This paper considers the problem of how to evaluate an offender’s criminal record. This evaluation is part of the sentencing process carried out by a judge, and may be complicated in the case of offenders with a heavy record. We give a comprehensive overview of the approach to an offender’s past record in various (Western) countries, considering the two major approaches: desert-based and utilitarian. The paper describes the determination of the parameters involved in the evaluation, and the construction of a (...) decision support system to be used by a judge about to pass sentence in a criminal case. The system may be used as a stand-alone system, but can also be integrated as a component of a general sentencing support system, e.g. a statistical sentencing information system. The system is a knowledge-based system. The knowledge base (in rule-form) was created primarily by eliciting knowledge from experts (judges, lawyers, academics and probation officers), but also by applying statutory law, case law and legal authoritative texts. It is flexible in the sense, that a user can introduce his1 own preferences (expressed as numerical coefficients) and thereby apply different sentencing principles. The prototype is at present undergoing testing by some of the participating judges. (shrink)

We describe the state of the Talmudic Logic project as of end of 2019. The Talmud is the most comprehensive and fundamental work of Jewish religious law, employing a large number of logical components centuries ahead of their time. In many cases the basic principles are not explicitly formulated, which makes it difficult to formalize and make available to the modern student of Logic. This project on Talmudic Logic, aims to present logical analysis of Talmudic reasoning using modern logical tools. (...) We investigate principles of Talmudic Logic and publish a series of books, one book or more for each principle. The series begins with the systematic analysis of Talmudic inference rules. The first book shows that we can present Talmudic reasoning intuitions as a systematic logical system basic to modern non-deductive reasoning, such as Argumentum A Fortiori, Abduction and Analogy. The second book offers a systematic common sense method for intuitively defining sets and claims that this method adequately models the Talmudic use of the rules Klal uPrat. These books also criticize modern Talmudic research methodology. Later books deal with additional topics like Deontic logic, and Temporal logic, Agency and processes in the Talmud and more. The aims of the project are two fold: 1. To import into the Talmudic study modern logical methods with a view to help understand complicated Talmudic passages, which otherwise cannot be addressed. 2. To export from the Talmud new logical principles which are innovative and useful to modern contemporary logic. (shrink)

Much legal research focuses on understanding how judicial decision-makers exercise their discretion. In this paper we examine the notion of legal or judicial discretion, and weaker and stronger forms of discretion. At all times our goal is to build cognitive models of the exercise of discretion, with a view to building computer software to model and primarily support decision-making. We observe that discretionary decision-making can best be modeled using three independent axes: bounded and unbounded, defined and undefined, and binary and (...) continuous. Examples of legal tasks are given from each of the eight ensuing octants and we conclude by saying what this model shows about current legal trends. We should stress that our taxonomy has been based on our observations of how discretionary legal decisions are made. No claim is made that our model is either complete (providing advice in every domain) or exact, but it does help knowledge engineers construct legal decision support systems in discretionary domains. (shrink)

This article deals with a set-theoretic interpretation of the Talmudic rules of General and Specific, known as Klal and Prat (KP), Prat and Klal (PK), Klal and Prat and Klal (KPK) and Prat and Klal and Prat (PKP).

We investigate the form of mathematical structuralism that acknowledges the existence of structures and their distinctive structural elements. This form of structuralism has been subject to criticisms recently, and our view is that the problems raised are resolved by proper, mathematics-free theoretical foundations. Starting with an axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we identify a mathematical structure as an abstract object encoding the truths of a mathematical theory. From such foundations, we derive consequences that address the main questions and issues that (...) have arisen. Namely, elements of different structures are different. A structure and its elements ontologically depend on each other. There are no haecceities and each element of a structure must be discernible within the theory. These consequences are not developed piecemeal but rather follow from our definitions of basic structuralist concepts. (shrink)

How far should our realism extend? For many years philosophers of mathematics and philosophers of ethics have worked independently to address the question of how best to understand the entities apparently referred to by mathematical and ethical talk. But the similarities between their endeavours are not often emphasised. This book provides that emphasis. In particular, it focuses on two types of argumentative strategies that have been deployed in both areas. The first—debunking arguments—aims to put pressure on realism by emphasising the (...) seeming redundancy of mathematical or moral entities when it comes to explaining our judgements. In the moral realm this challenge has been made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street; in the mathematical realm it is known as the 'Benacerraf-Field' problem. The second strategy—indispensability arguments—aims to provide support for realism by emphasising the seeming intellectual indispensability of mathematical or moral entities, for example when constructing good explanatory theories. This strategy is associated with Quine and Putnam in mathematics and with Nicholas Sturgeon and David Enoch in ethics. Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics addresses these issues through an explicitly comparative methodology which we call the 'companions in illumination' approach. By considering how argumentative strategies in the philosophy of mathematics might apply to the philosophy of ethics, and vice versa, the papers collected here break new ground in both areas. For good measure, two further companions for illumination are also broached: the philosophy of chance and the philosophy of religion. Collectively, these comparisons light up new questions, arguments, and problems of interest to scholars interested in realism in any area. (shrink)

Biological phenomena can be investigated at multiple levels, from the molecular to the cellular to the organismic to the ecological. In typical biology instruction, these levels have been segregated. Yet, it is by examining the connections between such levels that many phenomena in biology, and complex systems in general, are best explained. We describe a computation-based approach that enables students to investigate the connections between different biological levels. Using agent-based, embodied modeling tools, students model the microrules underlying a biological phenomenon (...) and observe the resultant aggregate dynamics. We describe 2 cases in which this approach was used. In both cases, students framed hypotheses, constructed multiagent models that incorporate these hypotheses, and tested these by running their models and observing the outcomes. Contrasting these cases against traditionally used, classical equation-based approaches, we argue that the embodied modeling approach connects more directly to students’ experience, enables extended investigations as well as deeper understanding, and enables “advanced” topics to be productively introduced into the high school curriculum. (shrink)

What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have been debating these questions for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to (...) understand that both fields can make substantive contributions to the free-will debate, so working together is the best path forward to understanding whether, when, and how our choices might be free. We therefore asked leading philosophers and neuroscientists which questions related to free will they would most like the other field to answer. Those experts then voted on the 15 most important questions for each field to answer. This book is a collection of the answers to those questions along with follow-up questions from world experts in the neuroscience and philosophy of free will. These varied perspectives will fascinate, illuminate, and stimulate students from both fields along with anyone who wants to be brought up to date on these profound issues. (shrink)

According to Alix Cohen, Kant defines emotions as ‘feelings’. Although I find her account of Kantian feelings compelling, I provide three reasons to doubt that it is an account of emotions: (1) it is unclear why Cohen identifies emotions with Kantian feelings; (2) some Kantian feelings are not emotions; (3) some Kantian desires may be emotions. I propose, however, that with some qualifications Cohen’s account may be upheld, provided its extra-textual assumptions about emotions are explicated. Against her claim that Kantian (...) feelings have a derived intentionality, I argue that the text is compatible with their being intrinsically intentional. (shrink)

Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In (...) this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non-deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles. (shrink)

Assuming the existence of a supercompact cardinal and a weakly compact cardinal above it, we provide a generic extension where there are no Aronszajn trees of height ω 2 or ω 3 . On the other hand we show that some large cardinal assumptions are necessary for such a consistency result.

Commentators provide two different accounts of desires in Kant: “feeling-based” accounts stress their connection with feelings, while “action-based” accounts view them as causes of action. I argue that “feeling-based” accounts blur the feeling-desire distinction, while the “action-based” accounts conflict with Kantian desires that do not cause action. On my alternative, Kantian desires are dispositions to action normally directed at producing future objects, and so they differ from the feelings they are connected to, which refer to the way we are affected (...) by objects. This account preserves the feeling-desire distinction, is compatible with desires that do not cause action, and anticipates holistic theories of desire that combine dispositional, hedonic, and evaluative components. (shrink)

Commentators disagree about Kant’s view on the proper treatment of emotions. In contrast to a tendency in this literature to treat them uniformly, I argue that, according to Kant, feelings (but not affects) require cultivation, and inclinations – although they can and perhaps may be cultivated – generally require discipline. The appropriate treatment for emotions depends on their susceptibility to rational constraint and on the threat they pose to rational deliberation. Although I read Kant as recommending that we cultivate certain (...) emotions, I argue that my reading is not vulnerable to Thomason’s recent pertinent objections to such readings. (shrink)

In this essay I offer a new particularist reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I argue that the interpretation I present not only helps us to resolve some puzzles about Aristotle’s goals and methods, but it also gives rise to a novel account of morality—an account that is both interesting and plausible in its own right. The goal of this paper is, in part, exegetical—that is, to figure out how to best understand the text of the Nicomachean Ethics. But this paper (...) also aims to contribute to the current exciting and controversial debate over particularism. By taking the first steps towards a comprehensive particularist reading of Aristotle’s Ethics I hope to demonstrate that some of the mistrust of particularism is misplaces and that what is, perhaps, the most influential moral theory in the history of philosophy is, arguably, a particularist moral theory. (shrink)

We discuss the problem of finding forcing posets which introduce closed unbounded subsets to a given stationary set.

What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism (...) as a research program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particularist research program shows enough promise to warrant further exploration. (shrink)

The paper identifies a distinctive feature of friendship. Friendship, it is argued, is a relationship between two people in which each participant values the other and successfully communicates this fact to the other. This feature of friendship, it is claimed, explains why friendship plays a key role in human happiness, why it is praised by philosophers, poets, and novelists, and why we all seek friends. Although the characterization of friendship proposed here differs from other views in the literature, it is (...) shown that it accommodates key insights of other writers on the topic. Thus, in accordance with the Aristotelian strategy the paper employs, it is shown that the account on offer preserves the received opinions on friendship. (shrink)

The current study aims to examine how the intense emotions experienced by different Israeli groups during the 2006 Second Lebanon War affected their perceptions of risk. Two weeks after the end of the war, a questionnaire was distributed among 205 people. Some were from the north and had been directly affected by the rocket attacks; others were from the center of Israel. The questionnaires, based on Lerner et al., measured emotions and perceived risk. The results show significant differences between those (...) living in the north and those in the center of Israel. As expected, people living in the north reported more emotional difficulties during the war, greater perceived risk, and more pessimism in comparison to the center group. Moreover, the results point to significant differences between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs regarding emotions and perceived risk. In addition, the study results show a positive relation between anger and perceived risk. (shrink)

A forcing poset of size 221 which adds no new reals is described and shown to provide a Δ22 definable well-order of the reals . The encoding of this well-order is obtained by playing with products of Aronszajn trees: some products are special while other are Suslin trees. The paper also deals with the Magidor–Malitz logic: it is consistent that this logic is highly noncompact.

In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are (...) careful to keep separate the various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation of the fact that Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral scepticism. (shrink)

Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally, I (...) argue that particularists and pluralists are better situated than monists to explain why it is a good idea to think before we act, and that this gives us reason to favor particularism and pluralism over monism. (shrink)

Many of us read Peter Singer ’ s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer ’ s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (...) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ ad hominem reply ” to students ’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness / unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound. (shrink)

Descartes claimed that the Cogito is ‘so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it’. This paper aims to demonstrate that this claim is false by presenting a sceptical scenario for the Cogito. It is argued that the story ‘The Circular Ruins’ by J. L. Borges illustrates that one can doubt one’s own existence and that pace Descartes (and many others) the claim ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it (...) is put forward by me or conceived in my mind’ is false. (shrink)

We present two experiments that cast doubt on existing evidence suggesting that it is impossible to suspend belief in a comprehended proposition. In Experiment 1, we found that interrupting the encoding of a statement's veracity decreased memory for the statement's falsity when the false version of the statement was uninformative, but not when the false version was informative. This suggests that statements that are informative when false are not represented as if they were true. In Experiment 2, participants made faster (...) lexical decisions to words implied by preceding statements when they were told that the statements were true than when the veracity of the statements was unknown or when the statements were false. The findings suggest that comprehending a statement may not require believing it, and that it may be possible to suspend belief in comprehended propositions. (shrink)

To accelerate the adoption of a new method with a high potential to replace or extend an existing, presumably less accurate, medical scoring system, evaluation should begin days after the new concept is presented publicly, not years or even decades later. Metaphorically speaking, as chameleons capable of quickly changing colors to help their bodies adjust to changes in temperature or light, health-care decision makers should be capable of more quickly evaluating new data-driven insights and tools and should integrate the highest (...) performing ones into national and international care systems. Doing so is essential, because it will truly save the lives of many individuals. (shrink)

Nietzschean Psychology and Psychotherapy describes Nietzsche as an unacknowledged critic of psychology and mental health, bringing out and integrating his teachings about wise living, coping with pain and suffering, and effecting self-change and self-cultivation.

The Cnidaria represent the most ancient eumetazoan phylum. Members of this group possess typical animal cells and tissues such as sensory cells, nerve cells, muscle cells and epithelia. Due to their unique phylogenetic position, cnidarians have traditionally been used as a reference group in various comparative studies. We propose the colonial marine hydroid, Hydractinia, as a convenient, versatile platform for basic and applied research in developmental biology, reproduction, immunology, environmental studies and more. In addition to being a typical cnidarian representative, (...) Hydractinia offers many practical and theoretical advantages: studies that are feasible in Hydra like regeneration, pattern regulation, and cell renewal from stem cells, can be supplemented by genetic analyses and classical embryology in Hydractinia. Metamorphosis of the planula larva of Hydractinia can be used as a model for cell activation and communication and the presence of a genetically controlled allorecognition system makes it a suitable model for comparative immunology. Most importantly, Hydractinia may be manipulated at most aspects of its (short) life cycle. It has already been the subject of many studies in various disciplines, some of which are discussed in this essay. BioEssays 23:963–971, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

In the following pages we propose a theory on cognitive systems and the common strategies of perception, which are at the basis of their function. We demonstrate that these strategies are easily seen to be in place in known cognitive systems such as vision and language. Furthermore we show that taking these strategies into consideration implies a new outlook on immune function calling for a new appraisal of the immune system as a cognitive system.

What are the consequences, for human moral practice, of an evolutionary understanding of that practice? By ‘moral practice’ we mean the way in which human beings think, talk and debate in moral terms. We suggest that the proper upshot of such considerations is moderate support for anti-realism in ethics.

The methodology of physics is discussed. The limitations of the empirical method are exposed, and it is argued that these limitations are related to our sensory input. The limitations of mathematics and of the representation of physical theories by mathematical models are also examined. An alternative methodology, the establishing of physical models on neuropsychology, is suggested and demonstrated. A cognitive psychological model of the genesis and the termination of time is explored.

This study investigates the ontological status of some physical and cosmological theories that are not based on empirical observation and probably cannot be tested empirically. It is suggested that these theories exist only in our consciousness and are no more than Kantian ideas. Indeed, these theories imply paradoxes as was predicted by Kant regarding ideas of pure reason.