Joseph Margolis advances a view which he purports to be relativist in both the book and the article “The Truth About Relativism”. He develops this view in opposition to what he calls “relationalism”. Relationalism, however, is very much like what has traditionally been called “relativism”. Thus, in developing his view, Margolis distances himself from relativism as traditionally understood. Given this, the present article aims to determine the following: a) whether and how Margolis’ position is a relativist position; and b) whether (...) Margolis’ position is substantially different from the relationalist view from which he purports to depart. I argue that Margolis’ position is only relativist in part and that the relativistic aspect of his theory is essentially the relationalist position he is determined to avoid. (shrink)

Joseph Margolis advances a view which he purports to be relativist in both the book and the article “The Truth About Relativism”. He develops this view in opposition to what he calls “relationalism”. Relationalism, however, is very much like what has traditionally been called “relativism”. Thus, in developing his view, Margolis distances himself from relativism as traditionally understood. Given this, the present article aims to determine the following: a) whether and how Margolis’ position is a relativist position; and b) whether (...) Margolis’ position is substantially different from the relationalist view from which he purports to depart. I argue that Margolis’ position is only relativist in part and that the relativistic aspect of his theory is essentially the relationalist position he is determined to avoid. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

There are various equivalent formulations of the Church-Turing thesis. A common one is that every effective computation can be carried out by a Turing machine. The Church-Turing thesis is often misunderstood, particularly in recent writing in the philosophy of mind.

In the introduction and acknowledgments of this book Marcelo Dascal informs the reader as to the peculiar history behind the book and to the vision which inspired it. In particular, the dominance of Western Culture, evidenced by the presence of Coca-Cola, the dream of democratic freedom, and aspirations to the wonders of the market economy in all but the most remote parts of the world has created a tension between North America and Latin America in many, perhaps all, facets of (...) life. This tension has developed because the values present in North America are at odds with the values present, at least historically, in Latin America. This tension can result in one set of values being declared dominant, or better than the others; or it can result in a sort of relativism where the two or more sets of values are held to be, perhaps with some qualifications, equally good. It is the latter position with respect to the tension between North and Latin America which is the focus of this book. (shrink)

Philosophy of history is analyzed here from the point of its epistemological and ontological meaning. The author considers that the ontological point of view makes it possible to conceptualize the history as the unity of its all times - Past, Present and Future. The connection between these three times based on their relation to the concept of Eternity which has been symbolically formed within the mythological, religious and utopian Weltanschauung. The necessity of these relations transforms philosophy of history into a (...) special kind of ontological historical knowledge. The study of history from the prospect of unity is only possible within the historical interpretation of Future as an epoch of bridging the gap between Time and Eternity. Author calls this philosophical concept the Time of Freedom. (shrink)