There is sometimes a sense in which one theory posits ‘less structure’ than another. Philosophers of science have recently appealed to this idea both in the debate about equivalence of theories and in discussions about structural parsimony. But there are a number of different proposals currently on the table for how to compare the ‘amount of structure’ that different theories posit. The aim of this paper is to compare these proposals against one another and evaluate them on their own merits.

Glymour and Quine propose two different formal criteria for theoretical equivalence. In this paper we examine the relationships between these criteria.

In this article, I examine whether or not the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics are equivalent theories. I do so by applying a standard for equivalence that was recently introduced into philosophy of science by Halvorson and Weatherall. This case study yields three general philosophical payoffs. The first concerns what a theory is, while the second and third concern how we should interpret what our physical theories say about the world. 1Introduction 2When Are Two Theories Equivalent? 3Preliminaries on (...) Classical Mechanics 3.1Hamiltonian mechanics 3.2Lagrangian mechanics 4Are Hamiltonian and Lagrangian Mechanics Equivalent Theories? 4.1Tangent bundle versus cotangent bundle 4.2Tangent bundle versus symplectic manifold 4.3Lagrangian vector field versus Hamiltonian vector field 5Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

Logicians and philosophers of science have proposed various formal criteria for theoretical equivalence. In this paper, we examine two such proposals: definitional equivalence and categorical equivalence. In order to show precisely how these two well-known criteria are related to one another, we investigate an intermediate criterion called Morita equivalence.

Mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers of physics often look to the symmetries of an object for insight into the structure and constitution of the object. My aim in this paper is to explain why this practice is successful. In order to do so, I present a collection of results that are closely related to (and in a sense, generalizations of) Beth’s and Svenonius’ theorems.

The standard view is that the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations of classical mechanics are theoretically equivalent. Jill North, however, argues that they are not. In particular, she argues that the state-space of Hamiltonian mechanics has less structure than the state-space of Lagrangian mechanics. I will isolate two arguments that North puts forward for this conclusion and argue that neither yet succeeds. 1 Introduction2 Hamiltonian State-space Has less Structure than Lagrangian State-space2.1 Lagrangian state-space is metrical2.2 Hamiltonian state-space is symplectic2.3 Metric > (...) symplectic3 Hamiltonian State-space Does Not Have Less Structure than Lagrangian State-space3.1 Lagrangian state-space has less than metric structure3.1.1 A potential worry3.1.2 General Lagrangians3.2 Hamiltonian state-space has more than symplectic structure3.2.1 A dual structure on the Hamiltonian state-space3.2.2 Simple Hamiltonians3.3 Comparing Lagrangian and Hamiltonian structures3.3.1 Counting mathematical structure3.3.2 Symplectic and metric structure are incomparable4 An Alternative Argument for LS4.1 The argument for P3*4.2 Symplectic manifold vs. tangent bundle structure4.3 Trying to patch up the argument for P3*5 Interpreting Mathematical Structure5.1 State-space realism5.2 Model isomorphism and theoretical equivalence6 Conclusion. (shrink)

The purported fact that geometric theories formulated in terms of points and geometric theories formulated in terms of lines are “equally correct” is often invoked in arguments for conceptual relativity, in particular by Putnam and Goodman. We discuss a few notions of equivalence between first-order theories, and we then demonstrate a precise sense in which this purported fact is true. We argue, however, that this fact does not undermine metaphysical realism.

This paper presents a simple pair of first-order theories that are not definitionally (nor Morita) equivalent, yet are mutually conservatively translatable and mutually 'surjectively' translatable. We use these results to clarify the overall geography of standards of equivalence and to show that the structural commitments that theories make behave in a more subtle manner than has been recognized.

Wilhelm (Forthcom Synth 199:6357–6369, 2021) has recently defended a criterion for comparing structure of mathematical objects, which he calls Subgroup. He argues that Subgroup is better than SYM \(^*\), another widely adopted criterion. We argue that this is mistaken; Subgroup is strictly worse than SYM \(^*\). We then formulate a new criterion that improves on both SYM \(^*\) and Subgroup, answering Wilhelm’s criticisms of SYM \(^*\) along the way. We conclude by arguing that no criterion that looks only to the (...) automorphisms of mathematical objects to compare their structure can be fully satisfactory. (shrink)

Quine often argued for a simple, untyped system of logic rather than the typed systems that were championed by Russell and Carnap, among others. He claimed that nothing important would be lost by eliminating sorts, and the result would be additional simplicity and elegance. In support of this claim, Quine conjectured that every many-sorted theory is equivalent to a single-sorted theory. We make this conjecture precise, and prove that it is true, at least according to one reasonable notion of theoretical (...) equivalence. Our clarification of Quine’s conjecture, however, exposes the shortcomings of his argument against many-sorted logic. (shrink)

This paper makes an observation about the ``amount of structure'' that different classical and relativistic spacetimes posit. The observation substantiates a suggestion made by Earman and yields a cautionary remark concerning the scope and applicability of structural parsimony principles.

It has been suggested that we can tell whether two theories are equivalent by comparing the structure that they ascribe to the world. If two theories posit different structures, then they must be i...

In this paper, we examine the relationship between general relativity and the theory of Einstein algebras. We show that according to a formal criterion for theoretical equivalence recently proposed by Halvorson and Weatherall, the two are equivalent theories.

In his book Philosophy of Logic, Putnam (1971) presents a short argument which reads like—and indeed, can be reconstructed as—a formal proof that a nominalistic physics is impossible. The aim of this paper is to examine Putnam’s proof and show that it is not compelling. The precise way in which the proof fails yields insight into the relation that a nominalistic physics should bear to standard physics and into Putnam’s indispensability argument.

The purpose of this paper is to examine in detail a particularly interesting pair of first-order theories. In addition to clarifying the overall geography of notions of equivalence between theories, this simple example yields two surprising conclusions about the relationships that theories might bear to one another. In brief, we see that theories lack both the Cantor-Bernstein and co-Cantor-Bernstein properties.

This is an essay review of Jill North’s book Physics, Structure, and Reality. It focuses on two of the main topics of the book. The first is North’s idea that we can use coordinates as a window into the structure that a theory posits; the second is North’s argument for the inequivalence of Lagrangian and Newtonian mechanics.

Economist, philosopher, civil servant, and politician, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) made his mark as a liberal in Victorian society. His major works--System of Logic and Principles--as well as his famous essays--"On Liberty" and "Women"--reveal his extraordinary skill at clarifying difficult political and philosophical problems. Based on a detailed assessment of the influences on Mill's life, William Thomas traces the main ethical, economic, and psychological doctrines explored in his work and offers an unusual interpretation of the origins and development (...) of Mill's philosophy. (shrink)

The fifth volume of The Hackett Aquinas, a series of central philosophical treatises of Aquinas in new, state-of-the-art translations accompanied by a thorough commentary on the text.

Ransomware attacks on healthcare systems are becoming more prevalent globally. In May 2021, Waikato District Health Board in New Zealand was devastated by a major attack that crippled its information technology system. The Department of Orthopaedic Surgery faced a number of challenges to the way they delivered care including, patient assessment and investigations, the deferral of elective surgery, and communication and patient confidentiality. These issues are explored through the lens of the four key principles of medical ethics in the hope (...) that they will provide some guidance to future departments who may experience such attacks. (shrink)

A reluctant Aidan, recently returned home to Corenwald after three years in the Feechiefen Swamp, learns of a new party of Aidanites who believes he is the destined king to overthrow the tyrant King Darrow.

Thomas clarifies his basic criticism of Yeager's book, Ethics as Social Science, emphasizing his concern about lack of clarity of argument rather than style. Thomas discusses the role of ethical standards in contextual moral reasoning and defends Rand's rejection of ethical altruism against criticisms that it represents a "corner solution" or an unrealistic slippery-slope argument.