Wie können wir uns in der Welt ohne Selbstverlust orientieren, wie unsere rationalen Fähigkeiten und Vermögen erhalten? Kant ist der Philosoph der reinen Vernunft und des kategorischen Imperativs. Aber mit seinen Überlegungen zur Selbsterhaltung der Vernunft erweist er sich zugleich als ein Philosoph mit einem klaren Bewusstsein davon, worauf es in unserem Leben ankommt: auf Selbstbilligung und Selbstständigkeit, auf Selbstdenken und Kritik, auf Aufklärung und Humanität, auf Recht und Freiheit, auf die Überwindung unserer Unmündigkeit und auf den Austausch von Argumenten (...) und Perspektiven. Mit seinem Fokus auf die Selbsterhaltung der Vernunft bietet das Buch einen neuen Zugang zu Kants Werk und leistet zugleich einen Beitrag zur Debatte über die Modernität seines Denkens. (shrink)

: The paper discusses the concepts of obligation and moral evidence in Mendelssohn’s and Kant’s prize essays. I argue that Mendelssohn departs in significant ways from Christian Wolff’s position, and that Kant intends to overcome Wolffian philosophy with Newtonian methodology while still owing a lot to Wolff and to the project of an ethics within the limits of metaphysics. Although quite akin to Francis Hutcheson’s philosophy, it becomes clear that Kant intended to lay the foundation of an innovative concept of (...) obligation, which shares some similarities with Christian August Crusius’s interpretation of it. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 1 Seiten: 88-96.

Wenn es eine Lehre gibt, welche neben der Raum-Zeittheorie der Inauguraldissertation von 1770 für die Genese der Kritik der reinen Vernunft von zentraler Bedeutung ist, dann ist es die von Kant in den frühen Anthropologievorlesungen der siebziger Jahre vorgetragene Theorie eines spontanen, freien und selbstbewußten Ich. Aus welchen systematischen Erwägungen heraus hat er diese Ich-Theorie entwickelt? Was hat ihn dazu veranlaßt, seine Philosophie auf einem spontanen, freien und selbstbewußten Ich zu gründen, welches als eine einfache, numerisch identische, immaterielle und freie (...) Substanz verstanden wird, von der wir eine anschauende Erkenntnis im inneren Sinn haben? Aufgrund welcher konzeptionellen Änderungen wird diese Theorie gegenüber seiner Dissertation überhaupt erst ein sinnvolles Unternehmen? Es wird im Rahmen einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der Problemlage, mit der sich Kant zwischen 1770 und 1772 konfrontiert war, gezeigt, daß er wesentliche Anregungen durch seinen früheren Schüler Marcus Herz erhalten hat, der in seiner Schrift Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit einige grundlegende Lehrstücke der Dissertation kritisiert und mit Moses Mendelssohn für die Notwendigkeit eines „ersten Subjekts" plädiert. Nicht Rousseau, sondern Herz und Mendelssohn haben also in ihrer direkt auf die Dissertation bezogenen Kritik Kant davon überzeugt, daß das epistemisch aufgewertete Ich als Grund einer neuen Theorie des Verhältnisses von Denken und Gedachtem fungieren muß, um die Einheit unserer Erfahrung erklären zu können. (shrink)

In her new book, Patricia Kitcher supports Onora O'Neill's view that the categorical imperative is the highest principle of both practical and theoretical reason. I claim that neither O'Neill's original interpretation nor Kitcher's additional evidence in favour of it are convincing. At its core, this misconception of Kant's position consists in the identification of self-referential critique of reason with the concept of autonomy. It will be shown that the (Kant) of both practical and theoretical reason is not the categorical imperative, (...) but the reflective power of judgement, as Kant claims in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. (shrink)

Foucault est fasciné par l’essai de Kant « Réponse à la question : qu’est-ce que l’ Aufklärung? » (1784) et s’y confronte à plusieurs reprises. Selon lui, l’essai représente une « charnière » entre les « trois Critiques » et son présent (l’actualité). Il contient « l’esquisse » de l’attitude de la modernité, que Foucault décrit comme attitude de la critique. Contre Foucault, l’article soutient que Kant, dans le cadre de sa réflexion sur le présent, tient des propos qui prétendent (...) à une validité intemporelle. Ensuite, l’essai s’adresse à un public érudit pour lequel les idées qu’il défend sont compréhensibles sans aucune connaissance relevant des domaines de la philosophie transcendantale et de la métaphysique. Enfin, l’attitude de la modernité est mieux décrite par le concept de « penser par soi-même » [ Selbstdenken ] que par celui de critique. Penser par soi-même vise l’état de majorité et « l’autoconservation de la raison » (Kant). (shrink)

Kant und die Alternativen Heiner F. Klemme Manfred Kühn, Dieter Schönecker. H . Klemme / M. Kühn / D. Schönecker (Hg.) Moralische Motivation Kant und die Alternativen Meiner KANT-FORSCHUNGEN Begründet von Reinhard Brandt und ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Supplement to: "David Hume to Alexander Dick: A New Letter" Heiner F. Klemme Afterreading Hume'slettertoDick,1 Professor Ian Rosskindlybrought to my attention William R. Brock's book, Scotus Americanus: A survey ofthe sources for links between Scotland and America in the eighteenth century. There is helpful information in Brock's book toidentify the two Scots referred to by Hume in his letter to Sir Alexander Dick. The first ofthese (...) men is likely to be the Reverend George Panton,2 who had been in charge of the Grammar School at Jedburgh in 1769 and had obtained a degree from Marischal College. After becoming a clergyman of the Church of England, he set out for New York to take employment as tutor to the children of a Colonel Philips. He arrived there by June 1773. Hume belonged to a number ofinfluential friends who supported him in his undertaking. In his letter to Dick, Hume asked him to recommend Panton to a certain Mr Smith. This person is probably the Reverend Dr. William Smith,3 an episcopal divine, who was born in Aberdeenshire in 1727. After becoming a tutor to the children ofJosiah Martin, he arrived inNewYork in May 1751. During his short stay he wrote an anonymous pamphlet in which he urged the foundation ofa King's College there. The college came into existence in 1754, changing its name to Columbia University later on. Smith played an important role in the development ofAmerican higher education by promoting the new educational method ofthe Scottish universities. He was appointed to teach logic, rhetoric, ethics, and natural philosophy at Benjamin Franklin's new College of Philadelphia in 1754 and became first Provost of the then University of Pennsylvania a year later. It was Smith who edited and published American Magazine for the first time. Philipps-UniversitätMarburg Heiner Klemme, "David Hume to Alexander Dick: A New Letter," Hume Studies 16, no. 2 (November 1990): 87-88. William R. Brock, Scotus Americanus: A survey ofthe sources for links between Scotland and America in the eighteenth century (Edinburgh, 1982), 42, 107-8. Brock, 111-12. Volume XVII Number 1 87 88Hume Studies... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Supplement to: "David Hume to Alexander Dick: A New Letter" Heiner F. Klemme Afterreading Hume'slettertoDick,1 Professor Ian Rosskindlybrought to my attention William R. Brock's book, Scotus Americanus: A survey ofthe sources for links between Scotland and America in the eighteenth century. There is helpful information in Brock's book toidentify the two Scots referred to by Hume in his letter to Sir Alexander Dick. The first ofthese (...) men is likely to be the Reverend George Panton,2 who had been in charge of the Grammar School at Jedburgh in 1769 and had obtained a degree from Marischal College. After becoming a clergyman of the Church of England, he set out for New York to take employment as tutor to the children of a Colonel Philips. He arrived there by June 1773. Hume belonged to a number ofinfluential friends who supported him in his undertaking. In his letter to Dick, Hume asked him to recommend Panton to a certain Mr Smith. This person is probably the Reverend Dr. William Smith,3 an episcopal divine, who was born in Aberdeenshire in 1727. After becoming a tutor to the children ofJosiah Martin, he arrived inNewYork in May 1751. During his short stay he wrote an anonymous pamphlet in which he urged the foundation ofa King's College there. The college came into existence in 1754, changing its name to Columbia University later on. Smith played an important role in the development ofAmerican higher education by promoting the new educational method ofthe Scottish universities. He was appointed to teach logic, rhetoric, ethics, and natural philosophy at Benjamin Franklin's new College of Philadelphia in 1754 and became first Provost of the then University of Pennsylvania a year later. It was Smith who edited and published American Magazine for the first time. Philipps-UniversitätMarburg Heiner Klemme, "David Hume to Alexander Dick: A New Letter," Hume Studies 16, no. 2 (November 1990): 87-88. William R. Brock, Scotus Americanus: A survey ofthe sources for links between Scotland and America in the eighteenth century (Edinburgh, 1982), 42, 107-8. Brock, 111-12. Volume XVII Number 1 87 88Hume Studies... (shrink)

Klemme offers a summary of one of Schiller’s most influential philosophical writings, its origin, philosophical context, and reception in the literature. Special attention is given to Kant’s impact on Schiller. On the one hand, Schiller is critical of Kant’s ethics, which has no room for grace because it constructs the concept of duty out of the opposition between freedom and nature. On the other hand, he refrains from any critical dissociation from Kant’s ethics in the section on dignity, which (...) Schiller conceives of as more of a ‘masculine’ virtue that more closely approximates Kant’s model of human volition characterized by conflict and difference. Apart from that, Schiller’s conception of the sublime does not constitute any continuation of this doctrine in Kant. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 2 Seiten: 249-250.

Neste texto, discute-se a concepção desenvolvida por Rainer Forst do “direito à justificação”, um princípio filosófico básico dos direitos humanos presente na tradição da ideia kantiana de “razão pura prática”. Forst procura demonstrar que o reconhecimento do outro, como um ser finito e com necessidades, fundamenta diante de mim um direito a razões justificadoras. A dignidade do outro me obriga a agir perante ele apenas conforme tais razões, as quais ele pode compreender e aprovar. No texto, demonstram-se também alguns pontos (...) fracos desse princípio de Forst que, sobre tudo, resultam da insolúvel tensão entre uma teoria da razão prática e uma teoria do reconhecimento. Além disso, defende-se a tese de que o “direito à justificação” deve ser considerado “direito ao conhecimento do Bem” (Hegel), que a pessoa ativa tem em relação aos outros. (shrink)

In this talk, Hume’s distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the Treatise of Human Nature will be discussed. It will be argued that Hume accuses previous moral philosophers neither of committing a logical error in their reasoning, nor of falling short of a possible deduction of an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ because of false assumptions. Rather, Hume argues that these philosophers have an incorrect notion of reason: By means of reason, we do not discover eternal moral truths, and also, reason (...) does not motivate us. According to Hume, reason reveals only causal relations that exist between external facts and our emotions, which are facts as well. The ‘ought’ is located just in our emotions and not in the things which evoke the moral emotions inside us. (shrink)