The societal and ethical impacts of emerging technological and business systems cannot entirely be foreseen; therefore, management of these innovations will require at least some ethicists to work closely with researchers. This is particularly critical in the development of new systems because the maximum degrees of freedom for changing technological direction occurs at or just after the point of breakthrough; that is also the point where the long-term implications are hardest to visualize. Recent work on shared expertise in Science & (...) Technology Studies (STS) can help create productive collaborations among scientists, engineers, ethicists and other stakeholders as these new systems are designed and implemented. But collaboration across these disciplines will be successful only if scientists, engineers, and ethicists can communicate meaningfully with each other. The establishment of a trading zone coupled with moral imagination present one method for such collaborative communication. (shrink)

Jean Ayres invented Sensory Integration for children experiencing learning and social difficulties because, according to Ayres, they could not adequately integrate information from multiple sensory modalities. She established a scientific basis for her identification of children with sensory integrative difficulties, using statistical techniques to identify symptoms and neuroscience to determine a cause. She was an unusually reflective practitioner who catalyzed a community of practice around SI without becoming a guru—indeed, she encouraged her students to come up with their own ideas (...) and test them empirically. She felt isolated from the growing field of Occupational Therapy yet is viewed as one of its greatest pioneers. After her death in 1988, the SI community gradually began to argue about fundamental issues like what should constitute an appropriate diagnosis and set of tests for SI. At present, the network is fragmented to the point where some of the opposing positions may be incommensurable with each other, which would require a trading zone. (shrink)

Historians of technology have provided important accounts of technological innovation, but they rarely employ concepts which permit a rigorous analysis ofinvention as a mental or cognitive process. This article seeks to address this theoretical lacuna by using concepts adapted from cognitive psychology to compare the mental processes of two telephone inventors, Alexander Graham Bell and Thomas Edison. Specifically, we suggest that invention may be seen as a process in which inventors combine ideas with objects, or what we call mental models (...) and mechanical representations. The strategies by which inventors generate and manipulate these mental models and mechanical representations are what we refer to as heuristics. Using these concepts to narrate the development of the telephone, this article shows how invention can be interpreted as being much more than simply a mysterious act of individual genius. (shrink)

This article proposes three states in an actor-network and a global/local distinction among actants. This theoretical framework is applied to two invention networks: one created by an inventor of solar heating systems and another created by a designer who wanted to create an environmentally sustainable furniture fabric. Both solar inventor and fabric designer wanted to develop technologies that would improve the environment and also make money. The article concludes by considering whether invention networks that intend to turn “good into gold” (...) have to evolve a shared representation or whether it is sufficient for a new design to serve as a boundary object for actants. (shrink)

The societal and ethical impacts of emerging technological and business systems cannot entirely be foreseen; therefore, management of these innovations will require at least some ethicists to work closely with researchers. This is particularly critical in the development of new systems because the maximum degrees of freedom for changing technological direction occurs at or just after the point of breakthrough; that is also the point where the long-term implications are hardest to visualize. Recent work on shared expertise in Science & (...) Technology Studies (STS) can help create productive collaborations among scientists, engineers, ethicists and other stakeholders as these new systems are designed and implemented. But collaboration across these disciplines will be successful only if scientists, engineers, and ethicists can communicate meaningfully with each other. The establishment of a trading zone coupled with moral imagination present one method for such collaborative communication. (shrink)

The author describes his efforts to become a participant observer while he was a Program Director at the NSF. He describes his plans for keeping track of his reflections and his goals before he arrived at NSF, then includes sections from his reflective diary and comments after he had completed his two-year rotation. The influx of rotators means the NSF has to be an adaptive, learning organization but there are bureaucratic obstacles in the way.

As computating technologies become ubiquitous and at least partly autonomous, they will have increasing impact on societies, both in the developed and developing worlds. This article outlines a framework for guiding emerging technologies in directions that promise social as well as technical progress. Multiple stakeholders will have to be engaged in dialogues over new technological directions, forming trading zones in which knowledge and resources are exchanged. Such discussions will have to incorporate cultural and individual values.

This article reviews the public health and environmental regulations applicable to nanotechnology using a life cycle model from basic research through end-of-life for products. Given nanotechnology's immense promise and public investment, regulations are important, balancing risk with the public good. Trading zones and earth systems engineering management assist in explaining potential solutions to gaps in an otherwise complex, overlapping regulatory system.

Productive work on societal implications needs to be engaged with the research from the start. Ethicists need to go into the lab to understand what's possible. Scientists and engineers need to engage with humanists to start thinking about this aspect of their work. Only thus, working together in dialog, will we make genuine progress on the societal and ethical issues that nanotechnology poses.Davis Baird, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, May 1, 2003Federal funding of the (...) National Nanotechnology Initiative has averaged roughly $1 billion annually for the last three years, from 2004 to 2006. Society is poised to see more realistic nano-scale devices enter the marketplace, along with futuristic depictions of nanotechnology. For this reason, serious thought must be given to the societal impact of nanotechnology. (shrink)

This article presents a framework for practitioners who may be interested in maintaining adaptive stability of sociotechnical networks. The framework is developed from assembling several concepts that are useful for assessing and for drawing on appropriate moral reasoning strategies as sociotechnical networks are designed, constructed, and adapted. One such strategy involves the ability to assess degrees of perspective sharing and trading relationships in networks using moral imagination. The article uses the case of the design of an environmentally sustainable fabric to (...) illustrate these strategic concepts. The framework also draws on other examples of cases in which sociotechnical networks have become destabilized to illustrate instances in which the framework may have been useful for decreasing a tendency for destabilization. (shrink)

This review of Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group's Simple heuristics that make us smart focuses on the role of heuristics in discovery, invention, and hypothesis-testing and concludes with a comment on the role of heuristics in population growth.

Successful application of heuristics depends on how a problem is represented, mentally. Moral imagination is a good technique for reflecting on, and sharing, mental representations of ethical dilemmas, including those involving emerging technologies. Future research on moral heuristics should use more ecologically valid problems and combine quantitative and qualitative methods.

Dienes & Perner's theoretical framework should be applicable to two related areas: technological innovation and the psychology of scientific reasoning. For the former, this commentary focuses on the example of nuclear weapon design, and on the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger. For the latter, this commentary focuses on Klayman and Ha's positive test heuristic and the invention of the telephone.

Cognitive studies of science and technology have had a long history of largely independent research projects that have appeared in multiple outlets, but rarely together. The emergence of a new International Society for Psychology of Science and Technology suggests that this is a good time to put some of the latest work in this area into topiCS in a way that will both acquaint readers with the cutting edge in this domain and also give them a hint of its history. (...) One core theme includes how scientists, inventors, and engineers represent and solve problems; another, related theme is the extent to which they distribute and share cognition. Methodologies include fine‐grained studies of historical records, protocols of working scientists, observations and comparisons of engineering science laboratories, and computational simulations designed both to serve as research tools and also to improve scientific problem‐solving. The series of articles will conclude with the Associate Editor’s suggestions for future research. (shrink)

This article introduces a method to identify risks through expert elicitation, using silver nanotechnology as a case study. Unique features of the method include supplying experts with a list of silver nanotechnology products, and conducting the elicitation in an extended interview format that captures the experts' reasoning. The end result is a series of graphical representations of expert thinking from which high-risk scenarios and knowledge gaps can be reliably inferred. This methodology, combined with other approaches to expert elicitation, can help (...) identify knowledge and oversight gaps, and can be used as part of an adaptive management strategy. (shrink)

Disciplinary boundaries become increasingly unclear when grappling with “wicked problems,” which present a complex set of policy, cultural, technological, and scientific dimensions. “T-shaped” professionals, i.e. individuals with a depth and breadth of expertise, are being called upon to play a critical role in complex problem-solving. This paper unpacks the notion of the “T-shaped expert” and seeks to situate it within the broader academic literature on expertise, integration, and developmental learning. A component of this project includes an exploratory study, which is (...) aimed at evaluating the emergent attributes of T-shaped expertise in two different educational programs completed between January and May in 2015. The two programs build disciplinary knowledge in science, technology engineering, and mathematics fields at the core, while expanding the students’ awareness and comprehension of other expertise. The courses introduced science and engineering students to case study topics focusing around complex human-technological-ecological systems in a nanotechnology and society course; and the governance of genetically modified organisms in a science, technology, and society course. We analyze pre- and post-test data from this pilot project before presenting findings that pertain to student learning, as well as variants in the methodology and reflect on the utility of the selected methodology for evaluating expertise as it evolves over time. The paper closes with a discussion of a theory of acquisition with implications for delineating early attributes and characteristics of T-shaped expertise. (shrink)

At the forefront of international concerns about global legislation and regulation, a host of noted environmentalists and business ethicists examine ethical issues in consumption from the points of view of environmental sustainability, economic development, and free enterprise.

This book celebrates the work of Patricia Werhane, an iconic figure in business ethics. This festschrift is a collection of articles that build on Werhane’s contributions to business ethics in such areas as Employee Rights, the Legacy of Adam Smith, Moral Imagination, Women in Business, the development of the field of business ethics, and her contributions to such fields as Health Care, Education, Teaching, and Philosophy. All papers are new contributions to the management literature written by well-known business ethicists, such (...) as Norman Bowie, Richard De George, Ronald Duska, Edwin Hartman, Michael Hoffman, Mollie Painter-Morland, Mark Schwartz, Andrew Wicks, and others. The volume is comprised of articles that reflect on Werhane’s work as well as build on it as a way to advance further research. At the end of the festschrift, Pat Werhane provides responses to each chapter. The first chapter of the book also includes the overview of Patricia Werhane’s work and her academic career. The book is written to appeal to management scholars and graduate students interested in the areas of Business Ethics, Modern Capitalism, and Human Rights. Patricia Werhane is one of the most distinguished figures in the field of business ethics. She was a founder of the field, she is one of its leading scholars, and she has had a profound impact on the world of business practice. Among her many accomplishments, Pat is known for her original work on moral imagination, she is an acclaimed authority on employee rights in the workplace, and she is one of the leading scholars on Adam Smith. Having been active in Academia for over 50 years, Werhane is a prolific author of over a hundred articles and book chapters, and the author or editor of twenty-seven books, including Adam Smith and his Legacy for Modern Capitalism, Moral Imagination and Management Decision-Making, and co-authored books Organization Ethics in Health Care, Alleviating Poverty Through Profitable Partnerships, Obstacles to Ethical Decision-Making, Corporate Responsibility: The American Experience, and Research Approaches to Business Ethics and Corporate Responsibility. (shrink)

According to Christian belief, Jesus Christ is a divine person who became “incarnate,” i.e., who became human. A key event in the second act of the drama of creation and redemption, the incarnation could not have failed to interest Aquinas, and he discusses it in a number of places. A proper understanding of what he thought about it is thus part of any complete understanding of his work. It is, furthermore, a window into his ideas on a variety of other (...) topics: God, human nature, language, substance, and so on. Finally, it forces us to come to grips with what is at stake in acknowledging that Aquinas was not only a philosopher but a theologian as well. (shrink)

There is no consensus on how to define substance, but one popular view is that substances are entities that are independent in some sense or other. E. J. Lowe’s version of this approach stresses that substances are not dependent on other particulars for their identity. I develop the meaning of this proposal, defend it against some criticisms, and then show that others do require that the theory be modified.

Subjectivism about normativity (SN) is the view that norms are never intrinsic to things but are instead always imposed from without. After clarifying what SN is, I argue against it on the basis of its implications concerning intentionality. Intentional states with the mind-to-world direction of fit are essentially norm-subservient, i.e., essentially subject to norms such as truth, coherence, and the like. SN implies that nothing is intrinsically an intentional state of the mind-to-world sort: its being such a state is only (...) a status relative to the imposition of a norm. If one rejects this view of mind-to-world states, then one has grounds for rejecting SN itself. If one accepts it, an infinite regress arises that makes it impossible for norms to be imposed, which means that SN has undermined itself. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Theory of Belief Michael M. Gorman Belief is a key concept in Hume's philosophy, and yet Hume's statements aboutbeliefappear to be hopelesslyinconsistent.1 Various solutions have been offered, from saying that Hume is incorrigibly confused to saying that his theory ofbeliefchanged over the course of his career. This article will focus on the question ofthe nature ofbelief and show that Hume's theory is in fact consistent. In (...) sections 1 and 2, I will separate those passages where Hume discusses the nature of beUeffrom those where he discusses other questions. In sections 3-6, 1 will examine his theory ofthe nature ofbelief. Finally, in section 7, 1 will briefly look at his theories on other questions concerning belief. 1.Hume's statements about belief can be divided into at least nine different categories. Hume says that a beliefis: 1.an idea conceived in a certain manner (e.g., E 49, T 96); 2.that certain manner ofconception itself(e.g., E 49, T 97); 3.an idea that feels a certain way (e.g., E 48, T 103); 4.that certain feeling itself(e.g., E 49, T 624, 629); 5.an idea that has a great influence on the mind (e.g, T 118-20); 6.an act ofmind rendering realities influential on the mind (e.g., E 49, T 629); 7.a lively idea related to an impression (e.g., T 96); 8.a lively manner of conceiving an idea, which manner arises from an impression (e.g., E 50); 9.something that makes ideas forceful and vivacious (e.g., T 101, 627). If one were in a really bad mood, one could probably split Hume's formulations into even more categories.2 2.One solution wouldbe to saythat Hume ishopelessly confused.3 This is not accurate, however. The first thingtobe done is to notice thatonly the statements belonging to the first four categories are actually answers to the question, What is the nature of beUef? Hume tells us that abeUefis: an ideaconceived in acertainmanner, theverymanner ofconception ofsuch an idea, an idea thatfeels a certain way, thevery feeling of such an idea. To explicate Hume's theory of the nature of Volume XLX Number 1 89 MICHAEL M. GORMAN beUef, I will show that the second formulation is a poor version ofthe first and that the fourth formulation is a poor version ofthe third—in other words, that there are reallyonlytwo theorieshere, notfour. Then I will reconcile these two theories. As for Hume's discussion ofother questions concerning belief, the statementsin the fifth and sixth categories address the question, What does à belief do? Those in the seventh and eighth categories take for granted the statements in the first and second categories respectively and address the further question, What causes beliefs? Those in the ninth category are probably cases of bad writing. All these will be examined in section 7. 3. Let us look at the texts that fit into the first and second categories listed in section 1. These express what can be called Hume's "manner-of-conception theory" (MCT). First, Hume says that a belief is a certain kind ofidea, namely an idea conceived in a certain manner. He describes this manner ofconception by saying that such an idea is conceived with a high degree of force and vivacity, liveliness, and so forth. This analysis rests on Hume's distinction between the content of an idea and the manner in which the idea is conceived. [A]s 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception ofthe existence ofan object, and the beliefofit, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it. (T 94-95) One can believe that something is the case, or one can simply conceive ofits being the case without assenting to it. In both cases, Hume says, the content ofthe idea must be the same. Otherwise, both making up one's mind and disagreeingwith someone wouldbe impossible: making up one's mind would be a transition from thinking about one thing to thinking about... (shrink)

According to authoritative Christian teaching, Jesus Christ is a single person existing in two natures, divinity and humanity. In attempting to understand this claim, the high-scholastic theologians often asked whether there was more than one existence in Christ. John Duns Scotus answers the question with a clear and strongly-formulated yes, and Thomists have sometimes suspected that his answer leads in a heretical direction. But before we can ask whether Scotus‘s answer is acceptable or not, we have to come to a (...) clear understanding of what his answer is. And before we can ask what his answer is, we have to come to a clear understanding of what question or questions he is trying to answer. In this paper I begin by explaining that the question about Christ‘s existence is ambiguous, i.e., that there are actually two questions hidden behind one formulation. Next I look at Scotus‘s writings on the topic in order to determine which question he is really trying to answer, and I argue that he is trying to answer both of them, even though he does not make this clear. Third, I provide an initial look at the answers that he gives. Fourth, I explain why these answers might seem problematic, especially from a Thomistic perspective. Fifth, I explain Scotus‘s answers in more detail and show that they are not problematic in the way that some Thomists have held. Indeed, at least some of Scotus‘s ideas are the very same ideas that Thomas spells out in one of his works. (shrink)

Patrick Toner has recently criticized accounts of substance provided by Kit Fine, E. J. Lowe, and the author, accounts which say (to a first approximation) that substances cannot depend on things other than their own parts. On Toner’s analysis, the inclusion of this parts exception results in a disjunctive definition of substance rather than a unified account. In this paper (speaking only for myself, but in a way that would, I believe, support the other authors that Toner discusses), I first (...) make clear what Toner’s criticism is, and then I respond to it. Including the parts exception is not the adding of a second condition but instead the creation of a new single condition. Since it is not the adding of a condition, the result is not disjunctive. Therefore, the objection fails. (shrink)

C'est un témoignage jusque-là inconnu de l'influence des Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis d'Augustin que cet abrégé de l'ouvrage trouvé dans un fragment du manuscrit Paris lat. 10399 et dans trois manuscrits du IXe s. . Plusieurs passages de cet abrégé sont publiés ici pour la première fois. Les Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis ont dominé les tentatives de commenter l'Évangile de Jean, faites au début du Moyen Age ; les commentaires, alors publiés, sont ici brièvement discutés.

Ecclesia and Ethics considers the subject of Ecclesial Ethics within its theological, theoretical and exegetical contexts. Part one presents the biblical-theological foundations of an ecclesial ethic – examining issues such as creation, and Paul's theology of the Cross. Part two moves on to examine issues of character formation and community. Finally, part three presents a range of exegetical applications, which examine scripture and ethics in praxis. These essays look at hot-button issues such as the 'virtual self' in the digital age, (...) economics, and attitudes to war. The collection includes luminaries such as N.T. Wright, Michael J. Gorman, Stanley Hauerwas and Dennis Hollinger, as well as giving space to new theological and exegetical voices. As such Ecclesia and Ethics provides a challenging and contemporary examination of modern ethical debates in the light of up-to-date theology and exegesis. (shrink)

This book challenges the dominant approach to problems of justice in global normative theory and offers a radical alternative designed to transform our thinking about what kind of problem injustice is and how political theorists might do better in understanding and addressing it. It argues that the dominant approach, ideal moral theory (IMT), takes a fundamentally wrong-headed approach to the problem of justice. IMT seeks to work out what an ideally just society would look like, and only then outlines our (...) moral obligations in realizing that ideal. In other words, it ignores the realities of everyday politics. As Michael Goodhart asserts, IMT postpones engagement with actually existing injustices and distorts our understanding of them, and it normalizes many problematic features of our world. On the other hand, the leading alternatives to IMT struggle to make sense of the role values play in politics. This book sees justice as an ideology and develops an innovative bifocal theoretical framework for making sense of it. This framework provides two complementary perspectives on justice: a theoretical perspective that situates competing ideological claims about justice in a broader political context and a partisan perspective that evaluates the structure and coherence of particular conceptions of justice. As opposed to IMT, it focuses on barriers to justice and advocates an activist political theory that takes sides in political struggles against injustice. Goodhart argues that theorists can help to generate the countervailing power necessary for social transformation through the work of articulation, translation, and mapping, work which contributes to a more comprehensive social science of injustice. (shrink)