In this paper I discuss the question of what it means to say that a property is socially constructed. I focus on an influential project that many social constructivists are engaged in, namely, arguing against the inevitability of a trait, and I examine several recent characterizations of social construction, with the aim of assessing which one is more suited to the task.

What does it mean to say that some features, such as gender, race and sexual orientation, are socially constructed? Many scholars claim that social constructionism about a kind is a version of realism about that kind, according to which the corresponding kind is a social construction, that it, it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructionism, then, is a version of realism about a kind that asserts that the kind is real, and puts forward a particular view about (...) the nature of the kind, namely, that it is constituted by social factors and practices. Social constructivists about human kinds such as gender, race and sexual orientation often make an additional claim, namely, that these kinds are social constructions but they are typically believed to be biological kinds (that is, people are typically wrong about the nature of these kinds). Ron Mallon (2017) calls social constructions that are (falsely) taken to be biological kinds covert social constructions. This paper is about how we could have terms in our natural language that come to refer to covert social constructions. (shrink)

Are sexual orientations freely chosen? The idea that someone’s sexual orientation is not a choice is very influential in the mainstream LGBT political movement. But do we have good reasons to believe it is not a choice? Going against the orthodoxy, William Wilkerson has recently argued that sexual orientation is partly constituted by our interpretations of our own sexual desires, and we choose these interpretations, so sexual orientation is partly constituted by choice. In this paper I aim to examine the (...) question of whether our interpretations of our own sexual desires are constitutive of our sexual orientations. I will argue that whereas Wilkerson’s argument for the claim that sexual orientations are in part constituted by our chosen interpretations of our sexual desires is not sound, there are good reasons for endorsing a weaker claim, namely, that there are different but equally apt descriptions of the same sexual desires, depending on which concepts we have. (shrink)

An important question in the debate regarding the nature of politically significant human kinds, such as gender, race, and sexual orientations, is concerned with the question of whether these human kinds are socially constructed (Stein 1999; Root 2000; Haslanger 2012; and Ásta 2013). In order to settle this debate, a more fundamental question needs to be answered: what does it mean to say that a category is socially constructed? -/- Recently, many philosophers have become interested in this issue (Hacking 1999; (...) Stein 1999; Haslanger 2003; Mallon 2007; Diaz-Leon 2015; Ásta 2015). They all seem to agree that there is not a single notion of social construction, but rather, there are different notions of social construction for different purposes. The important question in order to formulate a useful notion of social construction, then, is which project is at issue, and which notion of social construction is more useful for the purposes of that project. In this chapter I will focus on two projects that social constructivists are often interested in, namely, (i) the project of arguing against the inevitability of a trait, that is, to show that those features are not determined by human nature; and (ii) the project of arguing against the universality of a trait, that is, to show that a certain human category or kind is not a universal, transcultural, culture-independent property and that it cannot be applied to other cultures, places, and times; and I will discuss which notion of social construction is more useful with respect to each project. -/- My main questions, then, will be the following: (a) Is there any notion of social construction that entails that if X is socially constructed, then X is not inevitable, that is, X is not determined by human nature? (b) Is there any notion of social construction that entails that if X is socially constructed, then X is not transcultural or universal? (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question of whether the characterization of physicalism that is presupposed by some influential anti-physicalist arguments, namely, the so-called conceivability arguments, is a good characterization of physicalism or not. I compare this characterization with some alternative ones, showing how it can overcome some problems, and I defend it from several objections. I conclude that any arguments against physicalism characterised in that way are genuine arguments against physicalism, as intuitively conceived.

Sally Haslanger (2006) is concerned with the debate between so-called social constructionists and error theorists about a given category, such as race or gender. For example, social constructionists about race claim that race is socially constructed, that is, the kind or property that unifies all instances of the category is a social feature (not a natural or physical feature, as naturalists about race would hold). On the other hand, error theorists about race claim that the term ‘race’ is an empty (...) term, that is, nothing belongs to this category, since the conditions that something should satisfy in order to fall under ‘race’ are not satisfied by anything. What kind of evidence could we use in order to support one or another of these theories? It seems that this debate is in part semantic: what makes the case that a category is an empty one (and therefore error theory about it holds), as opposed to it being socially constructed, has to do with the meaning of the corresponding expression. In particular, in the case of race, some people have argued that our concept RACE is such that something will fall under it only if it is a natural property that can explain certain features. Arguably, there are no natural properties of human beings that can do the explanatory work that races are supposed to do, and therefore, error theorists have concluded that ‘race’ is an empty term, that is, there are no races (Appiah (1996)). (Some theorists have introduced new terms for a new property that is very similar to that of race and can do part of the explanatory work that races were supposed to do, but it does not have to satisfy all the conditions that races are supposed to satisfy. For instance, Appiah (1996) has introduced the notion of ‘racial identity’ to that effect.) These considerations suggest that if we want to find out whether a certain category is socially constructed, or whether an error theory about it is correct, we have to engage in.... (shrink)

This comment on Ásta’s Categories we live by: the construction of sex, gender, race, and other social categories discusses Ásta’s arguments that the conferralist view on social properties does better than a response-dependence view concerning gender. Her key argument is that a response-dependence does not allow for mistakes. This comment tries to show that a response-dependence view can accommodate misgendering and passing.

The metaphysics of gender and race is a growing area of concern in contemporary analytic metaphysics, with many different views about the nature of gender and race being submitted and discussed. But what are these debates about? What questions are these accounts trying to answer? And is there real disagreement between advocates of differ- ent views about race or gender? If so, what are they really disagreeing about? In this paper I want to develop a view about what the debates (...) in the metaphysics of gender and race are about, namely, a version of metaphysical deflationism, according to which these debates are about how we actually use or should use the terms ‘gender’ and ‘race’ (and other related terms), where moral and political considerations play a central role. I will also argue that my version of the view can overcome some recent and powerful objections to metaphysical deflationism of- fered by Elizabeth Barnes (2014, 2017). (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts, the recognitional account, and defend it from some recent challenges. According to this account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that we use when we recognize experiences as “another one of those.” Michael Tye has argued that this account is viciously circular because the relevant recognitional abilities involve descriptions of the form “another experience of the same type,” which is also a phenomenal concept. Tye argues that we avoid the (...) circularity worry if we explain the reference-fixing of phenomenal concepts in terms of dispositions to re-identify tokens of the same type without appealing to any further phenomenal concepts. However, he argues, this account is incompatible with the intuitive claim that phenomenal concepts seem to involve rich modes of presentation of their referents. Philip Goff and others have similarly argued that a recognitional account of phenomenal concepts would make phenomenal concepts opaque, that is, unable to reveal anything about their referents, which seems problematic. In this paper, I present a new version of the recognitional account that avoids the circularity worry without entailing that phenomenal concepts are opaque. (shrink)

Sally Haslanger is concerned with the debate between social constructionists and error theorists about a given category, such as race or gender. For example, social constructionists about race claim that the term “race” refers to a social kind, whereas error theorists claim that the term “race” is an empty term, that is, nothing belongs to this category. It seems that this debate depends in part on the meaning of the corresponding expression, and this, according to some theorists, depends in turn (...) on our intuitions as competent speakers. But then, what should we say if competent users of the expressions “race” and “gender” understand the terms so that being a natural or biological property is a necessary condition in order to fall under the term? If that were the case, then it would seem that a social constructionist view would be out of the question. Haslanger has argued that a social constructionist view could still be defended in that situation. In order to argue for this, she draws on the classical arguments for semantic externalism, which show that the intuitions of competent speakers concerning the nature of a given category, and the objective type that actually unifies the instances of that category, may come apart. In this paper I will argue that the arguments for semantic externalism concerning natural kinds do not really offer support for Haslanger’s claim that ordinary intuitions concerning social kinds are not relevant. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Christopher Hom has recently argued that the best-overall account of the meaning of pejorative terms is a semantic account according to which pejoratives make a distinctive truth-conditional contribution, and in particular express complex, negative socially constructed properties. In addition, Hom supplements the semantic account with a pragmatic strategy to deal with the derogatory content of occurrences of pejorative terms in negations, conditionals, attitude reports, and so on, according to which those occurrences give rise to conversational implicatures to the effect that (...) the pejorative terms are non-empty, which explains the offensiveness of those occurrences. In this paper, I aim to defend this semantic strategy from several recent objections, and I will also present a novel objection, which in my view shows that we should understand the semantic account as a version of inferentialism, rather than radical externalism. (shrink)

What does woman mean? According to two competing views, it can be seen as a sex term or as a gender term. Recently, Jennifer Saul has put forward a contextualist view, according to which woman can have different meanings in different contexts. The main motivation for this view seems to involve moral and political considerations, namely, that this view can do justice to the claims of trans women. Unfortunately, Saul argues, on further reflection the contextualist view fails to do justice (...) to those moral and political claims that motivated the view in the first place. In this article I argue that there is a version of the contextualist view that can indeed capture those moral and political aims, and in addition, I use this case to illustrate an important and more general claim, namely, that moral and political considerations can be relevant to the descriptive project of finding out what certain politically significant terms actually mean. (shrink)

A posteriori physicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entailed a priori by physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida-Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested that a posteriori physicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish to defend (...) a posteriori physicalism from this new and interesting challenge, by arguing that a posteriori physicalists have the resources to explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal at least something of what it would take for the corresponding phenomenal property to be instantiated. (shrink)

The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude (...) that Chalmers has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy to succeed in blocking the conceivability argument. In doing so, my aim is not only to show that Chalmers’s argument has not refuted the phenomenal concept strategy, but also to clarify what any version of the strategy should achieve in order to be successful. (shrink)

One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful explanation of this epistemic gap. In this paper my aim is to defend the phenomenal concept strategy from his criticisms. I argue that Stoljar has misrepresented the resources of the (...) strategy, which can indeed accomplish the required explanatory task, once it is properly understood. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of the a priori entailment thesis, that is, the claim that microphysical truths a priori entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths such as ‘water covers 60% of the Earth surface’, which they use as a premise for an argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. Their argument relies on a certain view about the possession conditions of macroscopic concepts such as WATER, known as ascriptivism. In the paper I distinguish two (...) versions of ascriptivism: reductive versus non-reductive ascriptivism. According to reductive ascriptivism, competent users of a concept have the ability to infer truths involving such concept from lower-level truths, whereas according to non-reductive ascriptivism, all that is required in order to be a competent user of a concept is to be able to infer truths involving that concept from other truths, which need not be lower-level truths. I argue, first, that the a priori entailment thesis is committed to reductive ascriptivism, and secondly, that reductive ascriptivism is problematic because it trivializes the notion of a priori knowledge. Therefore, I conclude that Chalmers and Jackson have not presented a convincing case for the claim that microphysical truths entail ordinary non-phenomenal truths a priori, especially when we understand this claim in the sense that is relevant for their argument against the possibility of a reductive explanation of consciousness. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem.

According to many philosophers, there is an explanatory gap between physical truths and phenomenal truths. Someone could know all the physical truths about the world, and in particular, all the physical information about the brain and the neurophysiology of vision, and still not know what it is like to see red (Jackson 1982, 1986). According to a similar example, someone could know all the physical truths about bats and still not know what it is like to be a bat (Nagel (...) 1974). We can conceive of an individual that is physically identical to me, molecule per molecule, but does not have any phenomenally conscious state whatsoever (Chalmers 1996). Some philosophers have argued that the explanatory gap shows that we cannot explain consciousness in physical terms (Levine 2001), or even that phenomenal consciousness is not physical and therefore physicalism is false (Chalmers 1996, 2002). (shrink)

Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful.

David Papineau [1999. “Normativity and Judgement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 : 16–43.] argues that norms of judgement pose no special problem for naturalism, because all such norms of judgement are derived from moral or personal values. Papineau claims that this account of the normativity of judgement presupposes an account of content that places normativity outside the analysis of content, because in his view any accounts of content that place normativity inside the analysis of content cannot explain the normativity (...) of judgement in the derivative way he proposes. Furthermore, he argues that normative accounts of content along those lines are independently problematic. In this paper I aim to respond to both objections, by arguing that normative accounts of content can be seen as naturalist accounts, even if they place normativity inside the analysis of content; and that normative accounts of content are compatible with a derivative account of norms of judgement of the sort Papi... (shrink)

In response to commentaries by Esa Díaz León, Jennifer Saul, and Ra- chel Sterken, I develop more fully my views on the role of structure in social and metaphysical explanation. Although I believe that social agency, quite generally, occurs within practices and structures, the relevance of structure depends on the sort of questions we are asking and what interventions we are considering. The emphasis on questions is also relevant in considering metaphysical and meta-metaphysical is- sues about realism with respect to (...) gender and race. I aim to demon- strate that tools we develop in the context of critical social theory can change the questions we ask, what forms of explanation are called for, and how we do philosophy. (shrink)

The present paper intent to support the usefulness of some theoretical-methodological qualitative perspectives for the study of women?s health studies. This is a contribution to women?s function recognition in health systems as traditional health providers, communitary organizers and an invaluable ..

Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...) as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. (shrink)

En honor al elemento Estado Social, cuando menos, es que la misma sistemática ha previsto un novísimo juez a partir del acto legislativo número 03 de 2002 y se le ha otorgado la competencia, que no jurisdicción, de controlar ciertos ejercicios de investigación cumplidos por la fiscalía con su binomio policía judicial, algo así como el juez de la constitucionalización de los actos de ese binomio.Por regla general, pues, cuando los actos de indagación y de investigación afecten de alguna manera (...) un derecho fundamental del indiciado o del imputado antes de practicar el acto el fiscal debe solicitar la correspondiente autorización al juez de control de legalidad, caso por ejemplo cuando se precisa inspeccionar el cuerpo de aquél, o una vez cumplido el acto ir dentro de las siguientes treinta y seis horas ante el mismo funcionario con miras a que éste ejerza el control posterior.La regla de exclusión del artículo 23 del nuevo código de procedimiento penal se justifica porque de esa manera se desestimula la práctica de actos de investigación con violación a derechos fundamentales, se preserva la integridad judicial y se impide el beneficio que puede derivar de la prueba ilícita su autor. (shrink)

El lector me permitirá quizá que le explique de entrada el propósito y el alcance de este brevísimo ensayo, anticipándole los temas de las tres partes que lo componen. Primero, explico lo que quiero decir con la expresión «sociedad civil». Con este fin, describo un tipo o carácter ideal de sociedad civil, en torno al cual he organizado un esquema conceptual que utilizo desde hace años en un amplio programa de investigación en ciencia social; y esbozo las líneas de demarcación (...) entre mi uso de esa expresión y otros usos que se han hecho y se hacen tic ella. Segundo, reelaboro el proceso por el que comencé a utilizar este concepto a mediados de los años setenta. Se trata de un esbozo de reconstrucción, hipotético y fragmentario, del contexto de descubrimiento de aquel esquema conceptual. Es un flash back que me lleva de los primeros sesenta a mi libro Estado, burocracia y sociedad civil, que escribí en 1976 . Tercero, tomo nota de los cambios en mi posición a lo largo de estos años, y me interrogo sobre algunos de los problemas que me han llevado de la concepción de 1976 a la que expongo en La primacía de la sociedad civil de 1993 , y en mis trabajos ulteriores, donde hay un desplazamiento sistemático del énfasis de mi trabajo desde lo que Hamo «sociedad civil sensu stricto» hacia la «sociedad civil sensu lato». La explicación podría radicar en la necesidad de revisar, ampliar y formalizar el esquema «acomodándolo»: uno, al proceso en curso de mis trabajos de investigación empírica, y a la importancia creciente en esos trabajos de los temas de autoridad pública, esfera pública y política pública; dos, al horizonte histórico del whithcring away del totalitarismo comunista; y tres, a mi interés creciente en los temas de tradición, instituciones y retórica. Aunque los tres factores están interrelacionados, centraré aquí mi atención sobre todo en el primero de ellos, es decir, en los estímulos para la re-elaboración del esquema originario que han procedido de mi experiencia de investigación empírica, con alguna referencia al segundo, dejando el tercero poco más que aludido. (shrink)

Parte de la dificultad presentada a la hora de establecer la relación entre filosofia y filología en la teoría hermenéutica viquiana surge del hecho de que Vico vaciló entre dos formas de entender esa relación, las cuales dieron lugar a dos diferentes concepciones de la relación entre hermenéutica y metafísica: entre una hermenéutica metafísica (predominante en SNP) y una metafísica hermenéutica (predominante en SNS). La primera, conforme al deseo viquiano de elaborar un "arte diagnóstica", hace dependiente a la interpretación de (...) la metafísica y hoy es inviable. La segunda comporta una relación mucho más compleja entre interpretación y metafísica y ofrece un método de investigación hermenéutica de considerable relevancia para la filosofía actual. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como fin principal publicar la traducción de la lección de fray Luis de León del título, recientemente publicada y, como homenaje a este hecho, presentar la misma ofreciendo al lector el camino que la cuestión original planteada en la lección —con una trayectoria previa en Italia- recorre en el pensamiento español del XVII. Un camino que tiene dos grandes hitos: Cervantes y Spinoza. Cervantes, como se tratará de mostrar, desde una lectura directa del texto de fray (...) Luis, reflejada en su novela quijotesca _El curioso impertinente_. Spinoza, en cambio, más bien como filósofo impregnado de la cultura española y su pensamiento moral, del que se despega, como permite mostrar precisamente la reflexión anterior, al acoger el marco cartesiano de pensamiento ya en sus inicios, en el_ Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione_. (shrink)

La oposición entre dos grupos de valores, como nos muestran determinantes casos del mapa geopolítico actual, sugiere los límites de las expectativas modernizadoras tanto del viejo imperialismo como de sus opositores: los nuevos pueblos parecen tan reacios a la administración racional colonial como a la autóctona, y exigen formas de dirección y encuadramiento acordes con la propia cultura. Todo ello parece abrir de nuevo el problema de la tradición, ante el cual, desde la perspectiva de la cultura occidental, parece necesario (...) un proceso reflexivo y crítico sobre la diversidad de valores y lenguajes. Reticentes ante los esquemas de la conciencia moderna, hemos de proceder de manera análoga a la que Geertz advierte en minorías pertenecientes a culturas no occidentales, identificadas con los valores modernos de racionalidad crítica y ética autónoma: atender a las "voces mezcladas" de las tradiciones, demorarnos en esa babel que es el suelo, movedizo pero real, de los valores ilustrados. En el presente trabajo se ofrece, siguiendo algunas ideas de Isaiah Berlin, un acercamiento a la tradición, desde el que examinar dos estrategias cruciales en su constitución: las de De Maistre y Burke. (shrink)

El presente artículo expone la propuesta política de la etapa madura de Ágnes Heller, como ejemplo que permite observar el cambio que ha sufrido el horizonte político tras el fin de las grandes narrativas históricas y cómo sería aún posible pensar la emancipación. La propuesta de Heller veremos considera que el proyecto moderno de construir un mundo de libertad y reconocimiento de las personas como iguales es posible porque la modernidad se encuentra fundada en la libertad y no en principios (...) teológico-metafísicos, pero esa cualidad impide al mismo tiempo garantizar el logro o permanencia de cualquier proyecto político. La conciencia de esa limitación será la impronta del pensamiento helleriano, pero también la de la comprensión política contemporánea, por lo que el artículo suma a esta actitud prudente que podría parecer desalentadora, el recordatorio de que las luchas que se han emprendido en favor de la justicia constituyen ya un legado que permite continuar la tarea de construcción de ésta. (shrink)

Por razones de eficacia (cohesión social, comunidad cívica) y, unidas a ellas, por razones éticas (valores de libertad, igualdad y solidaridad) la propuesta normativa de nuestro tiempo debe ser la universalización de la democracia. No hay futuro para nadie si no se avanza en ella, en la universalización de los derechos humanos, en su protección y realización efectiva en esa escala. Frente a los hechos que impone hoy el neoliberalismo conservador y la muy desigual globalización realmente existente, deben prevalecer los (...) derechos que derivan de la filosofía ética, política y jurídica de la democracia. Su expresión institucional -se estima aquí- es aquella que se concreta en la fórmula o paradigma del Estado social y democrático de Derecho: es decir, un Estado de importante intervención cualitativa; una sociedad civil más y mejor vertebrada, de trama más ajustada, más inclusiva de los nuevos movimientos sociales (feministas, ecologistas, antixenófobos, etc.); un sistema económico mixto, con sector público estatal y social donde el mercado y el sector privado encuentren coherente articulación; todo ello para la protección y realización de los derechos humanos civiles y políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales, así como los nuevos derechos fundamentales de las minorías, los derivados de las diferencias personales y sociales (étnicas, sexuales...), del medio ambiente, etc. En definitiva la razón de ser del Estado de Derecho es la protección y realización efectiva de los derechos humanos. La universalización de éstos y de la democracia exige, pues, la universalización del Estado social y democrático de Derecho. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende invitar al estudio del impacto que tuvo _El Evangelio en Triumpho_ de Olavide sobre el pensamiento decimonónico. Con ese fin propone, en primer lugar, leerlo captando en sus rasgos esenciales el valor alegórico de sus personajes en sus relaciones. A continuación, señala qué aspectos de esa lectura habrían influido de manera más marcada en las obras de Maistre y Saint-Simon, con las que abarca las dos tendencias post-revolucionarias de entender la historia, catecóntica y quiliástica. Finalmente, presenta (...) la unidad milenarista de la obra de Olavide, ajena a aquellas interpretaciones precisamente por su ortodoxia, apuntando, como lectura alternativa a la francesa, la que sugiere Dostoyevski en _El Gran Inquisidor_. (shrink)

El inteligente hombre Sin lugar a dudas el más extraordinario descubrimiento que ha hecho el hombre, de lo que de por sí le es innato, es la inteligencia. Una que empezó a ser humana cuando nuestros antepasados decidieron bajar de los árboles y, algún día, ya nutridos de raíces y de frutos secos con un alto valor proteínico, observaron que el palo y la piedra que llevaban en sus manos y a los que habían recurrido para defenderse, al darles unos (...) golpes con destreza, soltaban unos pequeños trozos que, a la vez, creaban unas aristas que los convertían en instrumentos de primerísima categoría para, por ejemplo, ‘crear’ el fuego, carnear los animales cazados, atemorizarlos hasta el punto de poder domesticarlos y cultivar las plantas; creando a su alrededor un hábitat distinto al que la naturaleza les ofrecía. No había que salir a buscar el alimento todos los días recorriendo grandes distancias y exponiéndose a los peligros implícitos en esas actividades; podían valerse de los animales y plantas de la ‘granja, dejando tiempo para el ocio, el entretenimiento, el compartir con los demás integrantes del clan, amar a sus mujeres, educar a sus hijos y cultivar el arte de dejar plasmados en las paredes sus hazañas, sueños, esperanzas y temores. Todo eso gracias a su inteligencia. (shrink)

In this work we’ll present a part of the debates that configured la indirect reception of the Hegelian philosophy through the second quarter of the XIX century. For this we’ll briefly describe the experience and path of the Verein in charge of the first edition of Hegel’s works; the, we’ll analyze the disputes over the hypothetical Hegelian republicanism; and, finally, we’ll focus on the interpretation that the Young Hegelians made of that same debate in the context of Schelling’s arrival at (...) Berlin. En este trabajo presentaremos una parte de los debates que configuraron la recepción indirecta de la filosofía hegeliana durante el segundo cuarto del siglo XIX. Para ello describiremos brevemente la experiencia y recorrido de la Verein a cargo de la primera edición de las obras de Hegel, luego, analizaremos las disputas en torno al hipotético republicanismo hegeliano y, finalmente, nos enfocaremos en la interpretación que los jóvenes hegelianos realizaron de esa misma disputa en el contexto de la llegada de Schelling a Berlín. (shrink)