This work is the first monograph devoted to the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of chance in Physics II 4-6 and its implications and projections in other treatises, including an original and comprehensive account of the Aristotelian conception of chance, of accidental causality in the realm of nature, and of accidental causality in the realm of human action. One of the main interpretative issues around Aristotle’s discussion of chance is its relation to the four causes and to teleology. In this sense, (...) it is particularly difficult to find the common features which fortune (tyche) and spontaneity (automaton) share. This work, offers such an interpretation of Aristotle’s general concept of chance (i.e. common to fortune and spontaneity), which shows clearly its relation with his theory of causality (Phys. II 3), with teleology, and with the application of this theory to the study of nature. It also shows how fortune and spontaneity can be interpreted consistently with this general characterization of chance, and how the specific differences between them can be accounted for paying attention to the different structures of causality in the realm of nature and in the realm of human action. Regarding the specific concept of spontaneity (automaton), a crux interpretum, the book offers one of the few independent discussions this issue in Aristotelian literature, and proposes a sub-classification in two kinds of spontaneity based on an analysis of Aristotle’s different examples and characterizations: ‘mixed spontaneity’ (which shares some features with fortune), and ‘pure spontaneity’ (which takes place strictly in the realm of nature). These different structures had not been recognized in specialized literature before. The problem of chance has projections into Aristotle’s natural philosophy, as well as into Aristotle’s theory of action and practical philosophy. This ample perspective of Aristotle’s work, and of the different explanatory models and ontological structures therein involved, constitutes an interesting groundwork for future developments in some or many of these realms of investigation. (shrink)

This paper challenges a widespread reading of Aristotle’s use of dialectic in the treatment of aporiai. According to this reading, the search for a resolution of an aporia is supposed to proceed by arguing against conflicting theses to refute one of them. I argue that this reading is not satisfactory and propose an alternative, based on an often overlooked distinction between two dialectical procedures, the refutation (elenchos) of a thesis and the resolution (lysis) of an argument. These two terms are (...) employed fairly consistently by Aristotle in the treatises as well. Since an aporia requires not merely conflicting theses, but conflicting arguments for those theses, I contend that the ideal way out of aporiai involves a critical analysis of those arguments, akin to that involved in the dialectical resolution. A relevant implication of this reading is that it expands the critical use of dialectic for philosophy, and points to the specific philosophical utility of the Sophistical Refutations. (shrink)

Recently, a strong hylomorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of causal interaction between soul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point and basic thread, but relying also on the discussion of Rh. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included into the picture, then (...) a causal interaction of mind and body remains within Aristotelian emotions, independent of how strongly their hylomorphism is understood. Beyond the discussion with this recent reading, the analysis proposed of the fourfold causal structure of emotions is also intended as a hermeneutical starting point for a comprehensive analysis of particular emotions in Aristotle. Through the different causes Aristotle seems to account for many aspects of the complex phenomenon of emotion, including its physiological causes, its mental causes, and its intentional object. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the role of some peculiar elements of Aristotle's dialectical development —namely, those emerging in the Sophistical Refutations (SE)— in the analysis and discussion of the Eleatic thesis in Physics I, 2-3. The paper adresses some of Aristotle's preliminary thoughts (Phys. I, 2) (which are read as methodological considerations), and some remarks against Melissus' argument (Phys. I, 3), in order to find connections between such claims and passages of SE, as well as the (...) Topics. -/- . (shrink)

El artículo propone poner a prueba la idea comúnmente admitida de que en la concepción aristotélica las emociones tienen una función o fin en el ámbito biológico. Me propongo probar que esta concepción sería más propia de otras posturas, como la tomista y la cartesiana, y especialmente de la darwiniana y neo-darwiniana. Tras presentar en la sección 2 el tipo de explicaciones teleológicas que Aristóteles admite y emplea en biología, analizo en la parte 3 la concepción de las emociones de (...) Descartes y en especial de Darwin y muestro que ellas se adaptan bien al modelo explicativo teleológico aristotélico. En la sección 4, ofrezco varios argumentos con apoyo en los textos biológicos de Aristóteles para mostrar que, en cambio, este tipo de explicaciones teleológicas de las emociones no aparecen con claridad en los escritos biológicos del estagirita, toda vez que lo que encontramos allí es, más bien, explicaciones fisiológico materialistas del carácter de los animales. Por último, sugiero una asimetría con el tratamiento de las emociones desde el punto de vista de la racionalidad práctica que desarrollaré en trabajos ulteriores. (shrink)

Presentación del Dossier 'Perspectivas aristotélicas contemporáneas'.

This paper deals with Aristotle’s concept of chance, such as it is presented in Physics II 4-6. The central section of the article concentrates on an analysis of Aristotle’s definition of chance and its essential peculiarities: the fact of being an incidental (efficient) cause and the fact of existing in the domain of what is for the sake of an end. According to Rossi, both characteristics would correspond to a causal aspect (in an incidental sense) and to a non (...) causal aspect (or just apparently causal) of chance. Finally, the author also tries to show the structural connection between the aforementioned aspects, taking as a key point the thesis of coincidence among the formal, final, and efficient causes. (shrink)

In this paper I address some aspects of the discussion of Aristotle against materialism. I take as a starting point the inaugural sentence of Phys. 2.4, where Aristotle refers to the endoxon that there are things which are (einai), and things which become or are generated (gignesthai) by chance. In the first place, I show that Aristotle would have ascribed to the materialists (especially Empedocles) the opinion that things like animals and plants can be (and not only become) by chance. (...) I shall argue that, in fact, this thesis implies that it is not only the compound that is generated, but also the form or eidos of the living being. To this extent, I propose that there are strong reasons for Aristotle to reject that living beings may be by chance, and to circumscribe chance to that which becomes or is generated. In other words: chance can occur within processes of generation but has nothing to do with the causes and principles of those processes. Thus, this repositioning of chance within the sole field of what becomes is closely connected to the causal priority of the eidos in the processes of generation. (shrink)

Este artículo trata el concepto aristotélico de azar, tal como se lo presenta en Física II 4-6. La sección central del artículo se concentra en el análisis de la definición aristotélica de azar y sus peculiaridades esenciales: el hecho de ser una causa accidental y el hecho de existir en el dominio de lo que es en vista de un fin. Según Rossi, ambas características corresponderían a un aspecto causal y a un aspecto no causal del azar. Por último, (...) la autora también trata de mostrar la conexión estructural entre los aspectos antes mencionados, tomando como hecho clave la tesis de la coincidencia entre las causas formal, final y eficiente. (shrink)

This paper deals with Plato’s theoretical views on rhetoric, its value, its conditions, and its genuine ethical-political function. My goal is to show that, even from the theoretical and/or metarhetorical point of view (Gorgias and Phaedrus), Plato would admit the practice of arguing from probabilities (eikós) and opinions, and would accept as a legitimate part of rhetoric –in order to persuade the mob– devices such as appeals to emotion. As it is well known, concrete uses of these devices can be (...) found in the dialogues. I will refer, in this vein, to some passages of Plato’s political writings, esp. Republic and Laws, and to the role of some myths in the dialogues. Nonetheless, I sustain the necessity (and the possibility) of harmonizing this view, with Plato’s strong claim that knowledge of (and commitment to) an objective truth is essential to the true rhétor. (shrink)

The text of Physics 2.8 has been recently interpreted so as to restore the reading that Aristotle holds an external, and even an anthropocentric, natural teleology. This reading has been defended by D. Furley, and especially by D. Sedley. In this paper I present several arguments against this interpretation of the text. Thus, I will argue that Aristotle does not claim, in this chapter, that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, against an opinion which is (...) currently somewhat extended among interpreters. (shrink)

En el artículo se examinan los dos intentos de Aristóteles por explicar el fenómeno de las acciones voluntarias e involuntarias: Ética Eudemia (EE) II 6-9 y Ética Nicomaquea (EN) III 1. Entre ambos tratamientos hay muchas coincidencias, pero también diferencias sustantivas, tanto en la caracterización de las acciones involuntarias como en la estrategia argumentativa general y la definición de lo voluntario. El artículo procura dar cuenta de dichas diferencias de contenido en función de la estrategia metodológica general por la que (...) opta Aristóteles en uno y otro caso. The article examines Aristotle's two attempts to explain the phenomena of voluntary and involuntary actions: Eudemian Ethics (EE) II 6-9 and Nicomachean Ethics (EN) III 1. Though there are notorious coincidences, there are also substantial differences between them in the characterization of involuntary actions, in the general argumentative strategy, and in the definition of voluntary actions. The paper endeavors to account for these material differences on the basis of the general methodological strategy used by Aristotle in each case. (shrink)

This article is about the methodological remarks in Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145b2–7, and the way they are carried out in the following chapters. I argue that the procedure therein described does not aim to establish consistency among a subset of endoxa, but to test and refine—by considering and resolving objections against them—endoxa that could enter into a nominal definition of continence and incontinence. The dialectical lineage of this discussion, if there is one, is to be found in the use of (...) the critical procedure of resolution that can be traced back to Topics and Sophistical Refutations. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance (and of accidental causes), meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ when applied to Aristotle’s concept of accidental cause and to (...) chance, is best understood as a second-order predicate. More precisely, Aristotle uses ‘indeterminate’ to qualify a certain type of causal relation, rather than to indicate a quality of the causal power or of the effect. As a preparatory step in my argument, I contend that ‘accidental’ and ‘per se’ are also best understood as second-order predicates of ‘cause,’ and as a corollary of my main thesis I offer an interpretation of how chance involves an infinite number of possible causes. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance, meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ when applied to Aristotle’s concept of accidental cause and to chance, is best understood (...) as a second-order predicate. More precisely, Aristotle uses ‘indeterminate’ to qualify a certain type of causal relation, rather than to indicate a quality of the causal power or of the effect. As a preparatory step in my argument, I contend that ‘accidental’ and ‘per se’ are also best understood as second-order predicates of ‘cause,’ and as a corollary of my main thesis I offer an interpretation of how chance involves an infinite number of possible causes. (shrink)

In Physica I,8 Aristotle endeavors to show that a long-term Eleatic puzzle about coming-to-be can be resolved by appealing to his own ontological principles of change (substratum, privation, and form). In this paper, I posit that the key to Aristotle’s resolution lies in the introduction of aspectual distinctions within numerical unities. These distinctions within the terminus a quo and the terminus as quem of coming-to-be made it possible for Aristotle to maintain, while answering the puzzle, that there is no coming-to-be (...) ex nihilo and, at the same time, that the product of coming-to-be is something that did not exist before; i.e. that there is coming-to-be. Finally, I suggest that this resolution could be seen as an interesting case of the application of conceptual tools developed in the Sophistici Elenchi, and I analyze the advantages of this resolution over the Platonic resolution of a similar sort of Eleatic problem. (shrink)

En estas páginas ofrezco, en primer lugar, algunas con­sideraciones respecto del valor filo­sófico del estudio de la filosofía antigua, tanto en vista de los aspectos metodológicos y argu­mentati­vos desplegados por los textos de los filósofos antiguos, como en atención al contenido de estos tex­tos. En este último sentido, recojo algunas de las mu­chas instancias de rehabilitación de filósofos y doctri­nas antiguas que han tenido lugar a lo largo de los últimos decenios para poner de relieve cómo y hasta qué punto (...) la reflexión filosófica sustantiva no se de­sentiende de hecho del estudio de los antiguos, sino que más bien encuentra en ellos, una y otra vez, fuente de inspiración filosófica. Por último, realizo un breve recorrido por los artículos que componen este número monográfico. (shrink)

RESUMEN Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella (...) implica una continuidad entre la normatividad natural y la normatividadpráctica propia de un naturalismo fundacionalista que no puede atribuirse a Aristóteles. En conexión con ello, sostengo que el concepto de virtud natural no es un concepto natural, sino ético, tal que sólo cobra sentido en el marco de la normatividad práctica; la virtud natural, en este sentido, no forma parte de una explicación genética de la virtud sino de un análisis que va del todo a las partes, de acuerdo al cual ella no es anterior sino posterior a la virtud ética. ABSTRACT A recent trend in Aristotelian scholarship tries to link ethics and biology. Within these attempts, some sort of continuity between the character of non-rational animals and that of human beings has been proposed, so that the starting point ofmoral development could be identified in Aristotle’s description of animal’s character. In this article I argue that this reading should strongly qualified, for understood in some ways it entails a sort of continuity between natural normativity and practical normativity that belongs to an Archimedean ethical naturalism, which cannot be reconstructed from Aristotle’s writings. Connected to this, I argue that the concept of natural virtue is not a natural concept, but an ethical one that only makes sense from within the realm of practical normativity; natural virtue, thus understood, is not part of a genetic explanation of virtue, but emerges from a conceptual whole-part analysis. In this manner, natural virtue is no prior, but posterior to ethical virtue. (shrink)

Resumen: En Metafísica E 2 y 3 Aristóteles discute el problema de lo que es por accidente y sus causas, con el fin último de examinar si esto puede ser objeto de la filosofía primera. El resultado de esta discusión es, en este sentido, negativo. Sin embargo, la filosofía primera tiene algo que decir acerca del accidente, aunque solo sea mediante un discurso de segundo orden. La naturaleza de lo accidental es así explorada en estas páginas de la Metafísica para (...) confirmar la imposibilidad de un estudio científico acerca de esta forma de ser y sus causas. La parte central de este artículo discute el complejo pasaje E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, donde Aristóteles presenta las causas de lo que es por accidente. Procuraré mostrar que las tres causas allí presentadas son no solo compatibles, sino también relevantes para la completa caracterización de lo accidental, en la medida en que pueden entenderse como la causa formal, eficiente y material de lo que es por accidente.: Aristotle’s Metaphysics E 2 and 3 are devoted to the discussion about accidental being and its causes, with the aim of assessing its credentials as a possible object of first philosophy. The result of this discussion is, in this sense, negative. However, first philosophy has something to say about accidental being, if only through a second order speech. The nature of the accidental is thus explored in these pages of Metaphysics, with the ultimate aim of confirming the impossibility of a scientific study about this way of being and its causes. The central part of this paper deals with E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, where Aristotle introduces the causes of accidental being. I endeavor to show that each of the three causes presented in these lines are compatible and relevant, as they can be understood, respectively, as the formal, efficient and material cause of what happens by accident. (shrink)

The article examines Aristotle’s two attempts to explain the phenomena of voluntary and involuntary actions: Eudemian Ethics (EE) II 6-9 and Nicomachean Ethics (EN) III 1. Though there are notorious coincidences, there are also substantial differences between them in the characterization of involuntary actions, in the general argumentative strategy, and in the definition of voluntary actions. The paper endeavors to account for these material differences on the basis of the general methodological strategy used by Aristotle in each case.

The article analyzes the relation between practical normativity and nature focusing on the classical locus NE II 1, 1103a18-26, where Aristotle expressly considers the relation of nature to excellence of character. I argue that in Aristotle neither is practical normativity necessarily grounded on any kind of natural normativity, nor is nature is to be conceived of as being for the sake of human ends. The article deals, to a large extent, precisely with the limits and intersections between these two kinds (...) of normativity in Aristotle. I claim that, in the Aristotelian texts, human nature does not provide any more positive ethical goals than that of developing and making use of our reason and of our capacity to tell right from wrong. But, at the same time, human nature seems to set the conditions of possibility for practical normativity, through the special causality exerted by human beings as agents, i.e. due to the fact that, as rational beings, we do some things not “by nature” but eph’ hemin. (shrink)

The papers included in this book explore various aspects of the relation between nature and practical normativity in Antiquity, from the Presocratic period to Neoplatonism. Leaving aside the question how much of contemporary naturalism is present in Ancient Philosophy, and whether that much is sufficient for finding traces of it in ancient naturalism, one may still ask the historical question of whether or not this is a feature that all ancient ethics share. To this effect, the following pages offer a (...) palette of readings that provide diverse analyses and diagnoses about the manner, the extent, and the success with which the appeal to nature can be identified as a strategy for founding practical normativity in Ancient Philosophy. (shrink)

En esta presentación realizamos un breve balance de la importancia del estudio de la racionalidad en la filosofía antigua, y presentamos un sumario de cada uno de los artículos que integran el volumen, los cuales dan cuenta de un amplio abanico de cuestiones que se abren a partir de su temática central: desde aspectos lógico-semánticos que atañen a las bases de la racionalidad en Aristóteles, hasta aquellas concepciones ontológicas en que la racionalidad tiene un papel preponderante, como la parmenídea y (...) la estoica, pasando por versiones más “blandas” de la racionalidad, en sede retórica y de filosofía natural aristotélicas. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Metaphysics E 2 and 3 are devoted to the discussion about accidental being and its causes, with the aim of assessing its credentials as a possible object of first philosophy. The result of this discussion is, in this sense, negative. However, first philosophy has something to say about accidental being, if only through a second order speech. The nature of the accidental is thus explored in these pages of Metaphysics, with the ultimate aim of confirming the impossibility of a (...) scientific study about this way of being and its causes. The central part of this paper deals with E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, where Aristotle introduces the causes of accidental being. I endeavor to show that each of the three causes presented in these lines are compatible and relevant, as they can be understood, respectively, as the formal, efficient and material cause of what happens by accident. (shrink)

Empirical research in bioethics has developed rapidly over the past decade, but has largely eschewed the use of technology-driven methodologies. We propose “design bioethics” as an area of conjoined theoretical and methodological innovation in the field, working across bioethics, health sciences and human-centred technological design. We demonstrate the potential of digital tools, particularly purpose-built digital games, to align with theoretical frameworks in bioethics for empirical research, integrating context, narrative and embodiment in moral decision-making. Purpose-built digital tools can engender situated engagement (...) with bioethical questions; can achieve such engagement at scale; and can access groups traditionally under-represented in bioethics research and theory. If developed and used with appropriate rigor, tools motivated by “design bioethics” could offer unique insights into new and familiar normative and empirical issues in the field. (shrink)

Cécile Laborde has argued that the freedom we think of as ‘freedom of religion’ should be understood as a bundle of separate and relatively independent freedoms. I criticise that approach by pointing out that it is insufficiently sensitive to facts about the sorts of entities that liberal states are. I argue that states have good reasons to mould phenomena such as religion into easily governable monoliths. If this is a problem from the normative point of view, it is not due (...) to descriptively inadequate accounts of religion, but a problem with a lack of realism about the sort of institutions states are. My conclusion is a three-way disjunction: either one must reckon with liberal states’ historically determined limitations in the management of changing social phenomena, or one should direct one’s frustration at the marriage of liberalism and the state, or the very existence of states is normatively problematic. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendemos mostrar as diferentes implicações epistemológicas e éticas da ideia de princípio fisiológico do conhecimento nas filosofias de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Pois, se para o primeiro isto será a garantia de afirmação de um conhecimento irracional, para o segundo é a confirmação da não possibilidade de conhecimento. Assim, veremos como, para Schopenhauer, o princípio fisiológico do conhecimento nos liga a essência do mundo e nos torna capazes de atingir em certas vias a própria coisa em si, a vontade. (...) Na filosofia de Nietzsche, tal princípio é a justa prova de que todo o conhecimento não se liga a nada mais do que a manutenção da vida, de forma que a linguagem e a “verdade” são apenas construtos para a sobrevivência humana. Observaremos também qual valoração de vida ambos filósofos imputam em suas considerações, já que, em Schopenhauer, vislumbrar a verdade é se dar conta do quão pouco valor a vida possui, enquanto em Nietzsche a tragédia da vida se mostra sempre afirmativa. (shrink)

Em sua obra O segundo sexo “fatos e mitos”, Simone de Beauvoir se propõe uma genealogia do ser mulher considerando a questão do que fez da mulher o “outro”. Isto porque, em sua análise existencial, a filósofa percebe a situação da mulher como a do inessencial e inautêntico. A mulher estranha a si mesma pois se constitui como o outro do homem. E, por sua vez, vista pelo olhar masculino, a mulher é o misterioso de duas faces, é tudo aquilo (...) que o homem não é e não pode ser, o que faria da mulher o angustiante inexplicável da existência. Nesta alteridade negativa, é construída uma história da mulher no mundo e diversos mitos sobre o que é ser mulher, que resultam em uma situação. Evidentemente, uma situação opressiva, para a qual a autora considera ainda soluções, como a possibilidade de não se encerrar no destino materno e o ganho de poder aquisitivo — que livrariam as mulheres de sua sujeição social. Assim, expomos neste artigo como Simone de Beauvoir caracteriza a situação e os mitos da mulher, a fim de compreender porquê seria a mulher o segundo sexo. (shrink)

Abstract:In this article, we present a pragmatic approach to neuroethics, referring back to John Dewey and his articulation of the “common good” and its discovery through systematic methods. Pragmatic neuroethics bridges philosophy and social sciences and, at a very basic level, considers that ethics is not dissociable from lived experiences and everyday moral choices. We reflect on the integration between empirical methods and normative questions, using as our platform recent bioethical and neuropsychological research into moral cognition, action, and experience. Finally, (...) we present the protocol of a study concerning teenagers’ morality in everyday life, discussing our epistemological choices as an example of a pragmatic approach in empirical ethics. We hope that this article conveys that even though the scope of neuroethics is broad, it is important not to move too far from the real life encounters that give rise to moral questions in the first place. (shrink)

Critical Realism and the Objective Value of Sustainability contributes to the growing discussion surrounding the concept of sustainability, using a critical realist approach within a transdisciplinary theoretical framework to examine how sustainability objectively occurs in the natural world and in society. The book develops an ethical theory of sustainability as an objective value, rooted not in humans' subjective preferences but in the holistic web of relationships, interdependencies, and obligations existing among living things on Earth, a web believed to have maintained (...) life on Earth over the last 3.7 billion years. It proposes three pillars of sustainability ethics: contentment for the human existence given to us; justice (beyond distributive justice); and meaningful freedom (within ecological and moral limits). Using abductive reasoning, the book infers that there is an out-of-this-world Sustainer behind the Earth's sustainability acting as a metaphysical source of all being and value. It argues that sustainability value, accepted as a shared understanding of the common good, must guide individual decisions and socio-economic development efforts as a matter of deliberate choice, as well as be built on the awareness that there are non-negotiable, pre-established conditions for our planet's sustainability. This book will be of interest to students and scholars across fields of inquiry, including sustainability, sustainable development, environmental philosophy and ethics, philosophy of science, ecological economics, and to whoever may wonder why seasons exists and why humans have creative minds. (shrink)

Worldwide interest in understanding art and creative practices as valid forms of knowledge production has led to the establishment of research-creation as an interdisciplinary academic field in the last twenty years in Canada as elsewhere. Its establishment relates to a growing interest in critical making and technological innovation and to the legacies of feminism(s) and its critique of the power dynamics of knowledge production within academia. This article outlines a series of interactive projects that bring visibility to Latin American women (...) in art, science and technology and speculates on the legacies of feminism(s) in the emergence of research-creation. The four projects discussed build on each other and explore re-mediation, re-activation and re-enactment as part of a collaborative feminist research-creation methodology. I theorize their potential to activate political memory by highlighting how these three approaches to creation share a preoccupation for revisiting the past through repetition, iteration and the facilitation of intergenerational encounters among humans, non-humans and across media and technologies. While discussing the feminist orientation of these approaches, I suggest a critique of dominant modes of knowledge production that have obscured the contributions of Latin American women and offer four research-creation interventions in the media arts archive. (shrink)

In this review, we present some ethical imperatives observed in this pandemic from a data ethics perspective. Our exposition connects recurrent ethical problems in the discipline, such as, privacy, surveillance, transparency, accountability, and trust, to broader societal concerns about equality, discrimination, and justice. We acknowledge data ethics role as significant to develop technological, inclusive, and pluralist societies. - - - Resumen: En esta revisión, exponemos algunos de los imperativos éticos observados desde la ética de datos en esta pandemia. Nuestra exposición (...) busca conectar problemas éticos típicos dentro de esta disciplina, a saber, privacidad, vigilancia, transparencia, responsabilidad y confianza, con preocupaciones a nivel social relacionadas con la igualdad, discrimi nación y justicia. Consideramos que la ética de datos tiene un rol significativo para desarrollar sociedades tecnificadas, inclusivas y pluralistas. (shrink)

In this article the relations between philosophy and applied ethics are considered. The presented deliberation is concentrated on the question whether philosophy has contributed to applied ethics, especially to business ethics. Trying to find an answer to this question I will refer to the discussion which was started by R. Rorty in which he presented his own point of view on the issues related to moral development and the role of philosophy and philosophers in the modern world. Rorty points at (...) proper tools which, in his opinion, can be helpful to business ethicists and formulates the goal they should try to aim at. His opinions has started a vivid discussion. Patricia H. Werhane, Daryl Koehn and Richard T. De George try to discuss with Rorty’s statement. They oppose Rorty’s argument that philosophy is not more relevant to applied ethics than any other academic disciplines. They point to the facts which document philosophers’ contribution in forming business ethics. This article presents their arguments as well as an attempt of their critical assessment. (shrink)

Patentowanie ludzkich genów jest zjawiskiem, które w obecnych czasach nabrało intensywności i znaczenia. Jest jedną z kluczowych form zabezpieczania praw własności przemysłowej, zwłaszcza dla ośrodków badawczych i koncernów farmaceutycznych. Ze względu na naturę produktu podlegającego opatentowaniu, pomysł patentowania genów budzi wiele kontrowersji i rodzi spory na różnych płaszczyznach. Celem artykułu jest naszkicowanie ram prawnych dla tego zjawiska (m.in. porównanie regulacji europejskich i amerykańskich) oraz krytyczne omówienie argumentów przemawiających zarówno w obronie tej procedury, jak i przeciwko niej, wysuwane z różnych perspektyw: (...) prawnej (kwestia posiadania przez geny tzw. zdolności patentowej, kontrowersje związane z prawem własności do ludzkiego ciała), społeczno-ekonomicznej (wpływ zjawiska na rozwój badań naukowych oraz na ceny leków i dostępność różnych terapii) oraz etycznej (omówionej na podstawie wybranych kazusów). Artykuł zarysowuje również kilka propozycji rozwiązań praktycznych, które mają usuwać przynajmniej niektóre kontrowersje związane z patentowaniem genów. (shrink)