L’idea di una costruzione logica del mondo (eines logischen Aufbaus der Welt), cruciale per la filosofia della scienza del XX secolo, non è nuova. La tradizione aristotelica ha giocato una parte fondamentale nello stabilire una connessione essenziale fra scienza e logica, come pure più avanti le discussioni filosofiche del primo periodo moderno. Parallelamente, il possibile utilizzo metodologico e pratico della logica ha spesso indirizzato il lavoro dei praticanti dell’arte medica, i pedagogisti, gli enciclopedisti, i riformisti sociali e i primi utilitaristi. (...) A partire dalla seconda metà del XX secolo assistiamo al consolidamento di due specifici orientamenti. Da un lato, la logica si è espansa fino ad includere un numero crescente di forme argomentative e discorsive applicate ai domini più disparati del ragionamento umano; dall’altro lato, la logica formale si è applicata con successo crescente a campi di riflessione altamente specializzata. In questa antologia sono raccolti contributi che prendono in considerazione prospettive storiche e contemporanee sui rapporti fra logica, epistemologia, le scienze e la pratica – prendendo le mosse da un convegno organizzato a Ca’ Foscari su questi temi nel maggio 2019. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition (especially Christian thought). It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

By presenting a number of concrete examples, this paper aims at soliciting a reflection on how social phenomena become the ?objects of a science? by being classified in specific ways, to answer specific questions, in different social sciences. This is in view of arguing that the objectivity of the procedures by which social scientific objects are identified and classified can only be assessed in relation to the actual questions addressed and formulated about these objects ? rather than by referring back (...) to some ideal standard or protocol of objective inquiry. This also goes against the practice, often endorsed by social scientific literature, of fixing a model for what social objects are to be like (scientific or philosophical, under some description or other) and the distortingly ?normative? idea of social scientific objectivity which derives from such practice. The objects of social scientific inquiry are complex in a specific sense, and a plural identification of those objects in the context of the widest array of methods of description, classification and analysis is to be pursued. (shrink)

Science is remarkably reliable. It puts people on the moon, performs laser eye surgery, tells us about ancient civilisations and species, and predicts the future of our climate. What underwrites this reliability? This book argues that the standard answers—the scientific method, rigour, and objectivity—are insufficient for the job. Here we propose a new model of science that places its products front and centre. This is the ‘Tangle of Science’. In this book we show how any reliable piece of science is (...) underpinned by a vast, diverse, and thick network of other scientific products. In doing so we bring back into focus areas of science that have been long neglected, emphasising how every product, from the screws that hold the space shuttle together to ways of measuring the consumer price index to Einstein’s theory of general relativity, work together to support results we can trust. (shrink)

How does science enter policy making, and for what purpose? Surely consulting scientific facts in making policy is done with a view to making policy decisions more reliable, and ultimately more objective. In this paper I address the way/s by which science contributes to achieving objectivity in policy making and social debate, and argue that objectivity is not exhausted by what scientific evidence contributes to either. In policy making and social debates, scientific evidence is taken into account alongside other relevant (...) factors. Such complex contexts of practical interaction constitute a challenge both for the objectivity of scientific evidence, and for the objectivity of the role of the scientist in the policy-making process I analyse a case study - the ongoing debate over the spread of bovine TB in the UK - that displays some of the worries and several of the aspects we ought to keep in mind when we bring scientific objectivity to bear on social debate and policy making. I argue in favour of a picture where scientific objectivity enters a productive and effective dialogue with practical objectivity. (shrink)

Evidence-based approaches to policy-making are growing in popularity. A generally embraced view is that with the appropriate evidence at hand, decision and policy making will be optimal, legitimate and publicly accountable. In practice, however, evidence-based policy making is constrained by a variety of problems of evidence. Some of these problems will be explored in this article, in the context of the debates on evidence from which they originate. It is argued that the source of much disagreement might be a failure (...) to addressing crucial philosophical assumptions that inform, often silently, these debates. Three controversial questions will be raised which appear central to some of the challenges faced by evidence-based policy making: firstly, how do certain types of facts candidate themselves as evidence; secondly, how do we decide what evidence we have, and how much of it; and thirdly, can we combine evidence. In addressing these questions it will be shown how a philosophically informed debate might prove instrumental in clarifying and settling practical difficulties. (shrink)

Using a range of examples from specific social sciences, the book both identifies the practical and theoretical procedures involved in the identification of the ...

It is widely acknowledged that metaphors are used in science. Great scientists, such as Darwin and Einstein, believed that the use of metaphors is vital to the development of scientific ideas. The history of science is full of examples of scientific metaphors as tools at the forefront of discoveries of new facts and new concepts.

This is a much-needed new introduction to a field that has been transformed in recent years by exciting new subjects, ideas, and methods. It is designed for students in both philosophy and the social sciences. Topics include ontology, objectivity, method, measurement, and causal inference, and such issues as well-being and climate change.

What should citizens understand about science to participate in democratic life? Against the prevailing approach, we argue that “what” a public understanding of science is about strongly depends on the specific epistemological nature of the science related issues considered in different contexts and circumstances. We identify three specific categories of such issues and show how, equally, specific models of public understanding are required to address them. Only by endorsing such an alternative approach will citizens arguably be able to form sound (...) opinions about those very issues, as well as to discuss and deliberate rationally about them. (shrink)

Several and repeated attempts have been made to say what objectivity consists of and why it should be pursued in research. In the first part of this paper two main strategies are singled out, sharing the assumption that there is a way objectivity can be thought of in the abstract, and that it can be instantiated in context—and in enough contexts to justify the abstract case. But not only is this assumption open to the objection that objectivity so conceived does (...) not admit of one clear definition that is appropriate in many or most contexts where we intend the term to do its work. It also does not seem to pay specific attention to what actually constitutes a context of practice, when we think of objectivity in some relation to such context. The aim of this paper is to question how context works both as a mechanism of meaning formation for the concept of objectivity, and as a practical framework for pursuing research objectively. To articulate a suitable notion of context some insight from recent literature in the philosophy of science is first introduced and then adapted to show how research practices successfully achieve objectivity as one of their aims. It will be argued that an idea of context that includes activities which are relevant and reliable towards a settled aim is the model of practice that makes objectivity a pursuable task in research. This contextual picture of objectivity, it will be suggested, might better serve the purpose of scientific research than either of the two descriptive strategies outlined at the beginning of this paper can do. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that scientific discourse is full of metaphors. Does this undermine the commitment of such a discourse to truth and objective knowledge? Does this mean that the scientist (any scientist) is, after all, only a ‘rhetorician in disguise’?In what follows I will try to argue for quite the opposite view. I will show that metaphor is not simply a rhetorical device -at least, in the derogatory sense of rhetoric. There are metaphors which can be used to increment (...) our knowledge, and to explore new conceptual domains. This appears to be the case not only for natural science, but also for the so-called ‘sciences of the social’. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that scientific discourse is full of metaphors. Does this undermine the commitment of such a discourse to truth and objective knowledge? Does this mean that the scientist is, after all, only a ‘rhetorician in disguise’?In what follows I will try to argue for quite the opposite view. I will show that metaphor is not simply a rhetorical device -at least, in the derogatory sense of rhetoric. There are metaphors which can be used to increment our knowledge, (...) and to explore new conceptual domains. This appears to be the case not only for natural science, but also for the so-called ‘sciences of the social’. (shrink)

Is language – well beyond formulas and equations – important to science? This book dwells on the role played by Francis Bacon’s rich, original imagery in the early formulation of the new idea of science that would mature and flourish across the XVII century. A selection of Bacon’s key images, metaphors and analogies are analysed with an eye both to the XVI and early XVII century intellectual milieu that inspired them, and to Bacon’s own philosophical vision that creatively transformed them (...) and firmly held them together. (shrink)

A few years ago an interesting exhibition took place in Cambridge under the title ‘N01SE’.2 The title recalls of course the word ‘noise’ but written as ‘N01SE’ it also refers to the binary code which is the basic language of calculators - from the simplest to the most sophisticated,. The title of this exhibition could then be read in two ways. On one side, by playing with the word ‘noise/n01se’, we are presented with the idea that there might be a (...) core of information in any situation of noise, provided that there is a context, an interpretation, a point of view which allows us to identify such information and to decode it. On the other side, we are prompted to reflect critically on the assumptions and goals of the revolutionary field of contemporary digital technologies, whose promise is indeed that of a complete removal of any sort of noise. Is such a promise achievable? At what costs? Should noise, any form of noise, be removed? Is noise inevitably the dark side of any form of information? Is it the opposite of order? Are there contexts in which we can value its presence? Can noise turn into its purported opposite? Attendance at the Cambridge exhibition is what originally prompted some of the thoughts and ideas I explore in this paper. (shrink)

A few years ago an interesting exhibition took place in Cambridge (and London) under the title ‘N01SE’.2 The title recalls of course the word ‘noise’ but written as ‘N01SE’ it also refers to the binary code (with the two numbers 0 and 1) which is the basic language of calculators - from the simplest to the most sophisticated, (eg. contemporary computers). The title of this exhibition could then be read in two ways. On one side, by playing with the word (...) ‘noise/n01se’, we are presented with the idea that there might be a core of information in any situation of noise, provided that there is a context, an interpretation, a point of view which allows us to identify such information and to decode it. On the other side, we are prompted to reflect critically on the assumptions and goals of the revolutionary field of contemporary digital technologies, whose promise is indeed that of a complete removal of any sort of noise. Is such a promise achievable? At what costs? Should noise, any form of noise, be removed? Is noise inevitably the dark side of any form of information? Is it the opposite of order? Are there contexts in which we can value its presence? Can noise turn into its purported opposite? Attendance at the Cambridge exhibition is what originally prompted some of the thoughts and ideas I explore in this paper. (shrink)

Methodical doubt is usually associated with Descartes. However, it is with Francis Bacon that its function and scope are first recognized – as a preliminary stage in the attainment of knowledge, and as an epistemological tool (a rule) for achieving true knowledge. In this paper, I follow the various steps of construction and use of Baconian doubt as it appears in the first book of the New Organon. I will argue that Bacon - in distancing himself from traditional scepticism – (...) will come to conceive methodical doubt not only as a procedure for renovating knowledge, but more specifically as a prescriptive condition for identifying what 'mind' is required to pursue the aim of renovating knowledge. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition. It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition. It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition. It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition. It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition. It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition. It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition. It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

There is a sense in which pluralism needs no advocate. It is enough to take a quick look at contemporary science to realise that pluralism is common currency. It is a ‘fact’ that scientific disciplines entail a plurality of approaches, methods, styles of inquiry. It is equally easy to acknowledge how the referents of scientific investigation require a concert of disciplines and a variety of explanatory strategies. So pluralism seems to have both an epistemological and an ontological backing.1 Nor is (...) pluralism properly a new topic in philosophy of science. To some extent it is as old as its contending topic, the unity of science – that is at least as old as logical positivism, though back in those days, more than a properly well defined alternative perspective, it ranked as a critical reaction of the few against the many to the excesses of unification, and of reduction. One voice among the few was that of Patrick Suppes who, in a rather memorable PSA Presidential address in 1978, forcefully argued that neither the languages nor the subject matters of scientific disciplines were reducible to one. (shrink)

The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy" employs a wide construal of 'philosophy' that was common in former centuries. Its biographical entries include writers on mainstream philosophical topics whose individual contribution was small. But the encyclopedia also includes celebrated figures from other intellectual domains, who had something to say on topics that count as broadly philosophical. This interdisciplinary approach, coupled with sophisticated indexing and cross-referencing, makes "CEBP" easily accessible to students and specialists across a huge range of subjects. It will become (...) a highly important resource to support teaching and research in literature, history, classics, cultural studies, politics, economics, language, aesthetics, psychology and science, as well as in mainstream philosophy itself. (shrink)

The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy" employs a wide construal of 'philosophy' that was common in former centuries. Its biographical entries include writers on mainstream philosophical topics whose individual contribution was small. But the encyclopedia also includes celebrated figures from other intellectual domains, who had something to say on topics that count as broadly philosophical. This interdisciplinary approach, coupled with sophisticated indexing and cross-referencing, makes "CEBP" easily accessible to students and specialists across a huge range of subjects. It will become (...) a highly important resource to support teaching and research in literature, history, classics, cultural studies, politics, economics, language, aesthetics, psychology and science, as well as in mainstream philosophy itself. (shrink)

It has been urged that philosophers in the contemporary world should be able to engage with domains of practice and not just with each other. If that is the case, in what sense philosophy can become an ‘applied’ discipline, and with what consequences both for philosophy and for practice? As a preliminary I will rehearse some of the reasons why philosophical investigation is socially commendable. I will then show how philosophy in so called knowledge societies should interact with science and (...) the contexts where science is used. A suitably formulated idea of interdisciplinarity will suggest the necessary epistemic conditions to achieve this interaction. I will use two illustrations from the specific field of the philosophy of science to point out the kinds of readjustments required by philosophical analysis not so much to apply but to ‘engage’ with practice. (shrink)

What is noise? A tumultuous crowd is noisy or, more cheerfully, a group of students on holiday, or a flock of migrating birds. A loud conversation or loud laughter can be noisy if we are reading a philosophy article, or we are performing a physics experiment, or we are concentrating on a yoga exercise. In all such cases, noise is something that others do and that we unwillingly suffer, something that we perceive as an invasion of our perceptual space, or (...) an interference with it.2 We instinctively associate noise with an idea of impediment, or obstacle—with a source of distraction that prevents us from accomplishing the task or occupation we are focusing on. These associations are confirmed by dictionary... (shrink)