The ethics of bearing bad news has not yet been discussed by philosophers. How should the messenger feel? Is she, as Toni Morrison claimed in one of her novels, ‘corrupted’ by the message? And shou...

Let’s begin with a few examples. The queue at the supermarket is long. My shopping cart is full of groceries. You are standing behind me, and your cart has only two or three items in it. I let you go ahead of me so that you can finish your shopping quickly.A stranger in the street approaches you and asks you if you can light his cigarette. As a matter of course, you do.David Heyd, Supererogation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. (...) 149.You help someone find his way in town, or assist an old woman to cross the road.Ibid, p. 2.A person entering the store ahead of you holds the door open for you so it does not slam in your face.Edna Ulmann-Margalit, “Considerateness,” Iyyun 60, 2011, p. 205.Walking towards your car, about to leave the parking lot, you notice a driver searching in vain for a spot. You motion to her to follow you.You and I are not acquainted with each other, but we happen to sit next to each other at a meeting. You are momentarily called out of the room and I c. (shrink)

Suppose that Linda, Brian’s partner, is on a business trip. Brian cannot wait for her to come home. It would be plausible to construe his attitude as impatience, and claim that it is called for in this type of situation. But if this is indeed the case, then patience is uncalled for. However, it seems that patience cannot be uncalled for, as it is considered a virtue. So goes the common expression, and so attest all of the philosophical analyses of (...) patience in recent decades. Discussing them, I claim that patience is not always the right attitude. Enthusiasm and excitement, which might be impatient, have their own merits. Furthermore, as patience involves not only waiting, but also enduring or persevering, it might also be the case that one endures too much and thus allows vice to flourish. Being truly virtuous has to do with knowing when and how to be patient, but also when and how to be impatient. (shrink)

Suppose that somebody is asking me kindly to do her a favor. She has no right to it. It is my choice whether or not to respond positively. Hence, she asks me for the favor rather than demand it. On the other hand, it seems that my refusal to do her the favor would be rude, inconsiderate, unkind, and morally wrong. This is why we tend to respond positively to favor asking and feel that we have to apologize if we (...) refuse. In this article, I address this puzzle. I claim that refusing to do a favor is morally wrong precisely because a favor has been asked. The requestee needs me, and her very need calls upon me to reveal my goodness. In a sense, this is the strength of her weakness. I claim that acceding to do a favor is a special kind of imperfect obligation in Kant's and Mill's terminologies. As opposed to their descriptions, this obligation is directed toward a definite person at a prescribed time. It turns out that small favors are of the greatest importance for human activity. We all have our needs. We are social animals, and we are depended on others to fulfill our needs. Agreeing to do a favor is one of the building blocks of our shared social endeavor. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the nature of insults—a subject that has been rather neglected in the philosophical literature. I claim that an insult has to do with causing us to lose face. We save face with regards to everybody else, and thus anybody is supposedly liable to insult us. In this sense, our interlocutor serves both as an individual encountering us face-to-face, and as an audience in front of whom our weaknesses are exposed. When the insult involves something we know to (...) be wrong, we can try and refute it. True insults are harder to tackle, and therefore might hurt more. But we cannot adopt a strategy of not caring about what others think because it is through interactions with them that we explore both our views and identity. (shrink)

The connection between integrity and the notion of self seems obvious. A person of integrity is one whose various beliefs, views, experiences, are united into one totality. But if integrity is about the self, then it is for the self to decide what her personality revolves around. This might suggest that being a person of integrity means acting for no reason at all – just because this is “who I am”. I might consider my whimsical, or even corrupt ways of (...) conduct, as manifestations of integrity, and I would not have to offer reasons to anybody. In trying to reply to such an objection, it has been suggested that integrity as an epistemic virtue, aiming at truth and correctness. I show why these attempts are mistaken. And yet, it is true that as persons of integrity we act for sound reasons. Our integrity is connected to our self image. Rather than aiming at truth, our actions manifest the people we aspire to be, the values we admire, the notions we care about. By choosing my commitments I manifest a certain image of what a worthy person should aim at, and I invite others to share this image. (shrink)

When should we interfere in the course of a stranger’s life? While philosophers have discussed at length extreme cases of assisting poor people in famine stricken countries, much less attention has been given to casual, everyday episodes. If I overhear two people discussing a place they are about to visit, and know that it is closed for renovation, should I interfere and tell them so? If I stand next to a customer who has not been given enough change in the (...) supermarket, should I point that out or mind my own business? Using the Kantian notions of love and respect, I answer such questions. I claim that Kant’s terminology is ill-suited for instructing us how to deal with others with whom we are personally involved, but is important for our encounters with strangers. I suggest that we take seriously Kant’s claim that we are “united in one dwelling place”. When around others, keep an open eye to the possibility that they might need help. If there is good reason to suppose that you may help, knock on their door. Let them decide whether they want to open it. They are totally entitled to decline the offer, but should keep in mind that it was given as part of the joint venture of living together with others. The interference should therefore not be regarded as an infringement of privacy. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the notion of old times’ sake, one which is hardly discussed by moral philosophers, and claim that it serves as a moral reason for us to act on behalf of the people we used to cherish: former friends, colleagues, neighbors, or spouses. While our relationship with them has ended, the building-blocks of our identity will continue to bear their fingerprints, and they will ever be an important part of our biography. Acting for old times’ sake (...) reflects both our caring about them, and our caring about our own past, biography, and accumulated identity. Why the relationship has ceased will of course affect our attitude towards them. Although old times’ sake might not always be a decisive factor, it still serves as a moral reason for action. (shrink)

The concept of reputation has hardly been analyzed by philosophers. My analysis presents a puzzle: reputation is a portrayal of who one is. However, it is dependent on others. This description contradicts David Oderberg’s analogy between reputation and property. I discuss the relation of reputation to gossip and conclude that we should take spreading information seriously. We should go back to the original meaning of gossip: the term “Godsib,” meaning godfather. In our global village we are all entrusted with other’s (...) identities. We should pave our way with that information in a manner that would manifest great care. But this does not mean that these people are exempt from responsibility: the chain that ends in reputation starts with how you behave. It is your very identity that you entrust to other people—make sure to behave in a way that would result in the reputation you want to deserve. (shrink)

The item was in the news. A public official said that he would hire a male rather than a female driver, because following the growing influence of the #MeToo movement, hiring a man would be safer. That way nobody would accuse him of harassment. The official’s declaration aroused justified public criticism. Being a public official, he must be committed to equality-in-hiring practices. But suppose that it were a private individual, who wanted to do his utmost to keep away from temptation. (...) It might seem that there is nothing wrong with that: he is free to hire whomever he wishes, and his caution is justified: planning ahead and resisting temptation are marks of rationality and personhood, in Harry Frankfurt’s sense of the term. But why should one be so cautious to begin with? Challenging other philosophical analyses of temptation, I argue that temptations are hardly irresistible. We should all take responsibility for our actions and behavior. It is a moral duty to control ourselves and not let others pay the price for our shortcomings. This notion is both Kantian, as it emphasizes autonomy, and Aristotelian: it urges us to work on our virtues. (shrink)

I address the puzzle of the supposed wrongness of “a thumping liar” On the one hand, it seems that the more you lie, the more wrong you commit. On the other hand, the more you lie, the more people are aware that you are not telling the truth, the less can you deceive them, the less can you wrong them. The liar who is known as such seems to cause no harm. I show how according to some analyses such a (...) person would not even be considered to be lying, which is surely mistaken. I claim that he is both lying and bullshitting, thus challenging Frankfurt’s distinction between the two terms. The thumping liar excludes himself from being a meaningful part in the joint venture of conversation. It is himself that he mainly harms. (shrink)

It seems hard to imagine a concept more significant to modern thought than critique. Critique involved distancing oneself from religious explanations and theological argumentation and came to represent the essence of secular consciousness's potential to deliver modernity's promise of human progress through rational inquiry and scientific development. Critiques of Theology debunks this common understanding. Based on a novel reading of previously less-discussed writings by Sigmund Freud, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Hannah Arendt, the book shows how the practice of critique (...) emerged out of religious traditions and can, in many ways, be traced back to them. This study points to a persistent misreading of critique and demonstrates that it does not come from outside of religion to build a new world of ideas; on the contrary, it redeploys those already present within its theological constellations. (shrink)

Law and economics scholarship suggests that, in appropriate cases, the law can improve people’s behavior by changing their preferences. For example, the law can curb discriminatory hiring practices by providing employers with information that might change their discriminatory preference. Supposedly, if employers no longer prefer one class of employees to another, they will simply stop discriminating, with no need for further legal intervention. The current Article aims to add some depth to this familiar analysis by introducing the insights of behavioral (...) ethics into the law and economics literature on preference change. Behavioral ethics research shows that wrongdoing often originates from semi-deliberative or non-deliberative cognitive processes. These findings suggest that the process of preference change through the use of the law is markedly more complicated and nuanced than previously appreciated. For instance, even if an employer’s explicit discriminatory stance is changed, and the employer no longer consciously prefers one class of employees over another, discriminatory behavior might persist if it originates from semi-conscious, habitual, or non-deliberative decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, actual change in behavior might necessitate a close engagement with people’s level of moral awareness. We discuss the institutional and normative implications of these insights and evaluate their significance for the attempt to improve preferences through the different functions of the legal system. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the remains of the Baptistery chapel within the North Church complex on the outskirts of Shivta, a fifth-seventh century Byzantine village in the Negev. Presumably a monastery, the North Church is the largest and most elaborately constructed of the three Shivta churches. After addressing general structural and chronological issues of the complex, a comparison of the North Church Baptistery to the South Church Baptistery aims to clarify the linkage between shape and ritual. The authors propose that (...) the earlier South Church Baptistery probably served the public, while the later North Church Baptistery fulfilled the internal needs of the monastery. The remains of the Baptism of Christ wall painting, recently rediscovered in the apse of the North Church Baptistery, complements, even if partially, knowledge of the links between architecture, liturgy, and art within the space. The study offers a glimpse into the religious and cultural world of the people who lived in this arid and remote, but by no means isolated area. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

German scholars of Jewish origin who were students of Martin Heidegger in the 1920s and 1930s are frequently criticized for their supposed postwar refusal to ‘disavow earlier liaisons with Heidegger.’ These scholars are thus indicted for being fundamentally anti-liberal or apolitical, and for those reasons dangerous disciples of Heidegger. By examining the works of Karl Löwith and Hans Jonas, two of Heidegger's influential former students, the following paper presents a more nuanced reading of the relationship between master and disciples, namely (...) that Jonas and Löwith operate with Heidegger's philosophical grammar in order to turn against Heidegger, philosophically and politically. Within this framework, the article fleshes out the crucial importance of theology to the understanding of Jonas’ and Löwith's philosophical critique of Heidegger's thought. Following this theological turn, the paper demonstrates the complexity of Jonas’ and Löwith's postwar approach, that is an anti-Heideggerian ethical and political quest which is anchored nonetheless in Heidegger's philosophy. As such, Jonas’ and Löwith's political projects demonstrate the manner in which Heideggerian categories are not exhausted by Heidegger's own political interpretation; they grippingly denotes the aptitude to steer Heideggerian philosophy towards new ethical and political shores. (shrink)

Between 1910 and 1917, Walter Benjamin composed a range of philosophical works and fragmented texts all of which touch upon the concept of youth and its intersection with issues of modernity and theology, faith and political action, religion and secularization, God, and the world. Yet, while scholars have rather extensively discussed Benjamin’s early works on language, literature, and esthetics, less attention has been given to his work on youth. This paper focuses on Benjamin’s writings on youth from these early years. (...) Its aim is to demonstrate how these writings were intended as contributions to the composition of a comprehensive theory of youth, which itself was to combine philosophical discussion with theological imagination. More concretely, by using the example of Meister Eckhart, who is rarely discussed in connection to Benjamin’s thought, the paper shows how Benjamin draws on Christian mystical notions of time, transcendence, and divinity, albeit in a secularized and therefore transformed guise, and how Benjamin’s intellectual endeavor can hence be labeled a modern-mystical theory of youth. (shrink)

There have been many attempts during the history of applied ethics that have tried to develop a theory of moral reasoning. The goal of this paper is to explicate one aspect of the debate between various attempts of offering a specific method for resolving moral dilemmas. We contrast two kinds of deliberative methods: deliberative methods whose goal is decision-making and deliberative methods that are aimed at gaining edifying perspectives. The decision-making methods assessed include the traditional moral theories like utilitarianism and (...) Kantianism, as well as second order principles, such as principlism and specified principlism. In light of this assessment, we suggest taking a closer look at two perceptive models, casuistry and particularism. These models are used for dealing with moral dilemmas that provide for edifying perspectives rather than decision-making. These perceptive models, though less scientific and not as good at prescribing an action, are more human in the sense that they enrich our moral sensibilities and enhance our understanding of the meaning of the situation. (shrink)

Germany, the crisis of culture and secular theology -- Life philosophy or modern gnosis -- Modern Jewish gnosis -- Modern gnosis and Zionist thought.

The purpose of this article is to propose an ethical framework for software engineers that connects software developers’ ethical responsibilities directly to their professional standards. The implementation of such an ethical framework can overcome the traditional dichotomy between professional skills and ethical skills, which plagues the engineering professions, by proposing an approach to the fundamental tasks of the practitioner, i.e., software development, in which the professional standards are intrinsically connected to the ethical responsibilities. In so doing, the ethical framework improves (...) the practitioner’s professionalism and ethics. We call this approach Ethical-Driven Software Development, as an approach to software development. EDSD manifests the advantages of an ethical framework as an alternative to the all too familiar approach in professional ethics that advocates “stand-alone codes of ethics”. We believe that one outcome of this synergy between professional and ethical skills is simply better engineers. Moreover, since there are often different software solutions, which the engineer can provide to an issue at stake, the ethical framework provides a guiding principle, within the process of software development, that helps the engineer evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of different software solutions. It does not and cannot affect the end-product in and of-itself. However, it can and should, make the software engineer more conscious and aware of the ethical ramifications of certain engineering decisions within the process. (shrink)

Employee mobility is a phenomenon that challenges workplace ethics. This paper argues that despite on‐going attempts by management and consultants to build and install employee loyalty, and despite the complexity of relationships between employees and their organization, employee mobility remains a common phenomenon in today’s market. Courts, at least Israeli courts, perceive the employee–employer relationship as almost purely contractual and thus strive to protect workers first, often ignoring deeper commitments such as loyalty. This results in a certain dissonance in the (...) relationships between employees and employers. (shrink)

Employee mobility is a phenomenon that challenges workplace ethics. This paper argues that despite on‐going attempts by management and consultants to build and install employee loyalty, and despite the complexity of relationships between employees and their organization, employee mobility remains a common phenomenon in today’s market. Courts, at least Israeli courts, perceive the employee–employer relationship as almost purely contractual and thus strive to protect workers first, often ignoring deeper commitments such as loyalty. This results in a certain dissonance in the (...) relationships between employees and employers. (shrink)

This volume is dedicated to the drawing of the implications of the contemporary 'post-secular' social transformation for education. Contributions discuss such topics as the mystical tradition and its social and pedagogic implications; transformative and ecological education; and the relations between secular and religious education in different local contexts.

This paper uses the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts to illuminate the philosophical discourse referred to as “applied ethics.” It explores what thick ethical concepts have to offer in terms of a method for discussing issues in applied ethics. By focusing on thick ethical concepts, applied ethics can avoid the pitfall of creating a conceptual gap between empirical discourse and normative discourse. Applied ethics, the paper argues, is linked to philosophical and anthropological aspirations that have traditionally sought to (...) uncover the thick normative vocabulary relevant to particular practices and cultures. By focusing on thick descriptions, applied ethics discloses the rich normative meaning of our social practices and social relations. The concepts used therein are often unintelligible apart from the particular social practices through which their meaning is manifested. Accordingly, thick ethical concepts are philosophically useful for adopting a nonrepresentational conception of language, which underlies the expression of meaning of particular social practices. (shrink)

Disclosing the ontology of sports injuries by looking closer at their meaning provides us with insight into the professional ethics of the sports medicine specialist. The aim of this article is twofold: to disclose the “the ontology of sports injuries,” and to use the disclosure as an insightful perspective for dwelling on the ethics of sports medicine. Because of the unique nature of sports, the standard ethical prescriptions usually associated with medical ethics are of little use for the sports medicine (...) specialist in treating sport injuries. In spelling out the special ethical context of sports medicine, this paper suggests several distinctions. I propose several models, which provide different conceptions of what constitutes a sport injury: (1) The Medical Model; (2) The Normative Model; (3) The Liberal Model; (4) The Phenomenological Model. The implications of each of these models for sports medicine is assessed, and through them the concept of a sports injury is clarified in a way that can assist us in inferring what is to be done from an ethical point of view. (shrink)

Emotions have not received sufficient attention in business ethics. This paper identifies the positive role of emotions in human judgment and attitudes. It then argues that emotions as well as feelings on the part of managers and their employees can be positive forces for both business managers and for the organizations they lead. Allowing emotions a stronger role in business affairs could serve in putting a more human face on both managers and their organizations.

Basic human rights are supposed to protect people from abuse and harm. They are the means whereby we protect our humanity. One would expect, therefore, that basic human rights would be valid and sacred in any context, including industrial relations. However, the complexity of the employee–employer relationship obscures this issue, and it is not clear whether such rights can be protected or whether they are valid in the context of industrial relations. Since rights are relational, they are preconditioned on the (...) special nature of the relationship between employee and employer. Hence, the specific meaning that these rights have in industrial relations cannot be grounded in the notion of human rights as such, but rather depends on the special relationships between employers and employees. Though much legislation has been passed to regulate the relationship between employees and employers, the issues surrounding this relationship remain one of the most debated topics in business ethics. Our paper focuses specifically on the right to equal pay and the right to privacy. With respect to the right to property, the paper examines whether there is a conflict between general human rights and the fundamental right of employers to their property. The Israeli legislature has responded to this conflict by enacting ‘protective laws’ that legally outline and mandate certain human rights. Under these laws, employees are prevented and prohibited from waiving the rights granted to them by law, even if employed in private industries. Despite this legislative effort, market forces are at times stronger, and consequently some basic rights are not fully applied or implemented. (shrink)

Basic human rights are supposed to protect people from abuse and harm. They are the means whereby we protect our humanity. One would expect, therefore, that basic human rights would be valid and sacred in any context, including industrial relations. However, the complexity of the employee–employer relationship obscures this issue, and it is not clear whether such rights can be protected or whether they are valid in the context of industrial relations. Since rights are relational, they are preconditioned on the (...) special nature of the relationship between employee and employer. Hence, the specific meaning that these rights have in industrial relations cannot be grounded in the notion of human rights as such, but rather depends on the special relationships between employers and employees. Though much legislation has been passed to regulate the relationship between employees and employers, the issues surrounding this relationship remain one of the most debated topics in business ethics. Our paper focuses specifically on the right to equal pay and the right to privacy. With respect to the right to property, the paper examines whether there is a conflict between general human rights and the fundamental right of employers to their property. The Israeli legislature has responded to this conflict by enacting ‘protective laws’ that legally outline and mandate certain human rights. Under these laws, employees are prevented and prohibited from waiving the rights granted to them by law, even if employed in private industries. Despite this legislative effort, market forces are at times stronger, and consequently some basic rights are not fully applied or implemented. (shrink)

The Israeli approach to advertising consists of two complementary sets of norms, legal norms and moral‐ethical norms. Advertising legislation demands honest disclosure. The Israeli legislator refrains from intervening in fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, free trade, occupation, and liberty of contract in advertising. However, there are also few interventions to prevent phenomena that are dangerous or abusive, especially to groups needing protection. The Israeli courts do try to apply moral considerations in cases tried by them, but living up (...) to moral responsibilities is different from complying with legal obligations. Advertisers in Israel have a(i) Treatise(r), consisting of ten ethical guidelines, which neither sums up advertising ethics in its entirety nor is legally binding. Sociological and psychological features of the culture need to be examined in order to spell out what truth and honesty in advertising actually mean in this society, and the manner in which these values are practised. Lacking sanctions in public law against misleading consumers or manipulation based on false facts, consumers must find remedy in civil actions which rely on moral and ethical rules. (shrink)

The Israeli approach to advertising consists of two complementary sets of norms, legal norms and moral‐ethical norms. Advertising legislation demands honest disclosure. The Israeli legislator refrains from intervening in fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, free trade, occupation, and liberty of contract in advertising. However, there are also few interventions to prevent phenomena that are dangerous or abusive, especially to groups needing protection. The Israeli courts do try to apply moral considerations in cases tried by them, but living up (...) to moral responsibilities is different from complying with legal obligations. Advertisers in Israel have a(i) Treatise(r), consisting of ten ethical guidelines, which neither sums up advertising ethics in its entirety nor is legally binding. Sociological and psychological features of the culture need to be examined in order to spell out what truth and honesty in advertising actually mean in this society, and the manner in which these values are practised. Lacking sanctions in public law against misleading consumers or manipulation based on false facts, consumers must find remedy in civil actions which rely on moral and ethical rules. (shrink)

Business students appear predisposed to select disciplines consistent with pre-existing worldviews. These disciplines then further reinforce the worldviews which may not always be adaptive. For example, high levels of Social Dominance Orientation is a trait often found in business school students :691–721, 1991). SDO is a competitive and hierarchical worldview and belief-system that ascribes people to higher or lower social rankings. While research suggests that high levels of SDO may be linked to lower levels of empathy, research has not established (...) the potential relationship between another related adaptive trait in the workplace, compassion. Compassion facilitates workplace performance by lowering levels of litigation, easing stress, and facilitating cooperation. Accordingly, the following study aimed to examine the relationship between SDO and compassion while hypothesizing Economic Systems Justification would mediate this relationship. Because of the importance of compassion in the workplace, the prevalence of SDO in the business academic community and the topicality of ESJ, we conducted our study with business school students. Results confirmed all but one hypothesis. (shrink)

This article presents a response to a recent article by Yotam Lurie and Robert Albin in which they discuss and present the merits of casuistry as a method for resolving moral dilemmas in business, principally by developing 'edifying' perspectives on the situation, and in doing so highlight the shortcomings of principles (such as the categorical imperative) in generating insights and thereby moral choices. The present article accepts the importance of cases and examples as a source of insight, but argues (...) that the process of conceptualisation involved in understanding these necessarily involves some reference to principles. However, principles and cases are best seen as complementary to the ethical decision-making process rather than in opposition. The complementary functions of these are highlighted in processes such as reflection upon experience, in applications of moral imagination and in the integration of emotive and cognitive elements in ethical choice. (shrink)