Marcus Verhaegh - Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 336-337 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Marcus Verhaegh Grand Valley State University Rebecca Kukla, editor. Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 309. Cloth, $75.00. This collection of essays focuses on the Critique of Judgment, a work that offers material (...) in aesthetics, but that also has much to teach us concerning the nature of non-aesthetic judgment, concept formation, teleology, and the task of investigating both the natural and moral realms. The pieces in the collection reflect.. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I give a reading of Kant's Critique of Judgment. I focus on the cognitive value of judgments of beauty. I argue that judgments of beauty indirectly contribute to theoretical cognition. My particular focus is on such judgments' contributions to cognition of the 'rules of skill' that apply when one attempts to affect the behavior of other humans through language-use, and which also apply to formation of the subject's 'empirical character.' ;I base my reading on Rudolf Makkreel's work (...) on Kant. This work suggests that judgments of beauty have a role to play in the furthering the subject's global cognition. I examine Makkreel's reading in light of somewhat different accounts of the Critique of Judgment, such as are given by Paul Guyer and Henry Allison. I attempt to show where these scholars agree---and, where they disagree, I attempt to show how Makkreel's position is the correct reading. I focus on the central role of the 'principle of purposiveness' in Kant's account of judgments of beauty and their value, showing how Paul Guyer at times incorrectly downgrades this role. ;I next further elaborate my views on the centrality of this principle. I start with the basic point that the 'principle of purposiveness' is a principle that requires us to view nature as if it were ordered with the cognitive interests of humans in mind. I focus on Kant's claim that judgments of beauty give an aesthetic presentation of the order we take to find in nature, as we follow the principle of purposiveness. I then attempt to show that judgments of beauty point us toward useful ways of conceiving of this order in nature, and ultimately spur us on toward developing models of nature. However, I emphasize that the judgments of beauty themselves never reveal truth or knowledge concerning nature. I further emphasize that whatever accounts of nature we develop based upon these judgments' inspiration, we must check the accounts' validity independently of the status of any judgments of taste. (shrink)

Contemplation and politics in the life of the aristotelian philosopher.

I argue that Martha Nussbaum presents us with an invaluable stance toward nonmoral goods—especially those of fantasy—relative to 1) the anti-perfectionist view regarding moral goods taken in Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints" 2) theperfectionist stance taken by Iris Murdoch. I show how Nussbaum critiques Murdoch not by taking issue with her perfectionist agenda, but by suggesting an alternative to Murdoch's regret-less “coolness” in applying this agenda to the ubiquitously tragic situations that humans encounter.

I argue that Martha Nussbaum presents us with an invaluable stance toward nonmoral goods—especially those of fantasy—relative to 1) the anti-perfectionist view regarding moral goods taken in Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints" 2) the perfectionist stance taken by Iris Murdoch. I show how Nussbaum critiques Murdoch not by taking issue with her perfectionist agenda, but by suggesting an alternative to Murdoch's regret-less "coolness" in applying this agenda to the ubiquitously tragic situations that humans encounter.

I develop the concept of hypothetical interpretation to give an account of certain problematic interpretive practices within a broadly Gricean framework. These practices attempt to find neither speaker nor linguistic meaning but rather, seek to discover such things as the unconscious beliefs of a text’s producer. In developing the concept of hypothetical interpretation, I consider in particular the question of their plausibility. I show how the plausibility of a hypothetical interpretation can be taken as providing evidence about a speaker’s noncommunicative (...) mental state, and how psychoanalytic interpretive practices and similar “hermeneutics of suspicion” rely upon such evidence. (shrink)

I develop the concept of hypothetical interpretation to give an account of certain problematic interpretive practices within a broadly Gricean framework. These practices attempt to find neither speaker nor linguistic meaning but rather, seek to discover such things as the unconscious beliefs of a text’s producer. In developing the concept of hypothetical interpretation, I consider in particular the question of their plausibility. I show how the plausibility of a hypothetical interpretation can be taken as providing evidence about a speaker’s noncommunicative (...) mental state, and how psychoanalytic interpretive practices and similar “hermeneutics of suspicion” rely upon such evidence. (shrink)

This book contains a selection of papers from the workshop *Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy* held in October 2019 in Tilburg, the Netherlands. It is the first volume devoted to the role of women in early analytic philosophy. It discusses the ideas of ten female philosophers and covers a period of over a hundred years, beginning with the contribution to the Significs Movement by Victoria, Lady Welby in the second half of the nineteenth century, and ending with Ruth (...) Barcan Marcus’s celebrated version of quantified modal logic after the Second World War. The book makes clear that women contributed substantially to the development of analytic philosophy in all areas of philosophy, from logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science, to ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. It illustrates that although women's voices were no different from men's as regards their scope and versatility, they had a much harder time being heard. The book is aimed at historians of philosophy and scholars in gender studies. (shrink)

Robert Sinclair’s *Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction* persuasively argues that Quine’s epistemology was deeply influenced by C. I. Lewis’s pragmatism. Sinclair’s account raises the question why Quine himself frequently downplayed Lewis’s influence. Looking back, Quine has always said that Rudolf Carnap was his “greatest teacher” and that his 1933 meeting with the German philosopher was his “first experience of sustained intellectual engagement with anyone of an older generation” (1970, 41; 1985, 97-8, my emphasis). Quine’s autobiographies contain only a (...) handful of biographical references to Lewis and he regularly soft-pedaled the latter’s influence in private correspondence. In this note, I discuss some archival evidence that helps us better understand Quine’s reluctance to acknowledge Lewis’s influence. I contextualize the relation between Lewis and Quine and argue that the latter viewed his teacher as a retrograde force in modern epistemology, impeding the more rigorous approach that Carnap had been developing in Europe. Next, I briefly discuss Lewis’s contribution to the development of scientific philosophy in the United States and argue that Quine underestimated his teacher’s role in this process. In doing so, I hope to show that Quine’s zealous commitment to Carnap’s approach negatively affected his assessment of Lewis’s influence, thereby supplementing Sinclair’s praiseworthy reconstruction with an explanation of why Quine himself underestimated Lewis’s role. (shrink)

Susanne Langer was a student at Radcliffe College between 1916 and 1926---a highly transitional period in the history of American philosophy. Intellectual generalists such as William James, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce had dominated philosophical debates at the turn of the century but the academic landscape gradually started to shift in the years after World War I. Many scholars of the new generation adopted a more piecemeal approach to philosophy---solving clearly delineated, technical puzzles using the so-called “method of logical analysis”. (...) Especially at Harvard, the intellectual climate rapidly changed. The department hired several philosophers who had contributed to the development of symbolic logic---H. M. Sheffer, C. I. Lewis, and A. N. Whitehead---and Harvard quickly began to be viewed as a central hub for analytic philosophy in the United States. This chapter contextualizes Langer’s earliest work by reading it through the lens of this shifting academic environment. Though Harvard did not allow women to take its courses until 1943, Langer is one of the most significant fruits of this period. Her dissertation “A Logical Analysis of Meaning” and her first publications are all illustrations of the approach that came to dictate the American philosophical conversation. By exploring the increased focus on the logical-analytic method and Langer’s attempts to expand the new approach to what she later called “non-discursive” symbolisms, I situate her publications in the intellectual context of the 1920s. (shrink)

Carnap and Quine first met in the 1932-33 academic year, when the latter, fresh out of graduate school, visited the key centers of mathematical logic in Europe. In the months that Carnap was finishing his Logische Syntax der Sprache, Quine spent five weeks in Prague, where they discussed the manuscript “as it issued from Ina Carnap’s typewriter”. The philosophical friendship that emerged in these weeks would have a tremendous impact on the course of analytic philosophy. Not only did the meetings (...) effectively turn Quine into Carnap's disciple, they also paved the way for their seminal debates about meaning, language, and ontology---the very discussions that would change the course of analytic philosophy in the decades after the Second World War. -/- Yet surprisingly little is known about these first meetings. Although Quine has often acknowledged the impact of his Prague visit, there appears to be little information about these first encounters, except for the fact that the Quines “were overwhelmed by the kindness of the Carnaps” and that it was Quine’s “most notable experience of being intellectually fired by a living teacher”. Neither their correspondence nor their autobiographies offer a detailed account of these meetings. In this paper, I shed new light on Carnap’s and Quine’s first encounters by examining a set of previously unexplored material from their personal and academic archives. Why did Quine decide to visit Carnap? What did they discuss? And in what ways did the meetings affect Quine’s philosophical development? In what follows, I address these questions by means of a detailed reconstruction of Quine’s year in Europe based on a range of letters, notes, and reports from the early 1930s. (shrink)

Susanne K. Langer is best known as a philosopher of culture and student of Ernst Cassirer. In this chapter, however, I argue that this standard picture ignores her contributions to the development of analytic philosophy in the 1920s and 1930s. I reconstruct the reception of Langer’s first book *The Practice of Philosophy*—arguably the first sustained defense of analytic philosophy by an American philosopher—and describe how prominent European philosophers of science such as Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Herbert Feigl viewed her (...) as one of the most important allies in the United States. In the second half of this chapter, I turn to Langer’s best-selling *Philosophy in a New Key* and reconstruct her attempts to broaden the scope of the, by then, rapidly growing U.S. analytic movement. I argue that her book anticipated various developments in analytic philosophy but was largely ignored by her former colleagues. I end the chapter by offering some clues as to why New Key did not incite the same laudatory responses from analytic philosophers as her earlier work. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage interroge les articulations problématiques entre art, flux et contemporain, à partir de pratiques artistiques actuelles où interviennent le quotidien, le sociologique et le collectif. Traversé par des flux de toute sorte, le monde contemporain soulève la question de sa représentabilité, alors que les artistes ont, depuis toujours, éprouvé le besoin de se mettre en adéquation avec lui. Comment en effet montrer ce qui sans cesse se meut? Pourquoi suivre les mouvances du monde? Et finalement, que peut l'art d'aujourd'hui? (...) Il s'agit pour les artistes d'adopter une position de contemporanéité car toute observation du monde, fût-elle opérée sur un mode contemplatif, ne peut être l'objet de l'inactif et de l'inopérant. C'est pourquoi "devenir contemporain" est une nécessité, une injonction politique et éthique aussi bien qu'esthétique. Il nous faut dès lors entreprendre une "esthétique du contemporain", elle qui nous portera vers un "contemporain de l'esthétique" guidé par les flux et les devenirs. (shrink)

Historians have shown that philosophical discussions about the implications of relativity significantly shaped the development of European philosophy of science in the 1920s. Yet little is known about American debates from this period. This paper maps the first responses to Einstein’s theory in three U.S. philosophy journals and situates these papers within the local intellectual climate. We argue that these discussions (1) stimulated the development of a distinctly American branch of philosophy of science and (2) paved the way for the (...) logical empiricists, who emigrated to the United States in the years before World War II. (shrink)

This new edition brings Farquharson's authoritative 1944 translation up to date and includes a helpful introduction and notes for the student and general reader. Rutherford includes a selection of letters from Marcus to his tutor Fronto--most of which date from his earlier years--that offer personal detail and help to fill out the somber portrait of the emperor that is found in the Meditations.

This classic collection, newly revised and with a foreword by classicist Spencer Klavan, includes the famed original introduction by Russell Kirk, the full text of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, the complete Enchiridion of Epictetus, and key selections from Seneca and Hierocles of Alexandria in one compact volume.

Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find (...) his argument suggestive, if not entirely transparent. I do think there is at least an important kernel of truth even in (iii), and that (i) ultimately explains what’s right about the other two. Consciousness of an impossibility makes belief in the obtaining of the corresponding state of affairs an impossibility. Interestingly, an appreciation of this fact brings into view a novel conception of inference, according to which it consists in the consciousness of necessity. This essay outlines and defends this position. A central element of the defense is that it reveals how reasoners satisfy what Paul Boghossian calls the Taking Condition and do so without engendering regress. (shrink)

The dominant theory of the evolution of moral cognition across a variety of fields is that moral cognition is a biological adaptation to foster social cooperation. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that moral cognition is likely an evolutionary exaptation: a form of cognition where neurobiological capacities selected for in our evolutionary history for a variety of different reasons—many unrelated to social cooperation—were put to a new, prosocial use after the fact through individual rationality, learning, and the development and transmission (...) of social norms. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the emerging behavioral neuroscience of moral cognition. It then outlines a novel theory of moral cognition that I have previously argued explains these findings better than alternatives. Finally, it shows how the evidence for this theory of moral cognition and human evolutionary history together suggest that moral cognition is likely not a biological adaptation. Instead, like reading sheet music or riding a bicycle, moral cognition is something that individuals learn to do—in this case, in response to sociocultural norms created in our ancestral history and passed down through the ages to enable cooperative living. (shrink)

Kant’s revolutionary new approach to philosophy was accompanied by the introduction of a largely novel terminology. With the Kant-Lexikon, a lexical reference gives the modern reader access to his work on the basis of present-day editions and takes into account 20th century and contemporary research and advances in lexicology. The Kant-Lexikon includes 2395 entries authored by 221 scholars.

The foundation of historical materialism.--A study on authority.--Sartre's existentialism.--Karl Popper and the problem of historical laws.--Freedom and the historical imperative.

The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus of properties, the tychic, alert an agent to occasions on which the external world cooperates with or frustrates their goal-achievement. An agent’s sphere of competence is the set of goals that it is possible for them to reliably achieve. Luck concerns occasions on which there (...) is a mismatch between attempt and result; in bad luck the external world thwarts goal-achievement within the agent’s sphere of competence, in good luck the external world assists goal-achievement beyond the agent’s sphere of competence. Fateful events are those where, more passively, the agent finds the external world achieving or frustrating their goals. Fortune concerns the contraction and expansion of the agent’s sphere of competence. Eight reasons are given for accepting the account; its theoretical virtues and various things it explains. Lastly, three objections are answered; that the tychic properties relate to well-being rather than agency, that there are alternative theories of fortune available in the contemporary literature, that the account draws arbitrary distinctions between synonyms. (shrink)

Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...) Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are *statements* within a holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as *properties* of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine. (shrink)

Presenting the first step-by-step commentary on Husserl’s Ideas I, Marcus Brainard’s Belief and Its Neutralization provides an introduction not only to this central work, but also to the whole of transcendental phenomenology. Brainard offers a clear and lively account of each key element in Ideas I, along with a novel reading of Husserl, one which may well cause scholars to reconsider many long-standing views on his thought, especially on the role of belief, the effect and scope of the epoché, (...) and the significance of the universal neutrality modification. (shrink)

Abstract:We analyzed co-citation patterns in 332,498 articles published in Anglophone psychology journals between 1946 and 1990 to estimate (1) when cognitive psychology first emerged as a clearly delineated subdiscipline, (2) how fast it grew, (3) to what extent it replaced other (e.g., behaviorist) approaches to psychology, (4) to what degree it was more appealing to scholars from a younger generation, and (5) whether it was more interdisciplinary than alternative traditions. We detected a major shift in the structure of co-citation networks (...) between approximately 1955 and 1975 and draw novel conclusions about the developments commonly referred to as "the cognitive turn.". (shrink)

Meditations offers timeless guidance for troubled times. Renowned for his principled leadership, Aurelius kept private notes detailing his philosophy on life and leadership. Meditations is a collection of those private notes, filled with insights on responding well to hardship both in thought and in action. His writings are a cornerstone of the Stoic philosophy, embraced by leaders throughout history and across the world for its emphasis on collaboration, rationality, and striving for the good of all people. George Long's elegant 1862 (...) translation balances accessibility with preserving the classic tone of the text. With archival printing, this pocket-sized new hardcover edition is designed for both portability and longevity. "Motions and changes are continually renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite duration of ages." -Marcus Aurelius. (shrink)

Logical positivism is often characterized as a set of naive doctrines on meaning, method, and metaphysics. In recent decades, however, historians have dismissed this view as a gross misinterpretation. This new scholarship raises a number of questions. When did the standard reading emerge? Why did it become so popular? And how could commentators have been so wrong? This essay reconstructs the history of a “caricature” and rejects the hypothesis that it was developed by ill-informed Anglophone scholars who failed to appreciate (...) the subtleties of European scientific philosophy. It argues that the received view has a more complicated history and was frequently promoted by the European positivists themselves. The essay shows that the view has roots in both American and European scientific philosophy and emerged as a result of the complex interplay between the two communities in the years before the intellectual migration. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the origins of Gettier-style epistemology, highlighting the philosophical and methodological debates that led to its development in the 1960s. Though present-day epistemologists assume that the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge began with Gettier’s 1963 argument against the JTB-definition, I show that this research program can be traced back to British discussions about knowledge and analysis in the 1940s and 1950s. I discuss work of, among others, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, A. J. Ayer, Norman (...) Malcom, and A. D. Woozley, showing how exchanges between different schools of analytic philosophy gave rise to new ideas about the nature of knowledge and analysis. Finally, I turn to Gettier's intellectual development and argue that his paper was influenced by some of these debates, suggesting that even his interpretation of Plato’s definition of knowledge can be traced back to discussions in this period. (shrink)

Marcus Aurelius was Emperor of Rome from 121 to 180. Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius was written for school age children. The author believed that children should be given the wisdom of great leaders from all eras. Marcus Aurelius believed that human happiness arises in part from man's acceptance of his duties and responsibilities. He believed that one should accept calmly what cannot be avoided and perform one's duties as well as possible. "It was the doctrine of (...) class='Hi'>Marcus Aurelius that most of the ills of life come to us from our own imagination, that it was not in the power of others seriously to interfere with the calm, temperate life of an individual, and that when a fellow being did anything to us that seemed unjust he was acting in ignorance, and that instead of stirring up anger within us it should stir our pity for him. Oftentimes by careful self-examination we should find that the fault was more our own than that of our fellow, and our sufferings were rather from our own opinions than from anything real.". (shrink)

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the usefulness of qualitative research for studying the ethics of care, bringing to light the lived experience of health care recipients, together with the importance of methods that allow reconstruction of the processes underlying this lived experience. Lived experiences of families being approached for organ donation, parents facing the imminent death of their child and patients being treated using stem cell transplantation are used to illustrate how ethical principles are differentiated, modified or (...) contradicted by the narrative context of persons concerned. The integration of empirical data into ethics will help caregivers in their ethical decision making and may enrich care ethics as a narrative and interpretative field. (shrink)