Auf die metatheoretische Diskussion der deutschen Gegenwartspadagogik haben Kritische Theorie und Kritischer Rationalismus einen pragenden Einfluss. Die Untersuchung beleuchtet die Moglichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer Rationalitat anhand eines kritischen interparadigmatischen Vergleichs. Dieser ist thematisch konzentriert auf Probleme der erzieherischen Zielreflexion.".

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der philosophische Identitätskern (...) dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der philosophische Identitätskern (...) dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)

This paper provides new tools for philosophical argument analysis and fresh empirical foundations for ‘critical’ ordinary language philosophy. Language comprehension routinely involves stereotypical inferences with contextual defeaters. J.L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia first mooted the idea that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from verbal case-descriptions drive some philosophical paradoxes; these engender philosophical problems that can be resolved by exposing the underlying fallacies. We build on psycholinguistic research on salience effects to explain when and why even perfectly competent speakers cannot help making (...) stereotypical inferences which are contextually inappropriate. We analyse a classical paradox about perception, suggest it relies on contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance-verbs, and show that the conditions we identified as leading to contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are met in formulations of the paradox. Three experiments use a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task to document the predicted inappropriate inferences, in English, German, and Japanese. The cross-linguistic study allows us to assess the wider relevance of the proposed analysis. Our findings open up new perspectives for ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy. (shrink)

“Philosophical Anthropology,” which is reconstructed here, does not deal with anthropology as a philosophical subdiscipline but rather as a particular philosophical approach within twentieth-century German philosophy, connected with thinkers such as Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen. This paper attempts a more precise description of the core identity of Philosophical Anthropology as a paradigm, observes the differences between the authors within the paradigm, and differentiates the paradigm as a whole from other twentieth-century philosophical approaches, such as transcendental philosophy, evolutionary (...) theory or naturalism, existentialism, and hermeneutic philosophy. In determining the human being as “excentric positionality,” Philosophical Anthropology arrives at unique categorical intertwinings between the biological, social and cultural sciences. (shrink)

​„Plessner in Wiesbaden“ schildert das Leben und Werk eines Philosophen und Soziologen (1892-1985), der das 20. Jahrhundert durchlebt, durchlitten und durchdacht hat. Ausgangspunkt ist das jüngere Interesse seiner Geburts- und Heimatstadt an dem großen Sohn der Stadt, das sich in der Stiftung eines „Wiesbadener Plessner Preises“ manifestiert. Damit wird ein Schlüsseldenker der modernen Philosophischen Anthropologie gewürdigt. Neben einigen Beiträgen zu Plessner in Wiesbaden enthält der Band auch Beiträge zu Plessners anderen Lebens- und Wirkungsstationen wie Heidelberg, Erlangen, Köln, Groningen, Göttingen, New (...) York, Zürich. In diesen Stationen und ihren Facetten wird deutlich, warum Helmuth Plessner einer der maßgebenden Intellektuellen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland werden konnte.​. (shrink)

Nicolai Hartmann, einer der bedeutendsten Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts, zeichnet das Bemühen um eine Rekonstruktion der philosophischen Tradition in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Wissenschaften aus. Er hat, um diesen Gedanken zu unterstreichen, das Wort "systematische Philosophie" geprägt. Die Praxis systematischen Philosophierens wird erstmals in der hier in kommtierter Fassung vorgelegten Auswahl der "Cirkel-Protokolle" fassbar. Es handelt sich um das Dokument eines Disputierkreises, den Hartmann von 1920 bis 1950 geleitet hat. Hartmann hat in seiner Marburger, Kölner, Berliner und Göttinger Zeit mit (...) einem wechselnden Kreis von persönlich eingeladenen Studenten, Studentinnen und älteren Schülern zu verschiedenen philosophischen Themen und Problemen Gespräche geführt. Aufgrund ihrer dialogischen Form geben die im Nachlass Hartmanns befindlichen Cirkelprotokolle einen unvergleichlichen Einblick in die geistige Kultur des 20. Jahrhunderts. (shrink)

Behaviour is a key term in Plessner’s philosophical biology and anthropology. »Eccentric positionality« means the embeddedness of all human modes of be- haviour in the spectrum of animal behaviour (centric positionality) and at the same time the evoulutionary emergence of original patterns of human behaviour (via eccentricity). This paper aims at showing that if one considers Plessners main oeuvres rather systematically than chronologically they can be seen as exemplary realisations of Plessner’s theory of behaviour.

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 155-174.

In contrast to the successful previous year, 2020 turned out to be difficult, not only for the earth’s population due to COVID-19 but also for JDDM with an unusually small sixth volume. Looking back at these two very different years back-to-back led us to some reflection: As the COVID-19 pandemic forcefully illustrates, dynamic decision-making with all its complications and uncertainty is a topic of high relevance for modern societies.

Meister Eckhart war ein eigenstandiger Denker der abendlandischen Philosophie und Theologie, der als solcher noch nicht wirksam erfasst wurde - was mit den kirchlichen Prozessen und der Rezeption zusammenhangt, die ihn mit mystischen Schwarmereien in Verbindung gebracht hat. Dem "Aufbruch Meister Eckharts ins 21. Jahrhundert" (Georg Steer), den man dennoch erhoffen kann, soll dieser Band dienen. Dazu gehoren die Besinnung auf die grosse abendlandische Tradition (mit Aristoteles, Plotin, Origenes, Dionysius, Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin), Textinterpretationen und die unmittelbare Wirkungsgeschichte (Heinrich (...) Seuse, Nikolaus von Kues, Martin Luther) sowie die denkerische Beziehung zu epochalen Figuren (Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl). Schliesslich erfolgt ein Blick auf die Eckhart-Rezeption durch Rainer Maria Rilke, Martin Heidegger, Karl Rahner, Bernhard Welte und Joachim Kopper und auf die Beziehung zum zen-buddhistischen und konfuzianischen Denken. (shrink)

Originally a student of Marburg Neo-Kantianism, Nicolai Hartmann departed from this tradition to become one of the leading German philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century. He wrote on all the major fields of philosophy, including the philosophy of history, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, although his central interest was ontology. He held teaching posts in Marburg, Cologne, Berlin, and Göttingen, and was president of the German Philosophical Association after the Second World War. Perhaps unique among his peers, he (...) spearheaded the resurgence of ontology by developing a pluralistic, humanistic realism that attempted to do justice to both the sciences and the humanities.Over the last... (shrink)

This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control, and moral accountability. The (...) essays seek to provide a foundation for our practices of holding each other (and ourselves) morally and legally accountable for our behavior. A crucial move is the distinction between two kinds of control. According to Fischer, "regulative control" involves freedom to choose and do otherwise ("alternative possibilities"), whereas "guidance control" does not. Fischer contends that guidance control is all the freedom we need to be morally responsible agents. Further, he contends that such control is fully compatible with causal determinism. Additionally, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alternative possibilities in order for there to be a legitimate point to practical reasoning. Fischer's overall framework contains an argument for the contention that guidance control, and not regulative control, is associated with moral responsibility, a sketch of a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility (that ties together responsibility for actions, omissions, consequences, and character), and an account of the value of moral responsibility. On this account, the value of exhibiting freedom (of the relevant sort) and thus being morally responsible for one's behavior is a species of the value of artistic self-expression. (shrink)

In this paper I explore in a preliminary way the interconnections among narrative explanation, narrative value, free will, an immortality. I build on the fascinating an suggestive work of David Velleman. I offer the hypothesis that our acting freely is what gives our lives a distinctive kind of value - narrative value. Free Will, then, is connected to the capacity to lead a meaningful life in a quite specific way: it is the ingredient which, when aded to others, enows us (...) with a meaning over an above the cumulative value erived from ading together levels of momentary welfare. In acting freely, we are writing a sentence in the story of our lives, and the value of acting freely is thus a species of the value of artistic creativity or self-expression (understood appropriately). Finally, I contend that the fact that our lives are stories need not entail that they have endings, or that immortality would necessarily be unimaginable or essentially different from ordinary, finite human life. Yes, a certain sort of narrative understanding of our lives as a whole would be impossible in the context of immortality; but much of what we care about, and value, in our stories might remain. (shrink)

I am going to argue that it is a cost of libertarianism that it holds our status as agents hostage to theoretical physics, but that claim has met with disagreement. Some libertarians regard it as the cost of doing business, not a philosophical liability. By contrast, Peter van Inwagen has addressed the worry head on. He says that if he were to become convinced that causal determinism were true, he would not change his view that humans are free and morally (...) responsible. Rather, he would give up at least one of the formerly-thought-to-be a priori truths that are elements in his argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the relevant sort of freedom. Thus, according to van Inwagen, our status as free and morally responsible agents would not be held hostage to the physicists or hang on a thread I think that van Inwagen’s strategy for securing our freedom and responsibility is unattractive. Somewhat tendentiously, I have called the rejection of an a priori ingredient in the incompatibilist’s argument, contingent upon learning that causal determinism is true, ‘metaphysical fip-flopping.’ -/- And it does seem that van Inwagen’s approach is implausible insofar as he is open to such metaphysical fip-fopping. That he is open to it—that he would fip-fop if he became convinced of the truth of causal determinism—is a problem for his actual philosophical position. Or so I will argue. (shrink)