Abstract Suppose one is persuaded of the merits of noncognitivism in ethics but not those of expressivism: in such a case, a form of moral fictionalism, combining a descriptivist account of moral sentences with a noncognitivist account of the attitudes involved in their acceptance or rejection, might seem an attractive alternative. This paper argues against the use of moral fictionalism as a strategy for defending noncognitivism in ethics. It argues, first, that the view is implausible as it stands and, second, (...) that it does not enjoy the benefits over standard?expressivist?noncognitivism both that it claims to enjoy and that make up the principal rationale for the view. The paper then turns to the grounds for noncognitivism itself before showing how far the criticisms developed extend to alternative forms of moral fictionalism and developing independent objections to each. (shrink)

What nonsense might be, and what Wittgenstein thought that nonsense might be, are two of the central questions in the current debate between those—such as Cora Diamond, James Conant and Michael Kremer—who favour a “resolute” approach to Wittgenstein’s work, and those—such as P. M. S. Hacker and Hans-Johann Glock—who instead favour a more “traditional” approach. What answer we give to these questions will determine the nature and force of his criticisms of traditional philosophy, and so the very shape Wittgenstein’s work (...) has for us, as well as, to some extent, what the lesson of the Tractatus might be. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed defence of the austere view of nonsense, that lies at the heart of the resolute approach, against a range of influentialcriticisms developed by Hans-Johann Glock and which focus on Wittgenstein’s contextualism. In so doing, I hope also to shed some light on the kind of view the austere view is, as well as how it might relate to certain other crucial aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought. (shrink)

We tend to take for granted that we know what is involved in belief in other minds, and that the real problem lies in justifying that belief. By contrast, this chapter argues that we misunderstand what belief in other minds involves, and that the problem of other minds has its source in that misunderstanding. My aim is to rethink what belief in other minds involves in terms of what Wittgenstein calls ‘an attitude towards a soul’. Doing so not only undermines (...) the problem of other minds as traditionally formulated, but also has significant consequences for our understanding of the mind itself. One such consequence is that ethical considerations have a much more fundamental role to play in thinking about the mind than is typically believed. (shrink)

Can we perceive others' mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: He is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others' emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it (...) is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not “Is this perception?” but “What do we mean by ‘perception' here?” and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call “perception” here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein's answer to the question “Can we perceive others' mental states?” is yes and no: Both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhat explains the difference between a proposition and a mere list of the words it contains, presented in the same order? What unites the parts of a proposition to form a whole? José Zalaba...

It is a simple truth about the English language that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we (...) cannot really see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling, might be developed. (shrink)

This book offers a radical reappraisal of the nature and significance of Wittgenstein’s thought about ethics from a variety of different perspectives. The book includes essays on Wittgenstein’s early remarks on ethics in the _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,_ on his 1929 "Lecture on Ethics", and on various aspects of Wittgenstein’s later views on ethics in the _Philosophical Investigations_ and elsewhere. Together, the essays in this volume provide a comprehensive assessment of Wittgenstein’s moral thought throughout his work, its continuity and development between his (...) early and later work, and its connections with other aspects of his thought. Featuring fourteen original contributions written by internationally renowned Wittgenstein scholars, _Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought _opens up a new understanding of ethics that diverges from prevailing views prominent in contemporary discussions of the subject. (shrink)

Central to a new, or 'resolute', reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus is the idea that Wittgenstein held there an 'austere' view of nonsense: the view, that is, that nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give words a meaning, and so that there are no logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Resolute readers tend not only to ascribe such a view to Wittgenstein, but also to subscribe to it themselves; and it is also a feature of some (...) readings which in other respects are clearly not Resolute. This paper forms part of a reply to Hans-Johann Glock's work in which he argues (in part) that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus held a view of nonsense other than the austere view. Instead, Glock argues, Wittgenstein there held that there are many logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Here, I outline and defend the austere view, together with its attribution to the early Wittgenstein, against a number of Glock's criticisms, and focussing especially on Wittgenstein's reformulation in the Tractatus of Frege's context-principle. (shrink)

This paper is about what might be called the philosophical tradition of ethics, and Wittgenstein’s opposition or hostility to that tradition. My aim will be to argue that ethics, or a large part of what we think of as ethics, is nonsense, and in doing so I shall be developing the line of argument that I take to lie behind Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that there can be no ethical propositions. That argument has its basis in the simple (...) thought that value is not arbitrary or accidental, and what I shall show is how thinking through what is involved in that thought leads to a radically different conception of the possibilities open to ethical thinking than that which is assumed within the prevailing conception of ethics today. (shrink)

What are the limits of the imagination in morality? What role does fiction play in moral thought? My starting point in addressing these questions is Tamar Szabo Gendler's ‘puzzle of imaginative resistance’, the problem of explaining the special difficulties we seem to encounter in imagining to be right what we take to be morally wrong in fiction, and Gendler's claim that those difficulties are due to our unwillingness to imagine these things, rather than our inability to imagine what is logically (...) or conceptually impossible. Using a wide range of examples, I argue that there is no puzzle of imaginative resistance and that to think that there is such a puzzle is to miss almost entirely the role fiction plays in moral thought. That, however, does not mean that there are no limits to what we can imagine in morality. In fact, I argue, the imagination is limited in morality, as elsewhere, by what is logically or conceptually possible. Together, those claims suggest that fiction and the imagination play a fundamental role in shaping our conception of the moral landscape. The paper concludes by drawing some of the consequences of these views for the nature of moral thought. (shrink)

Two views are central to ‘New’ or ‘Resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: that Wittgenstein did not hold that some insights are ineffable; and that Wittgenstein did hold an austere view of nonsense . Adrian Moore, in his paper ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, offers an argument that seems to show that austerity in fact involves a commitment to the existence of ineffable understanding, and so that Resolute readers cannot hold both and . Hence, Resolute readers would have to give up one or (...) other core commitment. Neither option is attractive. Against Moore’s argument, I show that austerity does not involve commitment to ineffable understanding. (shrink)

This paper argues that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they lack any meaning whatsoever, that they are redundant, in that the work they are intended to do is already being done by other features of our language, and that they are harmful, insofar as they prevent us from appreciating what is of genuine ethical significance in our lives. Its aim is to outline a sense in which Wittgenstein can be seen to be trying, through the elimination (...) of “ethical propositions”, to reconnect us with the ethical commitments embodied in our ordinary “non-ethical” language, and so the ways in which ordinary language might be taken to be ethically revealing. (shrink)

This thesis focuses on 'New' or 'Resolute' readings of Wittgenstein's work, early and later, as presented in the work of, for instance, Cora Diamond and James Conant. One of the principal claims of such readings is that, throughout his life, Wittgenstein held an 'austere' view of nonsense. That view has both a trivial and a non-trivial aspect. The trivial aspect is that any string of signs could, by appropriate assignment, be given a meaning, and hence that, if such a string (...) is nonsense, that will be because we have failed to make just such an assignment. The non-trivial aspect is this: that there is no further, non-trivial story to be told, and so nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give signs a meaning. Hence, too, logically speaking, all nonsense is on a par. That view, both of nonsense and of Wittgenstein, has attracted a great deal of controversy. It is particularly controversial in relation to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus', where Wittgenstein famously declares, in the penultimate remark, that the reader is to recognise Wittgenstein's own elucidatory propositions there as nonsensical, and must eventually throw them away in coming to understand Wittgenstein himself. I defend the austere view and its attribution to Wittgenstein, early and later, against a number of exegetical and substantial criticisms put forward by, for instance, Peter Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock and Adrian Moore. (shrink)

abstract Using as a background the ongoing crisis afflicting the international cricket scene over whether or not to boycott Zimbabwe, this paper seeks to explore the moral complexities surrounding the case of the sporting boycott in general as a response to morally odious regimes. Rather than attempting to provide some easy formula by which to determine justifiable from unjustifiable boycotts, we take as our starting point many of the arguments raised in the national press and explore and develop these arguments (...) in order to shed light on the fundamental problems underlying the use of sporting boycotts as moral tools. The paper thus aims to show the inadequacy of the standard responses on both sides of the fence and, hopefully, clears the ground for future, more informed approaches to the issue. (shrink)

A review of _Wittgenstein’s Moral Thought,_ edited by Reshef Adam-Segal and Edmund Dain.

Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.

The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have been translated in footnotes. Secondary consideration has been given to a typescript (cited as "Typescript C") on which Husserl wrote in 1933: "Cartes. Meditationen (...) / Originaltext 1929 / E. Husserl / für Dorion Cairns". Its use of emphasis and quotation marks conforms more closely to Husserl’s practice, as exemplified in works published during his lifetime. In this respect the translation usually follows Typescript C. Moreover, some of the variant readings n this typescript are preferable and have been used as the basis for the translation. Where that is the case, the published text is given or translated in a foornote. The published text and Typescript C have been compared with the French translation by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas (Paris, Armand Collin, 1931). The use of emphasis and quotation marks in the French translation corresponds more closely to that in Typescript C than to that in the published text. Often, where the wording of the published text and that of Typescript C differ, the French translation indicates that it was based on a text that corresponded more closely to one or the other – usually to Typescript C. In such cases the French translation has been quoted or cited in a foornote. (shrink)

Teilband 1. Verstand und Gegenstand : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1909-1927) -- Teilband 2. Gefühl und Wert : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1896-1925) -- Teilband 3. Wille und Handlung : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1902-1934) -- Teilband 4. Textkritischer Anhang.

This eloquent 1757 treatise examines how interactions with the physical world affect formulation of ideals related to beauty and art. Tremendously influential on the development of aesthetic theory, this formative dissertation was among the first explorations of the concept of the sublime and remains a thought-provoking study for modern readers.

In seiner letzten Schrift unternimmt Husserl den Versuch, auf dem Wege einer teleologisch-historischen Besinnung auf die Ursprünge unserer kritischen wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Situation die Notwendigkeit einer transzendentalphänomenologischen Umwendung der Philosophie zu begründen. Er geht von seinem Begriff der "Lebenswelt" aus und entwickelt eine auf diesen Zentralbegriff seiner Spätphilosophie gegründete eigenständige Einleitung in die transzendentale Phänomenologie.

Russian translation of Gettier E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? // Analysis, vol. 23, 1963. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.

A recent innovation in the study of methods in the history of ideas is the introduction of elements of semantic externalism from the philosophy of language. Studies that rely on semantic externalism have done so to address particular questions of method in political theorising, including the interpretation of ‘essentially contested concepts’, and the issue of relativism in historical contextualism. In this paper, I critically review the use of semantic externalism, and associated methods such as Kripke’s causal theory of reference, in (...) the history of ideas. I explore the barriers that might prevent the use of externalism, and how studies relying on externalism seek to overcome such barriers. I then assess both the implications of relying on externalism, as well as a set of limitations. (shrink)

Edmund Königs Studie über Wilhelm Wundts Philosophie und Psychologie bietet einen sehr detaillierten Einblick in das Leben und Werk eines der einflussreichsten Psychologen und Philosophen der Moderne. Er untersucht Wundts Ansätze und Theorien zu den BereichenWahrnehmung, Bewusstsein, Emotionen, Sprache sowie politische und ethische Konzepte. Dieses Buch ist ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Psychologiegeschichte und ein faszinierender Einblick in das Leben und Wirken von W. Wundt. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the (...) knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Husserl (1859-1938) hatte sich in seinem Werk "Formale und transzendentale Logik" das Ziel gesetzt, den inneren Sinn, die Gliederung und Zusammengehörigkeit all dessen nachzuweisen, was bislang an logischen Problemen behandelt worden war, und die Notwendigkeit einer phänomenologischen Durchleuchtung der gesamten logischen Problematik darzutun. Ein Hauptstück der analytisch-deskriptiven Untersuchungen, die einer solchen phänomenologischen Begründung der Logik dienen, ist "Erfahrung und Urteil". Das Buch entstand in Zusammenarbeit mit Schülern und Mitarbeitern.

Die Cartesianischen Meditationen sind aus Vorträgen hervorgegangen, die Edmund Husserl Mitte Februar 1929 an der Sorbonne gehalten hat. Bei der Grundfragestellung Descartes’ einsetzend, entfaltet Husserl die transzendentale Phänomenologie als »Umbildung und Neu­bildung« des Cartesischen Programms der prima philosophia im Sinne einer Reform der Philosophie zu einer absoluten Wissenschaft aus absoluter Begründung. Eine französische Ausgabe, in der Übersetzung von Emmanuel Levinas und Gabrielle Pfeiffer, erschien 1931 bei A. Colin in Paris. Husserls Arbeiten an dem Manuskript für die deutsche Ausgabe, die (...) gegenüber der französischen erheblich erweitert werden sollte, blieben, nicht zuletzt wegen der 1933 veränderten politischen Situation, unvollendet. So erschien die erste deutschsprachige Ausgabe der Cartesianischen Meditationen erst postum in dem von Stephan Strasser herausgegebenen Band 1 der Husserliana , Den Haag 1950.Die Studienausgabe basiert auf dem Text der zweiten Auflage des Bandes in den Husserliana von 1963, hg. von Rudolf Boehm. (shrink)

There is no author's introduction to Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences,! either as published here in the first English translation or in the standard German edition, because its proper introduction is its companion volume: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. 2 The latter is the first book of Edmund Husserl's larger work: Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and is commonly referred to as Ideas I (or Ideen 1). The former is commonly called Ideen III. Between (...) these two parts of the whole stands a third: Phenomeno 3 logical Investigations of Constitution, generally known as Ideen II. In this introduction the Roman numeral designations will be used, as well as the abbreviation PFS for the translation at hand. In many translation projects there is an initial problem of establish ing the text to be translated. That problem confronts translators of the books of Husserl's Ideas in different ways. The Ideas was written in 1912, during Husserl's years in Gottingen (1901-1916). Books I and II were extensively revised over nearly two decades and the changes were incorporated by the editors into the texts of the Husserliana editions of 1950 and 1952 respectively. Manuscripts of the various reworkings of the texts are preserved in the Husserl Archives, but for those unable to work there the only one directly available for Ideen II is the reconstructed one. (shrink)

'Pain and pleasure are simple ideas, incapable of definition.'In 1757 the 27-year-old Edmund Burke argued that our aesthetic responses are experienced as pure emotional arousal, unencumbered by intellectual considerations. In so doing he overturned the Platonic tradition in aesthetics that had prevailed from antiquity until the eighteenth century, and replaced metaphysics with psychology and even physiology as the basis for the subject. Burke's theory of beauty encompasses the female form, nature, art, and poetry, and he analyses our delight in (...) sublime effects that thrill and excite us. His revolution in method continues to have repercussions in the aesthetic theories of today, and his revolution in sensibility has paved the way for literary and artistic movements from the Gothic novel through Romanticism, twentieth-century painting, and beyond. In this new edition Paul Guyer conducts the reader through Burke's Enquiry, focusing on its place in the history of aesthetics and highlighting its innovations, as well as its influence on many subsequent authors from Kant and Schiller to Ruskin and Nietzsche. (shrink)

-Das durchgehende Thema der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist die zeitliche Konstitution eines reinen Empfindungsdatums und die einer solchen Konstitution zugrunde liegende Selbstkonstitution der 'phanomenologischen Zeit'.- Martin Heidegger, 1928".

Klarheit in betreff dieser Sätze anstrebt, d. i. Einsicht in das Wesen der bei dem Vollzug und den ideal-möglichen Anwendungen solcher Sätze ins Spiel tretenden Erkenntnisweisen und der mit diesen sich wesensmäßig konstituierenden Sinngebungen und objektiven Gel- 1 11 S tungen • Sprachliche Erörterungen gehören r nun sicherlich zu den 1 r philosophisch I unerläßlichen Vorbereitungen für den Aufbau der [A 4] reinen Logik, weil nur durch ihre Mithilfe die eigentlichen Objekte der logischen Forschung und, in weiterer Folge, die wesentlichen (...) Arten und Unterschiede dieser Objekte zu unmißverständlicher 10 Klarheit herauszuarbeiten sind. Es handelt sich dabei aber nicht um 12 grammatische Erörterungen im r empirischen, auf irgendeine historisch gegebene Sprache bezogenen Sinn, sondern um Erörterun gen jener allgemeinsten Art, die zur weiteren Sphäre einer objekti ven Theorie der Erkenntnis und, was damit innigst zusammen- 13 15 hängt, einer rreinen Phänomenologie der Denk- und Erkenntniserlebnisse gehören. rDicse, wie die sie umspannende reine Phänomenologie der Erlebnisse überhaupt, hat es ausschließlich mit den in der Intuition erlaßbaren und analysierba ren Erlebnissen in reiner Wesensallgemeinheit zu tun, nicht aber mit 20 empirisch apperzipierten Erlebnissen als realen Fakten, als Erlebnis sen erlebender Menschen oder Tiere in der erscheinenden und als Erfahrungsfaktum gesetzten Welt. Die in der Wesensintuition direkt erfaßten Wesen und rein in den Wesen gründenden Zusammenhän ge bringt sie deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen 25 Wesensaussagen zu reinem Ausdruck. Jede solche Aussage ist eine 1 14 apriorische im vorzüglichsten Sinne des Wortes. (shrink)

Série de conférences faites à la Sorbonne en 1929, publié en 1931, l'ouvrage reprend le cogito ergo sum cartésien et développe le thème de la phénoménologie transcendantale en suivant le cheminement des Méditations de Descartes.

1. Bd. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. - 2. Bd. 1. T. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. 2. T. Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis.

Husserls Studien zum inneren Zeitbewusstsein bilden in ihrer chronologischen Folge sachlich und historisch entscheidende Teilschritte auf dem Weg zur Grundlegung der Phänomenologie. In Ergänzung zu der berühmten Erstedition des Textes der von Edith Stein redigierten Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins, die Martin Heidegger 1928 im Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung herausgab, bieten die hier nach den originalen Manuskripten aus dem Nachlass versammelten Texte aus den Jahren 1893–1917 die Möglichkeit, die Fortschritte Husserls in der Analyse des Zeitbewusstseins auch in (...) aller Strenge methodisch nachzuvollziehen. Im Unterschied zu der ersten Ausgabe dieser Texte in der Philosophischen Bibliothek von 1985 (PhB 362), die sich auf die Präsentation der aus dem Nachlass edierten Texte beschränkte, enthält diese Neuausgabe nun auch den von Edith Stein redigierten Text von 1928, der auf Manuskripten zu einer Göttinger Vorlesung im Wintersemester 1904/05 und ausgewählten Nachträgen bis zum Jahre 1910 beruht und seinerzeit große Beachtung fand, in manchen Teilen aber ohne die Hinzuziehung der Texte aus dem Nachlass nicht hinreichend transparent wird und seine Theorie in wesentlichen Punkten sogar als widersprüchlich erscheinen lässt. Eine fruchtbare Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Theorie muss sich daher im besonderen Maße auf die hier edierten ergänzenden Manuskripte stützen. (shrink)