Taking as a starting point Brandon's account of the principle of natural selection, we argue that it is possible to consider such a principle as bearing the same status of the principle of causation, to wit, that of a methodological rule whose function would be to introduce a "teleological mode of inquiring the living". This way of understanding the principle of natural selection will drive us into an interpretation of Darwinism that is close to that one argued for by Daniel (...) Dennett. (shrink)

Cuvier’s confidence in the possibility of reconstructing the way of life of an extinct animal from a complete knowledge of its anatomy and its physiology could make us think that his program for paleontology somewhat anticipated Darwinian adaptacionism. Nevertheless, even if this interpretation seems reasonable, it ignores the cognitive aims and the fundamental presuppositions of the Cuvierian program. This ignorance conspires against a correct evaluation of the meaning and the impact of the results obtained by Cuvier in the study of (...) fossils. The relevance of those results is in showing that extinct living beings were subordinated to the same laws of organization as living beings existing today. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es poner al descubierto los principales valores cognitivos y epistemológicos desde los que Warren Weaver puso en marcha el Programa de Biología Experimental, un programa que llevado a cabo desde la presidencia de la división de ciencias naturales de la Fundación Rockefeller, marcó y condicionó en buena medida el posterior desarrollo de la investigación biológica. Para tal fin se mostrará, en primer lugar, cómo fue la llegada de Weaver a la Fundación Rockefeller, así como las (...) razones bajo las cuáles el consejo de esa institución decidió entre 1932 y 1933 dar prioridad a las investigaciones biomédicas, y la manera por la cual lo hicieron. En un segundo momento, el más extenso e importante, veremos algunos de los elementos más significativos de la perspectiva epistemológica y cognoscitiva de de Weaver. Finalizaremos viendo cómo esa perspectiva, desarrollada en conexión con el Programa de Biología Experimental, inter-actuó con la visión reduccionista de la biología a la que el programa parecía apuntar. The aim of this article is to uncover the main cognitive and epistemological values that influenced Warren Weaver in starting the Experimental Biology Program, a program carried out from the time that he became president of the Natural Sciences Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, and which significantly marked and conditioned the subsequent development of biological research. To this end, we first describe the arrival of Warren Weaver at the Rockefeller Foundation, and the reasons for which the Board of this Foundation, between 1932 and 1933, decided to prioritize biomedical research, and the manner in which they did so. Then, secondly, in the largest and most important part of the article, we will present some of the most significant elements of Weaver's epistemological and cognitive perspective. Finally, we will show how this perspective, developed in connection with the Experimental Biology Program, interacted with the reductionist view of biology to which the program seemed to point. (shrink)

Admitiendo la distinción propuesta por Mayr entre biología funcional y biología evolutiva, sugerimos que estos dos dominios de investigación siguen dos distintos modos de considerar lo viviente que pueden ser entendidos, pero en dos sentidos diferentes, como teleológicos. Para distinguir esas dos formas de teleología hacemos una comparación entre la explicación funcional típica de la biología funcional y la explicación seleccional propia de la biología evolutiva. Cada uno de estos tipos de explicación obedece a una regla metodológica especial: la explicación (...) funcional sigue al principio de adecuación autopoiética; y la explicación seleccional sigue al principio de adecuación adaptativa. Pero, mientras el primero será presentado como estando subordinado a un principio general da causación; el segundo será presentado como siendo independiente de él. Finalmente, en el contexto de una breve discusión relativa al concepto de symmorphosis, sostenemos que, en la biología contemporánea, la noción de adecuación adaptiva es preeminente sobre la noción de adecuación funcional: esta encuentra su fundamento en aquella.Admitting Mayr’s distinction between functional and evolutionary biology we suggest that these two dominions of inquiry follow two different modes of onsider the living that can be considered, but in two different senses, as being teleological. To distinguish these two forms of teleology we make a comparison between the functional explanation, typical of functional biology, and the selective explanation, proper of evolutionary biology. Each one of this kind of explanation obeys an special methodological rule: the functional explanation follows the principle of autopoietic adequacy; and the selective explanation follows the principle of adaptive adequacy. But, while the former principle will be presented as being subordinated to a general principle of causation; the later will be presented as being independent of it. Finally, in the context of a brief discussion concerning the concept of symmorphosis, we argue that, in contemporary biology, the notion of adaptive adequacy is preeminent over the notion of functional adequacy: the later find its fundament in the former. (shrink)

La distinción propuesta por Ernst Mayr y François Jacob entre biología funcionaly biología evolutiva es una clave fundamental para un tratamiento claro y concluyente de dos problemas que, recurrentemente, se colocan en el ámbito de la Filosofía de la Biología: aquel que atañe al posible carácter teleológico de las explicaciones biológicas y aquel relativo a la autonomía de la Biología en relación a la Física y a la Química. Sin sostener una alternativa de solución para ninguno de estos problemas, presentamos (...) esa oposición mostrando su relevancia para el tratamiento de tales cuestiones. Nuestra idea es que las mismas no deberían plantearse sin especificar a cual de los dos dominios de la ciencias de la vida nos estamos refiriendo.Mayr’s and Jacob’s distinction between functional biology and evolutionary biology is a fundamental key for a clearer and more conclusive treatment of two problems that, currently, are discussed in Philosophy of Biology: that which matter to the teleological character of biological explanations and that which matter to the autonomy of Biology from Physic and Chemistry. Without hold any alternative solution for none of these problems, we present that opposition showing its relevance for the treatment of both questions. Our idea is that these problems shouldn’t be posed without a specification of the domain of Biology that is being considered. (shrink)

Contrariando la concepción etiológica de las funciones biológicas, se pretende mostrar que las explicaciones por selección natural, lejos de justificar atribuciones funcionales, las presuponen; y que estas atribuciones pueden ser entendidas apelando a una especificación particular de la concepción s..

The Darwinian revolution supposed and imposed a much broader and more complex concept of environment than that which, until that moment, had been considered by most as part of natural history. Until Darwin, the environment of living beings had been regarded, almost exclusively, as the inanimate surroundings. This pre-Darwinian notion of environment included physicochemical and climatic variables: the living beings themselves were scarcely considered, or they were regarded just as food to be assimilated. In contrast, with Darwin, the influence of (...) living surroundings began to be regarded as having decisive importance for understanding the distribution, configuration, and viability of living beings. The relationships established among different living beings became the main and more significant features of the biological environment. This conceptual change was an exigency derived from the formulation and justification of the theory of natural selection. The idea of struggle for existence supposed by that theory requires that the biotic environment be considered critical in determining the viability of each living being. (shrink)

Las presiones selectivas no son factores ambientales que existan independientemente de los linajes por ellas afectados. Su existencia y su configuración siempre dependen de las alternativas de evolución que el propio linaje genera y acepta; y dicha configuración, necesariamente, se va alterando conforme el propio linaje evoluciona. Aclarar eso es muy importante para desestimar algunas reticencias generadas por la dicotomía próximo-remoto. Esta polaridad continúa siendo un recurso conceptual válido e insustituible para entender la especificidad de la Biología Evolucionaria. Enmendar algunos (...) equívocos generados por Mayr en su caracterización del concepto de causa remota es una alternativa mejor que la de pensar en abandonar o en relativizar esa distinción. (shrink)

En la Teoría de la Selección Natural, el concepto de función biológica debe suponerse para delimitar el concepto de aptitud; y éste debe suponerse para delimitar el concepto de adaptación y también para explicar el fenómeno al que este último alude. Esos tres conceptos, por otra parte, son especificaciones de tres conceptos de aplicación más universal. El concepto de función biológica es un caso particular del concepto general de función; y el concepto de aptitud especifica el concepto de eficiencia. El (...) concepto de adaptación, mientras tanto, es una especificación del concepto de diseño. La visualización de esas articulaciones conceptuales permite entender la legitimidad de la naturalización de la teleología operada por el darwinismo.In Natural Selection Theory, the concept of biological function must be supposed to elucidate the concept of fitness; and this one must be supposed to elucidate the concept of adaptation and also to explain the phenomenon to which the last one alludes. These three concepts, on the other hand, are specificationsof three concepts of more universal application. The concept of biological function is a particular case of the general concept of function; and the concept of fitness is a specification of the concept of efficiency. The concept of adaptation, meanwhile, specifies the concept of design. The visualization of these conceptualjoints allows to understanding the legitimacy of the naturalization of the teleology produced by the Darwinism. (shrink)

El gran malentendido que está por detrás de la concepción etiológicadel concepto de función es haber confundido este último con el concepto de adaptación. Las explicaciones por selección natural no justifican imputaciones funcionales: ellas explican la configuración de determinada estructura orgánic..

Although the knowledge about biological systems has advanced exponentially in recent decades, it is surprising to realize that the very definition of Life keeps presenting theoretical challenges. Even if several lines of reasoning seek to identify the essence of life phenomenon, most of these thoughts contain fundamental problem in their basic conceptual structure. Most concepts fail to identify either necessary or sufficient features to define life. Here, we analyzed the main conceptual frameworks regarding theoretical aspects that have been supporting the (...) most accepted concepts of life, such as (i) the physical, (ii) the cellular and (iii) the molecular approaches. Based on an ontological analysis, we propose that Life should not be positioned under the ontological category of Matter. Yet, life should be better understood under the top-level ontology of “Process”. Exercising an epistemological approach, we propose that the essential characteristic that pervades each and every living being is the presence of organic codes. Therefore, we explore theories in biosemiotics and code biology in order to propose a clear concept of life as a macrocode composed by multiple inter-related coding layers. This way, as life is a sort of metaphysical process of encoding, the living beings became the molecular materialization of that process. From the proposed concept, we show that the evolutionary process is a fundamental characteristic for life’s maintenance but it is not necessary to define life, as many organisms are clearly alive but they do not participate in the evolutionary process (such as infertile hybrids). The current proposition opens a fertile field of debate in astrobiology, epistemology, biosemiotics, code biology and robotics. (shrink)

En la Teoría de la Selección Natural, el concepto de función biológica debe suponerse para delimitar el concepto de aptitud; y éste debe suponerse para delimitar el concepto de adaptación y también para explicar el fenómeno al que este último alude. Esos tres conceptos, por otra parte, son especificaciones de tres conceptos de aplicación más universal. El concepto de función biológica es un caso particular del concepto general de función; y el concepto de aptitud especifica el concepto de eficiencia. El (...) concepto de adaptación, mientras tanto, es una especificación del concepto de diseño. La visualización de esas articulaciones conceptuales permite entender la legitimidad de la naturalización de la teleología operada por el darwinismo.In Natural Selection Theory, the concept of biological function must be supposed to elucidate the concept of fitness; and this one must be supposed to elucidate the concept of adaptation and also to explain the phenomenon to which the last one alludes. These three concepts, on the other hand, are specificationsof three concepts of more universal application. The concept of biological function is a particular case of the general concept of function; and the concept of fitness is a specification of the concept of efficiency. The concept of adaptation, meanwhile, specifies the concept of design. The visualization of these conceptualjoints allows to understanding the legitimacy of the naturalization of the teleology produced by the Darwinism. (shrink)

The main cognitive target of Ecology is the functional analysis of the ecological processes and systems. It does not suppose, meanwhile, that these processes and systems are designed systems and processes like individual leaving beings. The Ecology, likewise Physiology, is constitutively guided by the presupposition of a privileged state , to be explained, that it is the persistence of the systems and processes that she studied; and its functional analyses obey to this presupposition. Ecology supposes an ideal of natural order (...) , under which consideration this privileged state is thinking as an improbable state of things and, for that, needed of explanation; and, in what concerns this latter point, the analogy between Ecology and Physiology can also result instructive. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p349. (shrink)

Asumiendo y profundizando la distinción entre Biología Funcional y Biología Evolutiva conforme ha sido propuesta por Ernst Mayr y François Jacob, comparamos la naturaleza de los procedimientos experimentales que se realizan en uno y otro dominio de las ciencias de la vida. En vistas a esto, introducimos ciertas precisiones sobre las nociones de observación y experimento e intentamos elucidar los presupuestos sobre los que se apoya la experimentación en biología funcional. A continuación, presentamos los fundamentos y las particularidades de los (...) procedimientos experimentales desarrollados en el contexto de ese capítulo de la biología evolutiva que es la genética de poblaciones, y analizamos las peculiaridades de las variables sobre la que estos se ejercen. Esto nos permite mostrar la diferencia radical que existe entre operar sobre variables poblacionales y operar sobre variables fisiológicas.In this article we compare the nature of the experimental procedures that are carried out in different areas of biology. This is done by accepting and deepening the distinction between Functional and Evolutive Biology as it is argued for by Ernst Mayr and François Jacob. Keeping this in mind, we introduce some remarks on the notions of observation and experiment and try to clear up the presuppositions on the basis of which experimentation in Functional Biology rest. In the wake of it, we show the foundations and the main aspects of those experimental procedures that are developed in the context of that chapter of Evolutive Biology called Genetics of Populations and analyze the peculiarities of the variables by which those experiments are carried out. This allows us to show the radical difference between working on population and physiological variables. (shrink)

Según Ron Amundson, los actuales desarrollos de la biología evolucionaria del desarrollo podrían estar exigiéndonos una revisión de la distinción entre causas próximas y remotas de los fenómenos biológicos propuesta por Ernst Mayr. En este trabajo argumentaré que, aunque sea cierto que la dicotomía ..

RESUMEN: La idea de selección interna, propuesta originalmente por Lancelot Whyte, no sólo sirve para entender el papel causal que los constreñimientos del desarrollo tienen en evolución; sino que además puede hacernos comprender de qué modo esos factores organísmicos o internos, cuya importancia la Biología Evolucionaria del Desarrollo hoy quiere rescatar, son pasibles de ser considerados desde una perspectiva variacional o seleccional compatible, pero no asimilable, a la Teoría de la Selección Natural. Así, considerado como un concepto autónomo y diferente (...) al de selección natural, el concepto de selección interna puede permitirnos comprender de qué modo eso que Wallace Arthur llama developmental bias constituye una causa, efectiva y positiva, de transformacionesevolutivas irreversibles y acumulables.ABSTRACT: The idea of internal selection, originally proposed by Lancelot Whyte, not only helps to understand the causal role that the developmental constraints have in evoltion, but it can also show how these organismic or internal factors, which relevancy the Evolutionary Developmental Biology remarks today, can be considered from a variational or selectional perspective that is compatible with, but not reducible to, Natural Selection Theory. Thus, being considered as a concept autonomous and different from natural selection, the concept of internal selection can allow us to understand how that phenomenon that Wallace Arthur calls developmental bias constitutes an effective and positive cause of irreversible and cumulative evolutionary changes. (shrink)

Firstly, in this article it is examined the nature of the putative remarks concerning evolution of species that are found in the works that Richard Owen published before 1858; and then it is made the same thing with the few and vague evolutionist conjectures that Owen certainly made after the public presentation of Natural Selection Theory. Regarding the former topic, the goal will be to highlight the ambiguity of those Owen’s remarks, and concerning the latter topic what is looked for (...) is to show that, when he explained his transmutationist thesis, Owen didn’t go beyond a pious theistic evolutionism, without postulating any mechanism of evolutionary change and remaining faithful to Design Theology praised by Paley. (shrink)

En los últimos años, algunos autores han venido sosteniendo que la validez de la representación arborescente del patrón filético generado por la evolución está siendo menoscabada por el reconocimiento del impacto evolutivo que tendrían la transferencia genética horizontal, la simbiogénesis, la especiación por hibridación y la introgresión. Esa concepción o representación cladogenética de la evolución sólo nos dejaría ver un aspecto parcial de las relaciones de filiación que conectan a los diferentes linajes de seres vivos; ocultando otro aspecto cuya representación (...) más adecuada sería un reticulado de relaciones entre taxones. Con todo, aún sin poner en tela de juicio la frecuencia y la relevancia explicativa de dichos fenómenos, en este trabajo se intentará mostrar que su admisión y reconocimiento no tiene por qué ir en detrimento de esa concepción cladogenética de la evolución cuya relativización se está pregonando. Por el contrario, la comprensión y la representación de tales fenómenos supone dicha concepción. Palabras clave: Filogénesis, Especiación por hibridación, Introgresión, Simbiogénesis, TGH. (shrink)

Research in modern biology has largely been developed according to two main ways of inquiry, as they were outlined by Charles Darwin and Claude Bernard. Each stands for a specific approach to the living corresponding to two different methodological rules: the principle of natural selection and the principle of causation.

Having as starting point that a proximal cause is one which effects can be registered in the states of an individual organism, in this work I will argue that what defines an ultimate cause is the fact that its effects can be registered in the evolution of lineages, and not simply in population states. This, on the other hand, not only will allow us to clarify how the developmental constraints can be understood as causes of the evolutionary phenomena; but also (...) it will allow us to point the eminently historical character of Developmental Evolutionary Biology that Wallace Arthur lessened in Biased Embryos and Evolution. Thus, and following this latter reasoning, I will also try to show that, although the action of developmental constraints could happen beyond the limits of a population or a particular species, that does not imply that we are before a comeback of typological thought in Evolutionary Biology. (shrink)

Having as starting point that a proximal cause is one which effects can be registered in the states of an individual organism, in this work I will argue that what defines an ultimate cause is the fact that its effects can be registered in the evolution of lineages, and not simply in population states. This, on the other hand, not only will allow us to clarify how the developmental constraints can be understood as causes of the evolutionary phenomena; but also (...) it will allow us to point the eminently historical character of Developmental Evolutionary Biology that Wallace Arthur lessened in Biased Embryos and Evolution. Thus, and following this latter reasoning, I will also try to show that, although the action of developmental constraints could happen beyond the limits of a population or a particular species, that does not imply that we are before a comeback of typological thought in Evolutionary Biology. (shrink)

The distinction between evolutionary and functional biology is a fundamental clue to a conclusive approach of one of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of biology: the possibility of reducing biology to physics and chemistry. The questions that defines the cognitive targets of functio..

El termino ideología suele ser usado en tres sentidos diferentes; cada uno de los cuáles alude a un concepto de diferente: la ideología en el sentido originalmente propuesto por Marx y Engels; la ideología como ideario político, que termino siendo la noción de uso más frecuente; y la ideología como sesgo que afecta las posiciones que pueden adoptarse en el campo de la teoría. Aquí será analizada esta última noción; tentando mostrar su diferencia, pero también sus relaciones, con las otras (...) dos nociones. También se intentará establecer una diferencia entre las nociones de sesgo ideológico en la teoría y posición política en la teoría. (shrink)

The term ideology is usually used in three different senses, each of which alludes to a different concept: ideology in the sense originally proposed by Marx and Engels; ideology as a political thought, which ended up being the most frequently used notion; and ideology as a bias that affects the positions that can be adopted in the field of theory. This last notion will be analyzed here; trying to show its difference, but also its relationships, with the other two notions. (...) An attempt will also be made to establish a difference between the notions of ideological bias and of political position in theory. (shrink)

Segundo Daniel Dennett insistiu em diferentes trabalhos, o programa adaptacionista darwiniano constitui uma legítima e insubstituível translação da perspectiva intencional ao domínio da biologia. Mas, para que essa tese possa ser formulada com toda clareza, e não fique no plano da simples metáfora – coisa que não é o objetivo de Dennett – é necessário esclarecer qual seria o sistema intencional cujo comportamento estudamos conforme essa perspectiva. Assim, e contra a alternativa escolhida pelo próprio Dennett, e retomando uma proposta do (...) Karl Popper, sustentaremos que esse sistema não é a natureza como um tudo, mas sim o sistema constituído por uma população ou uma linhagem de organismos: eles são os agentes dos processos adaptativos. Não é nossa meta, entretanto, contradizer as teses centrais da Dennett; mas sim as reforçar.How do species think? Daniel Dennett has insisted in different occasions that Darwin’s Adaptationist Program constitutes a legitimate and hardly displaceable translation of the intentional point of view in the Biology field. However, in order for us to be able to state this thesis clearly and to avoid getting into the domain of mere metaphor – which is not Dennett’s purpose -, we have to single out what intentional system the behaviour of which we study on such a perspective. That being noted, we shall argue, contrary to the alternative that Dennett himself picked out, and close to Karl Popper’s suggestion, that such a system is not nature as a whole, but the system made up by a population or a class of organisms: those are the agents of the adaptative processes. We do not, however, aim at contradicting Dennett’s overall strategy; rather, we aim at reinforcing it. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p53 Ratifying Haeckel and contradicting Kant’s negative prophesy, in this paper I try to show that Darwin was, really, the Newton of the blade of grass . Darwin showed how the configurations according to goals of the living beings, could be explained from a naturalistic point of view, without having to postulate the existence of an intentional agent that had arranged or prearranged then. This achievement, nevertheless, was obtained by a way that Kant could not foresee and that Haeckel could (...) not understand: Darwin came there showing that there was more natural science than that Newton, Kant and Haeckel could conceive. (shrink)

El arquetipo vertebrado delineado por Richard Owen a mediados del Siglo XIX fue un modelo concebido para pautar el análisis morfológico de los seres vivos dentro de los lineamientos definidos por la idea de una unidad de composición cuando ella se aplicaba al caso específico de los vertebrados. Pero aquí, además de analizar la razón de ser originaria de ese arquetipo y su modo de operar dentro del contexto epistémico en el que efectivamente surgió, también aludiremos al modo en que (...) ese modelo pudo pasar a ser considerado, no ya como una idealización, o una abstracción metodológicamente operativa, sino como una aproximación a una entidad real que debía ser individualizada y debidamente descripta. (shrink)

Neste trabalho estudamos a noçáo popperiana de "eu" e concluimos que, no marco do racionalismo critico, O sujeito é conhecedor e o individuo empírico; porém o mesmo náo deve ser pensado como uma natureza psicológica anterior as estruturas sociais mas sim como um artificio institucional.

In opposition to the etiological conception of biological functions, this paper attempts to show that explanations by natural selection, far from justifying functional attributions, presuppose them, and that these attributions may be understood by appealing to a particular specification of the systemic conception of function, that is, the biological conception of function. This paper argues that the etiological conception of function is based on two fundamental errors: confusing the concept of function with the concept of adaptation, and confusing selectional explanations (...) with functional analyses. This explains the inappropriate demand that those analyses include an etiological explanatory content and make possible the distinction between adaptations and exaptations. (shrink)

Ratifying Haeckel and contradicting Kant’s negative prophesy, in this paper I try to show that Darwin was, really, the Newton of the blade of grass. Darwin showed how the configurations according to goals of the living beings, could be explained from a naturalistic point of view, without having to postulate the existence of an intentional agent that had arranged or prearranged then. This achievement, nevertheless, was obtained by a way that Kant could not foresee and that Haeckel could not understand: (...) Darwin came there showing that there was more natural science than that Newton, Kant and Haeckel could conceive. (shrink)

A clausura causal do domínio físico pode ser aceita sem por isso negarmos que exista genuíno conhecimento causal, capaz de nos habilitar ao controle experimental dos fenômenos, que não esteja formulado em termos físicos, e que dificilmente possa ser formulado nesses termos. A Biologia dá bons exemplos disso: tal é o caso das explicações que articuladas na base da Teoria da Seleção Natural; mas também é o caso das explicações fisiológicas. Elas, conforme Claude Bernard soube mostrá-lo, podem fornecer efetivo e (...) eficaz conhecimento causal, sem para isso ter que estar construídas em termos físico-químicos.: The causal closure of the physical domain can be accepted without denying that there exists genuine causal knowledge that can enable us to control experimental phenomena, but is not formulated in physical terms, and that can hardly be formulated in such terms. Biology gives good examples of it: such is the case of explanations articulated by Natural Selection Theory; but it is also the case of physiological explanations. These, as Claude Bernard could show, can provide effective and efficient causal knowledge without been constructed in physico -chemical terms. Keywords: Bernard, Claude; causal explanation; physicalism; reductionism; supervenience. (shrink)