The strength of emotions in moral judgment and decision-making under risk The focus of this paper is the role of emotions in judgments and choices associated with moral issues. Study 1 shows that depending on the strength of emotions when making a moral decision, people become sensitive to the severity and the probability of harm that their decisions can bring to others. A possible interpretation is that depending on the strength of emotions, people in their moral judgments choose to be (...) either utilitarian or deontologist. In Study 2, following the priority heuristic model, we found that in situations in which the violation of moral norms does not evoke strong negative emotions, people are sensitive to quantitative risk parameters, and the decision-making process requires a relatively longer time. In moral situations in which a violation of the moral norm evokes strong emotions, decision-making is based on arguments other than quantitative risk parameters, and the process takes a shorter time. (shrink)

Gender differences in allocation choices made by children aged 5 to 6 The main aim of this article is to supplement gaps in current knowledge concerning the development of competences related to goods allocation choices. We conducted a study in which 158 children aged 5 to 6 made choices concerning allocations of goods between themselves and the other, anonymous child. The crucial findings point to boys as more selfish in their choices than girls. Furthermore, we provide evidence for the claim (...) that young children are aware that their choices are egoistic. Since our study adopted a similar methodology to that of the recent Swiss study, we were able to conduct cross-cultural analysis. The comparison of children's choices in the Polish study and the Swiss one pictures Polish children as displaying a stronger egalitarian preferences and revealing egoistic preferences less frequently than the children from Switzerland. (shrink)

Building upon Gasiorowska and Zaleskiewicz's (2021, 2023), we explored how a control threat and attachment style influence social relationship preferences. This experiment aimed to investigate how experiencing a control threat affects individuals with secure, anxious, and avoidant attachment patterns when they can choose between seeking assistance from the market, asking a close person for help, or coping with the situation alone. Participants with different attachment styles were randomly assigned to either the lack of control condition ( n = 290) (...) or the having control condition ( n = 277). Individuals with an anxious attachment were more inclined to choose the market-exchange option and less likely to select the agentic and communal options when faced with a control threat. Meanwhile, those with an avoidant attachment exhibited a higher tendency to choose the agentic option, while their preference for noncontingent help decreased after exposure to the control threat. Surprisingly, secure attachment individuals showed an increased preference for noncontingent help and decreased preferences for market exchange and self-reliance when exposed to the control threat compared to when they had control. These findings suggest that participation in market relationships may meet vital psychological needs and serve as a safeguard against attachment insecurities. (shrink)

David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly (...) troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the article is that Lewis’s influence method of solving the preemption problem fails, and that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if we want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation. (shrink)

In the late 2010s, various international committees, expert groups, and national strategy boards have voiced the demand to ‘open’ the algorithmic black box, to audit, expound, and demystify artificial intelligence. The opening of the algorithmic black box, however, cannot be seen only as an engineering challenge. In this article, I argue that only the sort of transparency that arises from critique—a method of theoretical examination that, by revealing pre-existing power structures, aims to challenge them—can help us produce technological systems that (...) are less deceptive and more just. I relate the question of AI transparency to the broader challenge of responsible making, contending that future action must aim to systematically reconcile design—as a way of concealing—with critique—as a manner of revealing. (shrink)

Anthropologists often have fieldwork experiences that are not explicitly analysed in their writings, though they nevertheless contribute to and shape their ethnographic understandings, and can resonate throughout their work for many years. The task of this volume is precisely to uncover these layers of anthropological knowledge-making. Contributors take on the challenge of reconstructing the ways in which they originally entered the worlds of research subjects - their anthropological Others - by focusing on pre-textual and deeply phenomenological processes of perceiving, noting, (...) listening and sensing. Drawing on a wide range of research experiences - with the Dogon in Mali, immigrant football players in Spain, the Inuit of the Far North, Filipino transnational families, miners in Poland and students in Scotland - this book goes beyond an exploration of the development of increased ethnographic sensitivity towards words or actions. It also commences the foundational project of developing a new language for building anthropological works, one stemming from recurring acts of participation, and rooted primarily in the pre-textual worlds of the tacit, often non-visible, and intense experiences that exceed the limitations of conventional textual accounts. (shrink)

Avant-propos -- L'œil énucléé -- L'œil du Dieu caché -- L'œil originel -- L'œil silencieux -- L'œil du non-savoir -- L'œil météorologique -- L'œil maternel -- L'œil incestueux -- L'œil persuasif -- L'œil orgiastique -- L'œil obscurci -- L'œil sociologique -- L'œil testamentaire -- L'œil transversal -- L'œil sacré -- L'œil artaudien -- L'œil du flâneur -- L'œil urbain -- L'œil méditatif -- L'œil éclaboussé -- En guise de vision : l'œil laminé.

This book is a collection of skeptical social essays in which the author reveals that much of our popular beliefs, psychology and science are defective, because, although we live in the 21st century, our approach to them is deeply rooted in our culture, and biased by history and evolution. These essays help the reader take a step sideways, think independently, and not fall victim to fads, fakes, and frauds. Anyone who values a deeper understanding of contemporary social reality and the (...) changes taking place in it should read this book, from students to scientists and intellectuals. Through these essays we learn to look under the veneer of reality, behind the altars of science, under the scenery of pop-psychology and behind the facade of therapeutic culture. Thanks to essays on suicide, euthanasia and more, we also come close to the edge of life and death. Contrary to many meticulous social critical analyzes, in sharing his thoughts the author takes us on a picturesque journey through bounty hunters, ludicrous machines, compulsive hoarding, Charlie Chaplin, and much more. (shrink)

The book _Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics_ offers various perspectives on the relation and mutual influence between modern physical theories and analytic metaphysics.

It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the (...) objects of perception, we can see that at least in two sensory modalities, smell and touch, there is no uniform answer to this question. The objects of olfactory and tactile experiences can move along the causal chain. Accordingly, the content of olfactory and tactile experience may vary. (shrink)

We study the monadic fragment of second order intuitionistic propositional logic in the language containing the standard propositional connectives and propositional quantifiers. It is proved that under the topological interpretation over any dense-in-itself metric space, the considered fragment collapses to Heyting calculus. Moreover, we prove that the topological interpretation over any dense-in-itself metric space of fragment in question coincides with the so-called Pitts' interpretation. We also prove that all the nonstandard propositional operators of the form q $\mapsto \exists$p ), where (...) F is an arbitrary monadic formula of the variable p, are definable in the language of Heyting calculus under the topological interpretation of intuitionistic logic over sufficiently regular spaces. (shrink)

One can often hear that intuitions are standardly “appealed to”, “relied on”, “accounted for”, or “used as evidence” in ethics. How should we interpret these claims? I argue that the typical understanding is what Bernard Molyneux calls “descriptive evidentialism”: the idea that intuition-states are treated as evidence of their propositional contents in the context of justification. I then argue that descriptive evidentialism is false- on any account of what intuitions are. That said, I admit that ethicists frequently rely on intuitions (...) to clarify, persuade, discover, or to support things other than the intuitions’ contents. The contents of intuitions are also commonly used as starting premises of philosophical arguments. However claims about these practices need to be sharply distinguished from the prevalent dogma. (shrink)

The article discusses the issue of the departure from examining real behaviours in a real environment, a trend in social psychology which has been observed going back several years, and the impact of this phenomenon for social psychology as a scientific discipline. The article presents two studies on the well-known and explored “bystander effect”. This phenomenon is examined in two ways – once by way of a “traditional” field experiment conducted in natural conditions, and once through a survey. As it (...) turned out, the results generated by the two studies were diametrically opposite, and only in the field experiment were we able to achieve a pattern of results consistent with those in the original studies. (shrink)

The presented analyses are focusing on three predominant theoretical approaches in the philosophy of science and technology: technoscience (STS), technology assessment (TA) and converging technologies (NBIC). On this base are extrapolated the coordinates of the heuristics of technosciences.

KNOWN - UNKNOWN GOD. REMARKS ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNKNOWABILITY OF GOD IN CHRISTIAN AUTHORS FROM SECOND TO SIXTH CENTURY The Fathers of the Church from the beginning of the Christian thought were under a strong influence of the Greek philosophy which was in this time understood mainly as the path to unity with the Supreme Being. Christian Apologists tried to convince in their apologies that Christianity is the true philosophy because it allows to reach its goal in (...) the best and the most certain way. Apologists commonly claimed that thanks to the biblical revelation Christians have the knowledge of God which is the most perfect and accurate. We can observe such claims also in the writings of Alexandrian Fathers for whom God is somehow known even at the highest mystical experiences. The Christian doctrine of the knowledge of God changed radically in the fourth century AD in the writings of Cappadocian Fathers who defended the orthodox faith against the Arians. The most famous of them - Eunomius claimed that the essence of God is to be unbegotten. Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa answered him that we cannot know the essence of God and none of his attributes can be understood as his essence. The Cappadocian Fathers were the founders of the Christian doctrine of unknowability of God, and they formulated it in the precise philosophical language. They also made a great contribution to the further development of this doctrine. Dialectic arguments showed only one aspect of unknowability of God; another one was the darkness in the ultimate mystical experience. Gregory of Nyssa explained it well in his Life of Moses, but this teaching reached its ultimate figure in writings of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite - unknown author from the end of the fifth century AD. Pseudo-Dionysius claimed that the best knowledge which we can have of God is ignorance. The man can reach this knowledge only at the highest stage of mystical life at the apophatic way. The conclusion of this brief analysis of unknowability of God in the Patristic tradition is the statement that there were two main stimulants of its evolution: theoretical and mystical. For both of them the key role played the Greek philosophy which was an inspiration in creative explanation of the Holy Scripture made by the Fathers of the Church. (shrink)

Consider how we evaluate how normal an object is. On the dual-nature hypothesis, a normality evaluation depends on the object’s goodness and frequency. On the single-nature hypothesis, the evaluation depends solely on either frequency or goodness. To assess these hypotheses, I ran four experiments. Study 1 shows that normality evaluations vary with both the goodness and the frequency assessment of the object. Study 2 shows that manipulating the goodness and the frequency dimension changes the normality evaluation. Yet, neither experiment rules (...) out that some people evaluate normality solely based on frequency, and the rest evaluate normality solely based on goodness. Whence two more experiments. Study 3 reveals that when scenarios are contrasted—presented one after another—only frequency matters. But, as study 4 shows, when scenarios are evaluated alone, both frequency and goodness influence normality evaluations in a single person, although the more a person is sensitive to one dimension, the less she’s sensitive to the other. The dual-nature hypothesis seems thus true of uncontrasted applications of the concept of normality, whereas the single-nature hypothesis seems true of contrasted applications. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate Boolean connexive logics in a language with modal operators: □, ◊. In such logics, negation, conjunction, and disjunction behave in a classical, Boolean way. Only implication is non-classical. We construct these logics by mixing relating semantics with possible worlds. This way, we obtain connexive counterparts of basic normal modal logics. However, most of their traditional axioms formulated in terms of modalities and implication do not hold anymore without additional constraints, since our implication is weaker than (...) the material one. In the final section, we present a tableau approach to the discussed modal logics. (shrink)

Standard deontic logic (SDL) is defined on the basis of possible world semantics and is a logic of alethic-deontic modalities rather than deontic modalities alone. The interpretation of the concepts of obligation and permission comes down exclusively to the logical value that a sentence adopts for the accessible deontic alternatives. Here, we set forth a different approach, this being a logic which additionally takes into consideration whether sentences stand in relation to the normative system or to the system of values (...) under which we predicate the deontic qualifications. By taking this aspect into account, we arrive at a logical system which preserves laws proper to a deontic logic but where the standard paradoxes of deontic logic do not arise. It is a logic of strictly-deontic modalities DR. (shrink)