The scientific understanding of cognition and consciousness is currently hampered by the lack of rigorous and universally accepted definitions that permit comparative studies. This article proposes new functional and unambiguous definitions for cognition and consciousness in order to provide clearly defined boundaries within which general theories of cognition and consciousness may be developed. The proposed definitions are built upon the construction and manipulation of reality representation, decision making, and learning and are scoped in terms of an underlyinglogical structure. It is (...) argued that the presentation of reality also necessitates the concept of absence and the capacity to perform transitive inference. Explicit predictions relating to these new definitions, along with possible ways to test them, are also described and discussed. (shrink)

This article provides the foundation for a new predictive theory of animal learning that is based upon a simple logical model. The knowledge of experimental subjects at a given time is described using logical equations. These logical equations are then used to predict a subject’s response when presented with a known or a previously unknown situation. This new theory suc- cessfully anticipates phenomena that existing theories predict, as well as phenomena that they cannot. It provides a theoretical account for phenomena (...) that are beyond the domain of existing models, such as extinction and the detection of novelty, from which “external inhibition” can be explained. Examples of the methods applied to make predictions are given using previously published results. The present theory proposes a new way to envision the minimal functions of the nervous system, and provides possible new insights into the way that brains ultimately create and use knowledge about the world. (shrink)

The scientific understanding of cognition and consciousness is currently hampered by the lack of rigorous and universally accepted definitions that permit comparative studies. This paper proposes new functional and un- ambiguous definitions for cognition and consciousness in order to provide clearly defined boundaries within which general theories of cognition and consciousness may be developed. The proposed definitions are built upon the construction and manipulation of reality representation, decision making and learning and are scoped in terms of an underlying logical structure. (...) It is argued that the presentation of reality also necessitates the concept of ab- sence and the capacity to perform transitive inference. Explicit predictions relating to these new definitions, along with possible ways to test them, are also described and discussed. (shrink)

Beckers et al. (2006) published intriguing results, obtained in the rat fear condi- tioning paradigm, challenging classical associativist theories of learning. One of the main findings of Beckers et al. (2006) is that what they called subad- ditive pretraining abolished the expres- sion of blocking. Haselgrove (2010) proposed an expla- nation, based on the well known Rescorla- Wagner Model (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). We will demonstrate here that the account offered by Haselgrove (2010) is contradictory to the basic assumptions of (...) the Rescorla-Wagner Model. (shrink)

Nudges involve designing social “choice contexts” to promote what “experts” regard as beneficial for individuals and the society, by making the “right” choices easier. The most common form of nudge...

Partiendo de la perspectiva filosófica actual, este volumen recoge la controversia "explicación-comprensión”, desde sus orígenes en Dilthey hasta los planteamientos que trascienden el aspecto puramente metodológico. En el libro se realiza una evaluación crítica de la transformación que la discusión ha tenido en el ámbito de la filosofía contemporánea y la productividad teórica e interés que tiene en diferentes ámbitos, como los de las ciencias humanas y sociales. Un debate que refleja la autocomprensión de la filosofía en el siglo XX (...) y que se desarrolla al hilo de la formación de los problemas filosóficos y de las corrientes de pensamiento que indirectamente contribuye a formar. Con contribuciones de destacados especialistas, las cuestiones abordadas recogen diferentes aproximaciones que van desde los planteamientos históricos, fenomenológicos, analíticos y hermenéuticos, hasta los de la teoría crítica. Algunos de los autores cuyas aportaciones merecen especial atención son: Von Wright, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Popper, Kuhn, Gadamer, Davidson, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt y Habermas. (shrink)

La existencia de la pena estatal es un continuo en el devenir de la humanidad. También lo son los estudios que se encargan de su análisis y de su justificación. Sin embargo, tras tanto esfuerzo, las soluciones a los problemas de la teoría de la pena son tan variadas como variados son los autores que se han aproximado intelectualmente a ellos. Además, de entre todas las posiciones dogmáticas, ninguna parece llevar la delantera en la dialéctica académica actual. Frente a aquel (...) fenómeno, esta obra pretende arrancar el acercamiento a la institución punitiva desde su base, que no es otra que el comportamiento humano. Si aceptamos que el castigo estatal es una de las formas de control social de conductas, resulta interesante comenzar conociendo cómo se comporta el ser humano con relación a los fenómenos punitivos. Desde ese punto inicial se pueden confirmar empíricamente las intuiciones que se esconden tras una gran parte de las teorías de la pena y construir una justificación propia de la misma que, aceptando tanto la complejidad del comportamiento humano como la de los efectos del castigo en el mismo, reconozca una vigencia todavía muy fuerte (aunque también muy diversa) de las teorías tradicionalmente denominadas como prevención general negativa y positiva. Además, este modo de aproximación también consigue explicar la pervivencia del «irracional» pensamiento retributivo y el encaje de las más modernas teorías del fair play. En suma, facilita construir un modelo de justificación de la pena complejo y netamente consecuencialista fundamentado en realidades empíricamente constatables, lo que, por un lado, vacuna a esta posición frente a críticas puramente valorativas y, por otro, pretende que la discusión general se desarrolle sin perder de vista el mundo de lo fáctico. (shrink)

El libro supone un acercamiento a la conformación de la lingüística española, a partir de la introducción en España por parte de Manuel Vilá i Fontanals de las novísimas metodologías y estudios científicos de las lenguas y el lenguaje que Alemania dio a luz a lo largo del siglo XIX. Hasta llegar a la figura importantísima en la lingüística histórica hispana, el autor realiza el recorrido desde Vilá, pasando por Menéndez Pelayo, hasta llegar al discípulo de ambos (de quienes bebe), (...) Ramón Menéndez Pidal. Enriquecedor es, además, la inclusión de un olvidado lingüista español, preestructuralista: Ángel Amor Ruibal, obviado por Pidal, pero coetáneo del mismo. La obra supone una visión de conjunto de la conformación de una ciencia en España que, con retraso respecto de Europa, ha seguido la estela de las grandes escuelas europeas desde la diacronía a la sincronía en sus intereses académicos. El público objetivo de este libro es el alumnado de grado universitario. Su autor es Ígor Rodríguez-Iglesias, profesor del Área de Lengua Española en la Universidad de Málaga y miembro del Grupo de Investigación HUM972 de Lingüística de la Universidad de Sevilla. Antes ha sido profesor en la Universidad de Huelva e investigador en las universidades de La Habana, Alcalá, Coímbra y Autónoma de Madrid. El libro está prologado por Francisco Marcos-Marín, profesor de la Universidad de Texas en San Antonio."--Cover page 4. (shrink)

Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the (...) dormant alternative theory of resemblance nominalism, showing first that it can withstand the attacks of such eminent opponents as Goodman and Armstrong, and then that there are reasons to prefer it to its rival theories. The clarity and rigour of his arguments will challenge metaphysicians to rethink their views on properties. (shrink)

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.

Ce compte rendu a déjà paru sous le titre « Le rythme : une des formes concrètes du temps. » sur EspacesTemps.net le 2 août 2021. M. Antonioli, G. Drevon, L. Gwiazdzinski, V. Kaufmann & L. Pattaroni, Manifeste pour une politique des rythmes, Lausanne, EPFL Press, 2021, 168 p. Le Manifeste pour une politique des rythmes est un argumentaire pour la reconnaissance de la nature rythmique des pathologies du capitalisme et la nécessité de politiques y répondant en termes d'émancipation, de (...) mise - Recensions. (shrink)

At head of title: Saberes emergentes. Collection of essays by prominent Dominican intellectual, humanist and educator noted for his contributions to psychology, scientific method, epistemology and the philosophy of science.

Los albores de la geografía la corriente posibilista -- Geografía racionalista -- La corriente paisajística -- La nueva geografía. El abordaje sistemático y su influencia en el concepto de región -- Balance del desarrollo conceptual de la región en el contexto de la nueva geografía -- La geografía radical humanística -- La geografía crítica -- La geografía soviética -- La geografía neo y posmoderna. El concepto de región en la geografía contemporánea.

David Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is the definitive statement of the greatest philosopher in the English language. His arguments in support of reasoning from experience, and against the "sophistry and illusion"of religiously inspired philosophical fantasies, caused controversy in the eighteenth century and are strikingly relevant today, when faith and science continue to clash. The Enquiry considers the origin and processes of human thought, reaching the stark conclusion that we can have no ultimate understanding of the physical world, or (...) indeed our own minds. In either sphere we must depend on instinctive learning from experience, recognizing our animal nature and the limits of reason. Hume's calm and open-minded skepticism thus aims to provide a new basis for science, liberating us from the "superstition" of false metaphysics and religion. His Enquiry remains one of the best introductions to the study of philosophy, and his edition places it in its historical and philosophical context. (shrink)

A leading political theorist’s groundbreaking defense of ideal conceptions of justice in political philosophy Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question (...) whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? Utopophobia argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. David Estlund does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does he assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. Estlund engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, he counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, Utopophobia stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy. (shrink)

The zetetic turn in epistemology raises three questions about epistemic and zetetic norms. First, there is the relationship question: what is the relationship between epistemic and zetetic norms? Are some epistemic norms zetetic norms, or are epistemic and zetetic norms distinct? Second, there is the tension question: are traditional epistemic norms in tension with plausible zetetic norms? Third, there is the reaction question: how should theorists react to a tension between epistemic and zetetic norms? Drawing on an analogy to practical (...) philosophy, I develop a focal point view to resolve these motivating questions. On the focal point view, traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms answer different types of normative questions. There is nevertheless a familiar type of evaluative tension between traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms, but this tension is an unavoidable feature of the normative landscape and not a sign that traditional epistemic norms need revision. But if traditional epistemic norms are not zetetic norms, then in what sense is zetetic epistemology a project for epistemologists? I conclude by articulating a sense in which some nontraditional epistemic norms are zetetic norms, and in which zetetic epistemology is an important part of the study of theoretical rationality. (shrink)

One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. Much recent attention has been devoted to the "animal question" -- consideration of the moral status of nonhuman animals. In this book, David Gunkel takes up the "machine question": whether and to what extent intelligent and autonomous machines of our own making can be considered to have legitimate moral responsibilities and any legitimate claim to moral consideration. The machine question poses a (...) fundamental challenge to moral thinking, questioning the traditional philosophical conceptualization of technology as a tool or instrument to be used by human agents. Gunkel begins by addressing the question of machine moral agency: whether a machine might be considered a legitimate moral agent that could be held responsible for decisions and actions. He then approaches the machine question from the other side, considering whether a machine might be a moral patient due legitimate moral consideration. Finally, Gunkel considers some recent innovations in moral philosophy and critical theory that complicate the machine question, deconstructing the binary agent--patient opposition itself. Technological advances may prompt us to wonder if the science fiction of computers and robots whose actions affect their human companions could become science fact. Gunkel's argument promises to influence future considerations of ethics, ourselves, and the other entities who inhabit this world. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to get to the bottom of an acute and perennial tension between our best scientific pictures of the fundamental physical structure of the world and our everyday empirical experience of it. The trouble is about the direction of time. The situation (very briefly) is that it is a consequence of almost every one of those fundamental scientific pictures--and that it is at the same time radically at odds with our common sense--that whatever can happen can (...) just as naturally happen backwards. Albert provides an unprecedentedly clear, lively, and systematic new account--in the context of a Newtonian-Mechanical picture of the world--of the ultimate origins of the statistical regularities we see around us, of the temporal irreversibility of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, of the asymmetries in our epistemic access to the past and the future, and of our conviction that by acting now we can affect the future but not the past. Then, in the final section of the book, he generalizes the Newtonian picture to the quantum-mechanical case and (most interestingly) suggests a very deep potential connection between the problem of the direction of time and the quantum-mechanical measurement problem. The book aims to be both an original contribution to the present scientific and philosophical understanding of these matters at the most advanced level, and something in the nature of an elementary textbook on the subject accessible to interested high-school students. Table of Contents: Preface 1. Time-Reversal Invariance 2. Thermodynamics 3. Statistical Mechanics 4. The Reversibility Objections and the Past-Hypothesis 5. The Scope of Thermodynamics 6. The Asymmetries of Knowledge and Intervention 7. Quantum Mechanics Appendix: Gedankenexperiments with Heat Engines Index Reviews of this book: The foundations of statistical mechanisms are often presented in physics textbooks in a rather obscure and confused way. By challenging common ways of thinking about this subject, Time and Chance can do quite a lot to improve this situation. --Jean Bricmont, Science Albert is perfecting a style of foundational analysis that is uniquely his own...It has a surgical precision...and it is ruthless with pretensions. The foundations of thermodynamics is a topic that has accumulated a good deal of dead wood; this is a fire that will burn and burn. --Simon W. Saunders, Oxford University As usual with Albert's work, the exposition is brisk and to the point, and exceptionally clear...The book will be an extremely valuable contribution to the literature on the subject of philosophical issues in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, a literature which has been thin on the ground but is now growing as it deserves to. --Lawrence Sklar, University of Michigan. (shrink)

Las contradicciones y falacias en las ideas políticamente correctas, hegemónicas en nuestro tiempo, quedan denunciadas con una pincelada mordaz y un toque burlón. Con ingenio, humor y talante liberal destroza las supuestas verdades adoptadas dogmáticamente por los pseudoprogresistas. Un libro que no pretende hacer amigos, sino hacer pensar. Doctor en Ciencias Económicas y catedrático de Historia del Pensamiento Económico en la U. Complutense de Madrid, es columnista en prensa y radio.

By means of an example, shows the possibility of beliefs that are separately rational whilst together inconsistent.

How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.