In this paper, I want to make two main points. The first point is methodological: Instead of attempting to give a classical analysis or reductive definition of the term “expertise”, we should attempt an explication and look for what may be called symptoms of expertise. What this comes to will be explained in due course. My second point is substantial: I want to recommend understanding as an important symptom of expertise. In order to give this suggestion content, I begin to (...) develop an account of understanding. Finally, I will draw attention to some consequences of this approach. (shrink)

What are experts? Are there only experts in a subjective sense or are there also experts in an objective sense? And how, if at all, may non-experts recognize experts in an objective sense? In this paper, I approach these important questions by discussing Alvin I. Goldman's thoughts about how to define objective epistemic authority and about how non-experts are able to identify experts. I argue that a multiple epistemic desiderata approach is superior to Goldman's purely veritistic approach.

How is metaphysics related to the empirical sciences? Should metaphysics in general be guided by the sources, methods and results of the sciences? And what about the special case of the metaphysics of the social world: should it likewise be guided by the sources, methods and results of the social sciences? In her paper “Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics?”, K. Hawley raises the question: If we are sympathetic to the project of naturalising metaphysics, how should we approach (...) the metaphysics of the social world? She proceeds by discussing three approaches to social metaphysics: inference to the best explanation from current social science, descriptive conceptual analysis, and normative, especially ‘ameliorative’ projects. At the end of her discussion, she reaches a rather pessimistic conclusion, especially as regards the IBE approach: “a number of phenomena indicate that the prospects for securely basing social metaphysics via inference to the best explanation from social science are currently faint. […] We need to look elsewhere if we are to develop a metaphysics of the social world.” In my comments on her paper, I try to re-animate the program of an inductive metaphysics by defending the idea that the method of inference to the best explanation should be the central method of justification for metaphysics in general and for social metaphysics in particular. (shrink)

Mein Beitrag behandelt zentrale Probleme der Methodologie der Textinterpretation im Lichte der neueren Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie. Nach Vorbemerkungen zum Begriff der Interpretation wende ich mich den Methoden der Bildung und kritischen Prüfung von Interpretationshypothesen zu. Wie ist das Verhältnis von Daten und Hypothesen im Falle der Textinterpretation? Wie können Interpretationshypothesen epistemisch gerechtfertigt bzw. gestützt werden? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen untersuche ich die Anwendung der Hypothetisch-Deduktiven Methode und der Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung auf die Textinterpretation. Der Vergleich zeigt, (...) dass die Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung vorzuziehen ist. (shrink)

Biology and history are often viewed as closely related disciplines, with biology informed by history, especially in its task of charting our evolutionary past. Maximizing the opportunities for cross-fertilization in these two fields requires an accurate reckoning of their commonalities and differences-precisely what this volume sets out to achieve. Specially commissioned essays by a team of recognized international researchers cover the full panoply of topics in these fields and include notable contributions on the correlativity of evolutionary and historical explanations, applying (...) to history the latest causal-mechanical approach in the philosophy of biology, and the question of generalized laws that might pertain across the two subjects. The collection opens with a vital interrogation of general issues on explanation that apart from potentially fruitful areas of interaction (could the etiology of the causal-mechanical perspective in biology account for the historical trajectory of the Roman Empire?) this volume also seeks to chart relative certainties distinguishing explanations in biology and history. It also assesses techniques such as the use of probabilities in biological reconstruction, deployed to overcome the inevitable gaps in physical evidence on early evolution. Methodologies such as causal graphs and semantic explanation receive in-depth analysis. Contributions from a host of prominent and widely read philosophers ensure that this new volume has the stature of a major addition to the literature. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 160-163.

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the nature of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic? I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and (...) to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the nature of the pictorial. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory. (shrink)

In this essay, the enlightenment is not considered as a bygone age, but as a systematic epistemological, moral and political program that can, in principle, be pursued at any time. Since Kant has done most to clarify this program, his philosophy may serve as a starting point for discussion of the questions: How do the leading ideas of the enlightenment hang together? How are they justified?

Book reviewed in this article: Philosophie de l'action *.

The paper aims at clarifying the relationship between philosophy of science, epistemology and metaphysics. I begin with a characterization of philosophy. Philosophy as a second order discipline differs from any of the individual sciences. Typically, it attempts to answer questions of the form "How is it possible that p?". Next I present the aims and tasks of epistemology, before, finally, I turn to the relationship between philosophy of science and epistemology. At this point, metaphysics enters the scene. It turns out (...) that philosophy of science includes three different projects that result from philosophy's being a second order discipline. Applied to the sciences, a second order discipline is possible in three different forms that complement one another. _German_ Ziel meines Aufsatzes ist es, das ungeklärte Verhältnis zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie, Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik zu klären. Dazu muss zunächst etwas über den Charakter der Philosophie gesagt werden. Philosophie ist als eine Disziplin zweiter Ordnung von jeder Einzelwissenschaft verschieden. Insbesondere versucht sie,,Was ist F?"-Fragen und,,Wie möglich?"-Fragen zu beantworten. Anschließend stelle ich die Ziele und Aufgaben der Erkenntnistheorie vor und gehe schließlich auf das Verhältnis zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie ein; dabei kommt die Metaphysik ins Spiel. Es zeigt sich, dass die Wissenschaftstheorie drei unterschiedliche Projekte umfaßt, die sich ganz folgerichtig aus dem Charakter der Philosophie als einer Disziplin zweiter Stufe ergeben. In Anwendung auf die Wissenschaften ist eine Disziplin zweiter Stufe in drei einander ergänzenden Formen möglich. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman (1906-1998) was one of the outstanding thinkers of the 20th century. In a memorial note, Hilary Putnam considers him to be ""one of the two or three greatest analytic philosophers of the post-World War II period"". Goodman has left his mark in many fields of philosophical investigation: Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Logic, Metaphysics, the General Theory of Symbols, Philosophy of Languageand Philosophy of Art, all have been challenged and enriched by the problems he has shown up, the projects (...) he developed from them and the solutions he has suggested. In August 2006 a coup. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I argue against both neuropsychological and cognitive accounts of our grasp of numbers. I show that despite the points of divergence between these two accounts, they face analogous problems. Both presuppose too much about what they purport to explain to be informative, and also characterize our grasp of numbers in a way that is absurd in the light of what we already know from the point of view of mathematical practice. Then I offer a positive methodological proposal about the (...) role that cognitive science should play in the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)