This paper sketches an historical outline of philosophy in Russia from the modern era to present time. It describes the main philosophical trends that characterized the ‘Silver Age’ in pre-revolutionary Russia (Cosmism, religious philosophy and early Marxist philosophy), and draws some lines of continuity both with Marxist and pre-Marxist philosophy. It studies the internal evolution and organization of Soviet official philosophical thought, and describes the main features the philosophical Renaissance that took place in the Soviet Union in the second half (...) of the 20th century. It finally describes the main trends, authors and publication of philosophy in Russia today. (shrink)

The article stresses the consistency and agreement between Kant's categorical claim about impermissibility of lying and his moral philosophy. Rejecting the case-study approach to Kant's essay, the author treats it as a most appropriate illustration of the ethics of duty, seeing in the forbiddance of lying a necessary consequence of Kant's absolutist ethical. As a solution to some practical situations allegedly allowing ethical dishonesty, the author proposes to consider the norm "Do not lie" as a categorical requirement in the realm (...) of speech, thus giving the individual an ability to maintain his moral integrity and at the same time remain within the bounds of practical prudence. (shrink)

The article discusses the role and place of the history of philosophy within the philosophical discipline. It shows that the history of philosophy is the main source and the medium of theoretical quests in all the areas of philosophical knowledge, and as such cannot be the exclusive domain for professional historians of philosophy. Being a specialized area of knowledge with its unique subject, it is an intellectual laboratory for all philosophical specialties, a place where, by the study of the philosophy (...) of the past, we discover new ideas and find the solutions to the pressing problems of the day. Thus, this branch of philosophical investigation cannot be merely perceived as philosophical history proper, but should be rather viewed as a contemporary way of philosophizing. (shrink)

This article argues that the structure of Nicomachean Ethics reproduces the structure of Aristotle’s ethical theory, consisting of three parts: the doctrine of the highest good, the doctrine of the virtues, and the doctrine of the three types of life. We show that the last four books successively analyze three concepts of happiness: the sensual, the practical, and the contemplative.

Philosophy is often understood in terms of public benefit as being synonymous with its application to other domains of public life such as politics, economics, education etc. The question I would like to raise is of an altogether different nature—namely, it is the question of whether philosophy can be seen as having any public or social value per se, before there is any further thought of application or usage. In particular, it is the question of whether it contains anything universally (...) significant, something that could make it of interest to anyone as seen in the context of one’s personal evolution. And in order to answer that question, first we have to find out what philosophy is to the philosophers themselves and how it benefits them. (shrink)

The discussion on Party ethics in the 1920s is an undeservedly forgotten page in the intellectual history of Soviet society. The new interest in it is due not only to the reawakened thirst for complete knowledge about our past and the much sharpened interest in moral and ethical problems. Another aspect is much more important: it goes back to the sources of socioethical utilitarianism and the distortions in morals associated with it that to a certain extent are specific to socialism. (...) In its current criticism and progress toward overcoming these distortions our society is coming to understand morality as a value in itself, as well as its permanent, universally human foundations. This debate will teach us much, and alert us against a lot. We shall dwell only on a few, in our opinion the most topical, lessons. (shrink)

V. T. Efimov's polemical remarks "Ethics and Moral Studies" pose the question of whether it is necessary to detach from philosophy what would be an independent learned discipline — moral studies, as the theory of morality. Furthermore, in his opinion, the emergence of moral studies does not mean that ethics also would become a specialized learned discipline. Ethics would be retained as the discipline studying "philosophical questions in the theory of morality.".

L.N. Tolstoy produced an original religious-moral doctrine that became known as Tolstoyism. It was left on the periphery of the spiritual processes in the twentieth century and, undeservedly, was forgotten. This becomes particularly obvious in the context of contemporary discussions about the dialogue of cultures and the interrelation between universalism and particularism. Tolstoy sought only the transcultural foundations of human existence. The basic questions that he examines as a thinker and wrestles with as a human being is the following: what (...) can religion and morality mean to contemporary men for whom reason is the basis of knowledge and individual responsibility is the basis of behavior? (shrink)

Cet article s'efforce d'analyser la spécificité de l'évolution de la philosophie en Russie au cours du vingtième siècle et jusqu'à présent. Il met en évidence trois courants principaux qui, à partir du début du 20e siècle et pour de nombreuses décennies ultérieures, ont déterminé le paysage philosophique de la Russie : la philosophie religieuse russe du siècle d'argent, le cosmisme russe et le marxisme russe. On montre comment, dans le cadre de la philosophie russe, aussi bien avant qu'après 1917, des (...) tentatives originales ont tenté d'interpréter la rationalité de façon non classique et la manière don't elles ont influencé la logique contemporaine ainsi que d'autres sciences humaines : la psychologie, la linguistique, la théorie littéraire. L'article examine l'étouffement de la pensée philosophique à l'époque du stalinisme et la renaissance, dans la seconde moitié du siècle, de toute une série d'orientations philosophiques (la théorie de la connaissance, la logique, la philosophie et la méthodologie de la science, la philosophie de la psychologie, l'anthropologie philosophique, l'histoire de la philosophie). Des arguments sont présentés pour étayer la thèse d'un élargissement significatif de la problématique et de l'apparition de nombreuses directions philosophiques qui se développent de façon concomitante dans la philosophie russe contemporaine (postérieure à 1991). En conclusion, les auteurs évoquent l'organisation institutionnelle de la vie philosophique dans le pays. (shrink)

Cet article s'efforce d'analyser la spécificité de l'évolution de la philosophie en Russie au cours du vingtième siècle et jusqu'à présent. Il met en évidence trois courants principaux qui, à partir du début du 20e siècle et pour de nombreuses décennies ultérieures, ont déterminé le paysage philosophique de la Russie : la philosophie religieuse russe du siècle d'argent, le cosmisme russe et le marxisme russe. On montre comment, dans le cadre de la philosophie russe, aussi bien avant qu'après 1917, des (...) tentatives originales ont tenté d'interpréter la rationalité de façon non classique et la manière don't elles ont influencé la logique contemporaine ainsi que d'autres sciences humaines : la psychologie, la linguistique, la théorie littéraire. L'article examine l'étouffement de la pensée philosophique à l'époque du stalinisme et la renaissance, dans la seconde moitié du siècle, de toute une série d'orientations philosophiques (la théorie de la connaissance, la logique, la philosophie et la méthodologie de la science, la philosophie de la psychologie, l'anthropologie philosophique, l'histoire de la philosophie). Des arguments sont présentés pour étayer la thèse d'un élargissement significatif de la problématique et de l'apparition de nombreuses directions philosophiques qui se développent de façon concomitante dans la philosophie russe contemporaine (postérieure à 1991). En conclusion, les auteurs évoquent l'organisation institutionnelle de la vie philosophique dans le pays. (shrink)

The interpretation of the theoretical content of the ethics of Democritus, as well as of its place in the history of ethical thought, encounters a special difficulty. Democritus' ethics, which has come down to us in fragments, the authenticity of which is still a matter of debate, is full of evident contradictions. It contains mutually exclusive judgments on questions which were the principal subject matter of the intellectual polemics in ethics in the fifth century B.C. On the one hand, Democritus (...) put forth a rather definite naturalistic-individualistic thesis: "Pleasure and displeasure form the boundary between what is useful and what is harmful." On the other hand, he intellectualizes moral motives and states his belief in the existence of general ethical determinations: "There is one and the same good and one and the same truth for all people, whereas one thing is agreeable to one person, another thing to another." Democritus is just as contradictory on the question of the moral value of the state. We find in him an unambiguous affirmation equating a moral individual with the citizen of a city state: "The interests of the state should be above everything else, and we must see to it that it is well governed. To assist in this, we must not struggle against justice and use force for our own benefit against the general good. For a well-governed state is a mighty bastion: it encompasses all, and as long as it persists, everything is as one, but if it should perish, all perishes with it." Yet at the same time a moral model of actions for him involves emancipation from laws: "He called laws a bad invention and said: "The wise man should not obey the laws, he live freely.". (shrink)

In his time, D. Hume made an observation that essentially predetermined the nature of subsequent ethics research. "In every system of morality that I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked," he wrote in A Treatise of Human Nature, "that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations (...) of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. … A reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."1 The obvious meaning of this statement is that the imperative nature of moral language cannot be considered an adequate expression of the essence of morality; rather, it conceals the erroneousness of its epistemologized schemes of explanation. The accuracy of such an interpretation of the excerpt, even if it were questionable on the basis of its literal meaning, raises no doubt in the general context of Hume's own ethics where morality is identified with a special moral sense-a sense of sympathy that can be revealed effectively without the compelling force of duty. By some strange logic, ethics after Hume turned his warning into a positive program and saw its task as laying bare the concept of the moral "ought" and trying to find a transition from "is" to "ought." These persistent and multifaceted efforts, which enriched the theory of ethics in many ways, nevertheless did not achieve their immediate goal. The question arises, then, whether the negative result was not predetermined by an improper formulation of the problem itself that arose from the assumption that the specific nature of morality is connected with its imperativeness. (shrink)

This concise history of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences includes discussion of the main periods of its development, its research problematic, and changes that have occurred in the life and work of the institute over the past two decades.

From the Editors:Such was the topic considered by members of a new discussion club, "The Free Word" [Svobodnoe slovo] , along with specialists from the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences.

From the Editors:Such was the topic considered by members of a new discussion club, "The Free Word" [Svobodnoe slovo], along with specialists from the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Developments in Soviet ethics have been largely, but not exclusively, determined by the official ideology. Since 1917 philosophers have debated four successive models of morality. In the first, morality was regarded as tool of the exploiting classes and thus was superseded by communism. This attitude in fact fostered moral nihilism and anarchism. In the second period of ethical reflection, morality was contrued as a social, class-relative, phenomenon, conceived in utilitarian terms. With respect to Communist morality whatever serves socialism as defined (...) by the Communist Party acquires the force of a moral imperative. It is important to understand whether this perspective is true to Marx''s views. Whereas classical ethics assumed an extraworldy foundation for morality Marx adopted the humanist, immanentist perspective, according to which morality has a pragmatic sense as an ideal, the goal of activity. Soviet ethical theory of the Stalin era did not deviate from this perspective, for which reason ethics as a professional science was entirely subordinated to Party decrees about socialism as an ideal. In the third period beginning in the mid-fifties, a new view came to the fore which was codified in the 1961 Party program: moral values are now regarded as having a specific quality, social development involves a moral dimension, and moral values exhibit an all-human import. During this period the leading issue among philosophers is the question of the essence and specificity of morality as distinct from other forms of social consciousness. Just prior to the era of perestrojka beginning in 1985 a fourth model emerged which in fact prepared in most essential respects the actual new thinking in morality. The matters under consideration had to do with the global dimensions of moral problems given the common experience and fears of humanity. For this reason morality was now seen as superseding politics. Presently, this reorientation has not only enabled abandoning attitudes favoring class morality, but thrown into relief the tragic consequences of this attitude within Soviet history.The new image of morality corresponds to abstract humanism with its stress on the person and universal values. The task before Soviet ethicians is to provide theoretical and methodological foundations for their research by which they can improve the professional quality of their work and provide the discipline with a new identity over and against Marxism. (shrink)

Developments in Soviet ethics have been largely, but not exclusively, determined by the official ideology. Since 1917 philosophers have debated four successive models of morality. In the first, morality was regarded as tool of the exploiting classes and thus was superseded by communism. This attitude in fact fostered moral nihilism and anarchism. In the second period of ethical reflection, morality was contrued as a social, class-relative, phenomenon, conceived in utilitarian terms. With respect to Communist morality whatever serves socialism as defined (...) by the Communist Party acquires the force of a moral imperative. It is important to understand whether this perspective is true to Marx's views. Whereas classical ethics assumed an extra-worldy foundation for morality Marx adopted the humanist, immanentist perspective, according to which morality has a pragmatic sense as an ideal, the goal of activity. Soviet ethical theory of the Stalin era did not deviate from this perspective, for which reason ethics as a professional science was entirely subordinated to Party decrees about socialism as an ideal. In the third period beginning in the mid-fifties, a new view came to the fore which was codified in the 1961 Party program: moral values are now regarded as having a specific quality, social development involves a moral dimension, and moral values exhibit an all-human import. During this period the leading issue among philosophers is the question of the essence and specificity of morality as distinct from other forms of social consciousness. Just prior to the era of perestrojka beginning in 1985 a fourth model emerged which in fact prepared in most essential respects the actual new thinking in morality. The matters under consideration had to do with the 'global' dimensions of moral problems given the common experience and fears of humanity. For this reason morality was now seen as superseding politics. Presently, this reorientation has not only enabled abandoning attitudes favoring class morality, but thrown into relief the tragic consequences of this attitude within Soviet history. The new image of morality corresponds to 'abstract humanism' with its stress on the person and universal values. The task before Soviet ethicians is to provide theoretical and methodological foundations for their research by which they can improve the professional quality of their work and provide the discipline with a new identity over and against Marxism. (shrink)

The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...

In this paper I examine Grace A. de Laguna’s theory of universals in its historical context and in relation to contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics. I explain the central features of her theory, arguing that her theory should be classified as a form of immanent realism and as a powers ontology. I then show in what ways her theory affords a theory of modality in terms of potentialities and discuss some of its consequences along the way.

A. H. Louie's More Than Life Itself is an exploratory journey in relational biology, a study of life in terms of the organization of entailment relations in living systems. This book represents a synergy of the mathematical theories of categories, lattices, and modelling, and the result is a synthetic biology that provides a characterization of life. Biology extends physics. Life is not a specialization of mechanism, but an expansive generalization of it. Organisms and machines share some common features, but organisms (...) are not machines. Life is defined by a relational closure that places it beyond the reach of physicochemical and mechanistic dogma, outside the reductionistic universe, and into the realm of impredicativity. Function dictates structure. Complexity brings forth living beings. (shrink)

This book argues for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology. The central claim is that a paradigm shift is underway in contemporary social ontology, from ideal to nonideal, and that this shift should be fully followed through. To develop and defend this central claim, the first step is to show that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social (...) ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. The second step is to show that, when taken together, objections to the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology) imply that this model needs to be given up in favor of nonideal social ontology. In other words, we should look to nonideal rather than ideal social ontology for core concepts. The third step is to offer a positive account, called the power view, of nonideal social ontology. This account places the concept of social power at the core of a general theory of the social world and replaces the flat and narrow conception of power in ideal social ontology with a richer and more extensive conception. In addition, it rectifies a shortcoming in nonideal social ontology by attending to class, which has been notably and oddly overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

This companion is a cutting-edge primer to critical forms of the posthumanities and the feminist posthumanities, aimed at students and researchers who want to catch up with the recent theoretical developments in various fields in the humanities, such as new media studies, gender studies, cultural studies, science and technology studies, human animal studies, postcolonial critique, philosophy and environmental humanities. It contains a collection of nineteen new and original short chapters introducing influential concepts, ideas and approaches that have shaped and developed (...) new materialism, inhuman theory, critical posthumanism, feminist materialism, and posthuman philosophy. A resource for students and teachers, this comprehensive volume brings together established international scholars and emerging theorists, for timely and astute definitions of a moving target – posthuman humanities and feminist posthumanities. (shrink)

I. Ókor -- II. A középkor és a reneszánsz -- III. Az újkor.

On fundamentals of Vedanta and science; a study.

La admirable riqueza cultural y artística del Renacimiento esconde una desoladora miseria y aquella "edad de la abundancia" contrasta con una inmensa pobreza. Lejos de ser una broma o una pesadilla, la celebrada Utopía de Tomás Moro fue antes que nada un desafío insoslayable, pues proponía que ninguna sociedad merece tal nombre si tolera la miseria de un solo pobre. Rico y pobre explora la cuestión en ese libro de 1516 y en otros del escritor londinense para concluir con un (...) esbozo de su vida a la luz de la pobreza como virtud indispensable y libertadora. He aquí un hombre afortunado que no fue indiferente ante el infortunio de tantos y que vio en la humanitas la virtud por excelencia que lleva a una constante atención y cuidado del prójimo. Inspirado por un cambio de actitud en su época, así como por su fe cristiana y la mejor tradición estoica, mostró una robusta preocupación sobre el tema subrayando el valor social que debe tener toda riqueza, tanto a nivel estatal como individual, destacando la grave obligación cívica de los ricos y la necesidad que tienen todos, ricos y pobres, de empeñarse en la práctica de cierto desprendimiento y generosidad si no quieren mermar su propia humanidad y fallecer en su avaricia. La percepción de la miseria había cambiado de tal manera que su remedio ya no podía estar en una u otra limosna en plazas e iglesias, sino en la acción bien pensada y perentoria de todo gobierno que se tenga por justo. Sir Tomás Moro, privilegiado desde la cuna y seguro en su trabajo profesional, vio la pobreza de tantos como un desastre social, pero uno que, al mismo tiempo, debería llevar a todo ser humano a ver en el desprendimiento y generosidad una excelencia o virtud que alumbra la "otra" libertad, y tan íntima y valiosa que en su caso brilló aun en la prisión y ante el horror de una muerte injusta y atroz." -- Page 4 of cover. (shrink)