Milton Friedman has argued that corporations have no responsibility to society beyond that of obeying the law and maximizing profits for shareholders. Individuals may have social responsibilities according to Friedman, but not corporations.When executives make contributions to address social problems in the name of the corporation, they are doing so with other people''s (shareholders'') money. The responsibility of corporate executives is a fiduciary one, to serve as an agent for the corporation''s shareholders, and to uphold shareholders'' trust, which requires executives (...) to maximize the return to their shareholders, who can then, if they choose, contribute their own money to worthy causes. (shrink)

Drawing on early work on ethical leadership, we argue that when leaders engage in leader moral hypocrisy (i.e., ethical promotion without ethical demonstration), followers can experience psychological reactance—a negative response to a perceived restriction of freedom—which can have negative downstream consequences. In a survey of employee–manager dyads (study 1), we demonstrate that leader moral hypocrisy is positively associated with follower psychological reactance, which increases follower deviance. In two subsequent laboratory experiments, we find similar patterns of results (study 2) and explore (...) potential alternative mechanisms (study 3). We demonstrate in a final experiment with working adults that the relationship between leader moral hypocrisy and psychological reactance is partly explained by increased perceptions of a leader’s use of power (study 4). We discuss the implications of our findings and advocate for further understanding of the risks associated with psychological reactance in response to leaders and other workplace situations. (shrink)

For a variety of reasons, including the common use of deception in psychology experiments, participants often disbelieve experimenters' assertions about important task parameters. This can lead researchers to conclude incorrectly that participants are behaving non- normatively. The problem can be overcome by deriving and testing normative models that do not assume full belief in key task parameters. A real experimental example is discussed.

Unfortunately, business is often associated with unethical behavior. While research has offered a number of explanations for why business might encourage unethical behavior, we argue that how a person frames a situation may provide important insight. Drawing on the decision frame literature, the goal of the current research is to identify the differences in cognitive processing associated with two decision frames dominant in the business ethics literature—business and ethical—and, with that knowledge, examine ways to mitigate the detrimental influence of frame (...) on unethical behavior. We first demonstrate the causal link between frame and misrepresentation, and then identify several differences in cognitive processing—cost–benefit analyses, concern for others, and construal level—that distinguish business and ethical frames, and investigate their effects on misrepresentation. In our final set of studies, we demonstrate that the influence of these frames on misrepresentation can be altered by manipulating these cognitive processes, both mitigating and exacerbating a decision maker’s engagement in misrepresentation. We conclude by summarizing our findings and their potential impact on unethical behavior more broadly. (shrink)

Any instance (i.e., event, behavior, trait) belongs to infinitely many reference classes, hence there are infinitely many base rates from which to choose. People clearly do not entertain all possible reference classes, however, so something must be limiting the search space. We suggest some possible mechanisms that determine which reference class is evoked for the purpose of judgment and decision.

Printed texts of Greek authors reflect a divergence of opinion, some giving σμενος others σμενος Only σμενος is correct, and it was never called in question until Usener drew attention to the spelling σμενος in the Bodleian MS. of Plato and in the Paris MS. of the same author. He was followed by Schanz, who gave σμενος in his editions of Platonic dialogues.

The word νóoς must, if it is inherited from Indo-European, be a word of the λóγoς type, and come from Indo-Eur. nósos, nówos, or nóyos, since a consonant must have been lost, and it is known that only s, w, and y vanished between vowels in Greek. Neither nóyos nor nówos can be traced with a suitable meaning in any Indo-European language; nóyos, on the other hand, would be a very probable ancestor of Skr. nayas. The senses of nayas are, (...) I submit, sufficiently close to those of νóoς to lend some support to the identification. They are: ‘leading, performance, behaviour, worldly wisdom, policy, fundamental principle, system, theory.’. (shrink)

The phrase may be rendered ‘uttering thick screams’, these English words bearing the same sense as in Scott,Heart of Midlothian, Chapter XXV.: ‘She proceeded to raise the family by her screams of horror, uttered as thick as if the Brownie had been flaying her.’.

To the instances of non-syllabic ε after -ιλ- or -υλ- which were given in Class. Quart. XVII. 196, two more may be added: Σιλεωνας, Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca 783, occurs in a trochaic line, and is scanned Cup – Cup –. Kaibel calls it a ‘nomen suspectum’; but in the re-edition in Anc. Gr.Inscr.in the British Museum, No. 796, the reading is defended by a comparison with Σιλνιος in C.I.G. 1577. 3 = I.G. 7. 2429.

The meaning of ποτπτω to plunge or dip into a liquid, is so different from that of τπτω, as to suggest that the word does not really contain τπτω but arises from πο-δπτω , in the same way as ποταπς from ποδαπς , κωλακρται from κωλαγρται, Πεταγετνιος from Πεδαγετνιος , δεκταρχος from δεκδαρχος , in all of which a voiced stop situated between two unvoiced stops becomes unvoiced.

The adjective Ολος is used very frequently by Theophrastus in his History of Plants. The English word 'curly’ may be accepted as its equivalent in phrases like ‘curly leaves’ or ‘curly roots’; but there is something not quite so natural in an expression like ‘curly wood,’ as when Theophrastus says that the ξνуα ει τ ξύλον ξανθν κα ολον, ‘has yellow and curly wood.’ Sir Arthur Hort has accordingly translated it in many passages by the word ‘close-grained,’ and this not (...) only gives a permissible sense in a large number of passages, but seems to be the only one which yields a good sense in III. 11. 3, where Theophrastus says ‘there are two kinds of ash. Of these one is lofty and of strong growth, with white wood of good fibre, softer, with fewer knots, and of more compact texture.’ Schneider, who recognized only the sense ‘curly,’ felt the absurdity of saying ‘with fewer knots and curlier, and he therefore proposed to substitute νουλότερον. The difficulty vanishes if Sir Arthur Hort's rendering is accepted. (shrink)

According to Walde's Etymological Dictionary, Latin spēs is cognate with spatium and with Old Church Slavonic spěchĭι. Under spatium he refers us to Skt. sphāyati, ‘swells out,’ ‘grows out,’ sphīta, ‘fat,’ ‘flourishing,’ and a number of Baltic-Slavonic and Germanic words, from which I will select O.E. spēd, ‘speed,’ and Lith. spēti, ‘have time for something,’ ‘to be quick enough.’ In place of this etymology I venture to suggest that spēs must be connected with another Lithuanian spēti, which is duly recorded (...) in Lalis's Lithuanian-English Dictionary. It means ‘guess,’ ‘conjecture,’ or ‘suppose,’ and occurs not only uncompounded, but also in the compound, ‘guess,’ ‘divine,’ ‘solve’. The Lat. spes means no doubt ‘hope,’ but it also means ‘expectation,’ which comes nearer to the meaning of the Lithuanian words. (shrink)

Always connect—that is the imperative of today’s media. But what about those moments when media cease to function properly, when messages go beyond the sender and receiver to become excluded from the world of communication itself—those messages that state: “There will be no more messages”? In this book, Alexander R. Galloway, Eugene Thacker, and McKenzie Wark turn our usual understanding of media and mediation on its head by arguing that these moments reveal the ways the impossibility of communication is (...) integral to communication itself—instances they call excommunication. In three linked essays, _Excommunication_ pursues this elusive topic by looking at mediation in the face of banishment, exclusion, and heresy, and by contemplating the possibilities of communication with the great beyond. First, Galloway proposes an original theory of mediation based on classical literature and philosophy, using Hermes, Iris, and the Furies to map out three of the most prevalent modes of mediation today—mediation as exchange, as illumination, and as network. Then, Thacker goes boldly beyond Galloway’s classification scheme by examining the concept of excommunication through the secret link between the modern horror genre and medieval mysticism. Charting a trajectory of examples from H. P. Lovecraft to Meister Eckhart, Thacker explores those instances when one communicates or connects with the inaccessible, dubbing such modes of mediation “haunted” or “weird” to underscore their inaccessibility. Finally, Wark evokes the poetics of the infuriated swarm as a queer politics of heresy that deviates from both media theory and the traditional left. He posits a critical theory that celebrates heresy and that is distinct from those that now venerate Saint Paul. Reexamining commonplace definitions of media, mediation, and communication, _Excommunication_ offers a glimpse into the realm of the nonhuman to find a theory of mediation adequate to our present condition. (shrink)

Consumer involvement in clinical research is an essential component of a comprehensive response during emergent health challenges. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the moderation of research policies and regulation to facilitate research may raise ethical issues. Meaningful, diverse consumer involvement can help to identify practical approaches to prioritize, design, and conduct rapidly developed clinical research amid current events. Consumer involvement might also elucidate the acceptability of flexible ethics review approaches that aim to protect participants whilst being sensitive to the challenging context (...) in which research is taking place. This article describes the main ethical challenges arising from pandemic research and how involving consumers and the community could enable resolution of such issues. (shrink)

Printed texts of Greek authors reflect a divergence of opinion, some giving σμενος others σμενος Only σμενος is correct, and it was never called in question until Usener drew attention to the spelling σμενος in the Bodleian MS. of Plato and in the Paris MS. of the same author. He was followed by Schanz, who gave σμενος in his editions of Platonic dialogues.

Oaksford & Chater's (O&C's) account of deductive reasoning is parsimonious at a local level (because a rational model is used to explain a wide range of behavior) and at a global level (because their Bayesian approach connects to other areas of research). Their emphasis on environmental structure is especially important, and the power of their approach is seen at both the computational and algorithmic levels.

In order to illuminate the similarities and differences between science and theology, we consider an epistemology and methodology for each that can be characterised as a dialectical critical realism. Our approach is deeply indebted to the work of the great Swiss theologian, Karl Barth. Key points are that the object under study determines the method to be used, the community of investigators and the nature of the possible knowledge to be gained; the necessity of a posteriori, rather than a priori (...) reasoning; and that the dialogue between theology and science should account for both the similarities and differences between the two disciplines. The counterintuitive nature of quantum physics is used to illustrate how in science the dialectic element should lead to a critical dimension to realism, and one is forced to engage with reality on its own terms. (shrink)

The adjective Ολος is used very frequently by Theophrastus in his History of Plants. The English word 'curly’ may be accepted as its equivalent in phrases like ‘curly leaves’ or ‘curly roots’; but there is something not quite so natural in an expression like ‘curly wood,’ as when Theophrastus says that the ξνуα ει τ ξύλον ξανθν κα ολον, ‘has yellow and curly wood.’ Sir Arthur Hort has accordingly translated it in many passages by the word ‘close-grained,’ and this not (...) only gives a permissible sense in a large number of passages, but seems to be the only one which yields a good sense in III. 11. 3, where Theophrastus says ‘there are two kinds of ash. Of these one is lofty and of strong growth, with white wood of good fibre, softer, with fewer knots, and of more compact texture .’ Schneider, who recognized only the sense ‘curly,’ felt the absurdity of saying ‘with fewer knots and curlier, and he therefore proposed to substitute νουλότερον . The difficulty vanishes if Sir Arthur Hort's rendering is accepted. (shrink)

The word νóoς must, if it is inherited from Indo-European, be a word of the λóγoς type, and come from Indo-Eur. nósos, nówos, or nóyos, since a consonant must have been lost, and it is known that only s, w, and y vanished between vowels in Greek. Neither nóyos nor nówos can be traced with a suitable meaning in any Indo-European language; nóyos, on the other hand, would be a very probable ancestor of Skr. nayas. The senses of nayas are, (...) I submit, sufficiently close to those of νóoς to lend some support to the identification. They are: ‘leading, performance, behaviour, worldly wisdom, policy, fundamental principle, system, theory.’. (shrink)

The phrase may be rendered ‘uttering thick screams’, these English words bearing the same sense as in Scott,Heart of Midlothian, Chapter XXV.: ‘She proceeded to raise the family by her screams of horror, uttered as thick as if the Brownie had been flaying her.’.

To the instances of non-syllabic ε after -ιλ- or -υλ- which were given in Class. Quart. XVII. 196 , two more may be added: Σιλεωνας, Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca 783 , occurs in a trochaic line, and is scanned Cup – Cup –. Kaibel calls it a ‘nomen suspectum’; but in the re-edition in Anc. Gr.Inscr.in the British Museum, No. 796, the reading is defended by a comparison with Σιλνιος in C.I.G. 1577. 3 = I.G. 7. 2429.

For a variety of reasons, including the common use of deception in psychology experiments, participants often disbelieve experimenters' assertions about important task parameters. This can lead researchers to conclude incorrectly that participants are behaving non- normatively. The problem can be overcome by deriving and testing normative models that do not assume full belief in key task parameters. A real experimental example is discussed.

The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.

The least element 0 of a finite meet semi-distributive lattice is a meet of meet-prime elements. We investigate conditions under which the least element of an algebraic, meet semi-distributive lattice is a (complete) meet of meet-prime elements. For example, this is true if the lattice has only countably many compact elements, or if |L| < 2ℵ0, or if L is in the variety generated by a finite meet semi-distributive lattice. We give an example of an algebraic, meet semi-distributive lattice that (...) has no meet-prime element or join-prime element. This lattice L has |L| = |LC| = 2ℵ0 where Lc is the set of compact elements of L. (shrink)

Psychologists and philosophers who pose moral dilemmas to understand moral judgment typically specify outcomes as certain to occur in them. This contrasts with real-life moral decision-making, which is almost always infused with probabilities (e.g., the probability of a given outcome if an action is or is not taken). Seven studies examine sensitivity to the size and location of shifts in probabilities of outcomes that would result from action in moral dilemmas. We find that moral judgments differ between actions that result (...) in an equal increase in probability of harm (equal size), but have different end-states (e.g., an increase in harm probability from 25% to 50% or from 50% to 75%). This deviation from expected value is robust under separate evaluation, and increases when the comparison between shifts is made explicit under simultaneous evaluation. Consistent with the centrality of perceived harm in some models of moral judgment, perceived harm partially mediates sensitivity to location of harm probability shift. Unlike for shifts in harm probabilities, participants are insensitive to the location of shifts in probability of beneficial outcomes. They are also insensitive to the location of shifts in probability of analogous monetary losses and gains, suggesting an asymmetry between harm and benefit in moral reasoning, as well as an asymmetry between moral and monetary decision-making more broadly. Implications for normative philosophical theory and moral psychological theory, as well as practical applications, are discussed. (shrink)