We tested the plausibility of a cognitive-emotional model to understand the effects of messages framed in terms of gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss, and related to the health consequences of red/processed meat consumption. A total of 544 Italian participants reported their attitude toward reduced red/processed meat consumption and intention to eat red/processed meat. One week later, participants were randomly assigned to four different message conditions: gain messages focused on the positive health outcomes associated with low meat consumption; non-loss messages focused (...) on the avoided negative health outcomes associated with low meat consumption; non-gain messages focused on the missed positive health outcomes associated with high meat consumption; loss messages focused on the negative health outcomes associated with high meat consumption. After reading the messages, participants answered a series of questions regarding their emotional and cognitive reactions to the messages, their evaluation of the messages, and again their attitude and intention toward red/processed meat consumption. Comparing different multivariate linear models under the Bayesian approach, we selected the model with the highest plausibility conditioned to observed data. In this model, message-induced fear influenced systematic processing, which in turn positively influenced message evaluation and attitude, leading to reduced intention to consume red/processed meat. Vice versa, message-induced anger reduced systematic processing, which in turn negatively influenced message evaluation, and led to no effect on attitude and intention. The comparison among message conditions showed that gain and non-loss messages activated integrated emotional and cognitive processing of the health recommendation, while loss and non-gain messages mainly activated emotional shortcuts toward attitude and intention. Overall, these results advance our comprehension of the effects of message framing on receivers' attitudes and intentions. (shrink)

We examined how children’s strategy choices in solving complex subtraction problems are related to grade and to variations in problem complexity. In two studies, third- and fifth-grade children (N≈160 each study) solved multi-digit subtraction problems (e.g., 34 - 18) and described their solution strategies. In the first experiment, strategy selection was investigated by means of a free-choice paradigm, whereas in the second study a discrete-choice approach was implemented. In both experiments, analyses of strategy repertoire indicated that third-grade children were more (...) likely to report less-efficient strategies (i.e., counting) and relied more on the right-to-left solution algorithm compared to fifth-grade children who more often used efficient memory-based retrieval and conceptually-based left-to-right (i.e., decomposition) strategies. Nevertheless, all strategies were reported or selected by both older and younger children and strategy use varied with problem complexity and presentation format for both age groups. These results supported the overlapping waves model of strategy development and provide detailed information about patterns of strategy choice on complex subtraction problems. (shrink)

What it means for conspiracy theories to become mainstream In debates about conspiracy theories, it is often claimed that conspiracy thinking is on the rise or has even become mainstream. In this article, I want to explore this claim conceptually, and argue that there are at least three ways to interpret the claim that ‘conspiracy thinking has become mainstream’. First, there is the individual level, where it is a matter of counting heads. Mainstream then means that the majority believes in (...) conspiracy theories. But there are two other levels. There is the institutional level, which is about whether conspiracy theories circulate within social institutions in an acceptable way. Is it acceptable to express conspiracy theories as a politician, scientist or journalist? Mainstream here means that dominant institutions in society view conspiracy thinking as an acceptable form of communication. Finally, there is the cultural level. Here the question is whether conspiracy thinking is a culturally acceptable way of speaking and thinking about society. Is it socially accepted as normal behavior, or is it rather a form of deviant behavior, accompanied by (informal) sanctions or demands for additional justification or proof? Mainstream here means that conspiracy thinking is seen as a normal way of speaking, without being accompanied by strange looks, shunning or the need to justify oneself as a conspiracy thinker. By making this distinction, we can think more clearly about whether conspiracy thinking is actually on the rise, and how we should deal with it. (shrink)

This article intends to summarise the content of my book Insurgent Universality: An Alternative Legacy of Modernity and expand the meaning of the term ‘universality’. Universality is not defined in abstract legal terms or by juxtaposition vis-à-vis a common enemy. Instead, I clarify the meaning of a more concrete and open practice of universality through historical examples and theories that I excavate from social practices.

Commonsense ontology often conflicts with the ontology of our best scientific and philosophical theories. However, commonsense ontology, and commonsense belief systems in general, seems to be remarkably efficient and cognitively fundamental. In cases of contrast, it is better to find a way to reconcile commonsense and ”theoretical” ontologies. Given that commonsense ontologies are typically expressed within natural language, a classical procedure of reconciliation is semantical. The strategy is that of individuating the ”ontologically problematic” expressions of natural language and paraphrasing the (...) sentences in which they appear in a (formal) language whose commitments are compatible with those of our best theories. We believe that this strategy of reconciliation, though quite standard, especially in the philosophical literature, is problematic: for a start, it forces us to conclude that the ”real content” of our commonsense expressions and beliefs is different from what it appears. Commonsense ontology becomes just an illusion. We will thus propose an alternative approach: according to our view, a commonsense ontology is reconciled with a theoretical ontology in case it is shown that the explanation of why we believe in the existence of a problematic entity is compatible with our best theories. We will call this kind of reconciliation ”epistemic”. The advantage of an epistemic reconciliation is that commonsense ontology is treated in its own right and could be taken prima facie. Another advantage of the view is that epistemic reconciliation can be analysed through the notion of explaining away: a commonsense ontology is epistemically reconciled with a theoretical ontology if and only if the problematic entities of the commonsense ontology are explained away by ”respectable” entities of the theoretical ontology. In the final part of the paper, we sketch a formal analysis of explaining away. (shrink)

Avatar, a passionate movie about empathy, features characters who, in various ways, are able to experience the world through the eyes of another or, as the saying goes, to “put themselves into another's shoes”. But, concealed beneath a surface of ecological pantheism, a contradiction lies at the heart of the movie's portrayal of empathy. On the one hand, in ordinary empathy access to another person's mind is mediated by our perception of her unique embodied identity. On the other hand, Avatar (...) introduces us to a seemingly more direct way to connect with the minds of others: tsaheylu – “the bond”. Mirror neurons are one of the most significant scientific discoveries of the last fifteen years. Mirror neurons testify that empathy, as usually experienced by terrestrial creatures like us, is nothing like a direct mental access. (shrink)

Jax Teller, Clay Morrow, and the other members of SAMCRO are first and foremost bikers and mechanics who fix bikes. Many bikers experience riding as therapeutic, since a good ride can help a suffering soul to forget the worries of life. Martin Heidegger argues that practical skills, such as the ones Tig needs to repair bikes, are the most fundamental form of knowledge. Many bike owners don't feel confident when they have to do repairs and finally face the dreaded encounter (...) with the un‐ready‐to‐hand. In Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance Robert Pirsig notes, that many bike owners are afraid to get their hands dirty with engine oil. Caring for a piece of technology is exactly the opposite of treating it instrumentally. As Pirsig explains, even fixing a mechanical problem can become an occasion of participation, unity, and reconciliation with the world. (shrink)

Reevaluates Western and Chinese philosophical traditions to question the boundaries of entrenched conceptual frameworks.

This book examines the different areas of knowledge, traditions, and conceptual resources that contributed to the building of Max Planck's theory of radiation. It presents an insightful comparative analysis that not only sheds light upon a fundamental chapter in the history of modern physics, but also enlarges our understanding of how theoreticians work. Coverage offers a deep investigation into the technical aspects behind the theory and extends in time the notion of quantum revolution. It also presents a full-fledged discussion of (...) the combinatorial part of Planck's theory and places emphasis on the epistemological role of mathematical practices. By painstakingly reconstructing both the electromagnetic and the combinatorial part of Planck's black-body theory, the author shows how some apparently merely technical resources, such as the Fourier series, effectively contributed to shape the final form of Planck's theory. For decades, historians have debated the conditions of possibility of Max Planck's discovery as a paradigmatic example of scientific revolution. In particular, the use of combinatorics, which eventually paved the way for the introduction of the quantum hypothesis, has remained a puzzle for experts. This book presents a fresh perspective on this important debate that will appeal to historians and philosophers of science. (shrink)

Scritto complesso, compatto e volutamente non sistematico - all'acme della carriera accademica e dell'attività filosofica di Robert Spaemann (1927 - 2018) -, Persone. Sulla differenza tra 'qualcosa' e 'qualcuno' (1996) non è solo un capolavoro del grande pensatore tedesco, ma è innanzitutto una pietra miliare nella filosofia del Novecento sul realismo delle persone. La sua acuta riflessione sa pro-vocare e destare l'uomo di oggi alla 'grande questione' ch'egli da sempre è a se stesso, ponendolo di fronte al senso autentico del (...) suo essere-persona che, dentro i drammi e i rinnegamenti delle persone reali e dentro le traversìe della storia è stato prima obliato dal modo d'esistere dell'uomo moderno, per poi scorrere come fiume carsico nei meandri della travagliata storia della personologia, con un concomitante imporsi, nella forma mentis oggi imperante, della 'dialettica di naturalismo e spiritualismo'. Si offre qui uno studio rigoroso e inedito della filosofia delle persone di Spaemann - miniera ricchissima tutta da scavare -, che prende sul serio la domanda esistenzialmente decisiva sull'enigma della persona, per arrischiare una comprensione della realtà personale che ognuno di noi è, lasciandoci guidare dal 'Socrate tedesco' in un avvincente percorso che raccoglie a piene mani l'eredità e le sfide della tradizione filosofica e restituisce al lettore precisi segnavìa del senso, cioè della vettorialità fondamentale tracciata nell'essere-persona e, resi memori dell'origine e della meta, del senso di marcia a ognuno di noi affidato come compito per divenire le persone uniche che già siamo e sempre più saremo. (shrink)

This volume includes some of the papers from the second and third instalments of the series Festival Bruniano, held in Geneva in 2015 and in Tours and Wittenberg in 2018, respectively. By picking up the baton from the inaugural edition of 2014 and the two preparatory colloquia that preceded it in 2013, this volume aims to discuss Giordano Bruno's contribution to sixteenth-century ideas by focusing on some theological, moral, and legal-political aspects of his philosophy. Starting from a re-evaluation of Christianity (...) after Luther's Reformation, the four sections of this volume pay special, but not exclusive, attention to Bruno's later philosophical teaching, including his Wittenberg period and the 'Frankfurt trilogy'."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase the cardinality ascriptions in plural logic and, as a consequence, relative (...) counting requires the relativization either of quantifiers, or of identity, or of the is one of relation. However, some of these relativizations do not deliver the expected results, and others rely on problematic assumptions. In another broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about concepts or sets. The most promising development of this approach is prima facie connected with a violation of the so-called Coreferentiality Constraint, according to which an identity statement is true only if its terms have the same referent. Moreover - even provided that the problem with coreferentiality can be fixed - the resulting analysis of cardinality ascriptions meets several difficulties. (shrink)

In this short paper we consider Linnebo's thin/thick dichotomy: first, we show that it does not overlap with the very common one between abstract/concrete objects; second, on the basis of some difficulties with the distinction, we propose, as a possible way out, to move from thin/thick objects to thin/thick concepts.

The article analyzes, at different levels, the relationship between war and borders. The question of the borders may provide an interesting point of view. At stake, in “new wars” is not the path of interstate frontiers but different borders developments. To analyze these dynamics the article emphasizes the useful relationship between two different bibliographies, on one hand the strategic literature about “new wars”, on the other hand the territorial and regional studies analyzing the new form of political, economic and juridical (...) spatiality. The aim is to catch the types of non homogeneous territorialities striated by flux spaciality, scaling and rescaling processes and different regimes of temporality and mobility, at stake in the “new wars”. (shrink)

Building on dissatisfaction with current approaches that entail a superficial conception of the firm’s moral agency, this article has two broad theoretical underpinnings. First, it refers to the Catholic Social Thought’s view of the enterprise as a community of work, which leads to place stress on the possibility of creating ‘organizational humanizing cultures’ that revolve around the principles of human dignity and the common good and allow organizational members to flourish. Second, the article draws on the perspective of the sociologist (...) Philip Selznick to emphasize the key role of ‘institutional leadership’ in the formation and maintenance of a moral organizational character, also suggesting that these processes involve an influence on the development of employees’ moral identity conceived as a driver of moral agency. On these theoretical grounds, the article’s central argument is articulated by claiming that human resource management can provide essential support for the development of organizational humanizing cultures. In particular, it is highlighted how human resource management professionals may operate as institutional leaders who contribute to the embedding of moral identities in the organizational context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:About and Beyond Comorbidity:Does the Crisis of the DSM Bring on a Radical Rethinking of Descriptive Psychopathology?Massimiliano Aragona (bio)Keywordscomorbidity, nosography, phenomenology, philosophy of scienceThe problem of psychiatric comorbidity is part of a series of difficulties of the current diagnostic system which at once were considered as a consequence of the way the system itself is organized (Aragona 2006). It was then believed that a Kuhnian reformulation of the (...) contemporary debate on the problems of the psychiatric diagnosis was very useful because it allowed clarification in a comprehensive picture of the many rivulets of conceptual research in that field.In their comments Zachar (2009) and Banzato (2009) seem to agree with my analysis of psychiatric comorbidity (Aragona 2009a) when it stresses that abnormally high frequencies of co-occurrence are to be explained, in important respects, as a consequence of the way mental disorders are operationalized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; also showing the importance of conceptual clarification to deal with this sort of only apparently pure factual problems). On the contrary, they are both unconvinced of the appropriateness and/or fruitfulness of the use of the Kuhnian technical terms and theory in this context.It could be said that the major aim of the paper was to let clinicians understand the effect of conceptual decisions on what would otherwise seem as a simple empirical finding (in this case, high levels of comorbidity), and that this result seems to be achieved in any case, thus minimizing the importance of a disagreement about the philosophical terms as a pure terminological dispute. Nevertheless, in my work the Kuhnian model had a significant role in the clarification of this matter and it also suggests to the reader a range of possible consequences that are not trivial (Zachar, for example, says to be skeptical about the possibility of a crisis and also about the possibility that a new paradigm could eliminate what I call the [End Page 29] comorbidity anomaly). As a consequence, some of the Kuhnian concepts that seemed to be at odds in this context have to be considered in detail to justify my analysis and its consequences. For reasons of space, I avoid a point-by-point reply to all the comments and I concentrate my discussion on three main points. First, I discuss the background of Kuhn's definition of terms such as anomaly and paradigm, as well as my own reasons for using them. In doing so the details of the psychiatric items under study that I wanted to highlight through the use of these philosophical concepts should emerge more clearly. Second, I discuss the problem of having distinguished between artifactual and real comorbidity. Third, I reconsider some of these problems, looking for their implications for future psychopathological research.Anomalies and ParadigmsBanzato (2009) stresses that comorbidity cannot be a truly Kuhnian anomaly because it is an anticipated side effect of the initial setup of the DSM, and not some unexpected discovery that violates the paradigm-induced expectation. This is a basically correct account of the most known version of Kuhnian anomalies; that is, the tale of some evident nature's failure to conform to clear paradigm expectations, which immediately forces researchers to recognize its importance as a possible source of crisis. However, as is the case for many other Kuhnian terms, he discussed anomalies in several scripts and there are other possible versions of its meaning. In particular, Kuhn (1977, XVII) highlighted that only in very rare cases are anomalies completely unexpected and come out of blue to announce an imminent crisis that leads to a large revolution. More frequently, scientific revolutions are much more smaller, like the discovery of oxygen, and in these cases the process is so gradual that historians find it difficult to say exactly when a discovery was made and who did it. Even in these much smaller cases the usual prelude to changes of this sort is the awareness of anomaly, but here anomalies are not extraordinary events; rather, they are "countless discrepancies between theory and experiment [that] during the course of his career, every natural scientist again and again notices and passes by" (Kuhn... (shrink)

This study examines the implications of practical reason for entrepreneurial activities. Our study is based on Thomas Aquinas’ interpretation of such virtue, with a particular focus on the partition of practical reason in potential parts such as synesis, or common sense, and gnome, or perspicacity. Since entrepreneurial acts and actions deal with extremely uncertain situations, we argue that only this perspicacity, as the ability of correctly judging in exceptional cases, has the power to find wisdom under such blurred conditions. Perspicacity (...) frees entrepreneurs from their cognitive schemata rendering them able to be truly entrepreneurial. Based on this vision and thanks to a semantic analysis of the meaning of the Greek word gnome, we construct an interpretative model for entrepreneurial judgment composed of three dimensions, specifically, knowledge-cognitive, external-affective and personal-reflective. The model highlights how a ‘successful’ entrepreneurial judgment is also such from a holistic point of view. (shrink)

En este trabajo consideramos los discursos políticos y económicos actuales proponiendo el fenómeno start-up como el síntoma de un cambio profundo en la gubernamentalidad neoliberal y un nuevo episodio en la larga historia de las prácticas de organización de la fuerza de trabajo, de su gobierno y movilización. Nos basamos en los textos de Michel Foucault y en la literatura neomanagerial actual para analizar las recientes transformaciones de la racionalidad neoliberal. Con este punto de partida, proponemos que el emprendedor neoliberal (...) del yo, el empresario de sí mismo, tal y como lo concibió Foucault, se está transformando, además, en una especie de inversor de sí mismo administrando permanentemente sus activos personales y buscando constantemente la autoevaluación y la autovalorización en la lógica del rendimiento.In this paper we consider the political and economic discourses hyping the «start-up phenomenon» as the symptom of a deep change in neoliberal governmentality and a new episode in the long history of the practices of workforce government and mobilisation. After pointing out the recent transformations of neoliberal rationality of government, we concentrate on the forms of subjectification implied by what could be defined as the start-up subject: the typically neoliberal entrepreneur of the self is thus transforming into a sort of investor of the self permanently managing his personal assets and incessantly searching for self-evaluation and self-valorisation. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the controversial issue of sense perception in the Zhuangzi 莊子. Although scholars have not explicitly addressed this aspect of the Chinese text, a common assumption is that the Zhuangzi proposes a mysticism that undermines sense perception in favour of a transcendent self. After an overview of this interpretation, and after analysing some key passages of the text that deal with heart fasting (xinzhai 心齋), sitting and forgetting (zuowang 坐忘) and skill mastery, I demonstrate that some (...) interpreters of the Zhuangzi read the text as if it has a metaphysical bent, recommending that sense perception be transcended as a prerequisite to perfection. In contrast, my thesis is that the text does not propose a withdrawal from the senses and from the world, but rather warns about the danger of abiding to doctrinal knowledge, which has the consequence of a person losing their responsive awareness. Indeed, in the Zhuangzi, sense perception is not an impediment on the way to a supersensible reality, but an integral part of one's own being in the world. Through my analysis, I object to the idea that the Zhuangzi proposes a mystical union with something not immediately available, which moreover needs to be achieved by transcending the lived world that is encountered through sense perception. My view is that such a move not only postulates union with a transcendent entity, it also forces a dualism between a person's capacities. This is problematic because the Zhuangzi does not point to another world–in a two worlds theory–where one must ideally attain the condition of a transcendent self. On the contrary, in rejecting a univocal ethos, the text suggests one should keep responding to changing circumstances without turning one's perceptual awareness into entrenched habits. Thus, the Zhuangzi shows how sense perception should be seen, not as a “problem” but as an ethical possibility through which the univocity of doctrinal knowledge can be undermined. (shrink)