Quoi que nous nous efforcions de penser, nous continuons d'appartenir à notre siècle par Les croyances les plus communes et, quand cela a lieu, par le fait tout aussi commun de ne plus croire - ou de ne pas donner notre confiance au monde. Nos pères se sont tant méfiés, ou ils ont été à ce point cyniques, que cette foi, entendue dans son sens large, semble nous être aujourd'hui interdite. À nous qui avons hérité de cette perte sans l'avoir (...) consommée, ne restent que les débris d'une tradition devenue muette. Or la foi est vitale, et pas seulement la croyance religieuse. Mais dans une époque désorientée, nous ne pourrons peut-être sauver que le désir de croire : rien ne nous dit que nous retrouverons la croyance. Le paradoxe veut que cette impuissance annonce un temps de dangereuse crédulité. Il nous faut donc tout réapprendre. C'est à cette tâche que la philosophie doit s'atteler en prenant le contrepied de son éternelle tendance : en se mettant en quête de croire aussi résolument qu'elle avait cherché à savoir. La traversée du nihilisme est à ce prix."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L'ambition de ce livre est de fournir à la philosophie de Péguy l'"appareil" capable de manifester le plus fidèlement possible le "profond ordre intérieur" qui tient ensemble la multitude de textes qui a jailli génialement de sa plume. Loin de pointer les contradiction d'un homme, il s'agit alors de suivre la continuité et la cohérence d'un chemin, par-delà toutes les ruptures apparentes, qui se déroule selon un drame chrétien : L'état d'innocence, d'abord, la pureté de son combat socialiste et une (...) jeunesse saisie par l'événement de l'Affaire Dreyfus et tenue par la venue imminente de la cité harmonieuse ; la chute, ensuite, avec l'histoire de la décomposition du dreyfusisme et l'enfer du monde moderne ; le salut, enfin, avec le retour de la foi catholique et les nouvelles ressources que lui prodigue la vertu d'espérance. (shrink)

"Descartes ou la philosophie française : le caractère fondateur qui a été reconnu de droit à Descartes au regard de toute la philosophie moderne a masqué l'importance toute particulière que les penseurs français lui ont toujours accordée, de fait, dans leur propre édification intellectuelle. Descartes fournit en France moins les idées que la trame qui a servi à les ordonner -- ce qui n'est le cas d'aucun philosophe ailleurs. Sartre, toute sa vie durant, fut tenu par le projet de construire (...) une morale. Par la suite, il ne s'est jamais lassé de conclure : « Et j'ai toujours échoué. » Conscient de cet échec où son projet de métaphysique l'a mené, il reconduit les motifs qu'il avait de l'écrire à son enfance : « Ma seule affaire était de me sauver. » Il avait cru être au monde ; il a vécu dans l'imaginaire. Il avait bâti tout une œuvre afin de s'y mettre tout entier. Or ce Moi immortalisé, celui auquel il aspirait, c'était secrètement Descartes, médiateur caché dans la pénombre mais qui lui avait tracé un chemin pour le rejoindre. Sartre ne l'a pas dit. Néanmoins il savait qu'il était en train de récrire les Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes. C'était son secret et le propre du secret est d'appartenir à ce qui relève en chacun non pas de l'inconscient mais de ce « fonds sombre qui refuse d'être dit » -- le vécu. Un tel secret, encore enveloppé et obscur à lui-même, explique également que Sartre ait pu se dire à la fois existentialiste et cartésien. D'un côté, l'existentialisme est le nom que l'adversaire avait donné à la doctrine. Il est la manière objective dont sa pensée s'est extériorisée dans l'histoire, il est la doctrine vue du dehors. De l'autre côté, le cartésianisme est la même doctrine mais telle qu'elle est comprise du dedans par Sartre. Il est la manière subjective dont Sartre a intériorisé sa doctrine dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Deux courants de pensée dont l'un, tout en surface, a recouvert malencontreusement l'autre qui était pourtant le seul qui fût profond."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

If we are to understand the complex relationship between Bergson and Kant, we must not approach the former’s philosophy as if it could only be either pre-critical or post-Kantian. Instead, the present essay seeks to shed light on this relationship by treating Kant as another “missing precursor of Bergson.” In Bergson’s eyes, Kant, like Descartes, contains two possible paths for philosophy, which reflect the two fundamental tendencies that are mixed together in the élan vital and continued in humankind: intuition and (...) intelligence. Bergson breaks with Kant from the interior of his philosophy, which he divides into two Kantianisms: the one, which he rejects as ancient, and the other, which he appropriates. What the analysis of this Bergsonian appropriation of Kant reveals, however, is not the existence of a latent Bergsonism in Kant, but rather the recovery of a Kantianism that is completed in Bergson—a Kantianism that embarked down a path that Kant himself, who held himself back from following it in order to dispense with all “intellectual” intuition, had only sketched. Thus, if Bergson is to be believed, an intuitive metaphysics, which installs itself in pure duration, is neither below nor beyond Kantian critique, but can pass through it, can traverse it in its entirety, since it proposes to surpass it, to prolong it following the path that Kant himself had cleared in order to fulfill its suppressed virtualities. (shrink)

Michel Henry recognized himself within Maine de Biran’s work, while rejecting the French spiritualistic tradition to which this one was attached. However, without occulting the great differences which separate him from this tradition, it seems that we find in Bergson’s first book, more than in Maine de Biran, the premises of an ontological dualism, such as he supported, which announces an authentic philosophy of the conscience, beyond any intentionality. In return, as if Michel Henry had emphasized a tendency already present (...) in Time and Free Will, we could read again Bergson’s first book in the light of material phenomenology itself. (shrink)

L’article se propose de réintégrer Spinoza dans l’histoire des preuves de l’existence de Dieu et d’interroger, dans ce but, le cartésianisme de Spinoza.

L’un des principaux objectifs de Bergson a été de recentrer la philosophie autour du problème de la personnalité. Remis sans cesse sur le chantier, l’œuvre entière n’aura pas suffi à l’épuiser, pas plus que les nombreux cours qu’il lui consacra et dont certains passages reproduits ici sont encore inédits. En quittant l’opposition logique et immuable de l’un et du multiple, Bergson se propose de refondre temporellement les termes qui, pour le moins depuis Plotin, avaient servi à le poser. La personne, (...) donnée dans tous ses états, se substitue au sujet et se pense contre son exil transcendantal. Surtout : si la personne se fait dans le tissu de la durée, c’est qu’elle lui donne en retour le lieu où s’articulent ses différentes extases . Signifiant pour l’homme l’effort pénible qu’il lui faut fournir pour continuer d’être, et non une nature ou un droit à réclamer, elle est aussi bien le lieu où les extases peuvent se désarticuler. Bergson trouve les moyens de penser la folie et ce qui nous en préserve .One of Bergson’s main objectives was to refocus philosophy on the problem of personality. Incessantly drawn back to this problem, his entire life’s work was not able to exhaust the subject, nor were his courses dedicated to it and about which certain extracts herein have never before been published. By moving away from the logical and immutable opposition between unity and multiplicity, Bergson invites himself to dissolve temporally the terms which, from at least since Plotinus, have been used to define it. The person, in all its states, substitutes the subject and thinks itself in opposition to its transcendental exile. Essentially : if the person is held by the net of duration, its that it offers in return the place where all its different ecstasies come together. By significating a hard effort that man needs to make to continue being, not just a nature or a right to claim, it is also the place where these ecstasies may untangle themselves. Bergson finds the means to consider madness and how to protect us from it. (shrink)

Ne sachant pas écouter, ils ne savent pas non plus parler (Héraclite). Le langage n’a pas toujours été l’énigme qu’il est devenu pour la pensée occidentale. Il a fallu que la philosophie s’éloigne de la simplicité de sa source grecque. L’incapacité à traduire le terme grec sans le diffracter en une multitude d’approximations – langage, discours, parole, etc. – montre à elle seule l’étendue de la distance qui nous en sépare. Nous avons cessé d’habiter le λόγος. Quand les Grecs avaient (...) une conf... (shrink)

Tantôt nous retenons que Dieu s’est donné au temps de sa venue, mais nous pensons que le don, le message et la vie du Christ sont épuisés. […] Tantôt, en sens inverse, nous oublions que Dieu s’est donné en personne, absolument, pour croire que tout est à inventer, que l’Église n’a pas d’héritage. Sartre nous offre, semble-t-il, les moyens de bien poser le problème de notre incrédulité nouvelle, pour peu qu’on n’appauvrisse pas le sens qu’il a donné à la notion (...) de « mauvaise foi ». Gardons-nou... (shrink)

Que la vie, comme question, ait fini par occuper une place aussi privilégiée au sein de la philosophie française doit d’abord surprendre, s’il faut cumuler les attaques répétées qu’on a portées contre elle, voire les interdits qui ont toujours pesé sur elle. Tout se passe curieusement comme si à l’endroit où son interrogation était la plus menacée, toujours suspecte d’invoquer une signification vague et trompeuse, la notion de vie avait trouvé de quoi se renforcer, en se nourrissant et en se...

Resumo: O texto aqui apresentado analisa aspectos relevantes da complexa relação que Bergson estabelece com Kant. Defende-se a hipótese de que Bergson não pode ser considerado mero adversário do filósofo alemão, mas seu projeto filosófico tem como objetivo retomar a metafísica, levando em consideração os limites que a crítica kantiana lhe impôs. Nesse sentido, a Crítica da Razão Pura, à qual Bergson dedicou sua atenção, serve de guia e apoio para a colocação das questões propriamente metafísicas, as quais a filosofia (...) da duração busca responder. Procuramos mostrar também que, se Bergson criticou Kant em vários momentos da sua obra, foi apenas na medida em que a Crítica o impedia e impedia os outros de avançar. A relação entre as interdições kantianas para a razão especulativa e as ilusões da inteligência dissolvidas em A Evolução Criadora revela como Kant condensa ilusões que existiam antes dele e que, nesse sentido, Bergson não é nem pré-crítico, nem pós-kantiano. Em suma, defendemos que Bergson desloca as análises críticas e rompe com Kant do interior de sua filosofia, que ele divide em duas tendências - uma que ele rejeita, como antiga, outra da qual ele se apropria.: This paper examines important aspects of Bergson's complex relationship with Kant. Our hypothesis defends that Bergson can not be considered a mere opponent of Kant, but that instead his philosophical project aims to renew metaphysics, taking into account the limits that the Kantian critique has imposed. In this sense, the Critique of Pure Reason, to which Bergson devoted his attention, serves as a guide and support for reworking metaphysical questions that the philosophy of duration seeks to answer. We have also shown that if Bergson criticized Kant at various points in his work, it was only to the extent that the Critique was an impediment to moving forward. The relation between Kantian interdictions to speculative reason and the illusions of intelligence dissolved by the analysis of Creative Evolution shows how Kant condenses illusions that existed before him. In in this sense, Bergson is neither pre-critical nor post-Kantian. To sum up, we argue that Bergson displaces critical analysis and breaks with Kant from the inside of Kant's philosophy, which Bergson divides into two tendencies, one that he rejects as old, another that he accepts. (shrink)

In this paper, I support a hybrid view regarding the metaphysics of worlds. I endorse Lewisian Modal Realism for possible worlds (LMR). My aim is to come up with a hybrid account of impossible worlds that provides all the plenitude of impossibilities for all fine-grained intentional contents. I raise several challenges for such a plenitudinous hybrid theory. My version of hybrid modal realism builds impossible worlds as set-theoretic constructions out of genuine individuals and sets of them, that is, as set-theoretic (...) constructions from parts and sets of parts of genuine Lewisian worlds. _Structured worlds_ are defined as sets of tuples: structured entities built out of Lewisian ‘raw material’. These structured worlds are ersatz worlds, some of which are impossible. I claim that propositions must be sets of worlds rather than members of sets. Once the construction is in place, I evaluate the proposal and show that my hybrid account is able to supply a plenitude of impossibilities and thus giving the resources to make all the hyperintensional distinctions we are looking for, whilst remaining Lewisian-conservative. (shrink)

It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a (...) minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism. (shrink)

John Rawls is frequently perceived as being an advocate for purely redistributive policies designed to mitigate the consequences of a capitalist economy — an assumption I challenge in this article. My objective is to elucidate the biased nature of this view and provide a comprehensive analysis of the transformation of the corporate landscape that a just society would entail within Rawls's framework. Through a meticulous examination of Rawls's delineation of economic regimes, I underscore the profound — and often unsuspected — (...) implications of liberal egalitarianism on corporate ownership and management. Rawls's proposition of a “property-owning democracy” posits that citizens should retain ownership of shares in companies throughout their lifetimes. Liberal socialism implies the nationalization of the means of production and the socialization of their management. (shrink)

How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invoking normative facts and properties, or representational relations between normative language and the world, the thought (...) goes, while expressivists appeal instead to desire-like mental states in their explanations of meaning. However, I argue that, if we adopt a deflationary approach to representation and other related notions, there need be no such explanatory divide between expressivism and anything recognizable as a plausible notion of normative realism. Any alleged explanatory criterion for realism will either be incompatible with deflationism, or it will fail to capture some standard versions of normative realism. I conclude that, in a deflationary framework, expressivism is compatible with genuine realism. (shrink)

De la vie sociale à la vie politique, de la psychiatrie à l'agriculture, la normalisation décide de la forme de la pomme, de la psyché et du monde à travers l'imposition de ses modèles et de ses normes. Ce faisant, elle dessine les contours de la marge et de l'anormalité, monde sublunaire et dégradé. Car si les normes, explicites ou tacites, forment et conforment les êtres, les choses et les mots, c'est toujours accompagnée de son contraire que la norme constitue (...) ses objets. La plupart du temps en effet, les normes s'ordonnent à la logique des oppositions binaires qui déclinent leurs valeurs antagonistes, à commencer par celles du normal et de l'anormal. Nous sommes ainsi constitués par des normes qui, infiltrant tout, commandent notre être au monde, c'est-à-dire comment vivre, travailler, penser ou aimer pour participer à la normalisation générale, être normé, normatif et normal. Vagabondant à la marge, l'anomalie a ainsi très mauvaise réputation. Or, si l'anomalie n'est synonyme d'anormalité, voire de monstruosité que du fait d'une erreur étymologique, ce détournement du sens est le symptôme d'une provenance métaphysique plus profonde, selon laquelle hors des normes, théologiques, ontologiques ou logiques, il n'y a rien qui vaille. Il n'empêche que pour Georges Canguilhem, les anomalies biologiques peuvent correspondre à des mutations réussies, lesquelles instaurent alors une nouvelle normativité, tandis que pour Thomas S. Kuhn, les anomalies scientifiques (apparentées aux changements d'aspects étudiés par Ludwig Wittgenstein) sont à l'origine de réformes ou de révolutions. Avec Michel Foucault enfin, ce sont les anomalies littéraires, actes transgressifs, solitaires et précurseurs, qui anticipent le passage d'une épistèmê à une autre. Pluridisciplinaire, indisciplinée, à l'écart des normes mais aussi entre le normal et l'anormal, la puissance de transformation qui caractérise l'anomalie est donc telle qu'il devenait nécessaire et urgent de forger le concept d'anomalie créatrice. S'il est évident qu'il existe des anomalies esthétiques créatrices, cet ouvrage a ici pris un autre point de départ, cherchant à mettre au jour mais aussi à libérer et activer un concept dont on puisse, tôt ou tard, faire également un usage éthique et politique. (shrink)

This book brings together an introduction to the social sciences of religions - intended for the general public, which generally ignores them - in a critical essay in order to update them in the face of a current situation that strongly challenges them and will continue to do so. Indeed, the news of globalization imposes the confusing spectacle of a world of religions caught between the two extremes of forms so exclusivist that they justify violence, even terrorism, and such irenic (...) forms that they seek a spirituality fit to go beyond all borders, even religious ones. The place given to Islam in this way is explained, among other things, because during the conflicts of Salafist jihadist and certain branches of Sufism, it illustrates this contradiction in a particularly strong, but by no means exclusive way. (shrink)

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.

Over the last decade, personalized medicine has become a buzz word, which covers a broad spectrum of meanings and generates many different opinions. The purpose of this article is to achieve a better understanding of the reasons why personalized medicine gives rise to such conflicting opinions. We show that a major issue of personalized medicine is the gap existing between its claims and its reality. We then present and analyze different possible reasons for this gap. We propose an hypothesis inspired (...) by the Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methodology. We argue that the fuzzy situation of personalized medicine results from a mix between idiographic claims and nomothetic methodological procedures. Hence we suggest that the current quandary about personalized medicine cannot be solved without getting involved in a discussion about the complex epistemological and methodological status of medicine. To conclude, we show that the Gadamer’s view of medicine as a dialogical process can be fruitfully used and reveals that personalization is not a theoretical task, but a practical one, which takes place within the clinical encounter. (shrink)

Suppose that there are objective normative facts and our beliefs about such facts are by-and-large true. How did this come to happen? This is the reliability challenge to normative realism. As has been recently noted, the challenge also applies to expressivist “quasi-realism”. I argue that expressivism is useful in the face of this challenge, in a way that has not been yet properly articulated. In dealing with epistemological issues, quasi-realists typically invoke the desire-like nature of normative judgments. However, this is (...) not enough to prevent the reliability challenge from arising, given that quasi-realists also hold that normative judgments are truth-apt beliefs. To defuse this challenge, we need to isolate a deeper sense in which normative thought is not representational. I propose that we rely on the negative functional thesis of expressivism: normative thought does not have the function of tracking normative facts, or any other kind of facts. This thesis supports an argument to the effect that it is misguided to expect an explanation of our access to normative facts akin to the explanations available in regions of thought that have a tracking function. We should be content with explanations of our reliability that take for granted certain connections between our psychology and the normative truths. (shrink)

This article focuses on the ethics of education and training, from an interdisciplinary perspective that is itself structurally embedded in the multi-referential nature of the education and training sciences. We draw on Daniel Sibony's conceptualization of the in-between as a professional position in education and training to consider ways of reconciling educational and training support and proximity with the realities of physical distance in digital interventions, all in an ethical way. We discuss the conditions under which support can be successfully (...) incorporated into distance learning (1), dialecticize presence and digital technology in education and training (2), and finally lay some groundwork for an ethics of benevolent digital support, based on the concept of authority and its mutations in hypermodern democracies (3). (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

A la fin du XIXe siècle, alors que l'Europe assiste au retour triomphal de la métaphysique dont Henri Bergson est une figure de proue, sur le positivisme, l'Espagne de la Restauration bourbonienne fait figure de résistante. La répartition bipolaire de l'intellectualité espagnole, entre les conservateurs néo-thomistes et les réformateurs de plus en plus attirés par la psychologie scientifique notamment, rend le dialogue primordialement impossible avec le bergsonisme. Seul Leopoldo Alas, dit Clarin, tente alors de faire entendre la "philosophie nouvelle", dans (...) son pays. Après que le bergsonisme a été boudé durant ces premières décennies d'existence par l'Espagne, la crise théologique moderniste de 1907 précipite son entrée dans la péninsule. Les premiers acteurs "philosophiques" du bergsonisme sont anti-bergsoniens et catholiques. Cet anti-bergsonisme religieux se double d'un rejet politique, pendant la Grande Guerre, principalement lors de la visite diplomatique de Bergson à Madrid, en mai 1916. Parallèlement, les réformateurs, férus de pédagogie, qui ont créé en 1876 la Institucion Libre de Ensenanza, découvrent la conceptualité bergsonienne qu'ils intègrent progressivement, entre 1900 et 1930, dans leur nouvelle science psychopédagogique. Toutefois, les grands acteurs espagnols de la régénération métaphysique sont les littéraires, les poètes symbolistes, appelés "modernistes" dans ce pays, puis les avant-gardes esthétiques. Ce sont eux qui métabolisent le bergsonisme en une (méta-)physique intime et organique. Ce n'est que dans un second temps, dans les années 1910, et non sans obstacles, que les spécialistes espagnols de philosophie intègrent et diffusent le bergsonisme. (shrink)

Cet article se donne pour objectif de réfléchir à ce que la crise mondiale du Covid-19 a révélé de nos manières d’habiter les lieux où nous vivons, et parmi celles-ci, la pratique de la danse. La démarche adoptée ici est celle d’un dialogue entre trois courants philosophiques spécifiques : la phénoménologie, le pragmatisme et l’écoféminisme, au sujet de leur conception de l’expérience somatique, à la fois vécue, complexe et ordinaire. Nous cherchons ici les lignes communes à ces trois mouvements philosophiques, (...) dans le but d’esquisser une compréhensions nouvelle du corps, et par extension, une nouvelle approche de la danse par temps de crise pandémique. (shrink)

Cet article se donne pour objectif de réfléchir à ce que la crise mondiale du Covid-19 a révélé de nos manières d’habiter les lieux où nous vivons, et parmi celles-ci, la pratique de la danse. La démarche adoptée ici est celle d’un dialogue entre trois courants philosophiques spécifiques : la phénoménologie, le pragmatisme et l’écoféminisme, au sujet de leur conception de l’expérience somatique, à la fois vécue, complexe et ordinaire. Nous cherchons ici les lignes communes à ces trois mouvements philosophiques, (...) dans le but d’esquisser une compréhensions nouvelle du corps, et par extension, une nouvelle approche de la danse par temps de crise pandémique. (shrink)

The commons is a concept increasingly used with the promise of creating new collective wealth. In the aftermath of the economic and financial crises, finance and money have been criticized and redesigned to serve the collective interest. In this article, we analyze three types of complementary currency systems: community currencies, inter-enterprise currencies, and cryptocurrencies. We investigate whether these systems can be considered as commons. To address this question, we use two main theoretical frameworks that are usually separate: the “new commons” (...) in organization studies and the “common good” in business ethics. Our findings show that these monetary systems and organizations may be considered as commons under the “common good” framework since they promote the common interest by creating new communities. Nevertheless, according to the “new commons” framework, only systems relying on collective action and self-management can be said to form commons. This allows us to suggest two new categories of commons: the “social commons,” which fit into both the “new commons” and the “common good” frameworks, and the “commercial commons,” which fit the “common good” but not the “new commons” framework. This research advances a new conceptualization of the commons and of the ethical implications of CCs. (shrink)

Normative naturalism holds that normative properties are identical with, or reducible to, natural properties. Various challenges to naturalism focus on whether it can make good on the idea that normative concepts can be used in systematically different ways and yet have the same reference in all contexts of use. In response to such challenges, some naturalists have proposed that questions about the reference of normative terms should be understood, at least in part, as normative questions that can be settled through (...) normative inquiry. In this paper I have two goals. First, I argue that these naturalist proposals do not yet allow for radical disagreement on normative matters, or at least do not explain how such disagreement is possible. Secondly, I argue that, in order to account for radical disagreement, naturalists should not only treat normative reference as a normative issue but also adopt a non-representationalist account of normative concepts, on which such concepts are individuated through their practical role. I illustrate this point by showing how a view that combines naturalism and expressivism about normative discourse can vindicate the elasticity of normative concepts, their referential stability, and the objectivity of normative truths. (shrink)

The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might say in support of the privileged status of (...) our normative concepts can be mirrored by the imagined community? E.g., the realist might claim that using our concepts is what we ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but members of the other community can claim the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts. (shrink)

The past 10 years have seen considerable developments in the use of narrative in medicine, primarily through the emergence of the so-called narrative medicine. In this article, I question narrative medicine’s self-understanding and contend that one of the most prominent issues is its lack of a clear epistemological framework. Drawing from Gadamer’s work on hermeneutics, I first show that narrative medicine is deeply linked with the hermeneutical field of knowledge. Then I try to identify which claims can be legitimately expected (...) from narrative medicine, and which ones cannot be. I scrutinize in particular whether narrative medicine can legitimately grasp the patient’s lived experience of his or her illness. In the last section of this article, I begin to explore the potential usefulness of this epistemological clarification. This analysis allows for a further understanding of what is really at stake with narrative medicine, and thus to identify when it may be convenient, and when it may not. Furthermore, this clarification opens up promising new possibilities of dialogue with critics of the field. I conclude that narrative medicine finds its proper place as a possible tool available to mediate dialogue, which is at the heart of the clinical encounter in medical practice. (shrink)

It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind of realism on which realist theses are understood as (...) internal to moral discourse―is immune to this challenge, contrary to what some proponents of the moral argument have suggested, while robust non-naturalist realists might have good answers to all versions of the argument as well, at least if they adopt a certain stance on how to form metaphysical beliefs in the moral domain. (shrink)