L’acte de la philosophie japonaise est celui d’un évidement de soi: acte d’accueil des traditions philosophiques du monde, acte en résonance, créateur d’une terminologie, d’une logique, d’une conceptualité originales, s’alimentant aux sources d’une pensée mythique jamais tarie. Les textes présentés ici en feront sentir l’inclassable nouveauté: cette philosophie n’est ni purement shintoïste, bouddhique, chrétienne, néoconfucianiste ; elle n’est ni « orientale » ni « occidentale », mais proprement japonaise.

In spite of his clear and deliberate distinction between philosophical and religious discourse, Ricoeur lets these two aspects of his thought interweave with respect to the deep "conviction" motiving it. The idea of “attestation”, considered as the "password" granting access to his last "hermeneutics of the self", testifies to this in particular. This term, while containing a religious connotation, refers to what Heidegger calls Fundamentalontologie , in which attestation ( Bezeugung ) is totally de-theologized to indicate how Dasein assumes its (...) own death. But Ricoeur only incorporates this notion into his thought by making it undergo a profound modification. Ricoeur replaces “being–toward–death” with “remaining alive until…”, which allows him to recognize “the religious in common.” How can we develop a conception of the philosophy of religion from this winding process? This article marks a first step toward answering that question. (shrink)

The French Introduction to a special issue on Ricoeur and Theology.

Witnessing after the “end of philosophy,” in the sense in which Heidegger mentions it in his famous lecture on “The end of philosophy and the task of thinking”—what does this mean for us and our world today? As a preparation for an answer to this question, the present study proposes to elaborate a radical hermeneutics of testimony, by invoking French philosophers who can be qualified as “post-Heideggerian”—Lévinas, Ricoeur, Derrida, among others—whose thoughts on testimony were developed through the essential critique on (...) Heideggerian idea of attestation and the creative reactivation of the semantic resources historically preserved by terms such as “witness” and “testimony”. (shrink)

Dans 'les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion', Bergson évoque rarement le Japon. Et pourtant dans le quatrième chapitre du même texte, intitulé Remarques finales 'Mécanique et mystique', c'était lui qui a bien prévu Hiroshima avec ces mots testamentaires: ' Il faut que tous se battent contre tous, comme firent les hordes des premiers temps. Seulement on se bat avec les armes forgées par notre civilisation, et les massacres sont d'une horreur que les anciens n'auraient même pas (...) imaginée. Au train dont va la science, le jour approche où l'un des adversaires, possesseur d'un secret qu'il tenait en réserve, aura le moyen de supprimer l'autre'. Ainsi se pose la question de savoir comment envisager les Deux Sources, à travers les relations assez particulières de ce philosophe avec le Japon. À partir de cette interrogation, PBJ (Projet Bergson au Japon) a organisé, aux 5-8 novembre 2013, à Paris, un colloque qui s'intitule Remarques finales : autour des Deux sources de la morale et de la religion de Bergson. Le présent volume présente les actes de ce colloque ellipsoïdal dont les centres étaient Bergson et le Japon"--Back cover. (shrink)

Yasuhiko Sugimura’s review of my book La Religion dans la philosophie (Hermann, 2021) for the present issue of Études Ricœuriennes / Ricoeur Studies affords me an opportunity to return to my intention in this work. I verify the heuristic hypothesis that the complex relationship that Ricoeur’s philosophy established with religion can be explained by a process of secularization [laïcisation] of Ricoeur’s religious convictions. In dialogue with the aforementioned review, I propose to reconsider certain aspects of my criticism of (...) Ricoeur on the question of truth. (shrink)

Anfractuosité et unification consiste en une introduction à la pensée de Nishida Kitarô (1870-1945), au moyen du fil directeur interprétatif qu’est la notion d’« unification » (tôitsusuru). Que signifie unifier : atteindre une unité dernière, ou bien poursuivre « sans cesse » l’unité ? Une telle poursuite ne revient-t-elle pas à un « néant pur et simple » ? En fait, cette crainte ne proviendrait-elle pas de ce que l’homme ne peut faire face à l’« infini » qui se trouve (...) derrière l’être même ? Dès lors, à quel « lieu » correspondrait un tel « au-delà » ? La finitude serait-elle la limite du « soi », la notion d’être est-elle l’unique clé de l’histoire de la réalité ? Un « néant absolu » a-t-il encore quelque chose à voir avec l’être ? Michel Dalissier examine les réponses de Nishida à la faveur de trois explorations de ses oeuvres majeures, en insistant sur sa relation intellectuelle avec la philosophie occidentale, ainsi que sur les « annotations manuscrites » qu’il laissait dans ses livres. (shrink)

We explore the connections between Dickson’s lemma and weak Ramsey theory. We show that a weak version of the Paris–Harrington principle for pairs in c colors and miniaturized Dickson’s lemma for c-tuples are equivalent over \. Furthermore, we look at a cascade of consequences for several variants of weak Ramsey’s theorem.

1960年代以後、日本の思想・哲学に大きな影響力をもった廣松渉(1933‐94)。この独自な哲学者の人と思想と時代と影響関係の全体を思想史上に位置づけ、その思考過程を精密に追跡した、気鋭の書。.

The present article is based on a interview with a Japanese experienced caregiver who specializes in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, which generally leads to the locked-in syndrome. Professional caregivers for ALS patients with ventilator experience two particular temporalities in their practice. First, they must monitor the patient continuously during a seven-hour stay. Because a single problem in the ventilator can have fatal consequences, the care of an ALS patient with a ventilator requires long periods of sustained concentration. Second, trying (...) to understand the signs of a patient with a ventilator sometimes requires three hours to go through ten alphabets. In addition to the huge effort that such communication requires, caregivers must complete the meaning of the signs with their imagination: the ten alphabets are not sufficient to understand what the patient really wants to say. This imaginative capacity, however, is based on a long relationship, which started when the patient was still able to speak and move. That is why, as this article will show, even when a patient has entered total LIS, the caregiver can continue to realize his or her wishes. (shrink)

Behind the phase of cognition analysed by Husserl, there is a phase of affection. In this phase, there are significant mental disorders occurring. Similar to the way in which the phase of cognition is divided into reference, meaning (referent), and representation of words (classification according to Husserl's theory of meaning), the phase of affection is also divided into reference, “meaning,” and figure as sphere of “meaning”. The situation as a reference can allow various predications to form different explanations, i.e. different (...) states of affairs. From the point of view of affection, this reference has another role. The affection of a situation obliges us to produce bodily “meanings,” which is a sign of health. Mental disorders can be described as some distortion in the phase of affection. Healing in this regard occurs through the restoration of creativity for “meanings” which assume the situation. (shrink)

The “phenomenological” method according to Emmanuel Lévinas consists of two steps: first, reducing the said (le dit) to the saying (le dire); and second, “hyperbole” in his own words. Reducing the said to the saying, in itself, means in this context of the methodology a method to escape from ontology and cognitive philosophy, and to discover the dimension of inter-human facticity. In the second step of “hyperbole”, Lévinas outlines the horizon of this inter-human facticity as that of affectivity. In this (...) horizon (of ethics), the self is defined as phenomena containing the affectivity related to the two extreme situations: personal (physical and mental) suffering and that of the other. Ultimately, the death of the other person and a person’s own possible death limit the internal structure of this horizon. (shrink)

This book aims to revise the traditional interpretation of William Golding's fiction.

経済の発展期には美徳とされた勤勉の価値が豊かさの到来とともに揺らいでいる。よく働くことは余暇や家庭や地域の生活と相反する生き方になってしまった。勤勉な労働よりも、意味ある労働が求められるようになる。だ が、勤勉倫理に代わる新しい仕事倫理は生まれるのだろうか。仕事をめぐる過去の思索を訪ね歩き、「良い仕事」の思想の伝統の中に、現代の自己実現願望の限界を超える新しい仕事倫理・仕事理念の可能性を見出す。.

This paper seeks to demonstrate the structural difference in communication of schizophrenia and autism. For a normal adult, spontaneous communication is nothing but the transmission of phantasía (thought) by means of perceptual objects or language. This transmission is first observed in a make-believe play of child. Husserl named this function “perceptual phantasía,” and this function presupposes as its basis the “internalized affection of contact” (which functions empirically in eye contact, body contact, or voice calling me). Regarding autism, because of the (...) innate lack of affection of contact, intersubjective perceptual phantasía does not occur spontaneously. Consequently, autistics do not engage in make-believe play but in stereotyped and solipsistic play. Without the formation of perceptual phantasía, there is no differentiation between phantasía and perception. For this reason, people with Asperger's syndrome consider conversation not an immediate communication of thought but a logical transmission of concepts. Schizophrenia is characterized by a distortion in the internalized affection of contact, resulting in a disturbance of perceptual phantasía, and this later is covered by various symptoms—for example, delusion as a pathological kind of communication of thought. This delusion is based on the pathological internalized affection of contact represented by a terrifying Other. (shrink)

In the Essay Locke argues abstract ideas within the framework of the descriptivist theory of reference. For him, abstract ideas are, in many cases, conceptual ideas that play the role of “descriptions” or “descriptive contents,” determining general terms’ referents. In contrast, in the introduction of the Principles, Berkeley denies Lockean abstract ideas adamantly from an imagistic point of view, and he offers his own theory of reference seemingly consisting of referring expressions and their referents alone. However, interestingly, he mentions a (...) general term’s “definition” and suggests that it determines the scope of the term’s referents. For example, he takes up the definition of a triangle as “a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines” and suggests that just as Locke’s general idea of a triangle does, the definition determines the referents of the general term “triangle.” His definition reminds us of the fact that as Descartes grasps the content of the general idea of a triangle as “a figure enclosed by three lines,” so Locke grasps the abstract idea of a triangle as “a Figure including a Space between three Lines,” and so on. That is, since Berkeley is an imagist, he does not acknowledge Locke’s conceptual abstract ideas as “ideas,” but although he verbally denies “abstract ideas,” his theory of reference also actually has the same descriptivist framework consisting of referring expressions, their descriptive contents, and their referents. Thus, we understand the real reason why Berkeley’s criticism of Locke seems beside the point. (shrink)

La disociación, surgida a raíz del acontecimiento traumático, pone de manifiesto algunos caracteres fenomenológicos propios del cuerpo. En primer lugar, la destrucción de la esquematización propia del cuerpo es lo que genera el estado hipnótico. En segundo lugar, sólo si entendemos la facultad de esquematización como relacionada con la auto-conciencia podemos comprender el extraño fenómeno del sí-mismo despegado que se da en el estado de disociación. En tercer lugar, este desmoronamiento de la capacidad esquematizante tiene su origen en la destrucción (...) de un tipo muy especial y fundamental de intersubjetividad (se trata, por así decirlo, de la �phantasia �perceptiva� intersubjetiva�). (shrink)

Le silence et le sommeil constituent la base sur laquelle la cure psychothérapeutique et la créativité humaine se produisent. Or c’est avec le concept de sens latéral que Merleau-Ponty a esquissé la structure phénomé­nologique de la créativité humaine. Du point de vue du sens latéral qui surgit au creux de l’articulation intentionnelle du monde, le corps vivant apparaît comme style qui canalise la production du sens. Chaque surgissement du sens latéral est précédé par un silence qui suspend momentanément l’intention­nalité thématisante (...) et articulante. Le corps comme style n’est pas le corps réel mais le corps imaginaire qui se situe au centre du monde imaginaire en le fabriquant et en le déformant. Le corps imaginaire engendre la « déforma­tion » par rapport à l’articulation objective du monde et cette déformation constitue l’essence de la créativité. La création artistique, la cure dans la psychothérapie et le rêve sont les exemples éminents de cette créativité. Par contre, dans le silence et le sommeil qui précèdent la création et le rêve, non seulement l’articulation intentionnelle mais aussi celle du corps imaginaire sont suspendues. Le silence et le sommeil désignent le degré zéro du corps imaginaire en deçà du sens latéral. (shrink)

According to Kant, the division of the categories “is not the result of a search after pure concepts undertaken at haphazard,” but is derived from the “complete” classification of judgments developed by traditional logic. However, the sorts of judgments that he enumerates in his table of judgments are not all ones that traditional logic has dealt with; consequently, we must say that he chose the sorts of judgments in question with a certain intention. Besides, we know that his choice of (...) judgments and categories is strongly influenced by certain views of natural science that he fully accepts. For this reason, his argumentations are sometimes seriously inconsistent. As to Kant’s argumentations of categories, many problems have already been pointed out, but in this paper, I take up the categories of quantity and quality once more, and make clear his argumentations’ hidden logic and its distortion from the point of view of the history of logic and natural science. First, I confirm that there are non-negligible problems in his explanation to the effect that his derivation of the categories of quantity and quality is based on the quantity and quality of judgments. Next, I reconsider the meaning of his treating the categories of quantity and quality as pure concepts of the understanding. Finally, I conclude that by having recourse to the categories of quantity and quality Kant tried unjustly to apriorize the distinction between the “extensive magnitude” and “intensive magnitude” that has a long formational history since Aristotle. (shrink)