Husserl's Original View on Phenomenological Psychology* JOSEPH J.KOCKELMANS Some forty years ago Edmund Husserl spoke publicly for the first time of a ...

This books offers a naturalistic and critical theory of signs, minds, and meaning-in-the-world.

In this essay an effort is made to answer the question of what function psychology and psychiatry have in merleau-ponty's ``the structure of behavior and phenomenology of perception''. it is argued that in his first book merleau-ponty tried to present a philosophical critique of the behaviorist and gestaltist interpretations of empirical psychology, whereas ``phenomenology of perception'' attempts to make a contribution to philosophical anthropology which in many instances employs analyses which belong to phenomenological psychology, the regional ontology of psychic phenomena.

In Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology, Joseph J. Kockelmans provides the reader with a biographical sketch and an overview of the salient features of Husserl's thought. Kockelmans focuses on the essay for the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1928, Husserl's most Important effort to articulate the aims of phenomenology for a more general audience. Included are Husserl's text -- in the original German and in English translation on facing pages -- a synopsis, and an extensive commentary that relates Husserl's work as a (...) whole to the essay for the Encyclopedia. (shrink)

This anthology of selections from the works of noted philosophers affords the student an immediate contact with the unique historical background of the philosophy of science. The selections, many of which have not been readily accessible, follow the development of the philosophy of science from 1786 to 1927. Each selection is preceded by a brief introduction by the editor designed to familiarize the reader with a particular philosopher and provide insights into his work. Joseph J. Kockelmans divides the selections (...) into several sections. Part 1, from 17861850, includes chapters by Immanuel Kant, on the metaphysical foundations of natural science, John Frederick William Herschel, on experience and the analysis of phenomena, William Whewell, on the nature and conditions of inductive science, and John Stuart Mill, on induction and the law of universal causation; part 2, from 18701899, includes chapters by Hermann Von Helmholtz, on the origin and significance of geometrical axioms, William Stanley Jevons, on the philosophy of inductive inference, John Bernard Stallo, on the kinetic theory of gasses and the conditions of the validity of scientific hypotheses, Ernst Mach, on the economical nature of physical inquiry, Karl Pearson, on perceptual and conceptual space, Emile Boutroux, on mechanical laws, Heinrich Hertz, on the appropriateness, correctness, and permissibility of scientific theories, and Ludwig Boltzmann, on the fundamental principles and basic equations of mechanics. The third part, covering the first decade of the twentieth century, includes chapters by Henri Jules Poincare, on science and reality, Charles Peirce, on Induction, Pierre Marie Duhem, on the laws of physics, William Ostwald, on energetism and mechanics, Emile Meyerson, on identity of thought and nature as the final goal of science, Ernst Cassirer, on functional concepts of natural science; part 4, from 19101927, includes chapters by Charles Dunbar Broad, on phenomenalism, Alfred North Whitehead, on time, space, and material, Bertrand Russell, on the world of physics and the world of sense, Norman Robert Cambbell, on the meaning of science, Moritz Schlick, on basic issues of the philosophy of natural science, and Percy Williams Bridgman, on the concepts of space, time, and causality. Philosophy of Science provides a concise single volume text to the discipline and enables students to understand and evaluate the various trends in our contemporary philosophy of science. Joseph J. Kockelmans is professor emeritus of philosophy at the Pennsylvania State Univers. (shrink)

In Heidegger's "Being and Time", the author locates the main themes of Heidegger's seminal work within their historical context and, in the process, familiarizes the reader with the terminology and background information relevant to understanding Heidegger's text. This study of what is arguably the greatest philosophical text of the century takes the ontological view of Heidegger's work. Here the author presents a precise formulation of the genuine problem of the meaning of Being, an explanation of the fact that Being is (...) for us problematic and should be so, and a precise determination and articulation of the mode of Being of man . Contents: I. The Preparatory Fundamental nalysis of Dasein II. Dasein and Temporality. Bibliography. Index. Co-published with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. (shrink)

This anthology of selections from the works of noted philosophers affords the student an immediate contact with the unique historical background of the philosophy of science. The selections, many of which have not been readily accessible, follow the development of the philosophy of science from 1786 to 1927. Each selection is preceded by a brief introduction by the editor designed to familiarize the reader with a particular philosopher and provide insights into his work. Joseph J. Kockelmans divides the selections (...) into several sections. Part 1, from 17861850, includes chapters by Immanuel Kant, on the metaphysical foundations of natural science, John Frederick William Herschel, on experience and the analysis of phenomena, William Whewell, on the nature and conditions of inductive science, and John Stuart Mill, on induction and the law of universal causation; part 2, from 18701899, includes chapters by Hermann Von Helmholtz, on the origin and significance of geometrical axioms, William Stanley Jevons, on the philosophy of inductive inference, John Bernard Stallo, on the kinetic theory of gasses and the conditions of the validity of scientific hypotheses, Ernst Mach, on the economical nature of physical inquiry, Karl Pearson, on perceptual and conceptual space, Emile Boutroux, on mechanical laws, Heinrich Hertz, on the appropriateness, correctness, and permissibility of scientific theories, and Ludwig Boltzmann, on the fundamental principles and basic equations of mechanics. The third part, covering the first decade of the twentieth century, includes chapters by Henri Jules Poincare, on science and reality, Charles Peirce, on Induction, Pierre Marie Duhem, on the laws of physics, William Ostwald, on energetism and mechanics, Emile Meyerson, on identity of thought and nature as the final goal of science, Ernst Cassirer, on functional concepts of natural science; part 4, from 19101927, includes chapters by Charles Dunbar Broad, on phenomenalism, Alfred North Whitehead, on time, space, and material, Bertrand Russell, on the world of physics and the world of sense, Norman Robert Cambbell, on the meaning of science, Moritz Schlick, on basic issues of the philosophy of natural science, and Percy Williams Bridgman, on the concepts of space, time, and causality. Philosophy of Science provides a concise single volume text to the discipline and enables students to understand and evaluate the various trends in our contemporary philosophy of science. Joseph J. Kockelmans is professor emeritus of philosophy at the Pennsylvania State Univers. (shrink)

The problem concerning the manner in which truth is found in the statements of the natural sciences is an important one. It has been discussed from the very beginning of modern science, but in each phase of the development the issue was raised in a different way and for a different reason, such as the seeming conflict between reason and faith, the question concerning the limits of scientific knowledge, the meaning of induction, the probabilistic nature of many scientific statements, the (...) realization that even scientific theories and claims are inherently historical in character, etc. In this essay some contemporary positions are examined briefly. Then the thesis is defended that scientific theories that are well-established and accepted by the majority of the scholars in the relevant field of research, can be said to be true; and the same holds true for the statements derived from such theories to the degree that they are not yet falsified by experiment or observation. It is argued that in this case it will be necessary to rethink the essence of truth, not in terms of the classical correspondence theory, but rather in terms of the hermeneutic theory of truth as unconcealment. Theories and scientific statements are not true in the sense that they present us with mirror-images of what is in the „real” world. They are true, rather, in the sense that they make it possible for us to give a rational explanation of the states, relations, and forms of interaction of natural entities, which reveal these entities, their characteristics, and interactions in such a way, as they appear to show themselves independently of the theory in question in experiment and observation. (shrink)

Spiritualist ethics: The problem of evil, by L. Lavelle. On conscience, or On the pain of having-done-it, by V. Jankélévitch. Value and immortality; and, Dangerous situation of ethical values, by G. Marcel. The concept of fallibility, by P. Ricoeur.--Axiological ethics: Ethics and metaphysics, by R. Le Senne. Good and evil, by H. Reiner. Values and truths, by R. Polin. Values as principles of action, by G. Gusdorf.--Three contemporary conceptions of humanism: Jean-Paul Sartre: Sartre on humanism, by J. J. Kockelmans. (...) Moral perspectives in Sartre's thought, by F. Jeanson. Ambiguity, by S. de Beauvoir. Albert Camus: Albert Camus and the ethic of absurdity, by H. Hochberg. On humanism, by M. Heidegger. Existentialism's basic ethical position, by O. Bollnow.--Situation ethics: Systematic essentialist ethics and existential situation ethics, by T. Steinbüchel. The question of the Single One, by M. Buber. What is a Christian ethic? By D. Bonhoeffer. Meaning and analysis of the borderline situation, by H. Thielicke. (shrink)

Joseph J. Kockelmans provides a clear and systematic treatment of the central themes and topics of Heidegger's later writings, focusing on the all-important question of the relationship of truth and Being. If we are to understand Heidegger's thought, Kockelmans explains, we must conceive it as a path or way, rather than as a finished system. Adopting this approach himself, Kockelmans leads us with scholarly care through the wide range of issues that Heidegger wrote about between roughly 1935 (...) and 1965. After a discussion of Heidegger's own effort to learn to think, subsequent chapters present Heidegger's views on such matters as the meaning of Being; the ontological difference; heaven and earth; gods and mortals; and language, art, science, technology, ethics, and politics. In conclusion, Kockelmans reflects on the task of thinking in an age when classical philosophy has reached its logical end. (shrink)

In Heidegger's "Being and Time", the author locates the main themes of Heidegger's seminal work within their historical context and, in the process, familiarizes the reader with the terminology and background information relevant to understanding Heidegger's text. This study of what is arguably the greatest philosophical text of the century takes the ontological view of Heidegger's work. Here the author presents a precise formulation of the genuine problem of the meaning of Being, an explanation of the fact that Being is (...) for us problematic and should be so, and a precise determination and articulation of the mode of Being of man (using the hermeneutical and transcendental analytic of Dasein). Contents: I. The Preparatory Fundamental nalysis of Dasein II. Dasein and Temporality. Bibliography. Index. Co-published with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. (shrink)

This essay argues that the pervasive twentieth century understanding of meaning — a sign stands for an object — is incorrect. In its place, it offers the following definition, which is framed not in terms of a single relation, but in terms of a relation between two relations : a sign stands for its object on the one hand, and its interpretant on the other, in such a way as to make the interpretant stand in relation to the object corresponding (...) to it own relation to the object. Using this definition, it reanalyzes key concepts and foundational arguments from linguistics so far as they relate to anthropology and psychology. Such terms include: concept, intentional state, motivation, ground, iconicity, speech community, norm, performativity, joint-attention, embodiment, intersubjectivity, agency, role, functionalism, pragmatics, social construction, realism, and natural language. (shrink)

An effort is made in this essay to show the intrinsic hermeneutic nature of the natural sciences by means of a critical reflection on data taken from the history of classical mechanics and astronomy. The events which eventually would lead to the origin of Newton's mechanics are critically analyzed, with the aim of showing that and in what sense the natural sciences are essentially interpretive enterprises.

Goethe's 1810 Zur Farbenlehre has been the subject of an ardent critical debate from the start. For some, the book is not a scientific theory of physics at all ; for others, Goethe's theory is an alternative to Newton's within modern science. Today there are authors who consider Goethe's conception of science a scientific alternative to modern science.

Stegmüller's most recent publication, Theorie und Erfahrung, is the second of four volumes of a work which appears under the general title Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und analytische Philosophie,. In this voluminous and daring work the author intends to deliver a systematic, critical account of the most important literature which has appeared on various basic topics of philosophy of science and its underlying assumptions over the past twenty-five years. The work promises to become a classic in the German language (...) because of its comprehensiveness, thoroughness, and clarity. (shrink)

Attempts to introduce phenomenology to the English-speaking world have often been hampered by the specialist's tendency to substitute a part for the whole--thereby threatening the delicate balance guaranteed by the transcendental turn and so carefully maintained by Husserl throughout his-philosophical career. Thus some, in their concern to place Husserl in the context of the realism-idealism issue, have stressed the contrast between Ideen and some aspects of Krisis. Others, relying on the illuminating power of the notion of human roles, have devoted (...) themselves exclusively to the working out of a mundane phenomenology with or without ontological pretensions. While there is value to be found in this branching out of the research, it nevertheless needs to be integrated. Because of the character of the phenomenological synthesis, moreover, such integration cannot be achieved simply by generalists. Hence the value of scholars like Kockelmans whose experience in more than one type of reduction permits them to move readily from one level of intentionality to another. As the book amply demonstrates, Kockelmans has acquired this multiple capability by following in detail Husserl's philosophical development as it progressively opens the way to the exploration of all these levels. In commenting upon this development, he is also rendering an invaluable service by bringing to light many of Husserl's writings which otherwise might remain unknown to the interested student. The work is concise, a model of balance between exposition of the doctrine and clarification of the issues; in short, an excellent and welcome addition to the phenomenological literature.-A. M. (shrink)

Kockelmans' contribution to the philosophy of science stems from ideas in this second chapter, developments and applications of ideas found in Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger's existential analytic, and Gadamer's hermeneutics. Kockelmans makes the now familiar claim that, as ever placed within the world, human thinking starts from the world, presupposing it, its things, structures, values, and meanings; there is no radically detached cogito. To be done, natural science and its ontology, presupposes human being-in-the-world and the life-world ontology constituted through (...) everyday human interpretive activity. These sciences, in turn, help us discover real things about that world of which our ordinary life-world philosophies may have never dreamt. Philosophy, and in particular philosophy of science, is essentially an ex post facto critical reflection on the lifeworld, its sciences, arts, and meaning-making activities in general. This is a role, Kockelmans argues, that cannot be abridged by the sciences, any more than the sciences can be supplanted by philosophical reflection. In some very nice lines reminiscent of Hegel, Kockelmans writes: "Experience wants to be reason without knowing this explicitly". "Philosophy, therefore, is the reflection of reason on itself". And, "as reason's consciousness of itself, philosophy becomes an element of man's total experience; afterwards it tries to withdraw from this experience in order to give direction in all realms of experience to the processes of rationalization which always are already on their way". Philosophy, then, in Kockelmans' view, resurrects, restores, refines, and maintains the meaning of human endeavor and consequence; further, it can thereby, within limits, articulate future possibilities for these endeavors. (shrink)

The articles in this book display the originality and creativity of Eros and Eris, and their important role in the history of our culture, particularly in the history of philosophy and its role in today's systematic philosophy. Although these contributions to a hermeneutical phenomenology in this compilation are organized in a linear-chronological order (treating Homer, Hesiod, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Cusanus, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas), they all carry out their own hermeneutical movement in the (...) history of philosphy on the basis of a commitment with out life, here and now, and a thematic, professional interest. Among the contributors are: R. Bernasconi, J. Colette, J.F. Courtine, L. Dupré, Kl. Düsing, J. Greisch, J. Kockelmans, P.-J. Labarrière and G. Jarczyk, E. Levinas, Al. Lingis, J.-L. Marion, O. Pöggeler, W. Richardson, P. Ricoeur, J. Sallis, M. Theunissen and S. IJsseling. (shrink)

A work of outstanding originality and importance, which will become a cornerstone in the philosophy of geography, this book asks: What is human science? Is a truly human science of geography possible? What notions of spatiality adequately describe human spatial experience and behaviour? It sets out to answer these questions through a discussion of the nature of science in the human sciences, and, specifically, of the role of phenomenology in such inquiry. It criticises established understanding of phenomenology in these sciences, (...) and demonstrates how they are integrally related to each other. The need for a reflective geography to accompany all empirical science is argued strongly. The discussion is orgamsed into four parts: geography and traditional metaphysics; geography and phenomenology; phenomenology and the question of human science; and human science, worldhood and place. The author draws upon the works, of Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer and Kockelmans in particular. (shrink)

This is a volume of twelve essays published in the successful tradition of _Essays in Philosophy_. These essays in metaphysics merge the eternal, the historical, and the immediately encountered dimensions of man’s experience to illustrate what is permanently valuable in the tradition of Western thought. Contributors: John M. Anderson; Karel Berka; Hiram Canton; Joseph C. Flay; Richard A Gotshalk; Carl R. Hausman; Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.; Joseph J. Kockelmans; Robert G. Price; Stanley H. Rosen; Albert Tsugawa; Carl G. Vaught.

For John M. Anderson philosophy, as the love of wisdom, is a concern for what is ultimate. The essays in this volume take to heart this understanding of philosophy, and are therefore responses to the ultimate. The first four essays by Kaelin, Schrag, Baillif and Johnstone, deal with Anderson's own account of ultimacy as it is presented in his reflections on the aesthetic occasion, the experience of the sublime, on freedom and on insight. The concern for what is ultimate is (...) formulated differently by each of the other eight essays. Desmond articulates ways of our encounter with the ultimate by means of what he calls essential perplexity. Gendlin reflects on Aristotle's characterization of thinking as an activity that is ultimate. Biemel and Lingis present death as an aspect of the ultimate. Hersch sees our loss of meaning and value as the result of our refusal of finitude and thus of our denial of the ultimate which reveals itself in this finitude. Ginsberg initiates us into the ultimacy of the human encounter that is dialogue. Verene speaks of the ultimate through his account of the fool. For Kockelmans philosophy, unlike science, deals with what-is as it manifests itself in our encounter with our lived world which is a source of meaning, and in that sense an ultimate. Finally, John M. Anderson writes of the awareness of our becoming more than we are, and does so by bespeaking the origin of the dialogue we are. (shrink)

The place of Heinrich Hertz’s The principles of mechanics in the history of the philosophy of science is disputed. Here I critically assess positivist interpretations, concluding that they are inadequate.There is a group of commentators who seek to align Hertz with positivism, or with specific positivists such as Ernst Mach, who were enormously influential at the time. Max Jammer is prominent among this group, the most recent member of which is Joseph Kockelmans. I begin by discussing what Hertz and (...) Mach had to say about one another, and I specify certain respects in which their views are indeed similar. I then go on to detail their differences, looking at Hertz’s attitude to the atomic theory, to the mechanical world-view, to simplicity, to unobservables and metaphysics, and his objections to Newtonian forces. I conclude that the positivist interpretation of Hertz’s mechanics significantly overplays its similarities to Mach’s views.Keywords: Ernst Mach; Heinrich Hertz; Mechanics; Positivism; Atomism; Force; Metaphysics. (shrink)

The problem of antimicrobial resistance is so dire that people are predicting that the era of antibiotics may be coming to an end, ushering in a ‘post-antibiotic’ era. A comprehensive policy response is therefore urgently needed. A part of this response will require framing the problem in such a way that adequately reflects its nature as well as encompassing an approach that has the best prospect of success. This paper considers framing the problem as a slowly emerging disaster, including its (...) potential benefits and difficulties, from a conceptual and policy perspective. (shrink)

THEODORE KISIEL Date of birth: October 30,1930. Place of birth: Brackenridge, Pennsylvania. Date of institution of highest degree: PhD., Duquesne University, 1962. Academic appointments: University of Dayton; Canisius College; Northwestern University; Duquesne University; Northern Illinois University. I first left the university to pursue a career in metallurgical research and nuclear technology. But I soon found myself drawn back to the uni versity to 'round out' an overly specialized education. It was along this path that I was 'waylaid' into philosophy by (...) teachers like H. L. Van Breda and Bernard Boelen. The philosophy department at Duquesne University was then (1958-1962) a veritable "little Louvain," and the Belgian-Dutch connection exposed me to (among other visiting scholars) Jean Ladriere and Joe Kockelmans, who planted the seeds which eventually led me to the hybrid discipline of a hermeneutics of natural science, and prompted me soon after graduation to make the first of numerous extended visits to Belgium and Germany. The endeavor to learn French and German led me to the task of translating the phenomenological literature bearing especially on natural science and on Heidegger. The talk in the sixties was of a "continental divide" in philosophy between Europe and the Anglo-American world. But in designing my courses in the philosophy of science, I naturally gravitated to the works of Hanson, Kuhn, Polanyi and Toulmin without at first fully realizing why I felt such a strong kinship with them, beyond their common anti positivism. (shrink)

Description from a book review by J. G. Beebe-Center: "Mr. Allen's book develops in detail the view that pleasure and unpleasure are essentially manifestations of the progression and thwarting of impulses. Part one is a brief summary of the principal theories of feeling. Part two is devoted to "sensory" or "bodily" pleasure and unpleasure. These forms of feeling, it is argued, 'depend on an analogue of conation existing in the organism, a nisus to maintain, or to carry out to the (...) full extent, the functioning proper to the bodily system.' Part three -- the piece de resistance (about half the book) -- deals with the relation of pleasure and unpleasure to the main instincts. Parts four, five and six take up a number of classical problems: the relation of pleasure and unpleasure to sensation, their relation to desire, the relativity of feelings, the qualitative variety of feelings, and the psychology of values. The author shows throughout a rare combination of historicophilosophical sophistication and of first-hand familiarity with the modern experimental literature.". (shrink)

Not unexpectedly, the October meeting of the Society at The Pennsylvania State University proved to be most enjoyable. The host institution, known for many years as a center of Hegelian scholarship, provided the Society with every opportunity and facility for the success of its meeting. The modern conference center, and its staff, was efficient without any sacrifice of cordiality. Certainly every member who attended the meeting and there were about one hundred, will recall the pleasant reception and banquet - both (...) of which were held in the attractive Nittany Lion Inn. Professor Joseph Kockelmans, as local chairman, has earned the gratitude of the Society. The book-display, organized by Kevin M. Clark, was both extensive and informative. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger first adverted to the hermeneutic phenomenological orientation to nature and scientific observation in the scientist's laboratory practice in addition to the scientist's own reflective theoretical expressions. From the start, hermeneutic philosophy of science has focused not only on historical and current scientific texts, including scientific laboratory reports and communications, professional articles, and research protocols, but, even beginning with Heidegger, it has also attended to the scientist's own hermeneutic and phenomenological (that is to say: experimental) interpretation of nature. This (...) includes the hermeneutic phenomenology of scientific observation‐“reading” scientific instruments. For Heidegger, a hermeneutic phenomenology is built into the world of scientific research. The range of approaches to the hermeneutic philosophy of science also includes Joseph Kockelmans’ studies of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, in addition to a range of philosophers of science cutting across the contemporary analytic‐continental divide. (shrink)