The standard model for mereotopological structures are Boolean subalgebras of the complete Boolean algebra of regular closed subsets of a nonempty connected regular T0 topological space with an additional "contact relation" C defined by xCy ? x n ? Ø.

A long-standing tenet of virtue theory is that moral virtue and knowledge are connected in some important way. Julia Driver attacks the traditional assumption that virtue requires knowledge. I argue that the examples of virtues of ignorance Driver offers are not compelling and that the idea that knowledge is required for virtue has been taken to be foundational for virtue theory for good reason. I propose that we understand modesty as involving three conditions: 1) having genuine accomplishments, 2) being aware (...) of the value of these accomplishments, and 3) having a disposition to refrain from putting forward one's accomplishments. When we understand modesty this way, we can properly identify genuine cases of modesty and see how modesty requires knowledge. Something similar can be said about other alleged virtues of ignorance. With the proposal in place, we have no serious reason to think that moral virtue requires ignorance. Additionally, we have good reasons for thinking that acting virtuously requires having good intentions and that a necessary condition of having a virtue is having knowledge. Although some might take these results to be trivial or obviously true, I think the Julia Driver's challenge should not be dismissed out of hand. Even though there are some reasons for thinking that some situations suggest that knowledge and virtue can be separated from one another, close analysis reveals this impression is only surface deep. (shrink)

The standard model for mereotopological structures are Boolean subalgebras of the complete Boolean algebra of regular closed subsets of a nonempty connected regular T 0 topological space with an additional "contact relation" C defined by xCy x ØA (possibly) more general class of models is provided by the Region Connection Calculus (RCC) of Randell et al. We show that the basic operations of the relational calculus on a "contact relation" generate at least 25 relations in any model of the RCC, (...) and hence, in any standard model of mereotopology. It follows that the expressiveness of the RCC in relational logic is much greater than the original 8 RCC base relations might suggest. We also interpret these 25 relations in the the standard model of the collection of regular open sets in the two-dimensional Euclidean plane. (shrink)

Michael Winters | : Dans cette contribution, on formule l’hypothèse qu’il y a deux styles de leadership dominants dans les discours épiscopaux qui émergent de nos jours aux États-Unis : un premier, plutôt agressif, qui adopte une attitude défensive vis-à-vis de la culture ambiante ; un second, plus traditionnel, qui se contente de relayer l’enseignement de l’Église et laisse les laïcs incarner cet enseignement dans la culture. | : In this paper, it will be argued that there are two (...) dominant styles of leadership which dominate in the United States today : one is the style of the culture warrior, who takes a defensive posture towards the dominant culture ; the other, more traditional, is that of the churchman, who teaches what the Church teaches, but lets the laity engage that teaching in the culture. (shrink)

More attention has been paid in recent years to the relationship between Aristotle’s science and his ethics, but little effort has been directed toward constructing a concrete model of a science of Aristotle’s ethics. I offer a proposal about how we might go about constructing a science of Aristotle’s ethics. I argue that constructing an axiomatic model for a portion of Aristotle’s ethics is not only possible, but helpful in making explicit relationships among concepts at the core of Aristotle’s theory. (...) The model of an axiomatic approach to Aristotle’s ethics, which I propose in this paper, is only a small first step in constructing a full-blown science of Aristotle’s ethics, but taking this first step goes a long way toward showing that this project is promising. (shrink)

More attention has been paid in recent years to the relationship between Aristotle’s science and his ethics, but little effort has been directed toward constructing a concrete model of a science of Aristotle’s ethics. I offer a proposal about how we might go about constructing a science of Aristotle’s ethics. I argue that constructing an axiomatic model for a portion of Aristotle’s ethics is not only possible, but helpful in making explicit relationships among concepts at the core of Aristotle’s theory. (...) The model of an axiomatic approach to Aristotle’s ethics, which I propose in this paper, is only a small first step in constructing a full-blown science of Aristotle’s ethics, but taking this first step goes a long way toward showing that this project is promising. (shrink)

This article presents a case for thinking that moral principles within Aristotle's ethical theory can be both codifiable and action-guiding without minimizing the role of practical reason in determining what should be done. I argue that McDowell dismisses this possibility too hastily. Much of the force of this case rests on my interpretation of "for the most part" relationships in Aristotle.

Recent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person's theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at odds with (...) ontic structural realism. In arguing towards this aim, I adopt an attenuated methodological naturalistic stance to show that traditional substance metaphysics, of the sort neo-Aristotelians endorse, is problematic and that we have naturalistic reasons for further developing process metaphysics. I then apply this framework to develop a processual account of mereological structures and show how we can understand structures as being stable processes. In the final section, I argue that these are the kind of structures with which the ontic structural realist concerns herself. By adopting a realist account of laws the ontic structural realist can explain how these structures enter into modal and causal relations. (shrink)

Goguen categories extend the relational calculus and its categorical formalization to the fuzzy world. Starting from the fundamental concepts of sets, binary relations and lattices, this book introduces several categorical formulations of an abstract theory of relations such as allegories, Dedekind categories and related structures. It is shown that neither theory is sufficiently rich to describe basic operations on fuzzy relations.

Bullying often results in negative coping in victims, including an increased consumption of alcohol. Recently, however, an increase in alcohol use has also been reported among perpetrators of bullying. The factors triggering this pattern are still unclear. We investigated the role of empathy in the interaction between bullying and alcohol use in an adolescent sample (IMAGEN) at age 13.97 (±0.53) years (baseline (BL), N = 2165, 50.9% female) and age 16.51 (±0.61) years (follow-up 1 (FU1), N = 1185, 54.9% female). (...) General empathic distress served as a significant moderator of alcohol use in perpetrators (F9, 493 = 17.978, p < 0.01), which was specific for males and FU1. Male perpetrators, who are generally less sensitive to distress, might thus be more vulnerable to alcohol abuse. (shrink)

Recent reports of the discovery of a “God module” in the human brain derive from the fact that epileptic seizures in the left temporal lobe are associated with ecstatic feelings sometimes described as an experience of the presence of God. The brain area involved has been described as either (a) the seat of an innate human faculty for experiencing the divine or (b) the seat of religious delusions.In fact, religious experience is extremely various and involves many parts of the brain, (...) including some that are prehuman in their evolutionary history and some that are characteristically human. In the continuing integration of such experiences, spiritual formation takes place. Thus the entire human brain might be described as a “God module.”Such a process is only possible because of the brain's complexity. The human brain is the most complex entity for its size that we know of. As used here, complexity is a specialized term denoting the presence of a web of interlinked and significant connections—the more intricate the web, the more complex the entity. Complex systems develop only in a milieu that provides both lawfulness and freedom, and they tend to be self‐organizing, becoming more complex and more effective as a result of both inward and outward experience. The evidence suggests that both personal growth and spiritual growth are processes of complexification of character, and of the brain itself. This thesis is tested in light of the work of William James and James W. Fowler. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

Political Theologies of Justice: Meritocratic Values from a Global Perspective Michael Puett In fourth century BCE China, a religious revolutionary named Mozi emerged. In opposition to much of the religious practices and assumptions of the time, Mozi announced that Heaven, the highest god, was a just and non-capricious deity who had created the world for humanity. As a just deity, Heaven rewarded good humans and punished bad ones. And Heaven charged humans with creating a political order that did the (...) same: Moreover, there are ways that I (Mozi) know Heaven loves the people deeply. It shaped and made the sun, moon, stars, and constellations so as to illuminate and guide [the people]. It formed and made the four seasons, spring, autumn, winter, and summer, so as to weave them into order. It sent down thunder, snow, frost, rain, and dew so as to make the five grains, hemp, and silk grow and prosper, and sent the people to obtain materials and benefit from them. It arranged and made mountains, streams, gorges, and valleys, and distributed and bestowed the hundred affairs so as to oversee and supervise the goodness and badness of the people. It made kings, dukes, and lords and charged them with, first, rewarding the worthy and punishing the wicked, and, second, plundering the metals, wood, birds, and beasts and working the five grains, hemp, and silk so as to make the materials for people's clothing and food. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 536-553, Winter 2021.

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 3, March 2022.

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la revue October, N° 131, Winter 2010, p. 23–50. Nous remercions Michael Cowan de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. In September of 1925, readers leafing through Der Kinematograph or Lichtbildbühne or another such film journal might have encountered a strangely familiar sight : in an advertisement for a major exhibition of the German film and photography industries entitled “Kipho” (“Kino und Photo”), which was to be held in Berlin from September (...) 25th to (...) - Cinéma, animation et vidéo – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

It is not a question here of demanding or strenuous work. In that sense of the word, we can work hard in almost any office and at almost any job. I can work hard writing this book, and sometimes do. A task or a cause that seems to us worth the hard work it entails is clearly a good thing. For all our natural laziness, we go looking for it. But hard has another sense--as in "hard winter" and "hard (...) heart" --where it means harsh, unpleasant, cruel, difficult to endure. Thus the account in Exodus of Israel's oppression, "And the Egyptians embittered their lives with hard labor" (1:14). Here the word describes jobs that are like prison sentences, work that people don't look for and wouldn't choose if they had even minimally attractive alternatives. This kind of work is a negative good, and it commonly carries other negative goods in its train: poverty, insecurity, ill health, physical danger, dishonor and degradation. And yet it is socially necessary work; it needs to be done, and that means that someone must be found to do it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 eviews THE DENOTING CENTURY, 1 19 90 05 5– –2 20 00 05 5 Michael Scanlan Philosophy / Oregon State U. Corvallis, or 97331, usa [email protected] Guido Imaguire and Bernard Linsky, eds. On Denoting: 1905–2005. Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2005. Pp. 451. 98.00. isbn 3-88405-091-5. his anniversary collection of papers connected with Russell’s 1905 publiTcation of “On Denoting” reflects both the (...) almost mythic status that paper has achieved in analytic philosophy and the quite variegated nature of the significance that philosophers have seen in it. The papers in this collection break down roughly into two sorts. There are those which take a historical approach and attempt to explicate various aspects of the content of the OD article. The other sort might be labelled “application” papers in which Russell’s analysis in OD is seen as a tool or a model for subsequent philosophical work, in the spirit of Ramsey’s much quoted “paradigm of philosophy” remark. The volume opens with a reprint of the OD text with pagination indicated for the original Mind printing, for the text in Collected Papers 4 and for the widely referenced Logic and Knowledge Russell collection edited by R. C. Marsh. The Mind and Papers texts use the American convention of single quotation marks within double quotation marks. The Marsh edition (and the text given here) uses the inverse British convention. Readers need to be aware that paper authors here, and elsewhere, vary in which text they cite. The end of the volume has a comprehensive 21-page bibliography of the secondary literature. In between there are thirteen papers. I will be rather brief with the “application” papers, since I believe that Russell readers will tend to favour the more historically oriented papers. Some of the application papers wander quite far afield from Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions. For instance the paper by Thomas Mormann on “Description, Construction and Representation from Russell and Carnap to Stone” takes off from Russell’s assertion that his theory of descriptions was an early version of his subsequent interest in substituting “constructions” for “inferred entities” such as space-time points. The paper is almost exclusively a (worthwhile and mathematically astute) analysis of Russell’s efforts along these lines in Our russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 26 (winter 2006–07): 167–90 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631 _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 168 Reviews Knowledge of the External World and The Analysis of Matter. The author argues that Russell’s constructions did not actually achieve the effects he wanted, but that (curiously) they can be properly developed within the later framework of topological spaces developed by Marshall Stone in 1937. The paper by Guido Imaguire, “Theory of Descriptions and Inferential Semantics”, explicitly eschews an “exegetical” approach and allies itself with a “systematical approach, in which one analyses possible new features and extensions of the proposed theory” (p. 397). The extension considered here is to “inferential semantics”, especially that of Robert Brandom. The spirit of this approach is to take the semantics of a language to be determined by the set of allowed inferences within that language. Imaguire takes as an essential lesson of Russell’s theory of descriptions that definite descriptions and proper names cannot be treated as singular terms of a language in the same manner. He goes on to argue for a criterion for distinguishing proper names from definite descriptions based on inferences allowed between sentences containing them, and he takes this distinction to argue for a modification of Brandom’s treatment of singular terms in his inferential semantics. Elena Tatievskaya’s paper on “Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and Wittgenstein on Internal Properties of Propositions” is another paper that is mainly about something other than Russell and his theory of descriptions. It is a very detailed study of Wittgenstein’s attempt to make good on his claim that the logical symbols of propositional logic notation, such as v and ~, do not correspond to “logical” components of propositions (Tractatus... (shrink)

ABSTRACTJulian of Norwich, anchorite and seer, was, according to the twentieth-century mystic poet and monk Thomas Merton, “one of the most wonderful of all Christian voices” and “with Newman the greatest English theologian.” Her Shewings, or Revelations of Divine Love, are an account, meditation, and teaching proceeding from sixteen visions she experienced on a single day in May of 1373. This “Soundproof Room” encounter takes the form of a mild creole of medieval and postmodern English of the sort that in (...) prior works, most notably Paris Views and Foucault in Winter, in the Linnaeus Garden, the author has called “mixed language.” Here also the author takes his cue from Merton’s reputed avowal that “Rather than ‘Sister’, one calls her the ‘Lady Julian’,” by making dialogue a like instance of seeking how to address another. (shrink)

In the pages that follow I looked closely at two major paintings by Gustave Courbet : the After Dinner at Ornans, perhaps begun in the small town of the title but certainly completed in Paris during the winter of 1848-49; and the Stonebreakers, painted wholly in Ornans just under a year later. The After Dinner and the Stonebreakers are the first in a series of large multifigure compositions--others are the Burial at Ornans and the Peasants of Flagey Returning from (...) the Fair —that mark not only Courbet's maturity as an artist but his emergence as a disruptive force, almost a one-man wrecking crew, in the cultural politics of his time. They are also those works in which his self-declared identity as a Realist first becomes manifest, and probably the chief concern of the most interesting recent scholarship on Courbet has been to try to decode that epithet in social-historical terms, or at any rate to situate his activity as a painter during the years 1848-55 in the context of the social and political struggles that accompanied the creation of the Second Republic and its subversion by Louis Bonaparte.2 At the core of that tradition, motivating and, as it were, mobilizing it, is the demand that the painter succeed in placing in abeyance the primordial convention that paintings are made to be beheld—that he contrive in one way or another to establish the fiction, the meta-illusion, that the beholder does not exist, that there is no one standing before the picture. From Greuze through Gèricault, this was chiefly to be accomplished in and through the medium of visual drama, that is, by representing figures so deeply absorbed in their actions, emotions, and states of mind and furthermore so efficaciously bound together in a single comprehensive dramatic situation that they would strike one as absolutely immured in the world of the painting and a fortiori as oblivious to the very possibility of being viewed. And one way of describing the crisis that I believe overtook French painting by the 1820s and '30s is to say that the dramatic as such came more and more to be revealed as inescapably theatrical—that the array of conventions that once had served to establish the meta-illusion of the beholder's nonexistence now seemed merely to attest to his controlling presence.1. The present essay is adapted from a book-length study, in progress, of Courbet's art. Recent books and articles emphasizing social and political considerations include Linda Nochlin, Gustave Courbet: A Study of Style and Society ; T.J. Clark, "A Bourgeois Dance of Death: Max Buchon on Courbet," Burlington Magazine 111 : 208-12, 282-89, and Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the Second French Republic, 1848-51 ; Jack LIndsay, Gustave Courbet: His Life and Art ; Klaus Herding, ed., Realismus als Widerspruch: Die Wirklichkeit in Courbets Malerei ; Herding, "Les Lutteurs 'détestables': Critique de style, critique sociale," Histoire et critique de l'art 4-5 : 94-122; and James Henry Rubin, Realism and Social Vision in Courbet and Proudhon .2. For an account of the early evolution of that tradition, see my Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot , as well as the essays on Courbet cited in n. 3.Michael Fried, professor of humanities and the history of art at the Johns Hopkins University, is the author of Morris Louis and Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot. He is currently at work on a book on Courbet. (shrink)

Current philosophical debate on the anns race and on the use of nuclear weapons tends to focus on the rationality and morality of deterrence. I argue, however, that in view of recent scientific findings concerning the possibility of nuclear winter following upon nuclear war, or of some lesser but still massive consequences for nature, the perspective of environmental ethics is one from which nuclear war and preparations for it ought to be examined and condemned. Adopting a “weak anthropocentric” position (...) of the sort advocated by Bryan Norton and others, I argue that it is the extinction or decimation of the human species that should be our central concern, but that even without ascribing intrinsic value to nature, natural objects and nonhuman organisms, the destruction or decimation of the environment provides additional grounds for judging nuclear war to be immoral and unthinkable. (shrink)