The second analogy of experience is one of the most famous and crucial parts of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Despite 220 years of intense scrutiny and debate, however, no consensus has emerged as to the precise nature of its argument. A main source of disagreement in recent years has been the following question: With what is Kant concerned in this section? Is he concerned with necessary conditions of our believing in the first place that there has been a case (...) of objective as opposed to merely subjective succession? Is he concerned, in other words, with necessary conditions of our at least seeming to be aware or having any representation at all of an event? Or is he concerned merely with conditions under which alone beliefs of some sort can be verified or confirmed? The second of these possibilities has found its most eloquent champion in Paul Guyer; the first has been defended with great ingenuity by Beatrice Longuenesse. (shrink)

Kant has long been held in some quarters to undermine Hume’s derivation of the concept of cause. At least part of what Kant aims to show in his second analogy, according to adherents of this view, is that our putative awareness of objective succession—and thus of individual events—depends on our already having it. The aim of this paper is fourfold. First, to make clear that there are strong textual grounds for the claim that Kant aims to show this. Second, to (...) reveal a problem with the most prominent defense of the claim that Hume can account for the putative awareness in question without any appeal to the relevant concept. Third, to propose an alternative defense of that claim. And fourth, to defend the position ascribed to Hume on this alternative defense against an attack ascribed to Kant byBeatrice Longuenesse. The conclusion is thus that Kant fails in his attempt to refute Hume’s derivation. (shrink)

Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s First Analogy is among the most intriguing in the literature. Its virtues are considerable, but no previous discussion has done full justice to them. Nor has any previous discussion systematically explored the most important challenges to which it seems subject. This paper does both. Early sections provide a more thorough exegesis than is otherwise available and provide stronger textual backing than does Allison himself. Later sections turn to problems, most of which have not been raised (...) by others. These problems, while serious, do not necessarily rule out the interpretation of Allison. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with a passage that has long intrigued interpreters of Kant’s First Analogy. the passage in question can be found at A188/B231 of the Critique of Pure Reason. In order to perceive that some item x comes to exist or ceases to exist, asserts Kant in this passage, you must connect the coming to exist or ceasing to exist of x to things that already exist before it takes place and continue to exist until it is completed. (...) But if you do so, he further asserts, it must be the case that x is only a determination of such things and that the coming to exist or ceasing to exist of x is a mere change in the determinations of such things. These assertions are cryptic and give rise to several questions. In what way must you perform the act described? Why must you do so in order to perceive that x comes to exist or ceases to exist? And how does this entail that x is in fact only a determination of such things and thus that its coming to exist or ceasing to exist is not in fact ex nihilo or in nihilo? The answers given in this paper serve both to clarify Kant’s argument and to identify the main issues that would have to be faced in its assessment. (shrink)

“Where Is Kant’s Objective Deduction?”. The preface to the first edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is marked by a distinction between objective and subjective sides of the transcendental deduction. The objective side alone is said to be essential to Kant’s main purpose and is also said to retain its full strength even if the subjective side is not found to be convincing. The thesis of this paper is twofold. First, that the most prominent accounts of this distinction in (...) the literature are all subject to insuperable objections. Second, that the meat of the objective side is not to be found in the chapter explicitly devoted to the transcendental deduction but rather in the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles. What this implies is that a portion of the text frequently held to be the very heart of the Critique is said in the preface to the first edition to be inessential. We must therefore ask whether it is and be prepared to justify any divergence from the position espoused by Kant himself in 1781. (shrink)

Kant has long been held in some quarters to undermine Hume’s derivation of the concept of cause. At least part of what Kant aims to show in his second analogy, according to adherents of this view, is that our putative awareness of objective succession—and thus of individual events—depends on our already having it. The aim of this paper is fourfold. First, to make clear that there are strong textual grounds for the claim that Kant aims to show this. Second, to (...) reveal a problem with the most prominent defense of the claim that Hume can account for the putative awareness in question without any appeal to the relevant concept. Third, to propose an alternative defense of that claim. And fourth, to defend the position ascribed to Hume on this alternative defense against an attack ascribed to Kant byBeatrice Longuenesse. The conclusion is thus that Kant fails in his attempt to refute Hume’s derivation. (shrink)

Hume claims to prove in Treatise 1.3.3.3 that the causal maxim is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain. The aim of this paper is to elucidate some puzzling features of his argument and thereby show that objections raised by James Beattie, Barry Stroud, and Harold Noonan can be answered. The conclusion is that Hume's argument goes through given convictions Hume expects his readers to share long before they reach this point of the Treatise. These convictions are that all ideas are imagistic (...) entities, that all images must be fully determinate, and that there is no empirical evidence against the claim that nothing we can conceive or imagine in detail implies a contradiction. (shrink)

Hume claims to prove in Treatise 1.3.3.3 that the causal maxim is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain. The aim of this paper is to elucidate some puzzling features of his argument and thereby show that objections raised by James Beattie, Barry Stroud, and Harold Noonan can be answered. The conclusion is that Hume's argument goes through given convictions Hume expects his readers to share long before they reach this point of the Treatise. These convictions are that all ideas are imagistic (...) entities, that all images must be fully determinate, and that there is no empirical evidence against the claim that nothing we can conceive or imagine in detail implies a contradiction. (shrink)

This dissertation centers on a prominent but generally neglected line of argument in Kant's second analogy of experience. It differs from most other recent treatments of this section of the Critique of Pure Reason in taking Kant to be concerned there with conditions of representation or putative awareness rather than mere conditions of verification or confirmation. This difference in conception has profound implications for the interpretation not only of the section itself but also of the transcendental deduction of the categories (...) and other crucial parts of Kant's theoretical philosophy. The dissertation does not maintain that recognition of the line of argument in question allows for the solution of all problems in regard to the second analogy. This line of argument---like those ascribed to Kant on all other interpretations with which the author is familiar---may not lead to the conclusion that there cannot be an event which does not have a cause. It does, however, still appear to be sound in important respects. This, the author tries to show, has intriguing implications and allows us to see Kant as having his finger on something of true originality and philosophical importance in the second analogy. It also suggests an unexpected, subtle, and richly nuanced relation between Kant and his great awakener Hume. This relation is traced in detail in the final chapter of the dissertation. Other chapters include detailed analysis not only of the text of the second analogy itself but also of numerous commentators upon it. (shrink)

According to James Van Cleve, the principle with which Kant is concerned in the first analogy follows from the view that existence statements are properly made only with quantifiers and have to be expressible in the form ‘∃ xFx’. This thesis is extremely surprising and of great potential importance. It rests on the conviction that two more basic principles can be derived from the relevant view about existence statements. The first of these more basic principles is that there can be (...) no coming to exist ex nihilo or ceasing to exist in nihilo; the second is that there cannot be a series of modes not grounded in an ultimate subject. This paper outlines the relevant view about existence statements, traces the argument provided by Van Cleve in support of his thesis, and concludes that the argument rests on adubious assumption that ‘Everything exists’ either means or entails ‘Everything always exists’. (shrink)

The Meaning Circuit Hypothesis (MCH) is a synthesis of ideas providing John Wheeler’s outline of ultimate physics, which he fine-tuned over several decades from the 1970s onward. It is a ‘working hypothesis’ in which ‘existence is a ‘meaning circuit”’ that portrays the world as a “system self-synthesized by quantum networking.” It was strongly advocated by him for roughly two decades and since then has had an increasingly strong impact on the approach of many investigators of quantum theory; in particular, elements (...) such as the quantum participator and ‘it from bit’ are now considered by others as candidate components of a foundation for quantum theory in which information is involved essentially. Therefore, it is worthy of review and critique. (shrink)

This monograph identifies the essential characteristics of the objects described by current quantum theory and considers their relationship to space-time. In the process, it explicates the senses in which quantum objects may be consistently considered to have parts of which they may be composed or into which they may be decomposed. The book also demonstrates the degree to which reduction is possible in quantum mechanics, showing it to be related to the objective indefiniteness of quantum properties and the strong non-local (...) correlations that can occur between the physical quantities of quantum subsystems. Careful attention is paid to the relationships among such property correlations, physical causation, probability, and symmetry in quantum theory. In this way, the text identifies and clarifies the conceptual grounds underlying the unique nature of many quantum phenomena. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs the place of Marx's thought within Adorno's writings from his 1931 inaugural lecture to his famous 1962 seminar on Marx. It focuses on three areas: the critique and transformation of philosophy; the sociology of the commodification of art; and the social ontology of the objectivity of illusions, derived from the critique of political economy. Adorno, it argues, ended his academic life significantly more of a Marxist than he had entered it, leaving a legacy that was distinctive both (...) for its dialectical appropriation of Marx's critique – and suspended supersession – of philosophy and for its philosophical interpretation of Marx's critique of political economy. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas produced a voluminous body of work on moral theory, and much of that work is on virtue, particularly the status and value of the virtues as principles of virtuous acts, and the way in which a moral life can be organized around them schematically. Thomas Osborne presents Aquinas's account of virtue in its historical, philosophical and theological contexts, to show the reader what Aquinas himself wished to teach about virtue. His discussion makes the complexities of Aquinas's moral (...) thought accessible to readers despite the differences between Thomas's texts themselves, and the distance between our background assumptions and his. The book will be valuable for scholars and students in ethics, medieval philosophy, and theology. (shrink)

The book is about three things. First, how Ancient thinkers perceived humans as like or unlike other animals; second about the justification for taking a humane attitude towards natural things; and third about how moral claims count as true, and how they can be discovered or acquired. Was Aristotle was right to see continuity in the psychological functions of animal and human souls? The question cannot be settled without taking a moral stance. As we can either focus on continuity or (...) on discontinuities, how should natural science draw the boundaries? Moral agents act and react in a world that they see under a certain description, and there is no value free science that can settle what is the correct description. This book asks us to think about where moral justification could come from, and suggests that the supposed ‘moral status’ of the object cannot provide the answer. For the moral status of the object is a product of our own imagination, and once we see that, we also see that there remains the question where we ought to have the will to see it. Furthermore, since the perception of moral truth involves the development of imagination and will, the means to attain it will be better served by engagement with poetry and literature than with enquiries that seek to exclude the engagement of the imagination, or any appeal to the beauty of nature or the love of one's fellow creatures. (shrink)

This book presents a collection of novel contributions and reviews by renowned researchers in the foundations of quantum physics, quantum optics, and neutron physics. It is published in honor of Michael Horne, whose exceptionally clear and groundbreaking work in the foundations of quantum mechanics and interferometry, both of photons and of neutrons, has provided penetrating insight into the implications of modern physics for our understanding of the physical world. He is perhaps best known for the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality. This collection (...) includes an oral history of Michael Horne's contributions to the foundations of physics and his connections to other eminent figures in the history of the subject, among them Clifford Shull and Abner Shimony. Among the editors and contributors are John Clauser and Anton Zeilinger, recipients of the Nobel Prize in Physics 2022. (shrink)

This book argues that when visual jokes are harmful, they harm in a specific way: a subject’s personhood is revoked in a way that differs both in kind and degree depending on whether that person is depicted or described. Such revocation can occur in every role and any stage within the joke’s context, from character to audience member, from moment of depiction to uncritical exposure. Unlike a mere unhumorous insult, which doesn’t require the sympathy of its audience but can operate (...) solely between the target and the bully, a joke requires a particular kind of response from its audience to complete itself—to “deliver”, which requires not only some degree of complicity from audience members, but a complicity earned at the expense of the joke’s referent. This book shows how we need not prevent the occurrence of these things in order to undermine their oppressive power—we only need the right kind of recontextualization: turning those utterances into jokes or turning those jokes against themselves. Unlike other forms of visual oppression, the harms contained within visual jokes can be reconfigured to affirm those they were created to harm, changing their function from jokes which attack others to jokes which attack themselves, empowering those they were created to target by calling into question the problematic conceptions of audiences who are sympathetic to the harmful joke’s initial formulation. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Communities and Persons A Phenomenological Distinction between Community and Society Community Society The Self and its Social Roles Dispositional Vectors and the Shaping of Personality The Personality The Sociopathic Personality Type Conclusion.

Please find below the Bibliography in PDF format for Who's Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari? Whors"s Afraid of Del.

What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there be a credible alternative? In one classic example, philosophers ask whether we can ever know what is it is like for bats to sense the world using sonar. It seems obvious to many that any amount of information about a bat's physical structure and information processing leaves us guessing about the central questions concerning the character of its experience. A Place for Consciousness begins with reflections (...) on the existence of this gap. Is it just a psychological shortcoming in our merely human understanding of the physical world? Is it a trivial consequence of the simple fact that we just cannot be bats? Or does it mean there really are facts about consciousness over and above the physical facts? If so, what does consciousness do? Why does it exist? Rosenberg sorts out these problems, especially those centering on the causal role of consciousness. He introduces a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism for thinking about what causation is, about the natural world, and about how to create a detailed model to go along with the new paradigm. Arguing that experience is part of the categorical foundations of causality, he shows that within this new paradigm there is a place for something essentially like consciousness in all its traditional mysterious respects. A striking feature of Liberal Naturalism is that its central tenets are motivated independently of the mind-body problem, by analyzing causation itself. Because of this approach, when consciousness shows up in the picture it is not introduced in an ad hoc way, and its most puzzling features can be explained from first principles. Ultimately, Rosenberg's final solution gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical. (shrink)

Aquinas thinks that practical reason is distinct but not entirely insulated from speculative reason. Although his description of practical reasoning applies to a variety of human activities, his greatest focus is on that practical reasoning which is involved in human action. Although practical reasoning resembles the speculative in its use of a kind of syllogism, its connection with particular affairs precisely as contingent gives it a special character.

Within the overarching framework of considering the purpose of education, this book addresses issues such as the standards movement, high-stakes testing and accountability, and corporate education reform. It raises ethical questions related to school practices and considers the question of who should decide the purpose of education.

Alasdair MacIntyre’s criticism of contemporary politics rests in large part on the way in which the political communities of advanced modernity do not recognize common goals and practices. I shall argue that although MacIntyre explicitly recognizes the influence of Jacques Maritain on his own thought, MacIntyre’s own views are incompatible not only with Maritain’s attempt to develop a Thomistic theory which is compatible with liberal democracy, but also relies on a view of the individual as a part which is related (...) to the whole in a way that is incompatible with Maritain’s understanding of the spiritual individual or person. (shrink)

Opera, maintains the author of this comprehensive and provocative volume, finds itself in an artistic predicament that goes beyond previous generational disruptions and "is our own, and special." Arguing that we cannot solve the problem unless we recognize and define it, and that we cannot hope to envision the artform's future unless we first come to terms with its past, he examines all elements of recent operatic practice as revealed in performance--"Performance," he declares, "is our text." He asserts that with (...) renewal of the repertory long at a virtual standstill, we have tried to substitute auteurial production methods and cultural revisionism in its place, with disastrous results. Accordingly, Opera as Opera draws on performances encountered over an eighteen-year period to first analyze styles and techniques of production (direction and design), and then to trace, in copious detail, the developments in the performing disciplines of conducting, singing, and acting that have loosened our connection to the canon. "The masterworks," it flatly states, "are not before us." In a central section, it also surveys the more general cultural background of this situation, in particular the influence of modern and postmodern philosophy and literary criticism, and the turn away from the master narrative which in the author's view was the principal generating force behind opera's greatest era. Whether the reader's primary interest is musical or theatrical, whether it lies with intellectual and aesthetic matters or with into-the-weeds discussion of the work of the performers who bring opera to life, he or she will find much that will stimulate and challenge in this deeply informed, incisively written book."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

_Excavates the experiential structure of Habermas’s communicative action._.

Excavates the experiential structure of Habermas’s communicative action.

Why does philosophy give some people a headache, others a real buzz, and yet others a feeling that it is subversive and dangerous? Why do a lot of people think philosophy is totally irrelevant? What is philosophy anyway? The ABCs of philosophy??—easy to understand but never simplistic. Beginning with basic questions posed by the ancient Greeks - What is knowledge? What is good and evil? Philosophy For Beginners traces the answers given by western philosophy over the last 2,500 years.

This article begins the task of assessing polygamy as a moral ideal. The structure of traditional polygamy, in which only one central spouse may marry multiple partners, necessarily yields two inequalities. The central spouse has greater rights and expectations within each marriage and greater control over the wider family. However, two alternative structures for polygamy can remove these inequalities. In polyfidelity, each spouse marries every other spouse in the family. In “molecular” polygamy, any spouses may marry a new spouse outside (...) the family. These new models of polygamy face additional difficulties, but they can be egalitarian in principle. (shrink)

Although Elizabeth Anscombe’s work on causation is frequently cited and anthologized, her main arguments have been ignored or misunderstood as havingtheir basis in quantum mechanics or a particular theory of perception. I examine her main arguments and show that they not only work against the Humean causaltheories of her time, but also against contemporary attempts to analyze causation in terms of laws and causal properties. She shows that our ordinary usage does not connect causation with laws, and suggests that philosophers (...) emphasize laws for mostly historical reasons. Moreover, she argues that the core of causation is derivativeness, which is as neglected now as when she wrote. Her focus on derivativeness indicates to us how we can both avoid the position that the causal “because” is truth-functional and yet still hold that causal statements are really explanatory. (shrink)

The author proposes an in-class Rawls game to help teach Rawls’ idea of the veil of ignorance. This game is contrasted to another Rawls game (developed by Ronald M. Green) which emphasizes the importance of reaching an impartial unanimous decision. Unlike Green’s game, the game detailed in this paper illustrates Rawls’ justification for the veil of ignorance by showing how one’s natural assets and initial starting point in society are undeserved and arbitrary from a moral point of view. The lessons (...) delivered by each game are contrasted and the author argues for their complementarity. (shrink)

Polyhedral functions provide a model for an important class of problems that includes both linear programming and applications in data analysis. General methods for minimizing such functions using the polyhedral geometry explicitly are developed. Such methods approach a minimum by moving from extreme point to extreme point along descending edges and are described generically as simplicial. The best-known member of this class is the simplex method of linear programming, but simplicial methods have found important applications in discrete approximation and statistics. (...) The general approach considered in this text, first published in 2001, has permitted the development of finite algorithms for the rank regression problem. The key ideas are those of developing a general format for specifying the polyhedral function and the application of this to derive multiplier conditions to characterize optimality. Also considered is the application of the general approach to the development of active set algorithms for polyhedral function constrained problems and associated Lagrangian forms. (shrink)

This book is a lucid account of the amazing life of Sai Baba, one of the most revered saints, and one of the most extraordinary of India s holy men. The book discusses the life of this saint, his divine powers, and his teachings which sought to unite people of all creeds and faiths.

The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. The guidance theory offers a way of fixing representational content that gives the causal and evolutionary history of the subject only an indirect role, and an account of representational error, based on failure of action, that does not rely on any such notions as proper functions, ideal conditions, or (...) normal circumstances. Moreover, because the notion of error is defined in terms of failure of action, the guidance theory meets the “meta-epistemological requirement” that representational error should be potentially detectable by the representing system itself. In this essay, we offer a brief account of the biological origins of representation, a formal characterization of the guidance theory, some examples of its use, and show how the guidance theory handles some traditional problem cases for representation: the representation of fictional and abstract entities. Being both representational and actiongrounded, the guidance theory may provide some common ground between embodied and cognitivist approaches to the study of the mind. (shrink)

Within the criminal justice system, one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. This book argues against retributivism and develops a viable alternative that is both ethically defensible and practical. Introducing six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, Gregg D. Caruso contends that it is unclear that agents possess the kind of free (...) will and moral responsibility needed to justify this view of punishment. While a number of alternatives to retributivism exist - including consequentialist deterrence, educational, and communicative theories - they have ethical problems of their own. Moving beyond existing theories, Caruso presents a new non-retributive approach called the public health-quarantine model. In stark contrast to retributivism, the public health-quarantine model provides a more human, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior. (shrink)

When viewed in its historical context, Ockham’s moral psychology is distinctive and novel. First, Ockham thinks that the will is free to will for or against any object, and can choose something that is in some sense not even apparently good. The will is free from the intellect’s dictates and from natural inclinations. Second, he emphasizes the will’s independence not only with respect to passions and habits, but also with respect to knowledge, the effects of original sin, grace, and God. (...) Third, Ockham consequently argues that someone is even able to will to be unhappy, and can will another’s happiness more than or even instead of his own. (shrink)