This article defends a pure functionalist theory of territorial jurisdiction according to which a state’s moral right to rule over a territory rests on its present moral performance as a freedom‐enabling institutional structure. A common objection against functionalist theories is that they cannot explain why it matters that one particular state has exclusive jurisdiction over a certain territory. This deficiency is often associated with the annexation challenge, which is supposed to show that functionalist theories cannot deal adequately with cases of (...) annexation. Against this line of criticism, I argue that the pure functionalist justification of the right to rule is capable of tackling challenges related to particularity and annexation. First, the pure functionalist theory explains why it is important that one particular state rules over a given territory. It also tells us what set of laws and what government we should comply with. Second, the pure functionalist justification of the right to rule entails sufficient conceptual resources to account for the wrongdoing involved in annexation. Although the theory deems past wrongs irrelevant for the justification of the right to exercise jurisdiction on a territory, it is adequately sensitive to historical injustice. (shrink)

This article presents a defense of Kant’s idea of a league of states. Kant’s proposal that rightful or just international relations can be achieved within the framework of such a league is often criticized for being at odds with his overall theory. In view of the analogy he draws between an interpersonal and an international state of nature, it is often argued that he should have opted for the idea of a state of states. Agreeing with this standard criticism that (...) a league of states cannot establish the institutional framework for international justice, others also suggest an alternative stage model interpretation. According to this interpretation, Kant’s true ideal is in fact a state of states, whereas the league is merely introduced as a temporary and second best solution. In contrast to both the standard criticism and the stage model interpretation, I argue that fundamental normative concerns count in favour of a league rather than a state of states. I also argue that Kant’s defense of such a league is consistent with his position on the institutional preconditions for just interaction in the domestic case because of crucial relevant differences between the state of nature among individuals and the external relations between states. (shrink)

This article takes issue with the common view that cosmopolitan normative commitments are incompatible with recognition of state sovereignty as a basic principle of international law. Against influential cosmopolitans, who at best ascribe a derivative significance to the sovereignty of states, the article argues that state sovereignty is not only compatible with, but also essential to the recognition of individuals as units of ultimate concern. The argument challenges a problematic distributive conception of justice underlying many cosmopolitans’ support for reforms of (...) the international legal order towards a system where respect for basic human rights is the only criterion for political legitimacy. An alternative relational conception of justice makes it possible to see why there is an internal connection between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. The argument adds up to a novel defence of the so-called domestic analogy, which regards the territorial integrity of states as an internationa... (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas' reformulation of Kant's philosophical project Toward Perpetual Peace. Special attention is paid to how well Habermas' proposed multi-level institutional model fares in comparison with Kant's proposal—a league of states. I argue that Habermas' critique of the league fails in important respects, and that his proposal faces at least two problems. The first is that it implies a problematic asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. The second (...) is that it entails creating a global police force that has an obligation to intervene against egregious human rights violations worldwide, and that this seems incompatible with the idea that every person has an innate right to freedom. There are important normative constraints relevant for institutional design in the international domain that Habermas does not take sufficiently into account. However, this does not mean that Kant's league cannot be supplemented with more comprehensive forms of institutional cooperation between states. On the basis of my assessment of the multi-level model, I propose a hybrid model combining elements from Kant and Habermas. (shrink)

Taking Kant’s philosophy of right as my starting point, I defend the view that just exercise of political power requires economic redistribution. Against the common view that Kant’s political thinking has no economic implications, I argue that republican interpretations of his philosophy of right succeed in reconstructing a cogent argument in favor of public poverty relief. I also argue that the economic implications of Kant’s theory extend beyond public support of the poor. As freedom-enabling institutional structures, states are obliged to (...) remove hindrances to democratic self-legislation. It is reasonable to consider economic inequality as such a hindrance, and so public provisions for the poor is not enough. In order to exercise political power in a just way, public authorities must also take measures to reduce the gap between the richest and the poorest. (shrink)

It is common to interpret Kant’s idea of public reason and the Enlightenment motto to ‘think for oneself’ as incompatible with the view that testimony and judgement of credibility is essential to rational public deliberation. Such interpretations have led to criticism of contemporary Kantian approaches to deliberative democracy for being intellectualistic, and for not considering our epistemic dependence on other people adequately. In this article, I argue that such criticism is insufficiently substantiated, and that Kant’s idea of public reason is (...) neither at odds with deference to a certain kind of authority, nor with making judgements of character in rational deliberation. This view is corroborated by recent work on Kant’s epistemology of testimony. (shrink)

The article sets out to explore the international legal dimension in Jürgen Habermas' latest publications on philosophy of law. It is our view that Habermas deals with the examination of just relations beyond the nation-state first and foremost from a legal perspective, and that the key to a Habermasian reading of international justice is not through an application of discourse-theoretical models of communicative or moral action as such, but primarily through proper legal institutionalisation of the rule of law. In asserting (...) this view, we will look closer at the Kantian influence in Habermas' legal construct at the international level, and show why this institutional approach is to be sharply distinguished from and preferred to any exclusively non-institutional approach to international justice. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with Arthur Isak Applbaum’s power-liability view of political legitimacy. In contrast to the traditional view that legitimate rule entails a moral duty to obey, here called the right-duty view, Applbaum argues that political legitimacy is a moral power that entails moral liability for the subjects of political rule. According to Applbaum, the power-liability view helps us explain how responsible citizens in some cases can act contrary to law while still recognizing the claims of law. (...) Against Applbaum’s attempt at establishing the power-liability view through conceptual analysis, I argue that we cannot specify the moral implications of de jure legitimacy without considering the moral argument that justifies the right to rule. I further argue that Applbaum’s normative account of political legitimacy implies commitment to a normative idea that forms the basis of a strong case in favor of the right-duty view. Finally, I argue that the present defense of the right-duty view has resources to account for the moral phenomena that prompt Applbaum’s advocacy of the power-liability view. (shrink)

Preface : consciousness redux -- What is consciousness? -- Who is conscious? -- Animal consciousness -- Consciousness and the rest -- Consciousness and the brain -- Tracking the footprints of consciousness -- Why we need a theory of consciousness -- Of wholes -- Tools to measure consciousness -- The uber-mind and pure consciousness -- Does consciousness have a function? -- Computationalism and experience -- Computers can't simulate experience -- Consciousness : here, there but not everywhere -- Coda : why this (...) matters -- References -- Notes. (shrink)

A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about which (...) concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of our concepts. But how can proposals to engineer concepts be implemented in the real world? This is known as the implementation challenge to conceptual engineering. In this paper, I am concerned with the meta-philosophical implications of the implementation challenge. Specifically, must we overcome the implementation challenge prior to undertaking conceptual engineering? Some critics have recently answered this question affirmatively. I intend to show that they are mistaken. I argue as follows. First, successful (...) implementation is not an integral part of conceptual engineering. Second, the idea that the value of conceptual engineering relies on successful implementation is in tension with widespread assumptions about normative theorizing. (shrink)

In den letzten Jahren ist der Begriff der ›Person‹ zu einem Schlüsselbegriff des philosophischen wie des gesellschaftlichen Diskurses geworden. Eine systematisch interessante und bisher vernachlässigte historische Rückversicherung in der Personendebatte bieten die Überlegungen Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis (1743–1819) und Johannes Paul Richters (1763–1825), genannt Jean Paul. Jean Paul ist um 1800 nicht nur ein erfolgreicher Autor humoristischer Romane, sondern auch ein gut informierter Beobachter der zeitgenössischen Philosophie und philosophischer Vertrauter Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis. Wie Jacobi in einer konstitutiv doppelsinnigen Bewegung Spinozas Ethik (...) und Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre als unwiderlegbare Entwürfe einer streng rationalen Immanenzphilosophie dechiffriert, um sie im Namen der ›Vernunft‹ zu überwinden, so verbindet auch Jean Pauls philosophisches und poetisches Werk die Wertschätzung der Transzendentalphilosophie unmittelbar mit einem transrationalen Widersprechen gegen die Ansprüche der neuen Systemphilosophie. Um Individualität, Zeitlichkeit und Handlungsfreiheit als Grunderfahrungen menschlichen Daseins philosophisch zureichend zu würdigen, bedarf es für Jean Paul wie für Jacobi einer grundsätzlichen Umwertung des Verhältnisses von individuellem personalem Dasein und rationaler Welt- und Selbsterklärung. (shrink)

English summary: In this work, Anton Friedrich Koch develops a hermeneutical realism using methods of analytic philosophy, i.e. the thesis that although the real is independent from individual beliefs and perceptions, it is, however, not independent of there being beliefs and perceptions at all. We, the finite spatiotemporally embodied subjects, are therefore not a 'cosmic coincidence' but rather necessary for the existence of the material system of space-time, which, on the other hand, encompasses us and is in no way (...) a fiction or construction (subjectivity thesis). This brand of realism is hermeneutical because it treats knowing as a special case of reading and translating - of things into spoken language - (readability thesis), and in giving room to the discovery that completeness and consistency, as in mathematics, are likewise incompatible in the description of the world (antinomy thesis). German description: Anton Friedrich Koch begrundet und entwickelt in diesem Werk mit Mitteln der analytischen Philosophie einen hermeneutischen Realismus: die philosophische Lehre, dass das Reale zwar von einzelnen Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen unabhangig ist, nicht aber davon, dass es uberhaupt Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen gibt. Wir, die endlichen, raumzeitlich verkorperten Subjekte, sind also kein Zufall, sondern notwendig fur die Existenz des materiellen Raum-Zeit-Systems, das uns andererseits weitraumig umgibt und keineswegs unsere Konstruktion oder Fiktion ist (Subjektivitatsthese). Hermeneutisch ist dieser Realismus, weil er das Erkennen als einen Sonderfall des Lesens und Ubersetzens - der Dinge in Wortsprache - begreift (Lesbarkeitsthese) und weil er der Entdeckung Raum gibt, dass Vollstandigkeit und Widerspruchsfreiheit, wie in der Mathematik, so auch in der Weltbeschreibung unvertraglich sind (Antinomiethese). (shrink)

The continental tradition in philosophy has gotten more "materialistic" over the last two hundred years. This has resulted from a combination of some very specific moves with regard to the epistemological parameters of understanding and the assertion that ideas may have material force in history. Therefore, the materialism within the continental tradition is not a materiality of being, but a materiality of understanding and action. Such an inquiry opens up space between the activities of sensation and the mental faculty of (...) cognition. 'I think, therefore I am,' is not an empirical statement, but a statement of cognition. It is assumed that this distinction is at the core of continental philosophy. Cognition is always interpretive. Experience is the start of cognition, but not its final product. Our cognitions cannot be separated from our experience of the physical, social, and cultural environment around us. The symbolic nature of language reinforces the interpretive nature of our thoughts and ideas. Our language is, therefore, always projecting an implicit image of the world. Language is, therefore, always political. The materiality of these cognitive world-views is manifested in two ways. First, in their formation. They are the products of sensual contact with the world. Second, in their effects. They move people. It is a picture of the world which serves to shape the content and character of human behavior. Whether we want to call these phantoms of the mind, world-view, ideas, thoughts, cognitions, or any other term, the dual character of their materiality is secure. This work examines the threads of materialist ideas running through the efforts of some major authors in the continental tradition in philosophy. A model of materialism is constructed in Chapter One and used to assess the materialist elements in works from Kant, Marx, Weber, Nietzsche, and contemporary poststructuralism. The work demonstrates the evolution of materialist thinking within the tradition and asserts an evolving and developing articulation of materialism in relation to the thoughts and activities of human beings." -- Publisher's description. (shrink)

In den Aufsätzen dieses Bandes präsentiert Anton Friedrich Koch Hegels theoretische Philosophie als diejenige Nichtstandard-Metaphysik, in der sich die Metaphysik, nicht aber die Philosophie vollendet. Jenseits von Hegels Evolutionstheorie des Absoluten gilt es von einem Standpunkt der Endlichkeit aus neu zu philosophieren.

Following newer research trends this chapter is underpinned by the thesis that the British Empire, by its gradual disengagement from its former dominions, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, was seen as a threat by social actors in these respective societies. Concurrently, all these societies had to deal with a (growing) variety of ethnic and social groups. With the emphasis on developments in Canada and in Australia, Sebastian Koch studies two big celebrations of nationhood to question different ways of memoria (...) and anti-memoria: the celebration of Canada’s 100 years’ anniversary of independence in 1967 and the 1967 Expo in Montreal. His analysis of memoria and anti-memoria as knowledge practices shows that indigenous knowledge was still threatened and precarious even if Canada proclaimed the idea of “unity in diversity” during its coming of age party in 1967. Nevertheless, Koch’s chapter shows that formerly marginalized groups used (their) precarious knowledge to win recognition, highlight injustices, and play their part in the development of “new” identity concepts. (shrink)

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving (...) rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effectively putting conceptual engineering into practice. (shrink)

Dans le De fato, Alexandre construit une théorie péripatéticienne du destin et réfute les Stoïciens, partisans dune conception dure du destin. Par là il offre un document majeur sur le déterminisme dans lAntiquité. Louvrage montre comment lexégèse dAristote lui permet de proposer une conception nouvelle de la responsabilité.

Das sinnliche Bewusstsein, abstrakt einzeln betrachtet, bietet ein Sinnesdaten- Konglomerat in einem raumzeitlich ausgedehnten sensorischen Bewusstseinsfeld, welches affektiv in Leib und Gegenwartsbewusstsein des Menschen verankert und so auf dessen „Begehrungsvermögen“ bezogen ist, jedoch kein Bewusstsein von Subjekt und Objekt. Dieses entsteht erst durch die freie begriffliche Synthesis, die mit Fichte als intellektuelle Anschauung unseres eigenen Handelns – des Verbindens und dadurch Objektivierens sowie „Subjektivierens“/Selbstbewusstsein-Erzeugens – verstanden werden kann. In konservativer Projektion der verbindenden Verstandesbegriffe lässt sie uns erkennen, was das sinnliche (...) Bewusstsein – das Epistemische quasi vorzeichnend – zeitlich geordnet lediglich wahrnimmt. (shrink)

In the most inclusive sense, psychological mechanisms offer a type of causal explanation of mental states and behavior, often with reference to underlying processes, systems, activities, or entities. By postulating and investigating such mechanisms, researchers have sought explanations of a wide range of psychological phenomena. However, the concept has been deployed in dramatically different ways, with very different meanings, depending upon the particular school or tradition of psychology (and specific research program therein). In fact, usage has been so diverse as (...) to defy easy categorization or definition. But a historical perspective, even if rather selective, can trace the broad outlines of the significance of psychological mechanisms for the study of the mind. Perhaps most notable is the role they have played in the psychoanalytic tradition; research efforts within behaviorism and cognitive science have also made liberal use of versions of the concept in their explanatory frameworks (for discussion of evolutionary psychology, see the entry “evolved psychological mechanisms”). Cutting across all of these traditions are several key themes relating to psychological mechanisms, including questions concerning the scope of the relevant causal claims, debates about causal determinism and regularity, and the unresolved relation between mind and body. (shrink)

This chapter reviews past and present debates about the therapeutic relationship in order to draw out the ethical implications of relational practices in psychotherapy. The therapeutic relationship has been understood differently across psychotherapeutic approaches, with each tradition responding to the attendant ethical challenges in distinctive ways. Aside from practitioners’ theoretical and practical commitments, the therapeutic relationship has also been, and continues to be, shaped by broader societal influences. The chapter discusses the shifting ethical implications of relational practices, then, as situated (...) in their theoretical and historical contexts. The variability of concerns raised by the therapeutic relationship requires continued ethical analysis in order to confront the diversity and complexity of contemporary clinical practice. (shrink)

In so far as the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tzu are life-philosophies, they are philosophies of solitude. My aim in the following pages is to explain and defend this claim, clarifying the distinctive kind of solitude that is taught by Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu.