When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification (...) of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior. (shrink)

When philosophers speak of direct perceptual knowledge, they obviously mean to suggest that such knowledge is unmediated ? but unmediated by what? This is where we find evidence of violent disagreement. To clarify matters, I want to identify and briefly describe several important senses of "direct" that have helped shape our understanding of perceptual knowledge. They are (1) "Direct" as Non-Inferential Perception; (2) "Direct" as Unmediating by Objects of Perception; (3) "Direct" as Conceptually Unmediated Perception; (4) "Direct" as Independent Verification (...) of Perceptual Beliefs; and (5) "Direct" as Perception of What is Epistemically Prior. (shrink)

An examination of Schopenhauer’s epistemology can considerably enhance our appreciation of his philosophical achievement in at least three major ways: First, by shedding light on the unity and internal coherence of his system ; second, by clearly revealing some of his fundamental disagreements with Kant; and, finally, by making it plain that he is less removed from the mainstream epistemology-centred tradition of modern philosophy than some have supposed. To make good on these claims, I address three questions about his epistemology: (...) Does Schopenhauer accept a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification? On what grounds does he reject skepticism concerning our knowledge of the external world? and In what does he think the true philosophical significance of skepticism consists? (shrink)

The dissertation falls into two sections. Part I deals with classical pragmatist arguments against the correspondence theory of truth; Part II , with neo-pragmatist arguments against the possibility of a substantive theory of knowledge. The goal of Part I is to reconstruct and evaluate the main anti-correspondence arguments employed by the classical pragmatists and contemporary neo-pragmatists . Here we offer detailed critical and historical discussions of two arguments in particular: the comparison objection, which claims that the idea that truth is (...) a matter of correspondence with the facts leads directly to skepticism; and the constructivist or anti-realist objection, according to which the correspondence theory is tenable only if realism is defensible, and thus cannot survive the latter position's fall from grace. After considering these objections, we address what James and Dewey had to say about the nature of the correspondence relation itself, and urge that their position has been badly misunderstood by foes and friends alike. Part II deals with the misgivings neo-pragmatists have about the very idea of a philosophical "theory of knowledge." Within analytic philosophy, the most familiar and aggressive expression of this anti-epistemology attitude is Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. However, Rorty is far from alone in declaring epistemology moribund: philosophers in both the Anglo-American and Continental traditions have been busy composing obituaries for some time now. Our primary aim in Part II is to refute two main arguments central to the neo-pragmatist anti-epistemology case: the arguments against "foundations", a heterogeneous family of four objections to the idea of epistemology as 'foundational'; and the anti-representationalist argument, according to which skepticism and epistemology itself are said to rest on an untenable representationalist conception of thought or language. (shrink)

(2003). The World as Representation: Schopenhauer's Arguments for Transcendental Idealism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 57-87.

In this important new book, Douglas McDermid argues persuasively for two key claims: first, that the so-called "Neo-Pragmatist" critique of traditional epistemology is thoroughly unconvincing; second, that Rorty is guilty of taking the name of Pragmatism in vain, since there are crucial and far-reaching differences between Neo-Pragmatism and the Classical Pragmatism of James and Dewey. The Varieties of Pragmatism will take its place in the forefront of the literature on this most vital part of the American philosophical (...) legacy. (shrink)

Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an ideology or proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that unpractical ideas are to be rejected. Pragmatism originated in the United States during the latter quarter of the nineteenth century. Although it has significantly influenced non-philosophers—notably in the fields of law, education, politics, sociology, psychology, and literary criticism—this article deals with (...) it only as a movement within philosophy. (shrink)

Once a name to conjure with, Scottish idealist James Frederick Ferrier (1808–1864) is now a largely forgotten figure, notwithstanding the fact that he penned a work of remarkable power and originality: the Institutes of Metaphysic (1854). In ‘Reid and the Philosophy and Common Sense,’ an essay of 1847 which anticipates some of the central themes of the Institutes of Metaphysic, Ferrier presents an excoriating critique of Thomas Reid's brand of common sense realism. Understanding Ferrier's critique of Reid – its (...) content, motivations, and significance – is the task of the present essay. (shrink)

This chapter examines the work of pragmatism's two earliest exponents, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and William James (1842–1910). Particular attention is paid to the latter's version of pragmatism: a liberal and irenic Lebensphilosophie which judged thoughts by their practical consequences, encouraged individuals to trust the deepest demands of their natures, emphasized the creative and purposive character of all human thought, and stressed the moral and intellectual necessity of tolerating rival points of view. Two defining features of James's outlook (...) are emphasized and explored: his post‐positivist philosophy of science, and his ground‐breaking work in the philosophy of religion. Yet Jamesian pragmatism is full of arguments, many of them insightful, penetrating, and provocative. If philosophers have not always realized this, it is partly because of his magnificent prose style, which is both colloquial and eloquent, urbane but lofty, witty and playful yet not lacking in gravitas. (shrink)

This incisive study concerns the ways in which theological claims about creation's original and final perfection shape social ethics. Schuurman argues that prominent 20th century theologians Emil Brunner and Jurgen Moltmann wrongly envision the eschaton as radically discontinuous with creation, and that this discontinuity coheres with serious inadequacies in their social ethics. His thesis is that continuity between creation and eschaton is necessary if Christian social ethics is to avoid dualistic understandings of love and justice, personal and impersonal values, church (...) and world, revolutionism and conservatism. Schuurman establishes theological groundwork for a social ethic that calls for continuous transformation of social institutions and structures.". (shrink)

Anthropocentric and individualistic foundations result in forest management policy based on linear, single?dimensional, marginal analysis detrimental to the well?being of the forest ecosystem. Recent theories from the fields of ethics, economics, and policy analysis find that nonlinear, multidimensional analysis is possible, provided one can divorce oneself from anthropocentric and individualistic tendencies. Deep policy is introduced as a policy perspective that encourages questioning the fundamental values upon which policy decisions are made, just as deep ecology encourages a similar questioning of ecological (...) values. An experiment is proposed for forest management in the Pacific Northwest, in which a self?realizing Forest Board demonstrates punctuated equilibrium in forest management policy. (shrink)

My concern in this paper is with a simple question: Does Donald Davidson's case for an anti-foundationalist epistemology cohere well with his stance on conceptual schemes? After rehearsing Davidson's central anti-foundationalist argument in Section 2, I consider the objection that his argument rests on a premise which is defensible only if we invoke the so-called "dualism of scheme and content", Davidson's opposition to which is the subject of Section 3. Then, in Section 4, I explain why, despite appearances to the (...) contrary, there is actually no incompatibility between the premise of Davidson's anti-foundationalist argument and his insistence that the scheme / content dualism is untenable. Finally, in Section 5, I discuss what this reveals about the basic unity and orientation of Davidson's theory of knowledge. (shrink)

My concern in this paper is with a simple question: Does Donald Davidson's case for an anti-foundationalist epistemology cohere well with his stance on conceptual schemes? After rehearsing Davidson's central anti-foundationalist argument in Section 2, I consider the objection that his argument rests on a premise which is defensible only if we invoke the so-called "dualism of scheme and content", Davidson's opposition to which is the subject of Section 3. Then, in Section 4, I explain why, despite appearances to the (...) contrary, there is actually no incompatibility between the premise of Davidson's anti-foundationalist argument and his insistence that the scheme / content dualism is untenable. Finally, in Section 5, I discuss what this reveals about the basic unity and orientation of Davidson's theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Progress in transplantation outcomes depends on continuing research into both donor and recipient factors that may enhance graft and patient survival. A system of licencing for transplantation research, introduced by the Human Tissue Act 2004, which separates it from the transplantation process (then exempt from licencing), has damaged this vital activity by a combination of inflexible interpretation of the 2004 Act and fear of criminal liability on the part of researchers. Now, following the European Union (EU) Directive (2010) on standards (...) of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation, new UK Regulations have been drafted, which are intended to implement it. These Regulations impose a compulsory licencing system, similar to that for research, on the whole transplantation process. This goes beyond what is required by the Directive and may even have an inhibitory effect similar to that already seen in research. Initial draft Regulations went further, imposing criminal sanctions for breaches. However, following a public consultation process, the Department of Health (DH) has recently stated that, as a result of the overwhelming view of respondents that the proposed licencing system was unnecessary, all sanctions under the final Regulations are now decriminalised, with the sole exception of operating without a licence. While this does not eliminate the negative effect of licencing, it does suggest an awareness of the DH that excessive regulation unnecessarily harms the transplantation process. An opportunity thus arises for the Human Tissue Authority (the regulatory body for both the new licences and research licences under the 2004 Act) to end the current illogical and harmful separation of transplantation and transplantation research by ensuring that all centres licenced for organ donation, retrieval and transplantation are also fully licenced for related research. (shrink)

Douglas McDermid presents a study of the remarkable flourishing of Scottish philosophy from the 18th to the mid-19th century. He examines how Kames, Reid, Stewart, Hamilton, and Ferrier gave illuminating treatments of the central philosophical problem of the existence of a material world independently of perception and thought.

McDermid clarifies the nature of Santayana’s scepticism by examining his response to the traditional sceptical problem of the external world. The chapter explains in what sense we can regard Santayana as a sceptic and in what sense Santayana is a critic of the sceptical method promulgated by Descartes.

If truth were a matter of correspondence with the facts, then S could justify her empirical beliefs only by directly comparing them with a denuded and unconceptualized reality and confirming that the relation of correspondence obtains.

This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 4 5 Notes References Further Reading.

Is epistemology the opium of modern philosophers, numbing fine minds and filling them with world‐denying dreams? The American pragmatist John Dewey (1859–1952) was convinced that it was, and he thought his brand of naturalism was the proper way to treat this pernicious addiction. In this chapter, I shall present Dewey's audacious and influential defense of this thesis. Audacious, because Dewey attacks assumptions about the nature of mind, knowledge, truth, and reality which have long been central to Western philosophy. Influential, because (...) Dewey's bold polemic has served as a major reference point for several leading pragmatists – Sidney Hook (1902–1989), W.V.O. Quine (1908–2000), Richard Rorty (1931–2007), and Philip Kitcher (b. 1947) – whose naturalist predilections are well known. (shrink)

In this essay, I focus exclusively on an ill-understood Schopenhauerian objection to realism, which I call the Inconceivability Argument (since its conclusion is that realism is inconceivable or unintelligible). The received scholarly view of Schopenhauer’s supposedly conclusive disproof of realism is that it is nothing but a simple and familiar fallacy. I disagree; and in this paper I develop three ways of understanding the Inconceivability Argument, according to which Schopenhauer’s reductio is not an insubstantial and worthless sophism but a solid (...) construction in which some valuable philosophical insights are embedded. (shrink)

Consider the following proposition: It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: What is Ryle’s argument against?; How persuasive is it?; What positions are ruled out if is absurd?; and How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

In Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World, John Searle presents an uncompromising apologia for realism which is distinguished both by its lucidity and by its vigour. His basic strategy is to show that realists have at their disposal the resources needed to refute skeptics who allege that a mind-independent world is unknowable. In this paper, I reconstruct Searle´s principal pro-realist argument (Section 3), then argue that it is vitiated by its reliance on two unwarranted assumptions (Sections 4-6). (...) First, however, I summarize the position- “external realism”-Searle defends (Section 2). (shrink)