RésuméCeci est une réponse à l'étude critique de Vance Maxwell, «Making God Go Away», consacrée au livre de Leslie Armour, Being and IdeaLa discussion porte sur la question suivante : est-ilpossible qu'il y ait une signification transcendante à nos vies sans un Dieu tyrannique? Le livre traitait, de manière centrale, du fait que les réponses affirmatives à cette question exigent une unification du savoir. Maxwell suggère que le livre est un commentaire de Spinoza et de Hegel—malgré son soustitre (...) :Developments of Some Themes in Spinoza and HegelEt il ignore la tentative qui s'y trouve poursuivie de construire un systeme nouveau. Le preésent article explique ce système et défend certaines lectures de Spinoza. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Ceci est une réponse à l’étude critique de Vance Maxwell, «Making God Go Away», consacrée au livre de Leslie Armour, Being and Idea. La discussion porte sur la question suivante: est-il possible qu’il y ait une signification transcendante à nos vies sans un Dieu tyrannique? Le livre traitait, de manière centrale, du fait que les réponses affirmatives à cette question exigent une unification du savoir. Maxwell suggère que le livre est un commentaire de Spinoza et de Hegel (...) — malgré son soustitre: Developments of Some Themes in Spinoza and Hegel. Et il ignore la tentative qui s’y trouve poursuivie de construire un système nouveau. Le présent article explique ce système et défend certaines lectures de Spinoza. (shrink)

The wager fragment in Blaise Pascal’s _Penseés _opens with the phrase "_infini rien_"—"infinite nothing"—which is meant to describe the human condition. Pascal was responding to what was, even in the seventeenth century, becoming a pressing human problem: we seem to be able to know much about the world but less about ourselves. The traditional European view of human beings as creatures made in the image of God and potentially capable of a mystical union with God was increasingly confounded by the (...) difficulty of finding God in nature. Despite his own scientific work, however, Pascal argued that if one does not know whether or not God exists, one should bet that he does: if one is right the rewards are infinitely good and, if one is wrong, what one has lost is, by comparison, utterly trivial. The argument behind this wager is one of the most celebrated—and disputed—in the history of philosophy. It has been seen in terms of the calculus of probabilities, as a piece of religious apologetic, as an event in the religious and psychological life of Pascal himself, and as an event in the life of the Jansenist movement and its various expressions at Port-Royal. In this book, Leslie Armour explores the underlying logic of ideas brought to the surface by the intersection of two philosophical lines of thought. He shows that Pascal had come to philosophy by way of two particular strands of Platonism, one strongly mystical, associated with the founder of the French Oratorian order, Pierre de Bérulle, and the other the Augustinian Platonism associated with Duvergier de Hauranne and Cornelius Jansen. At the same time Pascal was engaged in an internal struggle with skepticism. While he agreed that it is difficult to find God in physical nature, he disagreed with the claim that we know nothing of nature. The problem is that the human being is both infinite and nothing. Thus, Armour locates Pascal’s wager within the confluence of a vital neo-Platonism and an intellectually powerful skepticism. He concludes that even today, "If we must act and cannot know enough, we must bet.". (shrink)

In this very readable and challenging work, Armour's approach is three-sided: to examine Hegel's objections to elements of Spinoza's accounts of knowledge and reality, to analyze the problems in Hegel's own system, and to propose a system that resolves some of these questions. Throughout, Armour is clear and thorough in his analysis, and his proposed system should engender valuable discussion among scholars. It is a treat to see metaphysics still being practiced, in spite of recent claims by many (...) analytic philosophers that this particular area of philosophical thought is dead. (shrink)

Mr. Mathien asks for evidence that there is Canadian philosophy in a special sense. He is not concerned with questions about whether people who were Canadians, or lived out much or most of their working lives in Canada, wrote philosophy which deserves to be taken seriously. Rather, he asks whether what has gone on in Canada by way of philosophy can be assembled in such a way as to make a coherent discipline.

In our article, “The Faces of Reason and Its Critics”, Dialogue 25/1, 105–118, Elizabeth Trott and I said that, in his presidential address to the Canadian Philosophical Association, Francis Sparshott “mysteriously seemed to have confused … John Clark Murray … with John Macmurray”. In footnote 6, we reported Martyn Estall's theory that there might, indeed, have been no confusion because Sparshott probably did mean Macmurray who was being “promoted” at Queen's at the time. Professor Sparshott reports that Professor Estall's surmise (...) is the correct solution to the “mystery”. He also reminds us that, when he came to Canada in 1950 he was at University College, Toronto. Later, from 1955 onwards, he was John Irving's colleague at Victoria College. (shrink)

I shall argue that Bradley needs a way of expressing logical tensions between apparently conflicting judgements, a way which will render them intelligible and non-contradictory. I shall also argue that the method he demands must, to meet his own standards, remain faithful to his belief that all philosophy — even logic — has to be anchored in experience. But it must also preserve certain basic logical notions about contradiction. The method cannot be either what is usually called the Hegelian dialectic (...) or the dialectic of relations of which Ralf Church speaks. It is, however, in important respects remarkably close to the procedure that Duns Scotus develops in his account of the disjunctive transcendentals. (shrink)

The thesis that enquiries into the nature and existence of God and enquiries into nature itself should be kept separate has gained new life from disputes about biology, but the development of physics and its relation to mathematics gives force to the idea that nature is more like a book to be read than it is like a collection of objects with no intrinsic meaning. The more one sees nature as a book to be read the more one sees it (...) as intrinsically intelligible. Intelligibility need not imply intelligence but the relation between the two is nonetheless a legitimate subject for investigation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:688 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 ters by Robert Payne and Gilbert Sheldon. (To my knowledge the only library in the United States that has The Theologian and Ecclesia.,tic is The Newbury Library in Chicago.) There are also letters in A Collection of Letters Illustrative of the Progress of Science, ed. J. Halliwell (London, 1840. Scholars in recent years have complained, usually justifiably, about the (...) cost of the books they need for their research. While $78.00 per volume is a lot of money, it would be well spent by anyone with a serious interest in the person or the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. These volumes, judiciously building upon the great labors of previous scholars, are the single most important contribution to Hobbes scholarship in the twentieth century. A. P. MARTINICH University of Texas at Austin Jeff Jordan, editor. Gambling on God: Essays on Pascars Wager. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994. Pp. viii + 164. Cloth, $49.oo. Paper, $19.95. Jeff Jordan has put together nine essays which give those who want to gamble on God something to think about. Though only three of them are really about Pascalk wager, all of them are worth reading. The most entertaining paper is Roy A. Sorensen's "Infinite Decision Theory." Sorensen confronts the St. Petersburg Paradox, which stems from the fact that there are available wagers with a potentially infinite payoff on which no one would bet $ao. Suppose you are offered $2n for each throw of a standard balanced coin until a head turns up. N = the number of tosses. It could be a long time--forever--before heads turns up. By the time n = loo you would have a bag of gold bigger than the sun. But Sorensen says the right bet is at least $23,but not much more. It is also true that since we don't know which actions God will reward, any human action has a possible infinite payoff and since all such actions have the same potential payoff none is better than the others. (Some god was moved to save Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, who had kindly thoughts about water-snakes.) Sorensen also notes that it is often said (Pascal would have agreed) that persons can be of infinite worth. If so, is rescuing one drowning person as good as rescuing five? The total worth seems to be the same. (Luckily, if Cantor is to be believed, there are larger and smaller infinities.) Sorensen ends inconclusively, but he is right that decision theory needs to address the infinite. Pascal would have had something to say. He thought that his bet was morally good. To bet on God is to act as if God exists. One who treats everyone as saved behaves as if God exists. (You don't know who is saved, but if you treat the saved as damned God will be annoyed whereas if you treat the damned as saved you won't detract from their ultimate penalty.) You don't have to bet $3, you only have to do what you ought to do anyway. The incremental cost of the bet appears to be zero. Anyhow, Pascal thought that it was not the infinite payoff (in the sense of a life of bliss) which provided the main motive for the bet but the fact that the required action was one's moral duty. Moreover, nook REVIEWS 689 if everyone behaves as if everyone is saved the result is a world in which God could appear and not be crucified. To be sure, there is a chance of an infinite life. Pascal believed human beings are potentially infinite--as is shown by our capacity for extending our knowledge to the infinite--but we are also potentially nothing, as is shown by the fact that the person never really appears in our scientific accounts. It is through God that our infinity is to be achieved, and so betting on God is also betting on ourselves in a perfectly intelligible way. This involw~s a notion of infinity not explored in any of these essays, which makes it possible to share with God without changing the divine nature... (shrink)

Bernard Bosanquet insisted that the truth of “moral socialism” — the doctrine that we all form part of a mutually dependent community and that we all have an obligation to put the common good ahead of our personal self-interest — follows necessarily from what we know about the nature of reality and from the logic of ethics. “Economic socialism”, the doctrine, in his view, that there ought to be a central bureaucracy on which all should depend for our continued well-being, (...) indeed, perhaps, for our very existence, is, he urged, the antithesis of moral socialism and is, in fact, a peculiar form of individualism. (shrink)