This volume provides a philosophical introduction to and analysis of the study of metaphor. By proceeding from the concrete analysis of complex metaphors, White is able to identify a range of features which are incompatible with standard accounts of the way words function in metaphor.

Introduction -- The mathematical roots of the concept of analogy -- Aristotle : the uses of analogy -- Aristotle : analogy and language -- Thomas Aquinas -- Immanuel Kant -- Karl Barth -- Final reflections.

Traditionally, the dominant theory of metaphor has taken the form of saying that metaphor is a matter of using a word with a figurative meaning, that is, a meaning which deviates from standard, literal, meaning. The present article challenges the assumption on which such a characterization rests: that there are standard meanings for words fixed by conventions normative for our use of words. It argues that the most sophisticated defence of such a conception of meaning‐that of David Lewis‐gives an account (...) of convention that cannot be coherently applied to the case of language, and which misdescribes the phenomena of language. The fluidity and flexibility exhibited in our normal literal uses of words is such that to say that a meaning deviates from past meanings assigned to a word registers no contrast between the metaphorical use of words and the literal. Hence if we contrast the literal and the metaphorical, we must do it in some other way than by talking about what happens to the meanings of words. (shrink)

As part of a review symposium on DARWIN'S ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY: FROM ARTIFICIAL TO NATURAL SELECTION (2021), the journal METASCIENCE invited Roger White, Jon Hodge and me to submit a response to the thoughtful commentaries on our book by Andrea Sullivan-Clarke, David Depew and Andrew Inkpen.

Peter Geach frequently showed the relevance of some of Frege's insights to contemporary philosophical debates, such as that which Geach called “the Frege Point” – “a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition”. Geach argued against a variety of “expressivist” accounts of certain propositions that their proponents could not explain the significance of such propositions in subordinate clauses. The paper extends Geach's argument to show that “the Frege Point” presents a powerful (...) challenge to any attempt, such as those influenced by the later Wittgenstein, to equate meaning with use. (shrink)

We examine the relation between worker substance abuse and workplace fraud in a sample of medical doctors. Relative to their peers, we observe that doctors engaging in substance abuse are between 50 and 100 times more likely to commit fraud in a given year. This result is consistent with research suggesting that substance abuse both creates financial pressures and impairs the functioning of cognitive self-regulatory mechanisms. Our results are robust in within-subject tests and between-subject tests, as well as in tests (...) using instrumental variables that exploit exogenous variation in the state-level availability of opioids, a commonly abused substance. (shrink)

This chapter provides us with an appropriate way in to the logic of the Tractatus. Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica was an attempt to vindicate “logicism”, the claim that truths of mathematics were disguised truths of logic. To overcome Russell's paradox, Russell had introduced the “theory of types”, stratifying sets, and with that the properties of sets. The resulting system was too weak to generate number theory without the addition of further axioms, including the “Axiom of Reducibility”. This chapter examines (...) the logical apparatus of language, “the logical constants” starting with what at one point Ludwig Wittgenstein calls his “fundamental thought” that the logical constants do not stand for anything. Wittgenstein stresses that operations are quite different from Russellian propositional functions. Wittgenstein's task is to introduce a single logical constant that is truth‐functional and in terms of which the whole of standard Fregean logic can be defined. (shrink)

In On the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin put forward his theory of natural selection. Conventionally, Darwin's argument for this theory has been understood as based on an analogy with artificial selection. But there has been no consensus on how, exactly, this analogical argument is supposed to work – and some suspicion too that analogical arguments on the whole are embarrassingly weak. Drawing on new insights into the history of analogical argumentation from the ancient Greeks onward, as well as on (...) in-depth studies of Darwin's public and private writings, this book offers an original perspective on Darwin's argument, restoring to view the intellectual traditions which Darwin took for granted in arguing as he did. From this perspective come new appreciations not only of Darwin's argument but of the metaphors based on it, the range of wider traditions the argument touched upon, and its legacies for science after the Origin. (shrink)

Political corruption imposes substantial costs on shareholders in the U.S. Yet, we understand little about the basic factors that exacerbate or mitigate the value consequences of political corruption. Using federal corruption convictions data, we find that firm-level economic rents and monitoring mechanisms moderate the negative relation between corruption and firm value. The value consequences of political corruption are exacerbated for firms operating in low-rent product markets and mitigated for firms subject to external monitoring by state governments or monitoring induced by (...) disclosure transparency. Our results should inform managers and policymakers of the tradeoffs imposed on firms operating in politically corrupt districts. (shrink)

In On the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin put forward his theory of natural selection. Conventionally, Darwin's argument for this theory has been understood as based on an analogy with artificial selection. But there has been no consensus on how, exactly, this analogical argument is supposed to work – and some suspicion too that analogical arguments on the whole are embarrassingly weak. Drawing on new insights into the history of analogical argumentation from the ancient Greeks onward, as well as on (...) in-depth studies of Darwin's public and private writings, this book offers an original perspective on Darwin's argument, restoring to view the intellectual traditions which Darwin took for granted in arguing as he did. From this perspective come new appreciations not only of Darwin's argument but of the metaphors based on it, the range of wider traditions the argument touched upon, and its legacies for science after the Origin. (shrink)

I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...) any causally relevant information, I’ve given my grounds for my belief. I’ve given reasons that might justify me in supposing that Tom’s baby is a boy. Less naturally, the question might be taken as a request for a broader causal explanation of my holding this belief. Appropriate answers might cite all manner of facts concerning the evolution of the human race, why I chose to pursue philosophy and hence came to know Tom, the mechanisms of email transmission, the firing of various neurons, the circumstances of concept formation as a result of which I’m able to grasp the thought that Tom’s baby is a boy, and so on. It is an interesting question what distinguishes the narrower set of answers that I first suggested. I won’t pursue that here. I assume you have a good enough sense of the distinction I’m drawing. We might call the narrower set of answers justifying reasons, the kind of reasons I might cite in justifying my belief. Answers of the first sort are clearly relevant to epistemological evaluation. In assessing whether you know p or are rational in believing it to the degree you do, I will naturally want to consider what reasons you have for your belief. In deliberating myself about whether to believe p, in seeking an answer to the question of whether p, I will naturally consider what reasons or grounds I have to suppose that p. But what I want to focus on here is how explanations of the broader sort bear on such questions as whether to believe p. From a third-person perspective we can ask, ‘In assessing the epistemic status of S’s belief that p, what is the relevance of causal information that lies outside of the realm of justifying reasons?’ From the first-person standpoint we can ask ‘In seeking to answer whether p, how should such causal information affect my deliberations?’ At first it might seem that such broader causal information could have little relevance if any. Like any belief my belief that p can be traced back to innumerable causes from far and wide.. (shrink)

Inleiding wetenschapsfilosofie voor 3e jaarsstudenten wis- en natuurkunde aan de TH Delft en Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Review of Roger M. White, Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: A Reader's Guide.

"We wish this volume to be a sure companion to the study of free will, broadly construed to include action theory, moral and legal responsibility, and cohort studies feathering off into adjacent fields in the liberal arts and sciences. In addition to general coverage of the discipline, this volume attempts a more challenging and complementary accompaniment to many familiar narratives about free will. In order to map out some directions such accompaniment will take, in this introduction we anchor the thirty (...) contributions to this volume in some common history from which they arise, and attempt to indicate where future work in free will and moral responsibility will–and has already begun to–depart from that history." -Excerpt from Introduction. ... ... To read full introduction, (1) download attached file or (2) follow wiley_dot_com link below, click "Read An Excerpt", then click :Excerpt 3:(pdf)". (shrink)

This paper argues that, in addition to humanitarian concerns, policies toward immigrants should also be shaped by recognition of special responsibilities toward some populations of noncitizens. National governments acquire such responsibilities in part through their histories of coercive impositions on those populations. Former imperial powers, in particular, often possess special obligations toward the inhabitants of their foreign colonies that go beyond their general humanitarian responsibilities. Those obligations might be met in various ways; but if national governments of wealthy, formerly imperial (...) states granted greater access for immigration to the poor of their former colonies, migration flows might significantly contribute to reductions in global levels of inequality. (shrink)

SummaryI contend on both theoretical and historical grounds that quantitative risk assessment is relevant for policy determination only as a cost estimate. In particular, it provides a method for estimating the costs of a hypothetical insurance policy against the potential liabilities associated with a given course of action. It is not relevant to the question of rational choice under risk.RésuméJe montre, en partant d'arguments aussi bien théoriques qu'historiques, que le calcul quanti‐tatif des risques n'aide à la détermination d'une politique à (...) suivre qu'en tant qu'estimation des coûts. En particulier, il fournit une méthode pour estimer les primes d'une police hypothétique d'assurance contre les responsabilites potentielles associées à une suite donnée d'actions. 11 ne permet pas un choix rationnel dans des situations comportant des risques.ZusammenfassungIch argumentiere, sowohl aus theoretischen als auch aus historischen Gründen, dass eine quantitative Risikoberechnung für die Wahl einer Handlungsweise nur als Kostenschätzung relevant ist. Namentlich bietet sie eine Methode, um die Prämie einer Versicherungspolice gegen pot‐entielle Haftbarkeit, welche mit den Vorgängen eines Aktionsverlaufs verbunden ist, zu bestim‐men. Bei der Frage einer rationalen Wahl in einer Risikosituation ist sie nicht relevant. (shrink)

Political theorists have argued for and against the propriety of a civic ethics of “public reason” that would set normative bounds on the expression of religious views in the public discourse of government officials and, to a lesser degree, citizens. This essay explores whether critics of ethical restraints on religious discourse have grounds to criticize the religious rhetoric of President George W. Bush. Quantitative and qualitative studies show that Bush has used a distinctive “prophetic” mode of religious expression more often (...) than any modern predecessor. This sort of religious discourse is argued to be ethically dubious from the standpoints of most public reason advocates and most of their critics. Even as it champions democracy and adherence to the plans of divine providence, it discourages and de-legitimates democratic dissent and fails to provide the religious guidance it promises. (shrink)

Authoritarian nationalism is on the rise in many countries around the world, threatening liberal democracies. Many on the left rightly fear that any and all celebrations of national identities risk heightening these dangers. It is questionable, however, whether illiberal nationalism can be defeated politically without some reliance on progressive stories of national identity that advance themes of equality, freedom, and inclusion in ways that resonate with many of the traditions in which those whom progressives seek to mobilize have been raised.

ABSTRACT Few denials of tolerance are more severe than rejection of the moral worth of another’s way of life. In the U.S. today, many traditional religious believers, especially fundamentalist Christians, and many LGBQT+ persons see each other’s ways of life as deeply evil in important respects. These gulfs probably cannot be bridged; but public policies can and should seek to accommodate all claims of conscience as far as this can be done without denying anyone meaningful possession of basic rights. By (...) placing religious and moral consciences equally in a constitutionally “preferred position,” governments can foster a wider sense that citizens are engaged in a shared enterprise of helping everyone to pursue their distinctive forms of happiness. (shrink)

The American Constitution held out the hope that ordinary people were capable of deciding their own fates, and in doing so it immeasurably elevated the dignity of common people. The organization and interplay of the parts that comprise the whole American government exist to provide people the opportunity to govern themselves and, at the same time, reveal the limits of democratic self-rule. The forgetting of these limits is not only destructive to the constitution but the nation as a whole.

Americans have always been divided over whether to welcome or to discourage immigration. But virtually all American leaders have rested their views on notions that the United States has unique providential or world-historical significance-as an asylum for the world's oppressed, as a model to the world, or even as the world's leader. Today, it is normatively desirable for the U.S. to view itself not as the world's "city on a hill" but simply as one worthy political society among many others. (...) Whether such a view can be made politically appealing to most Americans, however, remains in doubt. (shrink)

Subjective probability considered as a logic of partial belief succumbs to three fundamental fallacies. These concern the representation of preference via expectation, the measurability of partial belief, and the normalization of belief.

Michael Sandel's Democracy's Discontent traces America's woes to an erosion of community and a loss of a sense of collective self‐governance. He recommends a more communitarian, republican public philosophy as the cure. His book illuminates many important historical and contemporary issues, particularly the link between systems of political economy and visions of citizenship. His methods are, however, too impressionistic to support his empirical claims. He particularly neglects the role of civic republicanism in America's history of racial, gender, and religious discrimination. (...) Hence his call for Americans to minimize liberal doctrines of individual rights in favor of communally minded republicanism is not fully persuasive. (shrink)