Since the dawn of Romanticism, artists and intellectuals in Germany have maintained an abiding interest in the gods and myths of antiquity while calling for a new mythology suitable to the modern age. In this study, George S. Williamson examines the factors that gave rise to this distinct and profound longing for myth. In doing so, he demonstrates the entanglement of aesthetic and philosophical ambitions in Germany with some of the major religious conflicts of the nineteenth century. Through (...) readings of key intellectuals ranging from Herder and Schelling to Wagner and Nietzsche, Williamson highlights three crucial factors in the emergence of the German engagement with myth: the tradition of Philhellenist neohumanism, a critique of contemporary aesthetic and public life as dominated by private interests, and a rejection of the Bible by many Protestant scholars as the product of a foreign, "Oriental" culture. According to Williamson, the discourse on myth in Germany remained bound up with problems of Protestant theology and confessional conflict through the nineteenth century and beyond. A compelling adventure in intellectual history, this study uncovers the foundations of Germany's fascination with myth and its enduring cultural legacy. (shrink)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR George Hunt Williamson served with the Army Air Corps during World War II as Radio Director for the Army Air Forces Technical Training..

Zusammenfassung Das Thema des Gottesdienstes hat in der neueren theologiegeschichtlichen Forschung bislang keine hinreichende Beachtung gefunden. Die Diskussionen über die Notwendigkeit des Gottesdienstes, seinen Charakter und seinen Symbolgehalt führten am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts zu einer grundsätzlichen Erörterung des positiven Charakters des Christentums und seiner institutionellen Rolle in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Die Schriften Immanuel Kants, Carl Friedrich Stäudlins und Friedrich von Hardenbergs belegen den damaligen Wandel der Gottesdienstauffassung, indem sie die Ideen der Französischen Revolution und deren Implikationen für das religiöse (...) Leben thematisieren. Kants Unterscheidung von politischer und moralischer Religion nutzte Stäudlin, um die theophilanthropische Form eines aufklärerischen Gottesdienstes zu kritisieren. Novalis beurteilte die Theophilanthropie, die er als Negation jeglicher genuinen Religion ansah, ebenfalls kritisch. In Kants, Stäudlins und Novalis' Stellungnahmen zu Fragen des Gottesdienstes deutet sich zugleich der Übergang von aufklärerischen Religionskategorien zu frühromantischen Religionsmotiven an. (shrink)

Like a typical volume of the Library of Living Philosophers series, this volume has three parts, beginning with a short philosophical autobiography by the philosopher in question, Hans-Georg Gadamer. “Reflections on my Philosophical Journey” is partly a recounting of significant moments of Gadamer’s academic career and his postretirement career as a traveling lecturer, and partly a reassessment of the strengths and shortcomings of his major work, Truth and Method. He seems to wish to defend the political significance of hermeneutics against (...) what he terms, without naming names, “method-fanatics and ideology-critics”. An exploration of the factors that motivated his thinking, he suggests, will prove hermeneutics to possess both methodical rationality and a critical, emancipatory capacity. To this end, he sketches the relation of his central concepts to those of other thinkers, mainly Heidegger, Hegel, Kant, Plato, and Aristotle, emphasizing his recouping of ancient Greek “practical philosophy” against “scholasticism”. Practical philosophy, Gadamer insists, supplies a model of rationality that steers a middle course between absolute conceptual fixity and empty relativism, and can achieve the right balance of openness in unconstrained dialogue, yet remain tied to real human praxis. As such, hermeneutics offers the possibility of relevantly addressing and entering into dialogue with the Other, a capacity perhaps essential to the viability of modern politics. (shrink)

Entre-Nous is a valuable collection of essays, arranged chronologically from the early 1950s to the late 1980s, by the Lithuanian cum French Jewish thinker who died in 1995.

Identifying Selfhood organizes many of the features of Ricoeur’s philosophical views around the major theme of selfhood, Ricoeur’s hermeneutical quest for a “non-idealistic interpretation of the self.” In a quasi-developmental account, the author, Henry Isaac Venema, provides the reader with numerous details of Ricoeur’s relation to phenomenology and hermeneutics, as well as the complexities of Ricoeur’s views of self-constitution and self-understanding, involving the use of symbolism, metaphor, and narrative.

This volume succeeds the same authors' well-known An Introduction to Modal Logic and A Companion to Modal Logic. We designate the three books and their authors NIML, IML, CML and H&C respectively. Sadly, George Hughes died partway through the writing of NIML.

Book review of Jon Williamson's `In Defence of objective Bayesianism'.

Indeterminacy in its various forms has been the focus of a great deal of philosophical attention in recent years. Much of this discussion has focused on the status of vague predicates such as ‘tall’, ‘bald’, and ‘heap’. It is determinately the case that a seven-foot person is tall and that a five-foot person is not tall. However, it seems difficult to pick out any determinate height at which someone becomes tall. How best to account for this phenomenon is, of course, (...) a controversial matter. For example, some (such as Sorensen (2001) and Williamson (2002)) maintain that there is a precise height at which someone becomes tall and such apparent cases of indeterminacy merely reflects our ignorance of this fact. Others maintain that there is some genuine – and not merely epistemic – indeterminacy present is such cases and offer various accounts of how best to account for it. Supervaluationists (such as Keefe (2008)), for example, claim that the indeterminacy with respect to vague terms lies in their not having a single definite extension. Rather, each term is associated with a range of possible precise extensions or precisifications such that it is semantically unsettled which is the correct extension. One precisification of ‘tall’ might allow that anyone over five feet ten inches is tall, whereas another would only allow those over six foot to qualify; but no precisification will take someone who is five foot to be tall, and someone who is seven foot will count as tall on all precisifications. Thus – while someone who is seven foot will be determinately tall and someone who is five foot determinately not so – it will be indeterminate whether someone who stands at five foot eleven inches is tall. -/- Yet, it is important to stress that putative cases of indeterminacy are not limited to vague predicates of this kind. Philosophers have invoked indeterminacy in discussions of topics as diverse as moral responsibility (Bernstein (forthcoming)), identity over time (Williams (2014)), and the status of the future (Barnes and Cameron (2009)). In this paper, we focus on two areas where discussion of various kinds of indeterminacy has been commonplace: physics and fiction. We propose a new model for understanding indeterminacy across these domains and argue that it has some notable advantages when compared to earlier accounts. Treating physics and fiction cases univocally also indicates an interesting connection between indeterminacy in these two areas. (shrink)

According to Williamson , the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson’s prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson’s calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised (...) as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance hypotheses. The objective Bayesian equivocates between these calibrated density functions rather than between the calibrated probability functions themselves. The result is an objective Bayesianism that avoids the main problem afflicting Williamson’s original proposal. (shrink)

The book proceeds by investigating theism, atheism, pantheism, and panentheism as descriptions of Hegel's concept.

In epistemology and in philosophy of language there is fierce debate about the role of context in knowledge, understanding, and meaning. Many contemporary epistemologists take seriously the thesis that epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. This thesis is of course a semantic claim, so it has brought epistemologists into contact with work on context in semantics by philosophers of language. This volume brings together the debates, in a set of twelve specially written essays representing the latest work by leading figures in the (...) two fields. All future work on contextualism will start here. Contributors: Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, John Hawthorne, Ernest Lepore, Peter Ludlow, Peter Pagin, Georg Peter, Paul M. Pietroski, Gerhard Preyer, Jonathan Schaffer, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson, Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

Russell once compared a good notation to a good teacher. Whatever can be said in a good notation can be said in a bad one, just as whatever can be said by a good teacher can be said by a bad one; the difference is that the good notation and the good teacher help one discover more for oneself. It has gradually emerged that the language of modal logic constitutes a good notation for the study of formal provability. That application (...) of modal logic is the subject of George Boolos' welcome new book. (shrink)

Russell once compared a good notation to a good teacher. Whatever can be said in a good notation can be said in a bad one, just as whatever can be said by a good teacher can be said by a bad one; the difference is that the good notation and the good teacher help one discover more for oneself. It has gradually emerged that the language of modal logic constitutes a good notation for the study of formal provability. That application (...) of modal logic is the subject of George Boolos' welcome new book. (shrink)

Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one’s evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agent-dependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one’s evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard (...) to the probability function one should adopt as one’s belief function, Williamson advocates selecting the probability function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence while Masterton advocates selecting the expected probability function relative to the density function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence. In this paper we discuss the significant relative strengths of these two positions. In particular, Masterton’s original proposal is further developed and investigated to reveal its significant properties; including its equivalence to the centre of mass inference process and its ability to accommodate higher order evidence. (shrink)

Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...) illustrated by rigorous models based on epistemic logic and probability theory. The result is a new way of doing epistemology and a notable contribution to the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Second-order logic and modal logic are both, separately, major topics of philosophical discussion. Although both have been criticized by Quine and others, increasingly many philosophers find their strictures uncompelling, and regard both branches of logic as valuable resources for the articulation and investigation of significant issues in logical metaphysics and elsewhere. One might therefore expect some combination of the two sorts of logic to constitute a natural and more comprehensive background logic for metaphysics. So it is somewhat surprising to find (...) that philosophical discussion of secondorder modal logic is almost totally absent, despite the pioneering contribution of Barcan. (shrink)

I. An argument is presented for the conclusion that the hypothesis that no one will ever decide a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent. II. A distinction between sentences and statements blocks a similar argument for the stronger conclusion that the hypothesis that I have not yet decided a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent, but does not block the original argument. III. A distinction between empirical and mathematical negation might block the original argument, and empirical negation might be modelled on Nelson''s (...) strong negation, but only on intuitionistically unacceptable assumptions. IV. Intuitionists may have to accept the original argument, and therefore be committed to a dubious view of time on which there cannot be merely inductive evidence for statements about the infinite future. (shrink)

The chapter argues that a model‐building methodology like that widespread in contemporary natural and social science already plays a significant role in philosophy. One neglected form of progress in philosophy over the past fifty years has been the development of better and better formal models of significant phenomena. Examples are given from both philosophy of language and epistemology. Philosophy can do still better in the future by applying model‐building methods more systematically and self‐consciously, with consequent readjustments to its methodology. Although (...) it is neither likely nor desirable for model‐building to become the sole or even main philosophical method, its use enhances the power and reliability of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

The philosophical relevance of experimental psychology is hard to dispute. Much more controversial is the so‐called negative program's critique of armchair philosophical methodology, in particular the reliance on ‘intuitions’ about thought experiments. This chapter responds to that critique. It argues that, since the negative program has been forced to extend the category of intuition to ordinary judgments about real‐life cases, the critique is in immediate danger of generating into global scepticism, because all human judgments turn out to depend on intuitions. (...) Recently, some proponents of the negative program have tried to demarcate the target of their critique more narrowly. However, their attempts are still far too indiscriminate, and over‐generate scepticism. Nevertheless, once experimental philosophy has refined its own methodology, it may contribute to the refinement of the methodology of mainstream philosophy, by filtering out the effects of cognitive bias, although it offers no prospect of doing without judgments on real or imaginary cases. (shrink)

Is it possible for the churches to take a joint stand on human dignity, even though they hold different positions in certain ethical questions? This study paper by the (Roman-Catholic) German Bishops' Conference and the United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany, which is available in English for the first time, explores new paths in the ecumenical handling of ethical questions. Using the methodology of "differentiated consensus", the authors outline the theological similarities of the churches' teaching of anthropology, whilst still doing (...) justice to their differences in the ethical assessment of individual issues of human conduct. In this way, Catholics and Lutherans adopt a common position and make a theologically responsible contribution to ethical judgement. (shrink)

Experiences of embodied remembering are familiar and diverse. We settle bodily into familiar chairs or find our way easily round familiar rooms. We inhabit our own kitchens or cars or workspaces effectively and comfortably, and feel disrupted when our habitual and accustomed objects or technologies change or break or are not available. Hearing a particular song can viscerally bring back either one conversation long ago, or just the urge to dance. Some people explicitly use their bodies to record, store, or (...) cue memories. Others can move skilfully, without stopping to think, in complex and changing environments thanks to the cumulative expertise accrued in their history of fighting fires, or dancing, or playing hockey. The forms of memory involved in these cases may be distinct, operating at different timescales and levels, and by way of different mechanisms and media, but they often cooperate in the many contexts of our practices of remembering. (shrink)

Operational epistemology is, to a first approximation, the attempt to provide cognitive rules such that one is in principle always in a position to know whether one is complying with them. In Knowledge and its Limits, I argue that the only such rules are trivial ones. In this paper, I generalize the argument in several ways to more thoroughly probabilistic settings, in order to show that it does not merely demonstrate some oddity of the folk epistemological conception of knowledge. Some (...) of the generalizations involve a formal semantic framework for treating epistemic probabilities of epistemic probabilities and expectations of expectations. The upshot is that operational epistemology cannot work, and that knowledge-based epistemology has the right characteristics to avoid its problems. (shrink)

Metaphysical modalities are definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. In particular, the role of conceivability and inconceivability in assessing claims of possibility and impossibility can be explained as a special case of the pervasive role of the imagination in assessing counterfactual conditionals, an account of which is sketched. Thus scepticism about metaphysical modality entails a more far-reaching scepticism about counterfactuals. The account is used to question the (...) significance of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. (shrink)

This paper explores how a regime recognizable as a Rawlsian property-owning democracy might be enshrined constitutionally in the context of the U.S. Five specific constitutional amendments are proposed: establishing an equal right to education, establishing a guaranteed social minimum, clarifying the legitimacy of regulating corporate political speech for the sake of political equality: establishing an individual right to a share of society’s productive wealth, and assuring communities of significant size the right to remain economically viable over time. The substance and (...) reasoning behind each proposal is discussed in length, and the paper also briefly discusses why a focus on constitutional amendments may be helpful both in clarifying how a property-owning democracy might be realized in practice and in establishing clear goals for social movements motivated by the aim of establishing a more equitable distribution of wealth, power, and opportunity in the United States. (shrink)