Nurses are increasingly faced with situations in practice regarding the prolongation of life and withdrawal of treatment. They play a central role in the care of dying people, yet they may find themselves disempowered by medical paternalism or ill-equipped in the decision-making process in end-of-life situations. This article is concerned with the ethical relationships between patient autonomy and medical paternalism in end-of-life care for an advanced cancer patient. The nurse’s role as the patient’s advocate is explored, as are the differences (...) between nursing and medicine when confronted with the notion of patient autonomy. The impetus for this discussion stems from a clinical encounter described in the following scenario. (shrink)

In ‘Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument’ , 367–75), Professor William Lane Craig undertakes to demonstrate that J. L. Mackie's analysis of the kalam cosmological argument in The Miracle of Theism is ‘superficial’, and that Mackie ‘has failed to provide any compelling or even intuitively appealing objection against the argument’ . I disagree with Craig's judgement; for it seems to me that the considerations which Mackie advances do serve to refute the kalam cosmological argument. Consequently, (...) the purpose of this paper is to reply to Craig's criticisms on Mackie's behalf. (shrink)

The chapter argues that we should draw the line between realist and antirealist metaethics according to whether a theory locates the explanation for the special, puzzling features of moral terms and concepts out in the world, with the content of moral thoughts, or inside the head. This taxonomy places Mackie's error theory in the realist category, contrary to the usual scheme. The paper suggests that in looking for the “queerness” of objective value in the metaphysics of moral properties, (...) class='Hi'>Mackie makes a mistake parallel to a fantastic mistake made by some of the characters in E. B. White's Charlotte's Web. (shrink)

I start by arguing that Mackie’s claim that there are no objective values is a nonsensical one. I do this by ‘assembling reminders’ of the correct use of the term ‘values’ and by examining the grammar of moral propositions à la Wittgenstein. I also examine Hare’s thought experiment which is used to demonstrate “that no real issue can be built around the objectivity or otherwise of moral values” before briefly looking at Mackie’s ‘argument from queerness’. In the final (...) section I propose that Robert Arrington’s ‘conceptual relativism’, inspired by Wittgenstein, helps to make our use of moral language more perspicuous and avoids the problems faced by Mackie. (shrink)

월터 시노트-암스트롱은 맥키가 주장하는 “기이함”이 행동으로 일어날 수 있는 어떤 심적 상황을 찾으려고 한다. 그는 다양한 내재론들을 검토해서 “기이함” 기반이 될 수 있는 두 가지의 내재론을 지목한다. 여기에 그는 “기이한” 행동이 확실히 성립할 수 있는 두 가지 조건들도 첨부한다. 필자가 주목하는 것은, 그의 주장이 옳은가 또는 그른가가 아니라, 그의 이론 전개 과정에서 그가 이해하고 사용하는 맥키의 개념들이다. 즉 “기이함,” “오류,” 등이 맥키의 그것들과 같은가 하는 점에 주목한다. 필자는 이 개념들이 맥키가 제시하는 원래의 개념들과 다르다고 주장한다. 그런 차이의 근원은 시노트-암스트롱이 맥키의 (...) “두 단계의 도덕사고의 분리”를 충분히 수용하지 못하기 때문이라고 필자는 주장한다. 한 증거로서, “기이함”을 확인하는 행위가 두 이론가 사이에 서로 상반됨을 지적한다. 맥키의 “기이함”은, 객관적 가치들이 도덕행위자의 행의를 촉발하지 못할 때에 확인됨에 반해서, 시노트-암스트롱의 “기이함”은 어떤 행위가 이루어져야만 확인된다는 것이다. 맥키는 제 이 단계 도덕사고에 근거한 “기이함”을 논하는 반면, 시노트-암스트롱은 제 일 단계적 “기이함”을 다루려고 함으로, 이런 서로 상반된 주장이 나오게 된다고 필자는 주장한다. 시노트-암스트롱이 “제 이 단계”의 사고와 “제 일 단계”의 사고가 상통할 수 있다고 보는 반면, 맥키은 이 두 단계의 사고가 분리되어 있다고 본다는 것이며, 이것은 맥키의 이론을 이해함에 중요한 점이라고 필자는 강조한다. (shrink)

Cases of overdetermination or preemption continue to play an important role in the debate about the proper interpretation of causal claims of the form "C was a cause of E". I argue that the best treatment of preemption cases is given by Mackie's venerable INUS account of causal claims. The Mackie account suffers, however, from problems of its own. Inspired by its ability to handle preemption, I propose a dramatic revision to the Mackie account – one that (...) Mackie himself would certainly have rejected – to solve these difficulties. The result is, I contend, a very attractive account of singular causal claims. (shrink)

I argue that Mackie's approach to practical reasons is attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular I argue that it is much more plausible than the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated by Bernard Williams. This matters for Mackie's arguments for moral skepticism. Contra Richard Joyce, I argue that it is a serious mistake to invoke instrumentalism in arguing for moral skepticism.

My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis is plausibly false, (...) because belief in God is not just like a scientific hypothesis, and the second thesis is likely true if epistemic externalism is the correct view. However, even if the second thesis is true, I argue that to work on good arguments for God’s existence is unavoidable in order to cope with a new version of the Great Pumpkin objection, as well as to achieve other relevant purposes such as to convince rational observers outside the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or warranted. (shrink)

Mackie doubted anything objective could have the motivational properties of a value. In thinking we are morally required to act in a certain way, he said, we attribute objective value to the action. Since nothing has objective value, these moral judgments are all false. As to whether Mackie proved his error theory, opinions vary. But there is broad agreement on one issue. A litany of examples, ranging from amoralism to depression to downright evil, has everyone convinced that (...) class='Hi'>Mackie vastly overstated the motivational implications of moral judgment. Mackie did go overboard. But did he have to? I think not. Even on the most modest motivational assumptions, Mackie can make objective value look queer and morality look like a sham. I begin with a sketch. (shrink)

Distinguishing necessary and sufficient conditions can be challenging to undergraduate logic and critical thinking students. Explaining J. L. Mackie’s notion of INUS conditions—insufficient but necessary parts of unnecessary but sufficient conditions—is an even more difficult concept to understand. It is helpful to have memorable examples that not only clarify the concept, but make it easy to remember. Law student turned stand-up comedian Demetri Martin uses necessary, sufficient, and INUS conditions to construct absurdist jokes. These jokes provide effective tools for (...) making Mackie’s notion understandable and memorable. (shrink)

Moral error theory is comprised of two parts: a denial of the existence of objective values, and a claim about the ways in which we attempt to make reference to such objective values. John Mackie is sometimes presented as endorsing the view that we necessarily presuppose such objective values in our moral language and thought. In a series of recent papers, though, Victor Moberger (2017), Selim Berker (2019), and Michael Ridge (2020) point out that Mackie does not seem (...) to commit himself to this view. They argue that Mackie thinks this reference to objective values can, and perhaps should, be detached from our moral statements and judgments. In this paper, I argue that Moberger, Berker, and Ridge are right to point out that Mackie stops short of claiming a necessary connection between moral language and a commitment to objective values, but that he does not endorse the contrary claim either. Instead, Mackie stays neutral on the question whether it is possible to assert moral statements or make moral judgments without presupposing objective value. This is because he does not need to take a position on this matter. Mackie only engages with the conceptual analysis of moral language and thought to the extent required to achieve his argumentative goals: he wants to reject revisionary analyses of moral language and to refute the idea that we can assume moral truths to be in alignment with ordinary moral language. (shrink)

David Hume's greatness depends in large part on how his writings hint at beautiful and coherent theories which are recognizably Humean despite their divergences from the untidy originals. Now, perhaps the clearest vision of a contradiction–free Platonic Form of Hume was had by J. L. Mackie; he described it in such masterpieces as The Cement of the Universe, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, and The Miracle of Theism. How successful is this last in its attack on theism? I shall (...) discuss Mackie's case against theism of a Platonic or Neoplatonic type which replaces ‘God as a person or mind or spirit’ by a more abstract Creative Force or Principle. Mackie sees in it a ‘a formidable rival’ to any theism treating of a divine being; ‘if you demand an ultimate explanation, then this may well be a better one’ . But, his chapter thirteen contends, it fares badly in competition with an atheistic, naturalistic approach. (shrink)

J. L. Mackie, in "The Miracle of Theism" (OUP 1981), chapter 1, argues that "it is pretty well impossible that reported miracles should provide a worthwhile argument for theism addressed to those who are initially inclined to atheism or even to agnosticism." I argue that Mackie fails to establish this conclusion. All that he can show is that those who are initially inclined to theism or agnosticism may be justified in predicting that the next miracle report they examine (...) will not be such as to form the basis for a worthwhile argument for theism. (shrink)

Necessary-condition analyses of singular causal claims are particularly vulnerable to cases of linked overdetermination, so named because the nonoperation of the back-up factor (in fail-safe cases) or the preempted factor (in preemptive cases) is linked to the operation of the actual cause. As an example J. L. Mackie's analysis is here challenged with a simple switch-light case. Three replies are considered, a facts-vs.-events reply, a different-effect reply, and an in-the-circumstances reply. All are found deficient.

Gallant hero of romantic film, who has just killed his equally gallant antagonist in a duel: ‘Was I wrong, father?’ Father : ‘You were both wrong; and you were both right, too.’ David Hume, speaking of moral sceptics, once said ‘And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder opinions‘. I am guilty of an (...) inconsistency of some kind in quoting the above passage from Hume with approval for, though everything Hume wrote ought to be quoted with approval, it is inconsistent to approve of advice, and then immediately to disregard it. I am also guilty of an inconsistency of another kind. Once upon a time I myself defended a version of moral scepticism, but I can say in mitigation of this deplorable act that my tongue was partly in my cheek at the time, which is where one's tongue should be on the occasion of addressing the Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society. (shrink)

A recent discussion of Hume’s argument concerning the rationality of accepting a belief that a miracle has occurred is given by J. L. Mackie in The Miracle of Theism. Mackie believes that Hume’s argument is essentially correct, although he attempts to clarify and strengthen it. Any version of Hume’s argument depends upon one’s conception of miracles and laws of nature; I will argue that Mackie commits a simple logical error and that given his conception of laws of (...) nature and miracles there is no reason to reject rational belief in miracles. (shrink)

John P. Burgess has remarked that Mackie: “even though he talks of the need to invent morality … does not seem to think that this proposal could be worked into a revisionary meta-ethic”. In the first part of my paper, I argue that Mackie did propose a revisionary meta-ethic (conceptual reformism), and that Mackie was not a preservatist, abolitionist, or semantic pluralist. I also argue that interpreting Mackie as a conceptual reformist enables us to overcome a (...) number of standard objections to his error theory. The upshot is that we should take seriously the idea that Mackie was a conceptual reform moral error theorist. (shrink)

Gallant hero of romantic film, who has just killed his equally gallant antagonist in a duel: ‘Was I wrong, father?’ Father : ‘You were both wrong; and you were both right, too.’ David Hume, speaking of moral sceptics, once said ‘And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder opinions‘. I am guilty of an (...) inconsistency of some kind in quoting the above passage from Hume with approval for, though everything Hume wrote ought to be quoted with approval, it is inconsistent to approve of advice, and then immediately to disregard it. I am also guilty of an inconsistency of another kind. Once upon a time I myself defended a version of moral scepticism, but I can say in mitigation of this deplorable act that my tongue was partly in my cheek at the time, which is where one's tongue should be on the occasion of addressing the Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society. (shrink)

In “The possibility of morality,” Phil Brown considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or contingent thesis. Among other things, Brown contends that the argument from relativity, offered by John Mackie—error theory’s progenitor—supports a stronger modal reading of error theory. His argument is as follows: Mackie’s is an abductive argument that error theory is the best explanation for divergence in moral practices. Since error theory will likewise be the best explanation for similar divergences in (...) possible worlds similar to our own, we may conclude that error theory is true at all such worlds, just as it is in the actual world. I contend that Brown’s argument must fail, as abductive arguments cannot support the modal conclusions he suggests. I then consider why this is the case, concluding that Brown has stumbled upon new and interesting evidence that agglomerating one’s beliefs can be epistemically problematic—an issue associated most famously with Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox. (shrink)

In seeking to undermine Mackie’s logical argument from evil, Plantinga assumes that Mackie’s argument regards it as a necessary truth that a wholly good God would eliminate all evil that he could eliminate. I argue that this is an interpretative mistake, and that Mackie is merely assuming that the theist believes that God’s goodness entails that God would eliminate all evil that he could eliminate. Once the difference between these two assumptions, and the implausibility of Plantinga’s assumption, (...) are brought out, Plantinga’s celebrated critique of Mackie’s argument can be seen to be far less compelling than is often assumed to be the case. (shrink)