In dem vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich an aktuelle argumentationsdidaktische Überlegungen anknüpfen und einen spezifischen Aspekt genauer untersuchen, der von der philosophiedidaktischen Forschung bisher ein Stück weit vernachlässigt worden ist. Dieser Aspekt betrifft die Vermittlung sogenannter argumentativer Metakompetenzen, worunter ich grob gesprochen Fähigkeiten des angemessenen Gebrauchs bzw. der verantwortungsvollen Regulation von argumentativen Kompetenzen verstehe. Die grundlegende Idee ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass die Ausbildung basaler argumentativer Fähigkeiten zwar grundsätzlich durchaus wichtig und wünschenswert ist, dass aber gleichzeitig ein Einsatz dieser Fähigkeiten in (...) unterschiedlichen Situationen ganz unterschiedliche Funktionen erfüllt. Dementsprechend müssen Lernende nicht nur mit argumentativen Kompetenzen ausgestattet, sondern darüber hinaus auch zu einem reflektierten und situativ angemessenen Gebrauch dieser Kompetenzen befähigt werden. (shrink)

Student relativism is a widespread phenomenon in philosophy classes. While the exact nature of student relativism is controversially discussed, many authors agree on two points: First, it is widely agreed that SR is a rather problematic phenomenon, because it potentially undermines the very purpose of doing philosophy—if there is no objective truth, arguing seems to be pointless. Second, it is widely agreed that there will be some close connection between SR and a tolerant attitude towards conflicting opinions. In this paper, (...) I will argue that if these two assumptions are true, then discussing some basic philosophical insights about the concept of tolerance with students will be a promising new strategy of dealing with SR. (shrink)

Dass das Verständnis von und die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit argumentativen Zusammenhängen für den Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht von besonderer Bedeutung ist, ist unumstritten. Ebenso unumstritten ist es, dass es sich bei der schulischen Vermittlung von Argumentationskompetenzen um keinen Selbstzweck handelt, sondern dass Lernende vor dem Hintergrund der erworbenen Fähigkeiten und Kenntnisse zu einer fundierten Meinungsbildung befähigt werden sollen. In diesem Artikel argumentiere ich vor dem Hintergrund neuerer Ergebnisse der erkenntnistheoretischen Forschung dafür, dass das soeben skizzierte Bild jedoch einer grundlegenden Ergänzung bedarf, (...) da im spezifischen Kontext des Philosophie- und Ethikunterrichts nicht die Bildung, sondern vielmehr die Aufgabe eines eigenen Urteils das epistemisch wünschenswerte Ergebnis darstellt. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are significant instances of educational injustice in the context of philosophy teaching that can be effectively reduced by an increased implementation of digital technologies. More specifically, I show that there are good reasons to believe that testimonial injustices constitute serious instances of educational injustice that will frequently occur in philosophy classes. Using digital tools to anonymize student contributions opens up a promising way of dealing with these injustices. If convincing, my arguments give reason (...) to perceive epistemic injustices in educational settings as a serious threat to educational justice and to reconsider the implications of increased digitalization for issues of educational justice. (shrink)

Toleranz – eine Haltung, die in westlichen Gesellschaften wie kaum eine andere mit Nachdruck gefordert und mit Vehemenz verteidigt wird. Insbesondere eine tolerante Haltung gegenüber fremden Ansichten, Standpunkten und Überzeugungen wird von vielen als unverzichtbare Bedingung für das Gelingen eines demokratischen Miteinanders angesehen. Gleichzeitig wird kontrovers diskutiert, wo eigentlich die Grenzen einer toleranten Pluralität verschiedener Meinungen gezogen werden sollen. Welche Ansichten sind noch tolerabel, und welche nicht? Mit Blick auf aktuelle gesellschaftliche Diskurse und vor dem Hintergrund umfassender Kenntnisse der philosophischen (...) Toleranzforschung überprüft Dominik Balg kontrovers diskutierte Minderheitenpositionen auf ihre Tolerierbarkeit und entwickelt vor diesem Hintergrund einen klaren Kriterienkatalog, mit Hilfe dessen sich die Grenzen einer toleranten Haltung sinnvoll ziehen lassen. Darüber hinaus widmet er sich der Frage, was eigentlich jenseits unserer Toleranzgrenzen liegen sollte und wie man verantwortungsvoll mit Positionen umgehen kann, die nicht mehr tolerabel sind. (shrink)

In this article, it will be argued that tolerance is not necessarily a political or ethical, but rather an abstract attitude that can be applied to many different dimensions of normative evaluation. More specifically, it will be argued that there are genuinely intellectual forms of tolerance that are epistemically motivated and that need to be assessed on purely epistemic grounds. To establish this claim, an abstract characterization of tolerance will be applied to the epistemic phenomenon of disagreement in order to (...) develop a specific conception of tolerance that picks out a genuinely intellectual attitude towards recognized disagreement. Since the attitude that is picked out by this conception is very popular and widespread, an epistemology of tolerance would be of great significance to our intellectual practice. (shrink)

In this article, it will be argued that tolerance is not necessarily a political or ethical, but rather an abstract attitude that can be applied to many different dimensions of normative evaluation. More specifically, it will be argued that there are genuinely intellectual forms of tolerance that are epistemically motivated and that need to be assessed on purely epistemic grounds. To establish this claim, an abstract characterization of tolerance will be applied to the epistemic phenomenon of disagreement in order to (...) develop a specific conception of tolerance that picks out a genuinely intellectual attitude towards recognized disagreement. Since the attitude that is picked out by this conception is very popular and widespread, an epistemology of tolerance would be of great significance to our intellectual practice. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the effects of using thought experiments for the purpose of conceptual clarification on students’ hermeneutical abilities. On the one hand, by providing opportunities to explore the scope of normatively loaded concepts, thought experiments can effectively help students to interpret their social and moral reality more adequately, which in some cases might even help to reduce existing hermeneutical injustices. On the other hand, given their notorious susceptibility to distorting factors that are philosophically irrelevant, they can also (...) push students into accepting idiosyncratic intuitions that they don’t really share and thereby further impair their hermeneutical abilities. After setting out this dilemma in more detail, I will propose various strategies for facilitating the safe use of thought experiments that instructors can use to effectively exploit the empowering potential of thought experiments. (shrink)

When it comes to disagreements about religious, moral or political questions, many people consider a tolerant ‘live-and-let-live’ attitude to be the best reaction toward conflicting opinions. However, many epistemologists are rather skeptical about the epistemic acceptability of such a tolerant attitude. More specifically, the worry is that a tolerant reaction toward recognized disagreement is necessarily epistemically irrational. After setting out this worry in a little more detail, I will present and discuss three different arguments for the epistemic irrationality of a (...) tolerant attitude toward disagreement. I will argue that while all these arguments ultimately fail, they still reveal some substantial limitations to the epistemic adequacy of intellectual tolerance. (shrink)

Tolerance - desired by many and often demanded: By UNESCO, by the Pope, by Angela Merkel and Barack Obama. But what exactly does it mean to be tolerant? Does tolerance imply rejection? Or is tolerance merely the opposite of dogmatism? And how does a tolerant attitude differ from an indifferent one? Dominik Balg, starting from a well-founded explication of the concept of tolerance, subjects a tolerant attitude as an intellectual attitude toward conflicting opinions to a detailed critique and (...) discusses the plausibility of general tolerance claims in specific domains such as politics, religion, or ethics. He considers possible alternatives to a tolerant attitude and presents with intellectual open-mindedness and humility two substantial attitudes that can be clearly distinguished from a tolerant attitude and - in contrast to tolerance - can also be easily demanded on a general level. - With a foreword by Thomas Grundmann. This book is a translation of the original German 1st edition Leben und leben lassen by Dominik Balg, published by J.B. Metzler, an imprint of Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature in 2020. The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence. A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors. (shrink)

Toleranz – von vielen gewünscht und oft gefordert: Von der UNESCO, vom Papst, von Angela Merkel und Barack Obama. Doch was genau heißt es überhaupt, tolerant zu sein? Impliziert Toleranz Ablehnung? Oder ist Toleranz lediglich das Gegenteil von Dogmatismus? Und wie unterscheidet sich eine tolerante von einer gleichgültigen Haltung? Dominik Balg unterzieht, ausgehend von einer fundierten Explikation des Toleranzbegriffs, eine tolerante Haltung als intellektuelle Einstellung gegenüber konfligierenden Meinungen einer ausführlichen Kritik und diskutiert die Plausibilität allgemeiner Toleranzforderungen in spezifischen (...) Domänen wie Politik, Religion oder Ethik. Er erwägt mögliche Alternativen zu einer toleranten Haltung und stellt mit intellektueller Aufgeschlossenheit und Bescheidenheit zwei gehaltvolle Einstellungen vor, die von einer toleranten Haltung klar abgrenzbar sind und – im Gegensatz zu Toleranz - auch problemlos auf einer allgemeinen Ebene eingefordert werden können. - Mit einem Vorwort von Thomas Grundmann. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag möchte ich die These vertreten, dass die Vermittlung moralischen Wissens, also Wissen über den moralischen Status von Handlungen, ein zentrales Ziel moralischer Bildungsprozesse darstellen sollte. Vor dem Hintergrund einer genaueren Erläuterung dieser These werde ich zunächst drei naheliegende Einwände diskutieren und zurückweisen, um so die grundsätzliche Idee einer unterrichtlichen Vermittlung moralischen Wissens auf einer theoretischen Ebene zu plausibilieren. Hieran anschließend werde ich dann einige unterrichtspraktische Implikationen dieser Idee skizzieren.

When it comes to political, religious or ethical issues, many people consider a tolerant “live and let live”-attitude to be the best reaction to disagreement. However, the current debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement within social epistemology gave rise to certain worries about the epistemic rationality of tolerance. Setting aside those already extensively discussed worries, I would like to focus on the instrumental rationality of a tolerant attitude with respect to our epistemic goals.

Schulen müssen als paradigmatische Orte institutioneller staatlicher Bildung, an denen Lernende auf ihr späteres Leben in der Gesellschaft vorbereitet und zu konstruktiven Mitgliedern eines demokratischen Gemeinwesens erzogen werden sollen, einen entscheidenden Beitrag dazu leisten, Schüler*innen zu einem reflektierten und verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit konfligierenden Ansichten anderer Personen zu befähigen. In dem vorliegenden Beitrag wird vor dem Hintergrund aktueller philosophischer Debatten zur Erkenntnistheorie der Meinungsverschiedenheiten diskutiert, wie eine solche Befähigung fachlich angemessen gelingen und im Rahmen des Philosophie- und Ethikunterrichts didaktisch konkret realisiert (...) werden kann. (shrink)

This chapter examines how Spinoza deals with the identity problem by looking at his account of material and mental things. To understand how material things can remain the same over time, it looks at the “Physical Digression” where Spinoza explains the constitution of bodies. By using the structural criterion, Spinoza can solve a number of problems concerning identity and change. Spinoza would say that there is no identity between the body before and after the accident because the proportion between its (...) moving and non‐moving parts is no longer the same. Memory plays no decisive role, and can therefore be disregarded in the account of diachronic identity. Spinoza goes far beyond the Aristotelian conception by spelling out the form in kinetic terms for material things, and in representational terms for mental things. (shrink)

This paper addresses the ongoing debate over the relation between belief and credence. A proposal is made to reverse the currently predominant order of analysis, by taking belief as conceptually basic and credence as the phenomenon to be clarified. In brief, the proposal is to explicate an agent’s credence in a proposition P as the agent’s tendency toward believing P. Platitudinous as this reduction may seem, it runs counter to all of the major positions in the debate, including the Threshold (...) View, the Certainty View as conventionally understood, Dualism, Eliminativism, as well as Credence Primitivism. Section 1 gives an overview on the current state of the debate. Section 2 considers unsuccessful predecessors of the proposed belief-first approach to credence. Section 3 motivates and lays out the basics of a conceptual framework for thinking about doxastic states that characterizes such states in terms of two formally independent dimensions, one pertaining to the agent’s tendency toward believing P, the other to the level of resilience with which the agent manifests that tendency. Against this backdrop, it is argued in Sect. 4 that the present reduction satisfies a set of standard, theoretically neutral criteria of adequacy for theories of credence, at least once they are purged of a quite common conflation of tendency and resilience. Section 5 argues against all of the above competing accounts. (shrink)

Spinoza never discusses the scenario of radical skepticism as it was introduced by Descartes. Why not? This paper argues that he chooses a preventive strategy: instead of taking the skeptical challenge as it is and trying to refute it, he questions the challenge itself and gives a diagnosis of its origin. It is a combination of semantic atomism, dualism and anti-naturalism that gives rise to radical doubts. Spinoza attacks these basic assumptions, opting instead for semantic holism, anti-dualism and naturalism. This (...) crucial shift of basic assumptions prevents radical skepticism from arising. To be sure, local doubts are still possible, but the possibility of global doubt is ruled out. The paper examines this preventive strategy, situating it in the historical context and building a bridge to more recent anti-skeptical strategies. (shrink)

Aquinas holds that human beings perceive material objects in a rational way, since their sensory faculty is always under the guidance of the rational faculty. This paper intends to shed light on this fundamental thesis. First, it examines the metaphysical background, focusing on Aquinas’s claim that there is just one soul with interconnected, hierarchically ordered faculties. Second, it looks at the interconnection in the case of perception, paying particular attention to the vis cogitativa. This special power, which can only be (...) found in human beings, belongs to the sensory faculty but is always guided by the rational faculty and produces perceptions that are conceptually structured: it enables human beings to see something as something. Third, the paper builds a bridge to recent theories of “transformative rationality.” Like the advocates of this theory, Aquinas claims that rationality is not simply added to sensory activity, but rather something that is present in every act of human perception. (shrink)

This study illuminates how a cross-sector social partnership legitimizes itself toward multiple internal and external stakeholders. Within a single-case study design, we collected retrospective and real time data on the partnership between Deutsche Post DHL and The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Within this partnership, Deutsche Post DHL provides corporate volunteers that support disaster response after natural disasters on a pro bono basis. The main objects that needed legitimacy as well as the audiences from which legitimacy (...) was mainly sought changed over time. In addition, we identified legitimation work as occurring across objects, audiences, and time. Thus, we introduce legitimation work as the purposeful effort of the legitimacy seeker to avoid certain issues while ensuring other issues that are of importance to the conferrer of legitimacy. These findings contribute to micro-level considerations within institutional theory which view legitimacy as socially constructed between legitimacy seeker and conferrer. Hence, we add another perspective on legitimation to the previously existing conceptualizations of legitimacy as a deterministic consequence of institutionalization. (shrink)

Parallax, or the change in the position of an object viewed along two different lines of sight and more precisely, the assumption that this adjustment is not only due to a change of focus, but a change in that object's ontological status has been a key philosophical concept throughout history. Building upon Slavoj Žižek's The Parallax View, this volume shows how parallax is used as a figure of thought that proves how the incompatibility between the physical and the theoretical touches (...) not only upon the ontological, but also politics and aesthetics. With articles written by internationally renowned philosophers such as Frank Ruda, Graham Harman, Paul Livingston and Zizek himself, this book shows how modes of parallax remain in numerous modern theoretical disciplines, such as the Marxian parallax in the critique of political economy and politics; and the Hegelian parallax in the concept of the work of art, while also being important to debates surrounding speculative realism and dialectical materialism. Spanning philosophy, parallax is then a rich and fruitful concept that can illuminate the studies of those working in epistemology, ontology, German Idealism, political philosophy and critical theory. (shrink)

In eukaryotes, the messenger RNA (mRNA), the blueprint of a protein‐coding gene, is processed and packaged into a messenger ribonucleoprotein particle (mRNP) by mRNA‐binding proteins in the nucleus. The steps of mRNP formation – transcription, processing, packaging, and the orchestrated release of the export‐competent mRNP from the site of transcription for nuclear mRNA export – are tightly coupled to ensure a highly efficient and regulated process. The importance of highly accurate nuclear mRNP formation is illustrated by the fact that mutations (...) in components of this pathway lead to cellular inviability or to severe diseases in metazoans. We hypothesize that efficient mRNP formation is realized by a molecular mRNP packaging station, which is built by several recruitment platforms and coordinates the individual steps of mRNP formation. (shrink)

Consider where κ is an uncountable regular cardinal. By a result of Shelah's we have for almost all witnessing this. Here we consider the question if there could be a similar result for. We will discuss some basic facts implying that this cannot hold in general. We will use these facts to construct an interesting example of a pseudo Prikry forcing, answering a question of Sinapova.

In the past several years, observational entropy has been developed as both a quantum generalization of Boltzmann entropy, and as a rather general framework to encompass classical and quantum equilibrium and non-equilibrium coarse-grained entropy. In this paper we review the construction, interpretation, most important properties, and some applications of this framework. The treatment is self-contained and relatively pedagogical, aimed at a broad class of researchers.

This paper discusses a scenario borrowed from Williamson (2000) and repurposes it to argue for the possibility of conflict between two prima facie categorical norms of epistemic rationality: the norm to respect one’s evidence and the norm to be coherent. It is argued, pace Williamson, that in the conflict defining the scenario, the evidence norm overrides the coherence norm; that a rational agent with our evidence would lack evidence about some of their own credences; and that for agents whose evidence (...) is limited in this way, incoherence fails to entail irrationality. The above possibility claim has also been defended by Worsnip (2018), albeit on a quite different premise set and in conjunction with a coherence-centered account of epistemic rationality that issues predictions incompatible with those licensed by the evidence-centered account recommended here, as illustrated towards the end of the paper. (shrink)

Abstract of the book This volume has three aims. First, historians of philosophy have typically focused on the discussions of the moral relevance of emotions, and with the exception of scholars of ancient philosophy, neglected the place of emotions in cognitive life. This collection of articles refocuses the discussion of emotion in the medieval and early modern periods to their role in cognition. Second, though many have aimed to clarify relationship between the later thinkers and their predecessors with regard to (...) issues in metaphysics and epistemology, there has been very little effort at tracing similar lines of thought about emotion. As a whole, the contributions to this volume serve to begin a discussion about the continuities between medieval and early modern thinking about the emotions. In this regard, there is also a discussion of the emotions of cognitive life of the Renaissance. Though we get only a snapshot of a period of philosophical work often passed over, even this snapshot invites questions about how to weave an intellectual history about accounts of our emotions in our cognitive lives. Finally, attention to the concerns that engage philosophers of the medieval, renaissance and early modern periods can inform the contemporary debate regarding the relationship between emotions, cognition, and reason. The thirteen contributions explore this from the point of view of four key themes: the situation of emotions within the human mind; the intentionality of emotions and their role in cognition; emotions and action; the role of emotion in self-understanding and the social situation of individuals. (shrink)

In diesem Buch setzen sich zehn Wissenschaftler und Autoren aus verschiedenen Disziplinen mit dem unfaßbaren Thema Glück auseinander. Weit davon entfernt, Glücksratgeber zu sein, hinterfragen die hier versammelten Autoren verschiedene Glücksdefinitionen: Philosophisch gesehen findet sich das Glück zum Beispiel im «guten Leben». Wer der schwierigen Frage, was ein gutes Leben sei, aus dem Weg gehen will, der sucht das Glück vielleicht lieber in konkreten Dingen, wie Geld, Sport, Drogen, Musik, Reisen oder Lesen. Neben dem individuellen Glück werden auch große, kulturelle (...) Glücksbeschaffer besprochen, denn Religion, Ideologie und Magie wollen ebenfalls das Glück herbeibringen - oder sie versprechen es zumindest. Im Licht der unterschiedlichen Methoden und Fragestellungen treffen in diesem Band verschiedene Facetten der zutiefst menschlichen Suche nach dem Glück aufeinander. Aus der Summe der Perspektiven eröffnet sich ein fragmentarisches Panorama, welches auf eindrucksvolle Weise die Größe des gesuchten Gefühles offenbart. (shrink)

The book develops a philosophical foundation to the field of management education using the work of Martin Heidegger as a guiding philosophy. It asks the questions ‘what is a corporation?’ and ‘what is corporate management?’ These two questions are foundational for management thought in general and management ethics in particular. Most other academic fields are in some way defined and guided by a philosophical discourse. This philosophical discourse is largely missing in the field of management thought and education. Without this (...) foundation it can never be clear what actually belongs into a certain academic discipline and what does not. It also therefore lacks a sound and well articulated ontological foundation critical for developing approaches to ethical management. This book seeks to fill this gap and consequently represents an interdisciplinary effort between the academic field of management/business administration and philosophy, which is vital for business ethics. Intended as required reading for an elective on philosophy of management that is offered annually at the Wits Business School / University of the Witwatersrand / Johannesburg. The structure of the course will be largely based on the structure of the book. (shrink)

Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some (...) new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology. (shrink)

The practice of early modern natural history depended on the collective collecting activities of a great variety of people. Among them, artisans played a major role in acquiring and distributing knowledge about the natural world and they contributed significantly to the scholarly labour in natural history. This distributed labour was both acknowledged by contemporaries as well as hidden from sight, reflecting the period′s dominant norms for class and gender. By combining an interpretation of the visual representation of labour in European (...) insect studies with an examination of written sources about natural history practices from about 1680 to 1810, this article decodes the often‐codified frontispieces and other more symbolic illustrations to offer new insights into the labour of natural history. Those who identified as scholars and artisans (or both) conceptualised their own intellectual and practical engagement with natural history within the semantic field of work. Some seemed to have even envisioned a new social role for academics as well as artisans. This article analyses the diversity of the “productive forces” in insect studies as they changed over time and it reconstructs what I will call the social imaginaries of participation. (shrink)

The influence of Latin texts on Greek literature of the Imperial period remains somewhat understudied. However, there are some Greek texts that seem to depend from a Latin pretext, from works of Vergil in particular. This article discusses an epigram by Apollonides (Anth. Gr. 6.239), in which an old beekeeper named Kleiton is presented in much the same way as the old Corycian in Vergil’s “Georgics” (4.116-148). Vergil’s famous digression might therefore be a pretext for Apollonides’ poem. Moreover, Apollonides apparently (...) alludes to an epigram by Leonidas of Tarentum (Anth. Gr. 6.226) which features another old farmer named Kleiton. Apollonides’ poem could thus serve as an ‘appendix’ to Leonidas’ epigram based on the model of Vergil’s senex Corycius. (shrink)

How should political leaders address the emerging climate crisis if citizens are reluctant to accept costly but necessary climate action? In this article, I address this question by harnessing insights from the realist tradition in political theory. I propose that the realist legitimacy framework provides action guidance by offering two broadly applicable heuristics for political agents: responsibility and responsiveness. These heuristics collide if citizens are unwilling to accept policies designed to secure a nation's long-term stability. Faced with this problem, some (...) authors make the supposedly realist argument that policymakers in liberal democracies should prioritise responsibility over responsiveness and embrace eco-authoritarianism to address the climate emergency. Against this line of argument, I maintain that the realist legitimacy framework entails no such commitment. Instead, realists must emphasise that responsible climate action entails a sufficient degree of responsiveness. I conclude by sketching how this insight may guide democratic leaders and climate activists in the future. (shrink)

We develop a theoretical model of network formation where actors are limitedly farsighted. In this way we extend current models with a new set of micro-foundations. Computer simulations are used to predict the stable network structures that are likely to emerge under the new assumptions. The co-author model by Jackson/Wolinsky (1996) is used as an example. The co-author model formulates a tension between stability and efficiency when actors are myopic. Limitedly farsighted actors can overcome this tension but only if the (...) network is small enough. Thus, changing the micro-foundations of the network formation model leads to new implications at the macro-level in the sense that different networks are predicted to be stable than for existing micro-foundations. (shrink)