements of scientific research in order to profit from the indicated exceptions. Finally, it provides a comparison between the ethical and the legal systems of personal data protection in research (objectives, criteria, authorities, and procedures). (shrink)

A survey of the main approaches in a mind study -oriented part of Artificial Intelligence is made focusing on controversial issues and extreme hypotheses. Various meanings of terms: "intelligence" and "artificial intelligence" are discussed. Limitations for constructing intelligent systems resulting from the lack of formalized models of cognitive activity are shown. The approaches surveyed are then recapitulated in the light of these limitations.

Based on case studies prepared at the Harvard Business School, the article analyses the content of university courses on business history. Its aim is to answer the question whether or not business history courses are used for discussing the problems of CSR or moral dilemmas behind strategic decisions made by managers. The article argues that the chance of enhancing the understanding of social problems on the part of the managers and shaping their responsiveness to them, created by the presence of (...) courses on history in the academic curriculum, remains, to a large extent, unrealised. Teaching materials are still influenced by the Chandlerian paradigm and thus focus on changes in organisational structures and strategies of large multinational companies. They pay little attention to the social environment of business, rarely pose questions on the motivations of human actions or value hierarchies and avoid discussions on the social consequences of management decisions. (shrink)

Making more accurate marketing decisions by managers requires building effective predictive models. Typically, these models specify the probability of customer belonging to a particular category, group or segment. The analytical CRM categories refer to customers interested in starting cooperation with the company, customers who purchase additional products or customers intending to resign from the cooperation. During building predictive models researchers use analytical tools from various disciplines with an emphasis on their best performance. This article attempts to build a hybrid predictive (...) model combining decision trees and cluster analysis. During experiments five different cluster validity indices and eight datasets were used. The performance of models was evaluated by using popular measures such as: accuracy, precision, recall, G-mean, F-measure and lift in the first and in the second decile. The authors tried to find a connection between the number of clusters and models' quality. (shrink)

Many studies confirmed the positive effect of trust on human relations and performance in organizations. As a social judgment, trust should be related to perceived competence and warmth as two basic dimensions of person perception. Surprisingly, to date no attempts have been made to examine the influence of attributed competence and warmth on social judgments in interpersonal relations at work. To this end, we examine the influence of perceived competence and warmth on trust, liking and respect in upward and downward (...) work relations. A study involving 190 middle-stage managers revealed that the two fundamental dimensions of social cognition influence respect, liking and trust. Competence had a stronger effect on respect than warmth; the opposite was true for liking. Trust was conditioned by both competence and warmth to an equal, high extent. At the same time, warmth expressed by supervisors led to higher results in liking, respect and trust in them than warmth expressed by subordinates. (shrink)

The belief to have fixed or malleable traits and help giving: implicit theories and sequential social influence techniques Two sequential social influence techniques, the foot-in-the-door and the door-in-the-face, seem to be symmetrical, but there are different moderators and quite different mechanisms underlying each of the strategies. What links both techniques is the social interaction between a person presenting a sequence of requests and an interlocutor. The techniques' effectiveness depends on the course and perception of the interaction and the difficulty of (...) requests in the sequence. The aim of the article was to verify various mechanisms of incremental and entity theorists compliance with the FITD and the DITF techniques. In a series of four studies it was shown that incremental theorists comply the FITD technique to a greater extend especially when a sequence of requests meets their mastery style of behavior thus means an interesting challenge to undertake or opportunity to deepen contact with a newly met person. Entity theorists are more prone to the DITF strategy as their helpless style of behavior and sense of guilt are triggered, thus a sequence of decreasing in magnitude demands is perceived as less threatening. (shrink)

Over the years, the Austrian School of Economics has created the image of a thinker associated with ideas of liberalism. The views of members of this school are often considered controversial. However, the concept of freedom clearly displayed by the Austrians is very popular among economists. Carl Menger is said to be the founder and a leading member of the Austrian School of Economics, and his works are mostly devoted to methodology and economic theory. Nevertheless, you can also find his (...) views on the sphere of economic liberalism and freedom. Almost 150 years after the publication of Menger’s main works, it emerged that he had created not only the timeless foundations of the theory and methodology of economics, but his theory of subjective value had become the bedrock which is used to this day in deliberations on economic liberalism. The economy pursued by Menger (based primarily on the ideas of subjectivism and individualism) continues to be an important and timeless foundation for the development of the doctrine of economic liberalism. This article is a review based on an analysis of the literature on the subject. (shrink)

Approximately one in six top economic research papers draws an explicitly causal conclusion. But what do economists mean when they conclude that A 'causes' B? Does 'cause' say that we can influence B by intervening on A, or is it only a label for the correlation of variables? Do quantitative analyses of observational data followed by such causal inferences constitute sufficient grounds for guiding economic policymaking? The Philosophy of Causality in Economics addresses these questions by analyzing the meaning of causal (...) claims made by economists and the philosophical presuppositions underlying the research methods used. The book considers five key causal approaches: the regularity approach, probabilistic theories, counterfactual theories, mechanisms, and interventions and manipulability. Each chapter opens with a summary of literature on the relevant approach and discusses its reception amongst economists. The text details case studies, and goes on to examine papers which have adopted the approach in order to highlight the methods of causal inference used in contemporary economics. It analyses the meaning of the causal claim put forward, and finally reconstructs the philosophical presuppositions accepted implicitly by economists. The strengths and limitations of each method of causal inference are also considered in the context of using the results as evidence for policymaking. This book is essential reading to those interested in literature on the philosophy of economics, as well as the philosophy of causality and economic methodology in general. (shrink)

Awareness of mortality is one of the key aspects of human existence. Death goes beyond the boundary of knowledge, mortality. However, it is actually experienced by man as something inevitable. Death is a fact – the end of life, and the experience of mortality is one of the borderline situations. In the essay, the author puts forward the thesis that the experience of mortality has a significant impact on the human understanding of values. Attitudes towards death be it fear, resignation, (...) indifference, fascination, mourning, sadness, despair after the loss of a loved one, or the desire for death, indicate the wealth of the world of value of axiological experience. The attitude of the person towards death, in some sense, is a test of our humanity, the principal value to which we refer most often. The author of the essay adopts the position of axiological relationalism, it implies that values are independent of the subject, they form a network of relational connections, but they are in a significant way connected with culture. The study of these connections: 1) with the world of people, 2) world of things, 3) internal relations that take place between values, allows us to get to know the complex structure of the world of values. In the article, the author analyzes in what sense mortality influences human understanding of values. (shrink)

This is the first coherent description of all levels of communication of ciliates. Ciliates are highly sensitive organisms that actively compete for environmental resources. They assess their surroundings, estimate how much energy they need for particular goals, and then realise the optimum variant. They take measures to control certain environmental resources. They perceive themselves and can distinguish between ‘self’ and ‘non-self’. They process and evaluate information and then modify their behaviour accordingly. These highly diverse competences show us that this is (...) possible owing to sign-mediated communication processes within ciliates, between the same, related and different ciliate species, and between ciliates and non-ciliate organisms. This is crucial in coordinating growth and development, shape and dynamics. This book further serves as a learning tool for research aspects in biocommunication in ciliates. It will guide scientists in further investigations on ciliate behavior, how they mediate signaling processes between themselves and the environment. (shrink)