Formal systems of fuzzy logic are well-established logical systems and respected members of the broad family of the so-called substructural logics closely related to the famous logic BCK. The study of fragments of logical systems is an important issue of research in any class of non-classical logics. Here we study the fragments of nine prominent fuzzy logics to all sublanguages containing implication. However, the results achieved in the paper for those nine logics are usually corollaries of theorems with much wider (...) scope of applicability. In particular, we show how many of these fragments are really distinct and we find axiomatic systems for most of them. In fact, we construct strongly separable axiomatic systems for eight of our nine logics. We also fully answer the question for which of the studied fragments the corresponding class of algebras forms a variety. Finally, we solve the problem how to axiomatize predicate versions of logics without the lattice disjunction. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser's essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson's Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hajek proved it in the fuzzy logic BL for Grzegorczyk's variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as non-total non-functional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural logic and for a (...) much weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson's R (with arithmetic operations also interpreted as mere relations). Our result is based on a structural version of the undecidability argument introduced by Kleene and we show that it goes well beyond the scope of the Boolean, intuitionistic, or fuzzy logic. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser’s essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson’s Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hájek proved it in the fuzzy logic BL for Grzegorczyk’s variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as nontotal nonfunctional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural logic and for a much (...) weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson’s R (with arithmetic operations also interpreted as mere relations). Our result is based on a structural version of the undecidability argument introduced by Kleene and we show that it goes well beyond the scope of the Boolean, intuitionistic, or fuzzy logic. (shrink)

In the last few decades many formal systems of fuzzy logics have been developed. Since the main differences between fuzzy and classical logics lie at the propositional level, the fuzzy predicate logics have developed more slowly (compared to the propositional ones). In this text we aim to promote interest in fuzzy predicate logics by contributing to the model theory of fuzzy predicate logics. First, we generalize the completeness theorem, then we use it to get results on conservative extensions of theories (...) and on witnessed models. (shrink)

Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying “xis true” and satisfying the “dequotation schema”for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Łukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.

Vague language and corresponding models of inference and information processing is an important and challenging topic as witnessed by a number of recent monographs and collections of essays devoted to the topic. This volume collects fifteen papers, the majority of which originated with talks presented at the conference "Logical Models of Reasoning with Vague Information ", September 14-17, 2009, in Čejkovice, that initiated a EUROCORES/LogICCC project with the same title. At least two features set the current volume apart from other (...) texts: first, the interdisciplinary nature of the topic is nicely reflected by the wide range of interests of the authors, who include philosophers, linguists, logicians, as well as mathematicians and computer scientists. Secondly, all the papers are accompanied by comments written by other authors and a few outside experts. These comments and corresponding replies by the authors document the very lively ongoing debate on adequate models of vague language. (shrink)

It is shown that the low basis theorem is meaningful and provable in $I\sum_1$ and that the priority-free solution to Post's problem formalizes in this theory.

A simple complete axiomatic system is presented for the many-valued propositional logic based on the conjunction interpreted as product, the coresponding implication (Goguen's implication) and the corresponding negation (Gödel's negation). Algebraic proof methods are used. The meaning for fuzzy logic (in the narrow sense) is shortly discussed.

Rational Pavelka logic extends Lukasiewicz infinitely valued logic $by adding truth constants \bar{r} for rationals in [0, 1].$ We show that this is a conservative extension. We note that this shows that provability degree can be defined in Lukasiewicz logic. We also give a counterexample to a soundness theorem of Belluce and Chang published in 1963.

ukasiewicz''s four-valued modal logic is surveyed and analyzed, together with ukasiewicz''s motivations to develop it. A faithful interpretation of it in classical (non-modal) two-valued logic is presented, and some consequences are drawn concerning its classification and its algebraic behaviour. Some counter-intuitive aspects of this logic are discussed in the light of the presented results, ukasiewicz''s own texts, and related literature.

Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying "x is true" and satisfying the "dequotation schema" $\varphi \equiv \text{Tr}(\bar{\varphi})$ for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Lukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.

Residuated fuzzy logic calculi are related to continuous t-norms, which are used as truth functions for conjunction, and their residua as truth functions for implication. In these logics, a negation is also definable from the implication and the truth constant $\overline{0}$ , namely $\neg \varphi$ is $\varphi \to \overline{0}$. However, this negation behaves quite differently depending on the t-norm. For a nilpotent t-norm (a t-norm which is isomorphic to Łukasiewicz t-norm), it turns out that $\neg$ is an involutive negation. However, (...) for t-norms without non-trivial zero divisors, $\neg$ is Gödel negation. In this paper we investigate the residuated fuzzy logics arising from continuous t-norms without non-trivial zero divisors and extended with an involutive negation. (shrink)

Rational Pavelka logic extends Lukasiewicz infinitely valued logic by adding truth constants r̄ for rationals in [0, 1]. We show that this is a conservative extension. We note that this shows that provability degree can be defined in Lukasiewicz logic. We also give a counterexample to a soundness theorem of Belluce and Chang published in 1963.

Axiomatic set theory with full comprehension is known to be consistent in Łukasiewicz fuzzy predicate logic. But we cannot assume the existence of natural numbers satisfying a simple schema of induction; this extension is shown to be inconsistent.

Fuzzy logic is understood as a logic with a comparative and truth-functional notion of truth. Arithmetical complexity of sets of tautologies and satisfiable sentences as well of sets of provable formulas of the most important systems of fuzzy predicate logic is determined or at least estimated.

We show that the modal prepositional logicILM (interpretability logic with Montagna's principle), which has been shown sound and complete as the interpretability logic of Peano arithmetic PA (by Berarducci and Savrukov), is sound and complete as the logic ofπ 1-conservativity over eachbE 1-sound axiomatized theory containingI⌆ 1 (PA with induction restricted tobE 1-formulas). Furthermore, we extend this result to a systemILMR obtained fromILM by adding witness comparisons in the style of Guaspari's and Solovay's logicR (this will be done in a (...) separate continuation of the present paper). (shrink)

A t-tautology is a propositional formula which is a tautology in all fuzzy logics defined by continuous triangular norms. In this paper we show that the problem of recognizing t-tautologies is coNP complete, and thus decidable.

A very simple many-valued predicate calculus is presented; a completeness theorem is proved and the arithmetical complexity of some notions concerning provability is determined.

Witnessed models of fuzzy predicate logic are models in which each quantified formula is witnessed, i.e. the truth value of a universally quantified formula is the minimum of the values of its instances and similarly for existential quantification. Systematic theory of known fuzzy logics endowed with this semantics is developed with special attention paid to problems of arithmetical complexity of sets of tautologies and of satisfiable formulas.

Some aspects of vagueness as presented in Shapiro’s book Vagueness in Context [23] are analyzed from the point of fuzzy logic. Presented are some generalizations of Shapiro’s formal apparatus.

First the expansion of the Łukasiewicz logic by the unary connectives of dividing by any natural number is studied; it is shown that in the predicate case the expansion is conservative w.r.t. witnessed standard 1-tautologies. This result is used to prove that the set of witnessed standard 1-tautologies of the predicate product logic is Π2-hard.

The starting point of this work is the gap between two distinct traditions in information engineering: knowledge representation and data - driven modelling. The first tradition emphasizes logic as a tool for representing beliefs held by an agent. The second tradition claims that the main source of knowledge is made of observed data, and generally does not use logic as a modelling tool. However, the emergence of fuzzy logic has blurred the boundaries between these two traditions by putting forward fuzzy (...) rules as a Janus-faced tool that may represent knowledge, as well as approximate non-linear functions representing data. This paper lays bare logical foundations of data - driven reasoning whereby a set of formulas is understood as a set of observed facts rather than a set of beliefs. Several representation frameworks are considered from this point of view: classical logic, possibility theory, belief functions, epistemic logic, fuzzy rule-based systems. Mamdani's fuzzy rules are recovered as belonging to the data - driven view. In possibility theory a third set-function, different from possibility and necessity plays a key role in the data - driven view, and corresponds to a particular modality in epistemic logic. A bi-modal logic system is presented which handles both beliefs and observations, and for which a completeness theorem is given. Lastly, our results may shed new light in deontic logic and allow for a distinction between explicit and implicit permission that standard deontic modal logics do not often emphasize. (shrink)

It is shown that the propositional modal logic IRM (interpretability logic with Montagna's principle and with witness comparisons in the style of Guaspari's and Solovay's logicR) is sound and complete as the logic ofII 1-conservativity over each∑ 1-sound axiomatized theory containingI∑ 1. The exact statement of the result uses the notion of standard proof predicate. This paper is an immediate continuation of our paper [HM]. Knowledge of [HM] is presupposed. We define a modal logic, called IRM, which includes both ILM (...) andR (the logic of [GS]) and prove an arithmetical completeness theorem in the style of [GS], thus showing that IRM is the logic ofII 1-conservativity with witness comparisons. The reader is recommended to have Smoryński's book [Sm] at his/her disposal. (shrink)

Results on arithmetical complexity of important sets of formulas of several fuzzy predicate logics are surveyed and some new results are proven.

Each closed (i.e. variable free) formula of interpretability logic is equivalent in ILF to a closed formula of the provability logic G, thus to a Boolean combination of formulas of the form n.

Two variants of monadic fuzzy predicate logic are analyzed and compared with the full fuzzy predicate logic with respect to finite model property (properties) and arithmetical complexity of sets of tautologies, satisfiable formulas and of analogous notion restricted to finite models.

In [10] it is claimed that the set of predicate tautologies of all complete BL-chains and the set of all standard tautologies coincide. As noticed in [11], this claim is wrong. In this paper we show that a complete BL-chain B satisfies all standard BL-tautologies iff for any transfinite sequence of elements of B, the condition ∧i ∈ I = 2 holds in B.

We construct a faithful interpretation of ukasiewicz's logic in product logic (both propositional and predicate). Using known facts it follows that the product predicate logic is not recursively axiomatizable.We prove a completeness theorem for product logic extended by a unary connective of Baaz [1]. We show that Gödel's logic is a sublogic of this extended product logic.

It is shown that the low basis theorem is meaningful and provable in I∑ 1 and that the priority-free solution to Post's problem formalizes in this theory.

Gödel logics with truth sets being countable closed subsets of the unit real interval containing 0 and 1 are studied under their usual semantics and under the witnessed semantics, the latter admitting only models in which the truth value of each universally quantified formula is the minimum of truth values of its instances and dually for existential quantification and maximum. An infinite system of such truth sets is constructed such that under the usual semantics the corresponding logics have pairwise different (...) sets of tautologies, all these sets being non-arithmetical, whereas under the witnessed semantics all the logics have the same set of tautologies and it is Π2-complete. Further similar results are obtained. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Origin Many‐Valued Logic Fuzzy Logic in a Broad and Narrow Sense The Basic Fuzzy Propositional Calculus The Basic Fuzzy Predicate Calculus Similarity The Liar and Dequotation Very True Probability Conclusion.

This book collects most of the invited papers presented at the 12th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Oviedo, August 2003. It contains state of the art accounts of ongoing work by a selection of the most renowned researchers in the field. The papers in the Logic section deal with topics in mathematical logic, as well as philosophical logic, and the area of logic and computation. The section on General Methodology contains articles on models, theories, probability, (...) induction, causation, and other topics. A number of papers discuss Philosophical Issues of Particular Sciences, such as mathematics, physics, linguistics, psychology, biology, and medicine. There is also a section on Ethics of Science, and papers from a special symposium on the Emergence of Scientific Medicine in the 19th-20th Century. (shrink)

In fuzzy predicate logic, assignment of truth values may be partial, i.e. the truth value of a formula in an interpretation may be undefined . A logic is supersound if each provable formula is true in each interpretation in which the truth value of is defined. It is shown that among the logics given by continuous t-norms, Gödel logic is the only one that is supersound; all others are not supersound. This supports the view that the usual restriction of semantics (...) to safe interpretations is very natural. (shrink)

Caramuels’ proof of non-existence of God is compared with Gödel’s proof of existence.

An arithmetical interpretation of dynamic propositional logic (DPL) is a mapping f satisfying the following: (1) f associates with each formula A of DPL a sentence f(A) of Peano arithmetic (PA) and with each program α a formula f(α) of PA with one free variable describing formally a supertheory of PA; (2) f commutes with logical connectives; (3) f([α] A) is the sentence saying that f(A) is provable in the theory f(α); (4) for each axiom A of DPL, f(A) is (...) provable in PA (and consequently, for each A provable in DPL, f(A) is provable in PA). The arithmetical completeness theorem is proved saying that a formula A of DPL is provable in DPL iff for each arithmetical interpretation f, f(A) is provable in PA. Various modifications of this result are considered. (shrink)