The Phaedo is acknowledged to be one of Plato's masterpieces, showing him both as a philosopher and as a dramatist at the height of his powers. For its moving account of the execution of Socrates, the Phaedo ranks among the supreme literary achievements of antiquity. It is also a document crucial to the understanding of many ideas deeply ingrained in western culture, and provides one of the best introductions to Plato's thought. This new edition is eminently suitable for readers new (...) to Plato, offering a readable translation which is accessible without the aid of a commentary and assumes no prior knowledge of the ancient Greek world or language. (shrink)

In replying to my criticism of his interpretation of this passage, Professor H-N. Castañeda has disregarded much of my argument. In particular, he has ignored my contention that a contrast between 'essential’ and ‘accidental’ predication is integral to the wider argument for immortality in which Phaedo 102b-d is embedded. This would remain the case whatever the grammar of 102b-c, and whatever the exact force of πεφυxέναι and τυγχάνει at 102c1-2. Further, Castañeda pays no heed to the difficulty of interpreting Plato's (...) other relational examples in his way, given that no analysis parallel to that of 102b-d is anywhere hinted at for them. Moreover, he disregards the difficulty that several other examples in the nearby context are analysed in terms of the Theory of Forms, and yet are not overtly ‘relational’ in the usual sense at all.Castañeda says that it is ‘clear’ from my own translation of several passages that τυΥχάνει in the Phaedo ‘has nothing to do with accident.’. (shrink)

In this article I reopen some basic problems in the interpretation of Parmenides’ ‘Way of Truth’ familiar to anyone who has wrestled with his poem. The hub of my discussion is fr. B2, in which the goddess formulates two ‘routes of inquiry’, an affirmative one—‘is’, and a negative one—‘is not’. The former she commends, while the latter she rejects as ‘wholly unlearn-able’, on the ground that ‘thou couldst not know what is not, nor couldst thou point it out’.

Phaedo. As I recall. when these points had been granted him, and it was agreed that each of the forms was something, and that the other things, partaking in them. took the name of the forms themselves, he next asked: ‘If you say that that is so, then whenever you say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, you mean the, don't you, that both things are in Simmias, tallness and shortness?’.

This work is designed to make Aristotle's neglected but fascinating writings on sleep and dreams accessible in translation to modern readers, and to provide a commentary with a contemporary perspective. It considers Aristotle's theory of dreams in historical context, especially in relation to Plato. It also discusses neo-Freudian interpretations of Aristotle and contemporary experimental psychology of dreaming. Aristotle's account of dreaming as a function of the imagination is examined from a philosophical perspective. The work is a revised and corrected version (...) of the North American edition. (shrink)

These new translations present Plato's remarkable dramatizations of the momentous events surrounding the trial of Socrates on charges of irreligion and corrupting the young.

In this article I reopen some basic problems in the interpretation of Parmenides’ ‘Way of Truth’ familiar to anyone who has wrestled with his poem. The hub of my discussion is fr. B2, in which the goddess formulates two ‘routes of inquiry’, an affirmative one—‘is’, and a negative one—‘is not’. The former she commends, while the latter she rejects as ‘wholly unlearn-able’, on the ground that ‘thou couldst not know what is not, nor couldst thou point it out’.

History, according to Aristotle, relates "things that happen ; whereas poetry's function is to relate the kinds of things that happen—that is, are possible in terms of probability or necessity."1 A generic clause, expressing "the kinds of things that happen" to certain kinds of agents, distinguishes the task of the poet from that of the historian.2 History speaks of "particulars," whereas poetry speaks more of "universals." A historian might assert, for example, that Alcibiades urged the Athenians to invade Sicily, or (...) that he was later exiled, and finally murdered; whereas a poet would use Alcibiades's story to show the kind of person to whom things of that kind are likely or bound to... (shrink)

In replying to my criticism of his interpretation of this passage, Professor H-N. Castañeda has disregarded much of my argument. In particular, he has ignored my contention that a contrast between 'essential’ and ‘accidental’ predication is integral to the wider argument for immortality in which Phaedo 102b-d is embedded. This would remain the case whatever the grammar of 102b-c, and whatever the exact force of πεφυxέναι and τυγχάνει at 102c1-2. Further, Castañeda pays no heed to the difficulty of interpreting Plato's (...) other relational examples in his way, given that no analysis parallel to that of 102b-d is anywhere hinted at for them. Moreover, he disregards the difficulty that several other examples in the nearby context are analysed in terms of the Theory of Forms, and yet are not overtly ‘relational’ in the usual sense at all.Castañeda says that it is ‘clear’ from my own translation of several passages that τυΥχάνει in the Phaedo ‘has nothing to do with accident.’. (shrink)

This book deserves far more attention from philosophers and from the general public than it has so far received. Perhaps it is too much to hope that the hoary old myths about Philosophy having no practical relevance will ever be completely exploded. But if a sizeable number of thinking adults were to read this succinct and readable work, it might go a long way towards their demolition.

Gallop's criticisms are so extensive and so vigorous that one may wonder how he could mean it when he praises my book in the ways he does at the beginning and end of his notice. In the hope of making it believable that some at least of the praise is deserved, I will try to show that much of the criticism is not as damaging as it may at first appear. Most of what I say will be of a (...) rather general nature, and that is perhaps unfortunate when Gallop has gone into so many interesting questions of detail; but one of my general defences will be that this discussion of particular questions not only does not, but could not, support the objection that the decision procedure that is illustrated in the book is incapable of dealing with all too many of the moral dilemmas an average person is likely to have to face. (shrink)

How do we identify the "queer auteur" and their queer imaginings? Is it possible to account for such a figure when the very terms "queer" and "auteur" invoke aesthetic surprises and disorientations, disconcerting ironies and paradoxes, and biographical deceits and ambiguities? David A. Gerstner traces a history of ideas that spotlight an ever-shifting terrain associated with auteur theory and, in particular, queer-auteur theory. Engaging with the likes of Oscar Wilde, Walter Benjamin, James Baldwin, Jean Louis Baudry, Linda Nochlin, Jane (...) Gallop, Cáel Keegan, Luce Irigaray, and other prominent critical thinkers, Gerstner contemplates how the queer auteur in film theory might open us to the work of desire. Ultimately, Queer Imaginings is a journey in shared pleasures in which writing for and about cinema makes way for unanticipated cinematic friendships."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)