The question I address in the paper is “What is the ideal of MacIntyre’s moral philosophy? What is the telos of human nature?” Considering MacIntyre’s critique of modern culture, politics and philosophy, anti-intellectualism emerges as the main reason for his refutation of these values. So is it a reason for moral and political distortion that leads to the interpassivity of the modern self. Taking into account MacIntyre’s idea of characters I pinpoint the character of the philosopher as a moral ideal (...) of MacIntyre’s thought. For it is not only intellectual activity within any practice that enables us to develop our distinctively human nature but also philosophy that is the highest form of that kind of activity. From this point of view, it is crucial to grasp philosophy as a required way of life and the craft that enables us to be moral and political agents. (shrink)

Praca poświęcona jest naturze dobrego życia. Zastosowanie odnowionej w połowie XX wieku myśli Arystotelesa pozwala tu uchwycić i przezwyciężyć zarówno miałkość propozycji „przemysłu szczęścia”, jak i akademickiej filozofii. Autor interpretuje koncepcję starożytnego filozofa przy użyciu współczesnych narzędzi filozoficznych wskazując jak ich zastosowanie pozwala uchwycić węzłowe problemy życia (jak pytanie o szczęście i sens) oraz wskazać te metody myślenia, które umożliwiają krytyczny namysł nad rzeczywistością społeczną. Pytanie o dobro jest zatem zarówno o to, jak kształtować własne życie, ale też jak myśleć (...) o relacjach z ludźmi, z innymi istotami oraz jak współdziałać w dążeniu do dóbr wspólnych. Te ostatnie okazują się przy tym nie tylko dobrami publicznymi, infrastrukturalnymi, ale przede wszystkim formami kooperacji i współżycia. (shrink)

The paper addresses some of the aspects of the neo-Aristotelian concept of good on the basis of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. The author’s general thesis is that the idea of good organizes its normativity along two vectors pointed towards nature and emancipation, which are interlinked, that is — the normativity of the good is always organized by both of them and it is inappropriate to refer to one of them only. This fault is made, the author believes, by Nussbaum who (...) does not offer enough resources to establish a sound naturalistic evaluative standard in her theory. To address this issue the author starts by discussing the capabilities approach as a form of the concept of good and proceeds by analysing Nussbaum’s view on family as an exemplar of the inadequacies of the approach. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to discuss the general idea of a Central-European ethos in comparison with the values that shaped the contemporary form of Western societies. My argument is threefold. First, I briefly discuss the emergent character of Western modernization. Second, I pinpoint those historical and material conditions that have shaped the general situation of Central Europe in the last two hundred years in order to indicate their influence on what Charles Taylor calls "social imaginaries", shared by the (...) peoples of the region. And in part three, I attempt to point out some consequences of the otherness of the Central-European mode of modernization for regional ethos and its perspectives. My general thesis is that the countries of Central Europe, members of what-is-now the Visegrad Group, that is to say, for the last two hundred years (and some of them, like Poland for instance, for last three or even four centuries) are in the process of some kind semi-modernization, This semi-modernization concerns not only their economies and social relations, but also certain moral and world views (Weltsschauungen), whose basic outlines are derived from inferiority complex about the modernized West. But at the same time they are mostly unable, for the reason I shall refer to below, to propose their own way of modernization. Hence, claims to equality and justice made within Central-European are are of a special kind, which involves a strong recognition of history as the source and basis for them. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is twofold. Firstly, I argue for the thesis of the necessity of involvement of a concept of social imaginary1 into the traditional dialectic of freedom and responsibility. Secondly, I trace those forms of social imaginary which are crucial for development of contemporary Central-European ethos, and particularly its Polish version. My general thesis is that to understand contemporary form of the ethos, we need to look for its roots in certain social and world views shared by (...) the societies of the region in the last few decades based in their political and economic environment of the late communist era. The call for freedom, at least from the beginning of the Solidarity movement to the Velvet Revolution and the Round Table, should not only be seen as the call for self-governance, but primarily as rejection of the poverty of conditions of life compared with those of the Western world. For this reason there is no simple symmetry between the demand of freedom (and well-being) and the consciousness of responsibility among the societies of the region. (shrink)

In this paper I shall investigate the nature of education as seen from the neoAristotelian perspective. My thesis is that education should be seen as a part of political activity in the source sense of the term, that is, as an element of human development rooted in the idea of the good, which makes this concept at odds with the modern concepts of politics and education. I start with a brief discussion of the classical concept of politics with special attention (...) being paid to the relation between ethics, education and politics. I then address the changes in the philosophical background of this concept of politics introduced in early modernity, in order to indicate the consequences of this process for education as subordinated to an economy-influenced politics. Following is the discussion of some aspects of contemporary Aristotelianism. I argue for the thesis that education is the basic form of policy understood along Aristotelian lines. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the (...) accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan’s critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent’s recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community. (shrink)

Public opinion has it that ethics should be concerned with studying and providing precise and reliable rules of conduct. This view is based in a long philosophical tradition which begins with the Stoics and continues at least to Kant; it is, however, a false view. There are good reasons to turn our attention to these aspects of moral thinking which refer to and emphasize the element of risk and uncertainty. In the article I briefly discuss two of such reasons: the (...) problem of moral luck and the problem of action based on ignorance. Consideration of these two problems leads to the conclusion that the most tricky element in moral thinking is the firm belief of the subject in the truth of the premises on which they base their actions and in the irrelevance of external factors to the assessment of their deeds. In this light I argue that the basic requirement for a moral justification of a particular action is not its conformity to a certain set of rules but the subject’s critical reflection on their course of action. Indeed, what turns an attitude into a moral attitude is an amoral, epistemological factor: criticism and openness to uncertainty. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between the basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. The subject of discussion is, firstly, the ways that these categories are understood; secondly, the possible approaches towards moral acting that appear due to their use; and thirdly, their relationship within the moral system. However, what is of a special importance here is the relationship between the categories of norms and ideals (or in a wider aspect — laudable (...) acts) and a thesis about their complementary character. For it seems that the omission of one of the elements that are analysed within a moral system must result in an essential limitation of both the possibilities of finding an adequate approach to a given moral problem (on a descriptive level), as well as defining the full set of normative guidelines. Therefore, as I shall argue, resigning from a two-level method of moral analysis may lead to the atrophy of the very idea of ethics itself. (shrink)

Przedmiotem artykułu jest rozważenie znaczenia zmian, jakie dla form działania podmiotowego (duchowości) mają zmiany technologicznie. Przyjmując, że pewne punkty zaczepienia takiej refleksji dostępne są w popkulturowych formach oswajania postępu, jako osiowe wybieram pojęcie „dżihadu buteriańskiego” z powieści Diuna Franka Herberta, scalające kilka istotnych aspektów tak rozwoju technicznego, jak i refleksji nad nim. W części pierwszej, koncentrując się na drugim składniku tego wyrażenia, omawiam pogląd Samuela Butlera oraz wskazuję na znaczenie wystąpienie luddystów w początkach XIX w. W części drugiej rozwijam ten (...) wątek, omawiając krytykę społeczeństwa technologicznego formułowaną przez współczesnych anarchoprymitywistów. W części trzeciej zwracam uwagę na pierwszy element wyrażenia Herberta by wskazać na podmiotowe aspekty zmian technologicznych. W konsekwencji wskazuję kierunki analizy, dzięki którym etyka cnót może wypracować adekwatną odpowiedź na zagrożenia płynące ze strony technologii przy akceptacji korzyści zeń płynących. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to examine tentatively the difference between two kinds of moral frameworks based on the concepts of the good and that of interest. I shall start with some introductory remarks on language taken as an explanatory framework rooted in Gadamer and a hermeneutical reading of MacIntyre. In parts two and three, I use this hermeneutical background to analyse the difference between the concept of the good as seen within the classical tradition and that of interest (...) as it came up with the turn of modernity. I also deal with some consequences of this distinction for ethics. Finally, in part four I discuss the possibilities of using the Aristotelian idea of the ethical in a contemporary social and philosophical context. I argue for the necessity of including some references to developed economics by pointing out those aspects of Martha Nussbaum’s and Amartya Sen’s projects, which promote a conception of the good within liberal economics. (shrink)

Celem pracy jest przedstawienie wzorca moralnego formułowanego na gruncie koncepcji Alasdaira MacIntyre’a. Filozof ten w cyklu swoich prac, rozpoczętym publikacją Dziedzictwa cnoty, rozwija ideę etyki zogniskowanej wokół pojęcia cnoty i dobrego życia, którego spełnienie ma być możliwe dzięki praktyce cnót. W tym kontekście pojawia się idea człowieka rozumianego jako jednocześnie przedmiot i podmiot poszukiwań dobrego życia. Koncepcja ta powraca do starożytnego rozumienia etyki jako eudajmonologii, przy czym MacIntyre czerpie tu nie tylko z tradycji filozofii klasycznej, ale pozostaje w ścisłym związku (...) z ideami Hansa-Georga Gadamera. Wskazanie na wpływ koncepcji Gadamera na badania MacIntyre’a ma na celu nie tyle wykazanie kolejnego źródła inspiracji, ale ukazanie jego koncepcji z nowej perspektywy, która umożliwia przezwyciężenie niektórych wskazywanych przez licznych interpretatorów aporii. Chodzi tu przede wszystkim o kwestie budowy postulowanych przez MacIntyre’a lokalnych wspólnot, identyfikację ludzkiego dobra i wizję dobrego życia jako poszukiwania istoty dobrego życia. Analizując MacIntyre’owską wizję konstrukcji podmiotowości ludźmi i jej umiejscowienie w sieci relacji z innymi podmiotami oraz tradycją moralna i intelektualną, wskazuję na restytucję phronesis jako głównej cnoty, umożliwiającej hermeneutyczną w istocie relację do tradycji i innych oraz praktyczne odniesienie wyników refleksji do praktyki, co z kolei uwypukla rozumienie etyki jako filozofii praktycznej, czy też raczej jako filozofii praktyki. Oznacza to jednocześnie określenie filozofii jako podstawowej praktyki, dzięki której osiągalna będzie możliwość adekwatnej samowiedzy. To z kolei oznacza przywrócenie arystotelesowskiego ideału życia poświęconego kontemplacji, jako spełnienia ludzkiego życia (eudajmonii); powrót ten wyznacza nowy ideał moralny, który można określić MacIntyre’owskim terminem postać – człowiek-filozof byłby więc, jako moment skupiający centralne elementy omawianej propozycji, wzorem i podstawą dla formułowanych przez MacIntyre’a rozwiązań społecznych i politycznych. Centralne znaczenie dystynktywnej dla człowieka zdolności działania rozumnego okazuje się bowiem źródłem wezwania do upodmiotowienia człowieka jako członka wspólnoty kulturalnej i politycznej. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present moral philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre in its relation to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. For that purpose, his specific understanding of the tradition, a mode of its relation with an individual, and the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge are discussed in the paper. Considered primarily as Thomist and Marxist thinker, MacIntyre’s conceptions emerge as strongly influenced by continental hermeneutics. From the hermeneutical point of view, some key elements of MacIntyre’s thought can be understood (...) in a new way, enabling in this way to overcome the most commonly expressed reservations formulated against his views.Key words MORAL PHILOSOPHY, HERMENEUTICS. (shrink)

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na pewne, z rzadka jedynie podnoszone aspekty pojęcia dobra. Zadanie takie poprzedzić należy pewnymi wstępnymi założeniami, ponieważ pojęcie to, będąc kluczowym terminem filozofii moralnej od początku jej historii, obrosło wieloma konotacjami i stało się częścią wielu, często wzajemnie sprzecznych, koncepcji moralnych. Należy zatem zaznaczyć, że w opracowaniu poniższym chodzić zatem będzie o pojęcie dobra rozumiane na sposób arystotelesowski, a rozważania koncentrować się będą w głównej części na rozstrzygnięciach normatywnych wysuwanych w obrębie współczesnego anglosaskiego neoarystotelizmu. (...) Zasadniczą tezą mojej pracy jest, że tak ujmowane, pojęcie to charakteryzuje się dwiema cechami, czy też może należałoby raczej powiedzieć, że jego normatywność organizuje się według dwóch wektorów wyznaczających sposób orientacji bardziej szczegółowych normatywów: natury jako źródła idei dobra, oraz pewnej formy emancypacji wynikającej z jej zastosowania. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate into the relations between basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. I discuss, firstly, the ways of understanding these categories, secondly, how moral acting can be described using them and thirdly, how they relate within certain moral system. Yet, what is of a special importance is the relation between norms and ideals and their complementary character. For it might be argued that omission of one these categories may lead to (...) posing important limitations on the possibilities of grasping certain moral issue adequately and setting the full range of possible solutions. Hence, I argue that to resign from two-level form of moral analysis may lead to the atrophy of the very idea of ethics itself. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to address the possibility of explaining the nature of moral cognition as being rooted in an agent’s involvement in a social practice. Seen along such lines, not only does the recognition of the extent of moral standards show up as based in the agent’s experience that has been gathered in the process of education and developing their capacities for acting autonomously, but it is also thanks to the engagement in the set of such social (...) practices that the agent is able to define the moral aspect, which exceeds the practical aims of a certain area of life. Hence, I argue that in order to redefine the borders of shared morality, a practical experience is necessary to link the various practices that enable ethical reflection based on the moral resources that are obtained in this way. (shrink)

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest prezentacja koncepcji brytyjskiego filozofa zorientowana na normatywną stronę jego myśli, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem (w części pierwszej) rewolucyjnego, wyrastającego z marksistowskiego zaplecza MacIntyre ujęcia problematyki moralnej. W części drugiej omawiam etyczny składnik „rewolucyjnego arystotelizmu” MacIntyre’a, akcentując emancypacyjny, zakorzeniony w owym zapleczu charakter rozwijanej przez niego teorii cnót i praktyk, by w części trzeciej omówić przynajmniej niektóre konsekwencje społeczne (praktyczne) omawianego projektu.

Celem artykułu jest próba analizy cnoty sprawiedliwości jako cnoty intelektualnej (dianoetycznej). Przyjmując Arystotelesowy pogląd o proporcji jako istocie sprawiedliwości zwracam uwagę na zasadnicze znaczenie sprawiedliwości rozumianej nie tylko jako umiejętność oddania każdemu tego, co mu się słusznie należy, ale też jako miary przykładanej do wygłaszanych opinii i stanowisk. W tym sensie proporcja ta oznacza w istocie umiejętność wyjścia poza własne stanowisko i zważenia racji niezależnie od emocji. W ten zaś sposób sprawiedliwość okazuje się być cnotą umożliwiającą ukonstytuowanie się fundamentalnej nie (...) tylko w myśli Arystotelesa cnoty roztropności (phronesis). Choć zatem Stagiryta przedkłada przyjaźń nad sprawiedliwość, to ta ostatnia okazuje się mieć charakter fundamentalny nie tylko dla życia społecznego, ale też dla właściwego uformowania charakteru jednostki, umożliwiając jej nie tylko porozumienie z innymi, ale też wspomagając samorozumienie. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to present the sources of Alasdair MacIntyre’s political conception. Considering his criticism of contemporary culture as known, the issue of man’s subjectivity, its intellectual character, and perception of community as a place of thereby understood realization of the human nature follow. At the same time, an emphasis of the importance of philosophical reflection for self-knowledge of an average member of such a community somehow forces a conclusion on a political nature of an intellectual activity.

The growing significance of technology in both everyday life and professionalised practices has brought important volume of philosophical works. However, it is somehow surprising that this current is barely reflected in virtue ethics. This paper highlights two aspects of the issue as seen from the MacIntyrean perspective. Firstly, the rise of technologisation in most areas of human life demands reflection on its influence on the autonomy and unity of the agent’s quest for a good life. Here, the new perspectives for (...) phronesis need to be pointed out. Secondly, a methodological question shows up concerning the way in which virtue ethics may find an adequate response to the technical augmentation of the agency. For this, I argue, resources might be found in the Extended Mind thesis. (shrink)

This article focuses on Bob Zajonc’s views on unconscious emotion, especially in the context of the debates about the independence of affect and cognition. Historically, Bob was always interested in the “mere”—basic, fundamental processes. His empirical demonstrations of precognitive and preconscious emotional processes, combined with his elegant expositions of them, sharply contrasted with cold and complex cognitive models. Interestingly, Bob tended to believe that whereas the causes of emotion can be unconscious, the emotional state itself tends to be conscious. However, (...) he reconsidered this assumption and in his later work showed that subjects in affective priming experiments do not experience conscious affect, but instead act on basic preferences. Today, Bob’s insights continue to inspire research on “unconscious emotion.”. (shrink)

Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of (...) principles, we observe systematic equivocations in PP‐based models, or outright contradictions with its avowed principles. To make matters worse, PP‐based models are seldom empirically validated, and they are frequently offered as mere just‐so stories. The large number of PP‐based models is thus not evidence of theoretical progress in unifying perception, action, and cognition. On the contrary, we maintain that the gap between theory and its biological and computational bases contributes to the arrested development of PP as a unificatory theory. Thus, we urge the defenders of PP to focus on its critical problems instead of offering mere re‐descriptions of known phenomena, and to validate their models against possible alternative explanations that stem from different theoretical assumptions. Otherwise, PP will ultimately fail as a unified theory of cognition. (shrink)

This two-volume collection showcases a wide range of modern approaches to the philosophical study of language. Contributions illustrate how these strands of research are interconnected and show the importance of such a broad outlook. The aim is to throw light upon some of the key questions in language and communication and also to inspire, inform, and integrate a community of researchers in philosophical linguistics. Volume one concentrates on fundamental theoretical topics. This means considering vital questions about what languages are and (...) how they relate to reality, and describing some of the key areas of thought in linguistics and the philosophy of language. Contributors also discuss how philosophy influences related fields such as translation, pragmatics, and argumentation. (shrink)

Teologia już niejednokrotnie składała współczesnej myśli filozoficznej obietnicę poszerzenia horyzontów czy też otwarcia jej na transcendencję. Jednak obietnica ta nie spotkała się – jak dotąd – z przychylnym przyjęciem, gdyż teologia sama nie zdołała przekonać filozofii o swojej racjonalności. Filozofia przestała być bowiem, z jednej strony, wrażliwa na argumentację natury metafizycznej, z drugiej zaś, teologia jest skłonna poddawać się metodologiom nauk szczegółowych, rezygnując przy tym z własnej odrębności. Zarysowana tu hermeneutyka teologii jest w pierwszym rzędzie badaniem teologii jako nauki, próbą (...) uprawomocnienia jej na gruncie jednego z najważniejszych kierunków filozofii współczesnej, mianowicie hermeneutyki filozoficznej. Teologia zostaje tu ujęta w aspekcie immanencji, choć bynajmniej nie zamyka się w jej horyzoncie. Dziejący się świat teologii rozpada się na „kawałki” – miejsca teologiczne – które jednak wchodząc ze sobą w interakcje, uczestniczą w grze teologicznej. Jako pole owej gry zostaje wskazana liturgia, miejsce metodologicznie wyróżnione ze względu na naoczność dokonujących się konsekwencji gry teologicznej. Analiza czerpie z takich źródeł jak teoria miejsc teologicznych Melchiora Cano OP, koncepcja kręgu hermeneutycznego Martina Heideggera oraz projekt hermeneutyki filozoficznej Hansa-Georga Gadamera, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem roli prze(d)sądów, utożsamianych tutaj z miejscami teologicznymi. Nowość spojrzenia na tradycję katolicką kontekście myśli hermeneutycznej sprawia, że prezentowana książka może trafić nie tylko do teologów i filozofów, ale także do badaczy szeroko rozumianej kultury. (shrink)

This book is a manifesto of reformed Stoicism. It proposes a system of life which is bullet-proof, universal, viable and effective in every cosmic setting. It holds in every possible universe, under any government and within any economic system. We can be reformed Stoics no matter what we believe in. Reformed Stoicism is about enjoying and exercising our agency. In other words, it's about the flow of making autonomous and right decisions, and about celebrating our ability to make them. With (...) no reliance on nature, with the recalibration of metaphysical positions, with skepticism towards grand discourses and universal answers, with an emphasis on the usefulness instead of truthfulness of narratives, with no reference to the vanity argument, with criticism of both conservative and ascetic misinterpretations of Stoicism, with an overall softer and more empathic approach, we can no longer be defined by the generic term "Stoicism". Our time, in short, calls for a fresh interpretation of Stoicism. It is time for a new generation of Stoics. Thus: reformed Stoicism. (shrink)

Spanning the period between Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in 1929 and the first version of Philosophical Investigations in 1936, Piotr Dehnel explores the middle stage in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical development and identifies the major issues which engrossed him, including phenomenology, philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of language. Contrary to the dominant perspective, Dehnel argues that this period was intrinsically different from the early and late stages and should not be viewed as a mere transitional phase. The distinctiveness of Wittgenstein's (...) middle work can be seen in his philosophical thinking as it unfolds in a non-linear trajectory: thoughts do not follow upon each other, ideas do not appear sequentially one by one, and insights do not form a straight chain. Dehnel portrays the diffused and multifarious quality of Wittgenstein's middle thinking, enabling readers to form a more comprehensive view of his entire philosophy and acquire a better grasp of his conceptual trajectory, complete with the intricacies and challenges that it poses. (shrink)

Introduction. PHilosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Formal Turn Piotr Stalmaszczyk Gottlob Frege, Philosophy of Language, and Predication Piotr Stalmaszczyk Philosophy, Linguistics and Semantic Interpretation Christian Bassac An Unresolved Issue: Nonsense in Natural Language and Non-Classical Logical and Semantic Systems Elzbieta Chrzanowska-Kluczewska Varieties of Context-Dependence Tadeusz Ciecierski The Logos of Semantic Structure Marie Du í, Bjørn Jespersen and Pavel Materna The Good Samaritan and the Hygienic Cook: A Cautionary Tale About Linguistic Data Chris Fox The Meaning of Multiple (...) Quantified Sentences: Where Formal Semantics Meets Psycholinguistics Justyna Grudzinska The Hybrid Theory of Reference for Proper Names Filip Kawczynski On the Nature of Statistical Language Laws Agnieszka Kulacka Vagueness and Contextualism Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska The Myth of Semantic Structure Jaroslav Peregrin Scalar Implicatures, Communication and Language Evolution Salvatore Pistoia Reda Semantics and Contextuality: The Case of Pia s Leaves Stefano Predelli Is Logico-Semantical Analysis of Natural Language Expressions a Translation? Jirí Raclavský Beyond the Fregean Myth: The Value of Logical Values Fabien Schang Modal Calculus of Illocutionary Logic Andrew Schumann Subjectivity in Philosophy and Linguistics Barbara Sonnenhauser Asymmetrical Semantics Mieszko Talasiewicz Truth: An Anti-realist Adequacy Condition Luca Tranchini Belief Reports: Defaults, Intentions and Scorekeeping Giacomo Turbanti On Truth in Time Bartosz Wieckowski Order William J. SUllivan Indexes. (shrink)

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins’ view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since (...) it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins’ argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything. (shrink)

In its attempt to come to grips with the nature of the human mind idealism employs such terms as "pure self," "transcendental apperception," "pure con sciousness" and so on.

As the concept of recognition shifts from philosophical theory to other fields of the humanities and social sciences, this volume explores the nature of this border category that exists in the space between sociological and philosophical considerations, related as it is to concepts such as status, prestige, the looking-glass self, respect, and dignity - at times being used interchangeably with these terms. Bringing together work from across academic disciplines, it presents theoretical conceptualizations of recognition, demonstrates its operationalization in historical and (...) literary research, considers recognition as a fundamental problem of sociological theory and examines the concept as a marker of social distances and redistribution. An examination and demonstration of the full potential of recognition as a category, Understanding Recognition: Conceptual and Empirical Studies explores the contemporary meanings and manifestations of recognition and sheds light on its capacity to complement the notions of status, class or prestige. As such, it will appeal to scholars of sociology and social theory, philosophy, history and literary studies. (shrink)

Individuation -- Will -- Continuity -- Freedom.

Stoicism is coming back in a big way. Seen as a remedy for the craziness of the times we live in, it is experiencing a great surge in academic and cultural interest. Yet, can one live stoically and be a creative artist at the same time? Delving into its underlying tenets, obscure restrictions and limits of applicability, Stankiewicz critically explores Stoicism and its complex association with artistic creativity. Stoicism and artistic creativity are two great displays of the human spirit. Yet, (...) there are multiple reasons to suspect that they are at odds with each other. Popular culture encapsulates this problem in the figure of the rational, yet emotionally remote Stoic, who achieves serenity through withdrawal, and the contrasting figure of the “cursed poet,” “tormented artist,” or simply a rock star, who lives in a whirl of creative energy, yet falls short of quietude. Is this contrast valid? Other disciplines, including psychology, have explored this problem. But it has never been done philosophically. Pioneering in its philosophical approach, this book discusses how artistic creativity and its problems of identity, expression and self-creation serve as a great testing ground for Stoicism, as well as its theoretical challenges and practical limits. Stankiewicz presents a detailed investigation into the stereotypes of Stoic life that seeks to explain the cause of Stoicism’s modern revival. This book is an essential read for anyone captivated by Stoicism’s complex allure. (shrink)

The scientific papers published in a special edition of the journal “Scientia et Fides” are the result of an international scientific project titled “The Dynamic Theodicy Model: Understanding God, Evil, and Evolution.” The project leaders are Prof. Piotr Roszak (Nicolaus Copernicus University) and Prof. Saša Horvat (University of Rijeka), under the auspices of the University of Oxford and the John Templeton Foundation. Other members of the project team include Grzegorz Karwasz, Michał Oleksowicz, Tomasz Huzarek, and Jan Wółkowski.

The article presents a thought experiment aimed at indicating a possibility for thinking education beyond the logic of progress. In its first part, the argument reconstructs the entanglement of the modern idea of progress (as found in Francis Bacon and Comenius) and education, while tracking down the specific coupling of obedience and conquest at work. Through such an analysis a link between the ideas of progress and of emancipation is determined, which leads to the acknowledgement of the difficulty of the (...) task of imagining education outside of the logic of progress. In the second part an attempt is made to match this task by suggesting that when studying with a teacher, the logic of progress is deactivated. A phenomenological analysis of the practices involved in studying with a teacher points to a specific way of living together that such a collective study involves. This way of living together is formed by continual exercises in the humble equality realized through shared attention to something worthy of study: this stems from attentiveness to what exists, and it develops an attitude of care and respect for being as such. (shrink)