Through a comment of the correspondence between Furio Jesi and Gershom Sholem, the author explores the tension between atheism and Judaism that, according to the same Jesi, characterized his own research. His studies on the myth and the mystique and the mediation of Scholem did not only allow Jesi to get on top of his own biography of "half Jew". Being nameless and hidden, the God of the Jews seems also to legitimize and justify Jesi's attempt to develop his research (...) on religious beliefs without assuming the existence of a god. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Naharaim Jahrgang: 10 Heft: 2 Seiten: 303-319.

The volume collects a series of groundbreaking new studies which delve into the work of Franz Rosenzweig and assess its enduring yet still unacknowledged value for Epistemology, Aesthetics, Moral and Political Philosophy, going far beyond Theology and Philosophy of Religion.

In the early 1930s, Franz Rosenzweig’s work was celebrated, criticized and questioned for its relevance within the specific cultural, religious and philosophical preoccupations of the inhabitants of pre-state Israel. This could be seen in nuce at the opening of the Schocken Library in Jerusalem in December 1936 that was marked by a celebratory conference dedicated to the memory of Franz Rosenzweig. The evening featured a collection of four lectures held in Hebrew by eminent German-Jewish scholars: Ernst Simon, Julius Guttmann, Hugo (...) Bergmann and Gershom Scholem. Simon and Scholem’s lectures in particular put forward two strikingly different views on Rosenzweig’s possible Nachleben in the yishuv. The article is followed by Scholem’s hitherto unpublished lecture and Simon’s German summary of his own contribution that evening. (shrink)

Furio Jesi to Max Brod (Turin, le 15 Janvier 1965) - L'esploratore della Kabbalah. Scholem e i mistici - Furio Jesi in «La Stampa», 7 Marzo 1980 - Furio Jesi to Gershom Scholem (Turin, le 26 Novembre 1966) - Gershom Scholem to Furio Jesi (Jerusalem, 1.4.1973) - Furio Jesi to Gershom Scholem (Novara, 28.5.1973).

In what is undoubtedly his most famous essay, the late F.C.S. Schiller posed the deceptively simple query: “Must philosophers disagree?” To Schiller and, seemingly, the bulk of philosophers before and after him, the question should be answered in the negative. Yet, the dialogues among contemporaneous philosophers, past and present, as among the vast number of protagonists in the long, “unscripted” dialogue which constitutes the history of thought, reveal that the disagreements among philosophers justly may be said to define a central (...) problem of philosophy, if not the root problem. Perhaps fearful lest the diversity of philosophical alternatives evidence the defeat of reason, many have striven to piece together a unified whole, to gloss over deep rifts in convictions among individuals, and even to institutionalize some contemporaneously acceptable explanation. But none of these moves has been successful to the present and none seem destined to gain the field in the future. Indeed, contrary to the end which the “heart” may desire, the “mind” drives us towards the conclusion that the ineluctable characteristic of reason is disagreement. Yet this in no way disparages reason or its usages, for no principle of logic has been violated when one chooses from among diverse basic convictions which form the foundation of alternative philosophic systems. (shrink)

Resumo: A epistemologia é usualmente neutra quanto aos diferentes tipos de objeto que a ciência investiga. Entretanto, seguindo Popper e Stengers, podemos descrever que os objetos vivos impõem à investigação científica uma mudança radical em sua abordagem. As ciências que lidam com objetos vivos não podem mais compartilhar os pressupostos do experimentalismo: o ser vivo não é isolável de seu ambiente. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento; Evolução; Filosofia da ciência.

Our usual method" is an expression that Aristotle uses in a passage of the Politics (I.1, 1252a17-20) to describe the technique of subdividing a composite object of study into the elements that make it up, in order to study the possible combinations. What theory is the basis for this method? Is it really a usual method for Aristotle? Enrico Rini responds to these questions, starting with the analysis of some passages of the Aristotelian corpus that refer to concepts of (...) the part and the whole. From these passages, Rini attempts to extrapolate a theory that Aristotle states explicitly only on occasion. The mereology that emerges from this study is not a formal theory, unlike the logical mereology present today, and therefore takes into account different types of the whole and the part, with a scope that has applications for the field of biology. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to an examination of the epistemic account of the notion of deductive inference recently provided by D. Prawitz, and based on the notion of ground. This is part of the general scenario constituted by the “Proof-theoretic semantics”, presented since the ’70s of the last century as an alternative to the standard model-theoretic explication of the notion of logical consequence.Our argument pivots on the so-called “Curry–Howard Correspondence”, which exploited the idea of considering proofs as proper mathematical objects (...) in a remarkable way. A sort of rational reconstruction of this idea is outlined, tracing it back to Hilbert and Husserl’s investigations. (shrink)

1. Epistemologia, logica e dialettica -- 2. Fisica, antropologia e metafisica -- 3. Filosofia pratica -- 4, pt. 1. L'influenza di Aristotele: antichità, Medioevo e Rinascimento -- v. 4, pt. 2. L'influenza di Aristotele: età moderna e contemporanea.

This is a book about food, philosophy, and intellectual property rights. Taken separately, these are three well-known subjects; but it is uncommon to consider them together. Delivering a rich field of disputes, the book is comprised of 50 case studies, organized around eight themes: images; genericity and descriptiveness; language traps; procedures; menus, recipes, and creativity; boundaries; biotech; and empowerment. The introductory chapter frames the selection of cases and encourages readers to look beyond them, envisaging new lenses to look at food (...) vis-à-vis intellectual property. The terrain encompassed is wide-ranging and reaches out to fine-grained aspects of food products, recipes, and cooking. Conceived for a wide scope of readers, the volume ultimately interrogates the links between food and cultural identity, bringing to the fore the ethical, political, aesthetic worth of culinary arts and gastronomic experiences. This accessible book will be of value to scholars, students, practitioners and others with interests in the areas of intellectual property, food law and food studies. (shrink)

Täglich verwenden wir Ausdrücke, mit denen wir etwas anderes meinen, als wir sagen. Wir ersetzen Unaussprechliches, wir bleiben höflich, und manche suchen unangenehme Wahrheiten oder ihre tatsächlichen Absichten zu verschleiern. Solche verhüllenden Ausdrücke wurden schon in der Antike als Euphemismen bezeichnet. Ihr Gegenteil, meist krasse Negativbezeichnungen, heißen Dysphemismen. Ob sie als Tabubruch, als Verstoß gegen Konventionen oder als unangemessenes Verhalten gelten, hängt von den Textsorten, den Situationen und Diskursen ab, in denen sie gebraucht werden. Oft geht es um Tod oder (...) Krankheiten, um den Mediendiskurs über Immigranten oder Minderheiten, aber auch um Arbeitszeugnisse oder die Werbung für Produkte und Dienstleistungen. Das alles sind Themen der Beiträge in diesem Buch. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Rawlsians have largely misunderstood the idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, thereby failing to delineate in an appropriate way the place of comprehensive doctrines in political liberalism. My argument rests on two core claims. The first claim is that (i) political liberalism is committed to three theses about the overlapping consensus. The first thesis concerns the subject of the overlapping consensus; the second thesis concerns the function of the overlapping consensus; the (...) third thesis explains how the overlapping consensus can serve its function in accordance with political liberalism’s commitment to epistemic neutrality. The second claim on which my argument relies is empirical: (ii) Rawlsians typically deny at least one of the three theses to which political liberalism is committed. Based on (i) and (ii), I conclude that Rawlsians have hitherto provided unconvincing accounts of the place of comprehensive doctrines in political liberalism. (shrink)

The stated aim of cryptocurrencies is to free the monetary system from the need to trust financial intermediaries, by relying on incentive design and technology. Many descriptive studies, however, have questioned cryptocurrencies’ delivery on the promise of trustlessness. This paper promotes a normative analysis of trust in cryptocurrencies by discussing (i) whether trust is in principle eliminable, and (ii) whether trustlessness is in itself a desirable goal. These issues are closely related, we argue, to the further issue of what kind (...) of institutions cryptocurrencies represent. We discuss the cognitive functions played by cryptocurrencies through the lens of the “extended mind” hypothesis in the philosophy of mind and hence conceive of cryptocurrencies as mind-extending institutions. As the models of institutional mind extension differ in the fiduciary bond they assume exists between individuals and institutional resources, we compare the reliance-based model of “scaffolding institutions” with the trust-based model of “cognitive institutions,” showing that the ineliminability and desirability of trust lead to seeing cryptocurrencies as instances of the latter. In the end, our discussion suggests that trust is a necessary component of cryptocurrencies’ cognitive functions and its promotion helps to perform such cognitive functions more effectively and sustainably. (shrink)

Enrico Müller legt hier die erste philosophische Gesamtdarstellung zur Bedeutung der Griechen für Nietzsches Denken vor. Er zeigt, wie sich in Auseinandersetzung mit dem Griechentum Nietzsches eigene Philosophie entwickelte, und problematisiert deren Abgrenzungen von der Logosphilosophie der griechischen Klassik. Müller kommt dabei zu dem Schluss, dass auch Nietzsches Philosophie letztlich auf die Vorgaben der sokratisch-platonischen Dialektik angewiesen bleibt.

The idea of an ?inversion principle?, and the name itself, originated in the work of Paul Lorenzen in the 1950s, as a method to generate new admissible rules within a certain syntactic context. Some fifteen years later, the idea was taken up by Dag Prawitz to devise a strategy of normalization for natural deduction calculi (this being an analogue of Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem for sequent calculi). Later, Prawitz used the inversion principle again, attributing it with a semantic role. Still working (...) in natural deduction calculi, he formulated a general type of schematic introduction rules to be matched ? thanks to the idea supporting the inversion principle ? by a corresponding general schematic Elimination rule. This was an attempt to provide a solution to the problem suggested by the often quoted note of Gentzen. According to Gentzen ?it should be possible to display the elimination rules as unique functions of the corresponding introduction rules on the basis of certain requirements?. Many people have since worked on this topic, which can be appropriately seen as the birthplace of what are now referred to as ?general elimination rules?, recently studied thoroughly by Sara Negri and Jan von Plato. In this study, we retrace the main threads of this chapter of proof-theoretical investigation, using Lorenzen's original framework as a general guide. (shrink)

Exploring the metaphysics of deep disagreements, Ranalli identifies several essential features shared by all such disputes. These very features constitute a set of adequacy conditions that any satisfactory theory of deep disagreements must meet. The paper explains how Coliva’s Wittgensteinian hinge theory can satisfy Ranalli’s persistence desideratum. According to this condition, any appropriate theory must explain why deep disagreements tend to be persistent and thus unresolved without presupposing that they are rationally irresolvable. First, the work critically discusses how Coliva utilizes (...) her proposed view to account for this desideratum. Second, the paper points out that Coliva’s response is partly problematic because of Ranalli’s definition of deep disagreements for Wittgensteinian hinge theories, which over-generates instances of genuine deep disagreements. Third, the work argues that Coliva’s theory can satisfy Ranalli’s persistence desideratum by resolving a deep disagreement between an anti-vaccination advocate and a proponent of vaccination using an expanded version of Pritchard’s side-on approach. Finally, the paper critically engages with Coliva on the solvability of deep disagreements. (shrink)

Ce recueil comprend une vingtaine de mes articles, pour la plupart deja publie par ailleurs. Plusieurs d'entre eux ont paru en francais, la langue que je prefere pour la communication internationale; mais il n'y a pas tout ce que j' ai ecrit ou publie dans cette langue: je n'ai retenu que les etudes concernant la dialectique, la physique et la metaphysique d'Aristote, et parmi celles-ci seulement celles qui me paraissent les plus significatives. J'y ai ajoute cinq traductions d'articles publies en (...) italien ou en anglais et qui me semblaient constituer un complement utile aux theses developpees dans les autres. Le but de cette publication est avant tout de mettre a la disposition d'un public plus large les resultats de mes etudes sur ces differents themes, en lui permettant d'en avoir une vision pour ainsi dire synoptique - au risque de comporter des repetitions, dont je tiens a m'excuser ici. Comme il s'agit d'ecrits s'etendant sur une trentaine d'annees - le plus ancien remonte a 1979, mais il avait ete presente au Symposium Aristotelicum de 1972 -, il est inevitable que, sur plusieurs points, il y ait eu des changements d'opinion. Mais ceux-ci ne sont pas vraiment significatifs et il s'agit dans la plupart des cas de nuances, de differences d'accent ou encore de mises au point. Si j'ai choisi d'inclure ainsi des opinions que je ne soutiens plus de la meme maniere aujourd'hui, c'est dans une intention dialectique, au sens aristotelicien du terme, c'est-a-dire pour fournir tous les arguments en faveur d'une these aussi bien que tous ceux qui lui sont opposes, de maniere a developper les apories dans les deux directions, ce qui, pour Aristote, constitue la meilleure maniere de distinguer le vrai du faux. (shrink)