Ortega enriqueció su concepción del concepto y la racionalidad desde fecha temprana, en Meditaciones del Quijote y Vieja y nueva política en el sentido de la afirmación de la vitalidad y la constitución de perspectiva, y el compromiso realista con el quehacer político.

It is possible to describe certain basic principles that underlie Leibniz’s political activities. These principles do not literally determine the specific steps Leibniz takes, but play a much more decisive role than that due to mere metaphysical principles. They provide a general frame work for his activities and a point of reference towards which his reflections tend. Particular attention is paid here to the concept of perspective and its presence in Leibniz’s correspondence with Bossuet, Pellison and Madame de Brinon and (...) the way in which a theological dialogue enables Leibniz to develop his vision of reality. (shrink)

Leibniz’s role en current political and social thought is complex. On the one hand, he represents the last great synthesis built on the idea of the World as a creation of God and man as his cooperator in history. However his notion of contingency can help to explain some of the problems facing social sciences today in so far as he understandsthis concept not only from an ontological but also from an epistemological point of view. To this one should add (...) that criticisms of classical and modern philosophy such as those of Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt leave intact the need of reason to organise society and we can see in Leibniz use of reason a forerunner of public choice postions. In sum, his vision of reason is very much alive though in new contexts. (shrink)

Leibniz’s role en current political and social thought is complex. On the one hand, he represents the last great synthesis built on the idea of the World as a creation of God and man as his cooperator in history. However his notion of contingency can help to explain some of the problems facing social sciences today in so far as he understandsthis concept not only from an ontological but also from an epistemological point of view. To this one should add (...) that criticisms of classical and modern philosophy such as those of Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt leave intact the need of reason to organise society and we can see in Leibniz use of reason a forerunner of public choice postions. In sum, his vision of reason is very much alive though in new contexts. (shrink)

It is sought to return to the Leibnizian’s concept of contingency to thwart the postkantian’s and posthegelian’s philosophy of it. This search records two relatively different ways: Leibniz, as a typical thinker of his time, and Leibniz as a precursor of our own contemporary way of thinking. As regards this, the comparison that is made with Sartre and Rorty gains special importance.

I argue that, while Hume’s approach to Newton is sometimes critical and sometimes not, Hume’s position with regard to newtonian method is coherent overall. Rather than speaking of two Humes (one a newtonian, the other not), from an humean perspective we should rather speak of two Newtons: the positivist and the theologian.

I argue that, while Hume’s approach to Newton is sometimes critical and sometimes not, Hume’s position with regard to newtonian method is coherent overall. Rather than speaking of two Humes (one a newtonian, the other not), from an humean perspective we should rather speak of two Newtons: the positivist and the theologian.

Es bien conocida la primera filosofía de Ortega y Gasset en torno al "raciovitalismo" y al liberalismo. En cambio, su segunda navegación, en expresión suya, no ha alcanzado aún perfiles precisos ante el público interesado. Nada mejor para ello que revisitar la obra póstuma que mejor representa tal vez la tarea filosófica del último Ortega: "La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva". En este libro, por un lado se examinan las raíces alemanas con especial (...) atención a Fichte y a Heidegger y la teoría del conocimiento que Ortega va diseñando. Por otro, se analiza la estructura textual del libro mientras se profundiza en algunos de los logros más generales de la "segunda navegación" de Ortega, como el tema de "ideas y creencias", el constructivismo cognitivo y la teoría de la historia. En una tercera parte, se incide en diversas consecuencias de la obra de Ortega, en la hermenéutica y en el pensamiento cívico sobre España, así como en la crítica filosófica. (shrink)

Una de las aportaciones más importantes de la obra de Ortega se encuentra en su teoría y práctica de la perspectiva. Independientemente de su filiación nietzscheana, el artículo se plantea una posible segunda inspiración en Renan, autor que Ortega conocía bien en el momento de sus primeros trabajos. Para ello, se realiza una comparación de la posición de Renan ante el pensador Lamennais y la de Ortega ante Pío Baroja, donde se aprecian coincidencias no sólo en la interpretación de los (...) personajes, sino en la forma de concebir la práctica intelectual que subyace en sendos trabajos. (shrink)

One of Ortega y Gasset's more important contributions was his theory and methodological use of the concept of perspective. Clearly he´s indebeted to Nietzsche on this issue, but it can also be surmised that Renan was also important in this issue at the time that Ortega was preparing Meditaciones del Quijote. The article compares Renan's criticism of Lamennais with Ortega's interpretation of Pío Baroja focusing not only on the paralelism of their criticisms of established and prominent personalities of their intelectual (...) community, but also on the underlying understanding of cultural practice. (shrink)

It is possible to describe certain basic principles that underlie Leibniz’s political activities. These principles do not literally determine the specific steps Leibniz takes, but play a much more decisive role than that due to mere metaphysical principles. They provide a general frame work for his activities and a point of reference towards which his reflections tend. Particular attention is paid here to the concept of perspective and its presence in Leibniz’s correspondence with Bossuet, Pellison and Madame de Brinon and (...) the way in which a theological dialogue enables Leibniz to develop his vision of reality. (shrink)

Leibniz’s role en current political and social thought is complex. On the one hand, he represents the last great synthesis built on the idea of the World as a creation of God and man as his cooperator in history. However his notion of contingency can help to explain some of the problems facing social sciences today in so far as he understandsthis concept not only from an ontological but also from an epistemological point of view. To this one should add (...) that criticisms of classical and modern philosophy such as those of Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt leave intact the need of reason to organise society and we can see in Leibniz use of reason a forerunner of public choice postions. In sum, his vision of reason is very much alive though in new contexts. (shrink)

It is possible to describe certain basic principles that underlie Leibniz’s political activities. These principles do not literally determine the specific steps Leibniz takes, but play a much more decisive role than that due to mere metaphysical principles. They provide a general frame work for his activities and a point of reference towards which his reflections tend. Particular attention is paid here to the concept of perspective and its presence in Leibniz’s correspondence with Bossuet, Pellison and Madame de Brinon and (...) the way in which a theological dialogue enables Leibniz to develop his vision of reality. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza los discursos de las mujeres/garzonas, que trabajan en las salas de cerveza (schoperías) sobre la discriminación de género y los modelos relacionales que se establecen en estos espacios entre clientes y garzonas. Se postula que estos aspectos recién mencionados, coadyuvan a la permanencia de una identidad masculina hegemónica, que se intensifica en el contexto de la minería. Los antecedentes obtenidos muestran que las garzonas- en su mayoría mujeres oriundas de los países limítrofes y/o del sur de (...) Chile-, se encuentran afectadas por una situación de vulnerabilidad social y económica, precariedad laboral y, además, cargan con una serie de imaginarios sociales en torno a ellas, a los lugares en los que trabajan (schoperías) y a la ciudad en la que habitan. Es decir, son mujeres discriminadas. Estas trabajadoras se encuentran atrapadas entre el proceso de crecimiento económico y atracción que ofrece la industria minera en el norte del país y, a la vez, a las expectativas que tienen por mejorar su situación familiar. Asimismo, se ven confrontadas por la fuerza de un sistema sociocultural de sexo/género hegemónico que favorece relaciones de poder asimétricas y la subordinación femenina, lo que contribuye a reforzar identidades de género y modelos relacionales de inequidad, que son naturalizados en este entorno productivo. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente artículo consiste en analizar el trasfondo de las matemáticas empleadas por Aristóteles en el libro V de la _Ética a Nicómaco_ con el propósito de esclarecer las nociones de aritmética y geometría en relación con la justicia y la ética. Expongo brevemente la concepción de algunos estudiosos de Aristóteles que proponen una incompatibilidad radical entre ambos modelos matemáticos, y a partir de ello indico por qué esa lectura es equivocada. Finalmente, defiendo una interpretación integracionista, especialmente a (...) partir de la comprensión de la virtud como _enérgeia_ y _entelécheia_. (shrink)

O autor realça a dicotomia entre asidéias de Homem e de Deus, igualmente enfocadaem J. P. Sartre e em Nietzsche. O conteúdo axiológicoem Deus contém a afirmação absoluta doHomem, logo, não são idéias contrárias, uma vezque o homem tende para Deus. As metas humanasestão contidas na idéias de Deus, portanto,não nos é lícito proclamar "a morte de Deus" antesque o homem se transforme em Deus...

O Autor confronta as noções de pecado com os anseios da nova Axiologia. Ressalta os pecados sociais e os da essência estrutural, concluindo serem os pecados um afastamento entre o como-é, e o como-poderia ou deveria ser. A medida do pecado é a Afirmação, síntese dos valores contidos em Deus.

Si la pensée est universelle, nous ne pouvons toutefois pas nier la spécificité des modalités de pensées. Les études réunies dans cet ouvrage apparaissent ainsi comme une occasion d'interroger et de dégager les différentes modalités d'appropriation de la philosophie cartésienne au Brésil.

I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.

In this paper I argue for the following hypotheses: The Davidsonian language thesis, which presupposes a set of beliefs and shared desires, is a quasi-rational phenomenon that weights the truths, and from them, is able to derive other objective thoughts in the domain of values. This view of Davidson conceives that thinking and language are prior to convention, and that necessarily implies the acknowledgement of humans as thinking beings; capable of understanding even when deprived of content, this is to say, (...) negating naturalism or substance in beliefs and innate desires. (shrink)

Ascriptions of rationality are related to our practices of praising and criticizing. This seems to provide motivation for normative accounts of rationality, more specifically for the view that rationality is a matter of responding to normative reasons. However, rational agents are sometimes guided by false beliefs. This is problematic for those reasons-based accounts of rationality that are also committed to the widespread thesis that normative reasons are facts. The critical aim of the paper is to present objections to recent proposed (...) solutions to this problem, according to which the responses of deceived agents would be rationalized by facts about how things appear to them. My positive aim is to argue that accounts of reasons in terms of apparent reasons manage to capture the intuitions that seem to favor a normative account of rationality. (shrink)

Traditional expressivists want to preserve a contrast between the representational use of declarative sentences in descriptive domains and the non-representational use of declarative sentences in other areas of discourse. However, expressivists have good reasons to endorse minimalism about representational notions, and minimalism seems to threaten the existence of such a bifurcation. Thus, there are pressures for expressivists to become global anti-representationalists. In this paper I discuss how to reconstruct in non-representationalist terms the sort of bifurcation traditional expressivists were after. My (...) proposal is that the relevant bifurcation can be articulated by appeal to the contrast between relativistic and non-relativistic assertoric practices. I argue that this contrast, which can be specified without appeal to representational notions, captures the core intuitions behind the expressivist bifurcation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that defeasible inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference. More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity arises in inferentialist theories of content that appeal to defeasible inferences.

Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do not involve perceptual reasons at all. Nevertheless, I (...) claim that it is possible to overcome Whiting’s objection, by showing that it rests on an inadequate characterization of how defeat works in the examples in question. (shrink)