The paper describes the context and the origin of a particular debate that concerns the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. In 1965, British biologist A. D. Bradshaw proposed a widely cited model intended to explain the evolution of norms of reaction, based on his studies of plant populations. Bradshaw’s model went beyond the notion of the “adaptive norm of reaction” discussed before him by Dobzhansky and Schmalhausen by suggesting that “plasticity” the ability of a phenotype to be modified by the environment (...) should be genetically determined. To prove Bradshaw’s hypothesis, it became necessary for some authors to identify the pressures exerted by natural selection on phenotypic plasticity in particular traits, and thus to model its evolution. In this paper, I contrast two different views, based on quantitative genetic models, proposed in the mid-1980s: Russell Lande and Sara Via’s conception of phenotypic plasticity, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is linked to the evolution of the plastic trait itself, and Samuel Scheiner and Richard Lyman’s view, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is independent from the evolution of the trait. I show how the origin of this specific debate, and different assumptions about the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, depended on Bradshaw’s definition of plasticity and the context of quantitative genetics. (shrink)

In 1956, in his Principles of Embryology, Conrad Hal Waddington explained that the word “epigenetics” should be used to translate and update Wilhelm Roux’ German notion of “Entwicklungsmechanik” to qualify the studies focusing on the mechanisms of development. When Waddington mentioned it in 1956, the notion of epigenetics was not yet popular, as it would become from the 1980s. However, Waddington referred first to the notion in the late 1930s. While his late allusion clearly reveals that Waddington readily associated the (...) notion of epigenetics with the developmental process, in the contemporary uses of the notion this developmental connotation seems to have disappeared. The advent and success of molecular biology have probably contributed to focusing biologists’ attention on the “genetic” or the “non-genetic” over the “developmental”. In the present paper, I first examine the links that exist, in Waddington’s work, between the classical notion of epigenesis in embryology and those of epigenetics that Waddington proposed to connect, and even synthesize, data both from embryology and genetics. Second, I show that Waddington’s own view of epigenetics has changed over time and I analyze how these changes appear through his many representations of the relationships between genetic signals and developmental processes. (shrink)

The concept of plasticity has always been present in the history of developmental biology, both within the theory of epigenesis and within morphogenesis studies. However this tradition relies also upon a genetic conception of plasticity. Founded upon the concepts of ‘‘phenotypic plasticity’’ and ‘‘reaction norm,’’ this genetic conception focuses on the array of possible phenotypic change in relation to diversified environments. Another concept of plasticity can be found in recent publications by some developmental biologists (Gilbert, West-Eberhard). I argue that these (...) authors adopt a ‘‘broad conception of plasticity’’ that is closely related to a notion of development as something that is ongoing throughout an organism’s lifecycle, and has no clear-cut boundaries. However, I suggest that given a narrow conception of plasticity, one can define temporal boundaries for development that are linked to specific features of the morphological process, which are different from behavioral and physiological processes. (shrink)

This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the conceptual history of epigenesis, from Aristotle to Harvey, Cavendish, Kant and Erasmus Darwin, moving into nineteenth-century biology with Wolff, Blumenbach and His, and onto the twentieth century and current issues, with Waddington and epigenetics. The purpose of the topical collection is to emphasize how epigenesis marks the point of intersection of a theory of biological development and a theory of active matter. We also wish to show that the concept (...) of epigenesis existed prior to biological theorization and that it continues to permeate thinking about development in recent biological debates. (shrink)

The biologist Mary Jane West-Eberhard publishes, in 2003, a book, entitled Developmental Plasticity and Evolution, in which a new synthetic approach, integrating development with evolution, is offered. For this reason, the book is seen as a piece of work in the field of Evolutionary developmental biology, commonly known as Evo Devo, whose aim is to synthesize data from both development and evolution. However, West-Eberhard's ambition is much higher in this book because she does not only focus on gathering the data (...) from both fields, but she also wants to formalize a new synthetic theory of evolution, which includes development in its definition. She also explains that, in order to provide such a synthetic theory of evolution, she needs to offer an "inclusive definition of plasticity" in order to avoid "unnecessary distinctions at every turn" even if she assumes that such distinctions may be important for certain points. Our aim, in this article, is to explore the implications and consequences of West-Eberhard's "inclusive definition of plasticity" in such an attempt of a new synthesis of evolutionary theory, including development. (shrink)

This special issue of Biological Theory is focused on development; it raises the problem of the temporal and spatial boundaries of development. From a temporal point of view, when does development start and stop? From a spatial point of view, what is it exactly that "develops", and is it possible to delineate clearly the developing entity? This issue explores the possible answers to these questions, and thus sheds light on the definition of development itself.

The heterogeneity problem, which stems from the alleged difficulty of finding out what all pleasant experiences have in common, is largely considered as a substantial issue in the philosophy of pleasure, one that is usually taken as the starting point for theorizing about the essence of pleasure. The goal of this paper is to move the focus away from the heterogeneity problem and toward an alternative approach to pleasure. To do this, I first show that, although the approach stemming from (...) the heterogeneity problem has led to an interesting discussion about the essence of pleasure, it has usually endorsed an introspectionist methodology and other problematic assumptions that have led to doubtful results. I thus propose a natural-kind approach to pleasure, which seeks to determine what, if any, the natural kind of pleasure would consist in. This approach broadens the investigation of pleasure by enabling the use of a larger range of methodological tools, thus opening new promising directions for research. (shrink)

One of the main objections against effective altruism is the so-called institutional critique, according to which the EA movement neglects interventions that affect large-scale institutions. Alexander Dietz has recently put forward an interesting version of this critique, based on a theoretical problem affecting act-utilitarianism, which he deems as potentially conclusive against effective altruism. In this article I argue that his critique is not as promising as it seems. I then go on to propose another version of the institutional critique. In (...) contrast to Dietz's version, it targets not the core principles of effective altruism but rather some important methodological assumptions made in EA research, namely diminishing marginal returns and low-hanging fruits. One key conclusion is that it may be time for critics of effective altruism to shift their attention from the theoretical core principles of effective altruism towards the methodological tools actually employed in practice by the EA movement. (shrink)

Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as intuitively attractive as it is controversial. It is notably at the core of defences of anti-physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness, stand in relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to be fixed by (...) what their relata are. I argue that, under some plausible additional premises, no account of what grounds these relations in the essence of their relata is consistent with Revelation, at least if we take common phenomenological descriptions for granted. As a result, the plausibility of Revelation is undermined. One might however resist this conclusion by weakening the epistemic relation postulated between subjects and their phenomenal properties. (shrink)

L'hédonisme axiologique a une longue histoire en philosophie. Pourtant, il garde une mauvaise réputation qui lui vaut d’être parfois écarté sans ménagement de la discussion philosophique. Cet article se propose de défendre l'hédonisme axiologique en exposant les principaux arguments en sa faveur et en répondant aux principales critiques et confusions dont il fait l'objet. Une attention particulière sera portée aux arguments établissant la spécificité du plaisir et du déplaisir par rapport à toutes les autres choses — amitié, savoir, justice, etc. (...) — dont on pourrait argumenter la valeur finale.While axiological hedonism has a long history in philosophy, it also has a bad reputation, which has led to it being discarded without proper examination of its plausibility. In this article, I defend axiological hedonism by presenting the main arguments in its favour as well as the criticisms and confusions to which it has been subjected. I pay special attention to the arguments that hint at the specificity of pleasure and displeasure in comparison with other things — friendship, knowledge, justice, etc. — that might be argued to have final value. (shrink)

První monografický pokus z pera českého marxistického filosofa usiluje ozřejmit zásadní význam fenomenologie a poukázat na možnosti jejího využití ve vzájemné diskusi s marxismem. Po celkové charakteristice Husserlovyfilosofie z hlediska jejích vlastních imanentních principů vysvětluje koncepci intersubjektivity. Poslední část knihy je zasvěcena otázkám kritiky imanentní (a s ní související konfrontaci s Heideggerovým a Sartrovým pojetím) imarxistické. Podle autora je pro marxistickou filosofii z fenomenologie nejdůležitější způsob, jakým se dotazuje po problému objektivace.

Demuth tests generalize Martin-Löf tests in that one can exchange the m-th component a computably bounded number of times. A set fails a Demuth test if Z is in infinitely many final versions of the Gm. If we only allow Demuth tests such that GmGm+1 for each m, we have weak Demuth randomness.We show that a weakly Demuth random set can be high and , yet not superhigh. Next, any c.e. set Turing below a Demuth random set is strongly jump-traceable.We (...) also prove a basis theorem for non-empty classes P. It extends the Jockusch–Soare basis theorem that some member of P is computably dominated. We use the result to show that some weakly 2-random set does not compute a 2-fixed point free function. (shrink)

Kuera, A., On relative randomness, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 63 61–67. It is the aim of the paper to answer a question raised by M. van Lambalgen and D. Zambella whether there can be a nonrecursive set A having the property that there is a set B such that B is 1-random relative to A and simultaneously A is recursive in B. We give apositive answer to this question as well as further information about relative randomness.

A positive answer to a question of M. van Lambalgen and D. Zambella whether there exist nonrecursive sets that are low for the class of random sets is obtained. Here a set A is low for the class RAND of random sets if RAND = RAND A.

We show that there is a low T-upper bound for the class of K-trivial sets, namely those which are weak from the point of view of algorithmic randomness. This result is a special case of a more general characterization of ideals in $\Delta _2^0 $ T-degrees for which there is a low T-upper bound.

How do we understand the world around us? How do we solve problems? Often the answer to these questions follows a certain pattern, an algorithm if you wish. This is the case when our analytical left-brain side is at work. However, there are also elements in our behaviour where intelligence appears to follow a more elusive path, which cannot easily be characterised as a specific sequence of steps. Is Intelligence an Algorithm? offers an insight into intelligence as it functions in (...) nature, like human or animal intelligence, but also sheds light on modern developments in the field of artificial intelligence, proposing further architectural solutions for the creation of a so-called global Webmind"--Amazon.com. (shrink)

Proceeding in the theory with extensionality, comprehension for classes, existence of the empty set and the assumption the addition of one element to a set makes again a set we show a week assumption which guarantees existence of a saturated elementary extension of the system of hereditarily finite sets.

Osvald Demuth studied constructive analysis from the viewpoint of the Russian school of constructive mathematics. In the course of his work he introduced various notions of effective null set which, when phrased in classical language, yield a number of major algorithmic randomness notions. In addition, he proved several results connecting constructive analysis and randomness that were rediscovered only much later.In this paper, we trace the path that took Demuth from his constructivist roots to his deep and innovative work on the (...) interactions between constructive analysis, algorithmic randomness, and computability theory. We will focus specifically on Demuth’s work on the differentiability of Markov computable functions and his study of constructive versions of the Denjoy alternative, Demuth’s independent discovery of the main notions of algorithmic randomness, as well as the development of Demuth randomness, and the interactions of truth-table reducibility, algorithmic randomness, and semigenericity in Demuth’s work. (shrink)

Quand nous lisons un livre passionnant, quand nous passons une bonne soirée avec des amis ou quand nous dégustons des mets raffinés, nous nous trouvons parfois dans un état de plaisir. La notion de plaisir traverse de nombreux champs de recherche en philosophie. Une question centrale reste sans doute celle de sa nature : qu’est-ce donc que le plaisir ? Pour y répondre, une comparaison avec d'autres entités mentales plus familières se révèle fructueuse, et permet de mettre à jour ses (...) spécificités propres. La définition du plaisir doit rendre compte de sa diversité, puisque le plaisir semble toujours se présenter sous des formes multiples : qu'y a-t-il de commun parmi toutes les instances de plaisir ? Par ailleurs, le plaisir semble souvent avoir un objet, ce qui soulève une série de questions : Quel type de chose peut être un objet du plaisir ? Dans quelle mesure l'objet du plaisir constitue-t-il le plaisir lui-même ? Plus généralement, quelle est la nature du lien entre le plaisir et son objet ? Ces questions seront abordées dans la Section 1. Au-delà de ces questions définitionnelles, des questions plus spécifiques se posent concernant la manière dont on peut rendre compte du plaisir dans une optique naturaliste : dans quelle mesure le plaisir est-il une entité qui s’intègre dans une image unifiée du monde dans lequel on vit ? Puisqu'il est généralement entendu que la science manifeste cette ambition unificatrice, comment peut-on rendre compte du plaisir de manière scientifique ? La Section 2 est dédiée à ces questions. Une des principales difficultés rencontrées est que le plaisir ne semble pas neutre. Il paraît plutôt avoir une valeur affective positive, dans un sens qui reste bien sûr à éclaircir. Cette valeur se manifeste d'abord dans le fait que le plaisir est susceptible d'orienter nos actions et réactions : nous sommes typiquement attirés par le plaisir, de la même manière que nous cherchons à éviter la souffrance. C'est l'aspect motivationnel du plaisir. La valeur affective du plaisir semble cependant aller au-delà de son rôle motivationnel, pour donner lieu à des caractéristiques normatives. Non seulement le plaisir motive certaines actions, mais il les justifierait aussi, en fournissant des raisons d'agir qui semblent valides. Plus encore, le plaisir semble bon pour nous, ou nous faire du bien. Il semble donc avoir une valeur prudentielle, en ce qu'il contribuerait à rendre notre vie meilleure. Cela pourrait alors justifier son intégration dans le domaine de la morale. Ces considérations seront l’objet de la Section 3. (shrink)

Algorithmic decision making is used in an increasing number of fields. Letting automated processes take decisions raises the question of their accountability. In the field of computational journalism, the algorithmic accountability framework proposed by Diakopoulos formalizes this challenge by considering algorithms as objects of human creation, with the goal of revealing the intent embedded into their implementation. A consequence of this definition is that ensuring accountability essentially boils down to a transparency question: given the appropriate reverse-engineering tools, it should be (...) feasible to extract design criteria and to identify intentional biases. General limitations of this transparency ideal have been discussed by Ananny and Crawford :973–989, 2018). We further focus on its technical limitations. We show that even if reverse-engineering concludes that the criteria embedded into an algorithm correspond to its publicized intent, it may be that adversarial behaviors make the algorithm deviate from its expected operation. We illustrate this issue with an automated news recommendation system, and show how the classification algorithms used in such systems can be fooled with hard-to-notice modifications of the articles to classify. We therefore suggest that robustness against adversarial behaviors should be taken into account in the definition of algorithmic accountability, to better capture the risks inherent to algorithmic decision making. We finally discuss the various challenges that this new technical limitation raises for journalism practice. (shrink)

L’hédonisme éthique est la théorie selon laquelle les seules choses qui ont de la valeur finale, respectivement positive et négative, sont le plaisir et le déplaisir. Une grande partie du débat philosophique autour de l’hédonisme éthique s’est concentrée sur la nature de ces états affectifs. Cet article se propose de revisiter cette question en examinant les relations entre l’hédonisme éthique et la philosophie du plaisir et de la douleur. L’hédonisme éthique est traditionnellement associé à une théorie qui conçoit le plaisir (...) comme une qualité phénoménale, mais cette théorie est loin de faire l’unanimité. Nous montrerons que la plupart des théories récentes les plus prometteuses en philosophie du plaisir et de la douleur sont en fait incompatibles avec l’hédonisme éthique, ce qui place l’hédoniste dans une position difficile. (shrink)

Le messianisme a souvent été, dans l’histoire du judaïsme, le nom de moments de crise et de renversement de la tradition. Au sein de la modernité juive, il revient particulièrement à Levinas et à Benjamin de retravailler la notion de messianisme pour tenter d’en actualiser la portée éthique et politique dans une optique offensive vis-à-vis du politique. On se propose ici d’approfondir le dialogue entre ces deux auteurs sur la question du messianisme éthique afin d’y trouver un possible renouvellement de (...) la pensée révolutionnaire, mais aussi pour questionner la violence propre de la révolution et pour signaler les premiers jalons d’une pensée de la communauté éthique et messianique. (shrink)

Semantic deference allows for the meaning of a word w a speaker uses to be determined by the way other speakers would understand or use w. That semantic deference has some role to play in semantic content attributions is intuitive enough. Nevertheless, the exact conditions under which semantic deference takes place are still open for discussion. A key issue that the article critically examines is Recanati’s requirement that deferential uses be grounded, that is, that deferential uses be linked to non-deferential (...) uses (Recanati 1997; 2000). After distinguishing between semantic and epistemic deference, I submit that the only way to maintain the Groundedness Thesis for truly semantic deference is to allow deference to idealized future linguistic collectives. I conclude that this is too high a price to pay for Groundedness and I suggest that it should be rejected as a semantic thesis. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Polemical terms constitute a special category of polysemous terms. Like all polysemous terms, their use evidences a plurality of conventionalised senses that are felt to be related to one another and, possibly, to a highly abstract core meaning. However, in contrast with ordinary polysemous terms such as rubbish or mouth, polemical terms have something ‘polemical’ about what counts as their primary sense, i.e. the one which is the most faithful to the ‘concept’ they express and to the ‘topic’ they (...) pick out. This poses a challenge for theories that take speakers’ monosemic intuitions seriously and endorse the externalist thesis that it is speakers’ external environment that anchors word meaning in a univocal way. I consider Schroeter and Schroeter’s ‘connectedness model’, which offers an externalist dissociation between ‘concepts’ and the possibly diverging criteria used by speakers. I argue that the model can be adapted to tackle the problem of polemical terms, but only insofar as the assumption of alignment between externalistic concepts and lexical meanings is dropped. I submit that polemical terms do have an abstract core meaning, but of a more impressionistic than conceptual nature. (shrink)

I. Le ferment évangélique. L'élaboration séculaire. La synthèse thomiste. 2. éd.--II. L'âge moderne.