a comprehensive, somewhat Gricean theory of speech acts, including an account of communicative intentions and inferences, a taxonomy of speech acts, and coverage of many topics in pragmatics -/- .

_Minds, Brains, Computers_ serves as both an historical and interdisciplinary introduction to the foundations of cognitive science.

Internalism and Externalism in Speech Act Theory Internalism and externalism are related doctrines in the philosophy of language and mind, mostly centered on the role of reference in the individuation of propositions. This debate has recently been extended in speech act theory from content to force. But here the landscape becomes more complicated. It has been recently argued that speech act theory got off the track after Austin by internalizing Austin's "felicity" conditions. In reply it is noted that the issue (...) of internalism and externalism is more nuanced—there are internal and external elements in many theories, and a preliminary categorization is attempted here. Furthermore, internalism also has its virtues, which are largely overlooked, and we attempt to redress that imbalance. (shrink)

Grice proposed to investigate 'the total signification of the utterance'. One persistent criticism of Grice's taxonomy of signification is that he missed an important category of information. This content, and/or the process of providing it, goes by a variety of labels: 'generalized implicature', 'explicature', 'unarticulated constituents', 'default heuristics', 'impliciture'. In this study we first take a sample of such phenomena and, from the point of view of pure pragmatics, survey the central descriptions of the content expressed and the mechanisms that (...) might deliver these contents. We then, from the point of view of experimental pragmatics, focus on two accounts: Levinson's I-heuristic, and Bach's standardization. We find experimental evidence for the existence of such implicitures, and for the use of language specific standardizations over language neutral background information. (shrink)

The idea that speaking a language is a rule‑ governed form of behavior goes back at least to Wittgenstein’s language-game analogy, and can be found most prominently in the work of Searle and Alston. Both theorists have a conception of illocutionary rules as putting illocutionary conditions on utterance acts. We argue that this conception of illocutionary rules is inadequate — it does not meet intuitively plausible conditions of adequacy for the description of illocutionary acts. Nor are illocutionary rules as so (...) conceived necessary to account for the normative dimension of illocutionary acts. In light of these conclusions we address the question of what a conception of language use not as rule-governed, but still normative, might look like. (shrink)

Performative Utterances: Seven Puzzles It was John Austin who introduced the word "performative" into the philosophy of language and linguistics. His original idea was that there are utterances which are more correctly characterized as doing something rather than stating something. Austin wrote: "when I say ‘I do’, I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it." As is well known, Austin went on to work out this notion of a performative utterance in a number of directions, but (...) in the end the attempt to isolate performatives from constatives failed dramatically, and the idea of viewing language use in terms of the performative-constative dichotomy gave way to the study of speech acts: "The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomena which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating." But giving up the performative-constative distinction does not mean giving up theorizing about performatives, and there is a cottage industry in the theory of language devoted to them. We identify seven puzzles for theorizing about performatives. We consider how Austin might have dealt with some of them. Finding his answers problematic, we then survey recent theories of performatives and zoom in on the major contenders, identifying one theory in particular for scrutiny and seeing how it fares with the seven puzzles. The upshot is that there is still work to be done understanding performatives. (shrink)

Recanati (2004), Literal Meaning argues against what he calls ¿literalism¿ and for what he calls ¿contextualism¿. He considers a wide spectrum of positions and arguments from relevance theory to hidden variables theory. In the end, however, he seems to hold that semantic and pragmatic theorizing must answer to broadly introspective or folk psychological constraints ¿ they don¿t exist in ¿heaven¿. After surveying Recanati¿s wide-ranging and provocative discussion of these issues, we wonder why parity of reasoning does not condemn syntax and (...) phonology, as customarily practiced. (shrink)

In a single short passage in "On Sense and Reference" Frege outlines his conception of direct quotation wherein words must not be taken as having their customary reference, but rather refer to the words themselves or the words of another speaker. What unifies these uses? What is the logical form of direct quotation sentences, and what is their analysis? How does this view fit in with Frege's general semantics? How far can it be extended? What problems does it face? We (...) explore, if not completely answer, each of these questions."It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of another are quoted. One's own words then first designate words of the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. We then have signs of signs. In writing, the words are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary reference," ("On Sense and Reference", 144)The above quotation contains virtually everything Frege has to say about quotation and it raises a number of issues --some terminological, some substantive. First, note that in the passage cited, Frege opens with a discussion of quotation in general ("talk about"), then ends with the specific case of quotation marks in writing. Most discussions of Frege have concentrated on quotation marks in writing, and we shall do so here, but ultimately a Fregean account will have to be more general, a point we will return to later. Second, Frege speaks of words enclosed in quotation marks as about "the words themselves" and also as about "words of another speaker". But as we will see, these need not be the same. However, because Frege moved so easily between them he may have thought that referring to the words themselves is involved in reporting the words of another speaker. At least this is an idea we will exploit later, but first some terminology. (shrink)

Recanati, Literal Meaning argues against what he calls “literalism“ and for what he calls “contextualism“. He considers a wide spectrum of positions and arguments from relevance theory to hidden variables theory. In the end, however, he seems to hold that semantic and pragmatic theorizing must answer to broadly introspective or folk psychological constraints — they don't exist in “heaven“. After surveying Recanati's wide-ranging and provocative discussion of these issues, we wonder why parity of reasoning does not condemn syntax and phonology, (...) as customarily practiced. (shrink)

Modules, as Marr and Fodor conceive of them, lie between sensory and central processes. Modules have the functional property of representing that portion of the world which turns them on, and nine non-functional or structural properties that facilitate carrying out that function. Fodor has proposed that the processing of linguistic information is carried out by a language module , which therefore has the functional and structural features of modules. We argue that the proposed LM does not have the functional property (...) of modules in general . And we argue that Fodor's candidate for the output of the LM, interpreted syntactic form, does not satisfy important structural properties of modules . We propose another candidate, speech act potential, and argue that it fits almost all of Fodor's conditions . We next report on some pilot sentence completion studies suggesting that speech act information can influence the course of a parse and hence are a part of the LM . Finally, we outline possible experiments to test the modularity of speech act information by online methods of priming. (shrink)

Modules, as Marr and Fodor conceive of them, lie between sensory and central processes. Modules have the functional property of representing that portion of the world which turns them on, and nine non-functional or structural properties that facilitate carrying out that function. Fodor has proposed that the processing of linguistic information is carried out by a language module, which therefore has the functional and structural features of modules. We argue that the proposed LM does not have the functional property of (...) modules in general. And we argue that Fodor's candidate for the output of the LM, interpreted syntactic form, does not satisfy important structural properties of modules. We propose another candidate, speech act potential, and argue that it fits almost all of Fodor's conditions. We next report on some pilot sentence completion studies suggesting that speech act information can influence the course of a parse and hence are a part of the LM. Finally, we outline possible experiments to test the modularity of speech act information by online methods of priming. (shrink)

In this paper I have tried to give the SAS some descriptive content with respect to English. I have suggested that correlations of form, function and fit play a central role in accounting for understanding literal and direct communication, and I have tried to take some initial steps towards constructing a plausible theory of such communication incorporating these notions.As with any developing theory, the SAS has a long way to grow. Among the problem areas that need further work are the (...) following: (1) The nature of the semantic representation in line L2; (2) An account of the notion ‘knowledge of language’ appealed to in line L1(a); (3) Psychological evidence for the various levels of processing and mediating procedures; (4) An account of the nature of pragmatic rules and their relationsip to grammars. Fortunately, these are matters for other times and other places. (shrink)

We do not always talk in complete sentences; we sometimes speak in “fragments“, such as `Fire!', `Off with his head', `From Cuba', `Next!', and `Shall we?'. Research has tended to focus on the ellipsis wars — the issue of whether all or most fragments are really sentential or not. Less effort has been put into the question of exactly how fragments are to be interpreted, especially their force. We separate off the issue of fragment interpretation from the issue of systematically (...) accounting for their linguistic properties — the issue of how to generate fragments. We review two projects directed at the issue of fragment interpretation: Stainton, who approaches the issue obliquely, and Barton, who approaches the issue of interpretation directly and systematically. We find areas of agreement and disagreement with both studies. In the end we conclude that what may be needed is a more speech act oriented approach, one that fits fragment interpretation into a framework for performing, and communicating through, speech acts in general. (shrink)

We do not always talk in complete sentences; we sometimes speak in “fragments“, such as `Fire!', `Off with his head', `From Cuba', `Next!', and `Shall we?'. Research has tended to focus on the ellipsis wars — the issue of whether all or most fragments are really sentential or not. Less effort has been put into the question of exactly how fragments are to be interpreted, especially their force. We separate off the issue of fragment interpretation from the issue of systematically (...) accounting for their linguistic properties — the issue of how to generate fragments. We review two projects directed at the issue of fragment interpretation: Stainton , who approaches the issue obliquely , and Barton , who approaches the issue of interpretation directly and systematically. We find areas of agreement and disagreement with both studies. In the end we conclude that what may be needed is a more speech act oriented approach, one that fits fragment interpretation into a framework for performing, and communicating through, speech acts in general. (shrink)

Frege's puzzle for demonstratives is accounting for the cognitive significance of identity statements containing demonstratives, such as "That [demonstration-1] is identical to that [demonstration-2]". Since the demonstrative 'that' makes the same semantic contribution (has the same 'character') on both occurrences, the difference must be due to the cognitive significance or 'senses' of the associated demonstrations. But what is the sense of a demonstration? Kaplan's suggested solutions in terms of gestures and appearances are not compatible with his general theory, and do (...) not work - a different solution must be found. (shrink)

Frege's puzzle for demonstratives is accounting for the cognitive significance of identity statements containing demonstratives, such as "That [demonstration-1] is identical to that [demonstration-2]". Since the demonstrative 'that' makes the same semantic contribution (has the same 'character') on both occurrences, the difference must be due to the cognitive significance or 'senses' of the associated demonstrations. But what is the sense of a demonstration? Kaplan's suggested solutions in terms of gestures and appearances are not compatible with his general theory, and do (...) not work - a different solution must be found. (shrink)

This book is in the Studies in Philosophy: Outstanding Dissertations series. Its central theme is that Frege’s concept-notation is inadequate because it does not formalize his semantic theory after the introduction of the sense-reference distinction in 1891. This failing, according to Klement, opens Frege up to a number of philosophical and logical challenges that can be met only by completing the project of showing “how Frege’s mature semantic views would be incorporated into his mature logical system”, a project which, Klement (...) plausibly argues, Frege would have endorsed. This involves: allowing the concept-notation to represent explicitly what is expressed in natural language with indirect constructions such as “said that...” or “believes that... ”; allowing principles to be formulated over this notion which capture inferences involving indirect constructions such as: The Morning Star is a planet, Gottlob believes the Morning Star is a planet, so, Gottlob believes something true; being able to respond to certain objections to Frege’s views, some first bruited by Russell and in later correspondence, others involving the identity conditions on intensional entities and “quantifying in” ; making the concept-notation reflect Frege’s ontology; and evaluating the consistency of Frege’s ontology. The chapters of this book are devoted to fulfilling this project “based upon a careful reading of Frege’s own works”, and their contents are mostly self-explanatory. Chapter 2 sets out the formal apparatus of the Grundgeseze, even the bits Frege left out. Chapter 3 is the most philosophical. Senses are construed as interpersonally accessible information uniquely true of the references they determine—senses are objects and functions in the “third realm.” Singular terms are associated with an impossibly rich hierarchy of senses as objects. Functors, including predicates, are associated with senses as functions. Sentences are associated with thoughts as objects, composed of constituent sense-functions, and in many cases, also sense-objects. Robust compositionality at the level of sense raises the question of the nature of the relation between constituents and the whole—is it functional, or not? Compositionality potentially conflicts with a number of other claims, and Klement’s conclusion is reasonable: “the context principle, the priority thesis, and the possibility of there existing multiple decompositions for the same Gedanke, do not pose any great difficulty for the compositionality principle or the understanding of Gedanke as having determinate inner structures”. Chapter 4 sets out Church’s original system and investigates reformulations suggested by Church himself, Kaplan, and others. Chapter 5 presents Klement’s formalization of an intensional logic of sense and reference, based on the results of chapters 2 and 4, and sufficient for indirect speech and quantifying-in, but containing a contradiction. Chapter 6 takes up arguments of early Russell, Searle, and Bergmann. Chapter 7 addresses strategies for repairing the inconsistencies of chapter 5, but in a Fregean spirit: dropping some realms of entities, restricting their number, or modifying our conception of their nature. (shrink)