This reference work offers a representative and reliable survey of classical, medieval, and modern history in regards to the philosophical term, truth .

This essay on “The Status of Health in Plato’s Theory of Goods” discusses how health figures as a “good” in the framework of Plato’s general theory of human goods. It starts with meta-ethical distinctions regarding how things can be classified as “good,” including the conceptual distinctions between intrinsic, final, and constitutive goods. I then discuss passages in Plato that shed light on the function of health as an “instrumental good” that contributes to an undisturbed mode of existence free to pursue (...) truly valuable goals. Against Stoicising interpretations, I show that Plato maintains that health, as an instrumental good, makes a difference with respect to the quality of a virtuous person’s life. I then turn to the famous classification of goods introduced at the beginning of Republic II. The main concern there is the controversial status of justice as a good, but the division also mentions health as a good worthy to be pursued in its own right and not just on account of its causal consequences. Since this classification and how it is used create serious problems for the interpretation, I first try to work out a solution, focusing on the status of justice as an intrinsic, final and constitutive good. In my concluding segment, I then explain on what basis Plato can classify health as not only an instrumental, but also a (weak) constitutive good. This requires a discussion of how Plato views the relation of the body to the human ‘self.’ My answer credits him with a more differentiated understanding of this relation than is usually assumed. (shrink)

Die ethischen Herausforderungen der Gegenwart haben die Grenzen der gegenwärtig dominierenden Regel- und Prinzipienethik gezeigt, weshalb Ansätze zu einer Ethik der Tugenden und des guten Lebens international wieder an Bedeutung gewonnen haben. Dadurch erlebt auch die Frage eine Renaissance, welche Rolle der Reflexion auf die menschliche Natur für die Ethik zukommt. Der Band vereinigt unter diesen Themenstellungen philosophiehistorische Untersuchungen namhafter amerikanischer, britischer und deutscher Forscher zur antiken und mittelalterlichen Tugend- und Glücksethik mit Beiträgen zur zeitgenössischen Ethikdebatte.

Plato’s Lysis shows Socrates in conversation with two boys he has met at a wrestling school, Lysis and Menexenus. Their debate revolves around the notion of philia, seeking to pin down the nature of this relation, who or what takes part in it, and what causes it. The word philiahas usually been translated as “friendship” but has a wider application in this dialogue, as it encompasses a variety of friendly and loving attitudes toward both people and things. The kinds of (...) interpersonal philia evoked include erotic attachments, kinship relations, utility-based relations, and playful companionship. Roughly two-thirds into the dialogue, the focus turns to a more general theory of desiderative attachments and the question of their ultimate telos and cause. The conversation ends, at least on the face of it, in an impasse, an aporia, when the interlocutors find themselves thrown back to the point from where they started, and no attempt to answer the question of what philia is or what motivates it has stuck. The Lysis nevertheless offers many incentives for further discussion and has elicited radically different responses from its interpreters as to what its real message is. For instance, does it promote a form of utilitarian egoism according to which human attachment can never, or should never, be altruistically motivated? Or does it hint at a very different concept of interpersonal love based on the idea that friendship, as it were, completes us since it connects us with those that share the same values? Does this dialogue stay within the familiar ambit of Socratic ethics, centered around the question of what it takes to achieve happiness (eudaimonia) in a human life, without a concern for metaphysical questions? Or, quite the contrary, does its discussion of the highest object of love (to proton philon) point forward to the metaphysical program of Plato’s so-called middle-period dialogues and especially to the notions of the form of the good or the form of the beautiful, notions which are at the center of the Republic and the Symposium? These questions and others will continue to be debated about this puzzling dialogue. The essays assembled in the present volume address many of these topics. (shrink)

The Philebus describes the “good” that enables human eudaimonia as a “mixture” in which cognitive states have to be combined with certain types of pleasure. This essay investigates how the various senses of falsehood that Plato distinguishes are applied to the question of the hedonic “ingredients” of the good. It argues that his theory allows for the inclusion of certain virtuous pleasures that are deficient with respect to truth: either qua “mixed pleasures” lacking in truth on account of the compresence (...) of their opposite, pain, or because they are based on mistaken anticipations arising in the pursuit of virtuous and reasonable goals. (shrink)

In the Lysis, Socrates claims to be looking for an account of what kind of quality in another person or object stimulates friendship or love (philia). He goes through a series of proposals, refuting each in turn. In the end, he throws us back to the point from where the arguments started, declaring an aporetic outcome. What is the purpose of this apparently futile and circular inquiry? Most interpreters try to reconstruct a theory of friendship or love from the arguments (...) of this dialogue. Against such a doctrinal reading, this essay defends an “aporetic reading” of the dialogue and connects it to its protreptic function. Starting with a preliminary discussion of what defines an aporetic dialogue and what distinguishes indirect protreptic from explicit protreptic discourse, the essay then analyzes the aporetic method of the Lysis, distinguishing it from aporetic discourse in some of his earlier dialogues. Finally, it analyzes how, and for what kind of audience, the Lysisfunctions as an indirect protreptic. This includes a comparison with the protreptic use of aporetic argumentation in the Euthydemus. (shrink)

This essay offers an analysis and interpretation of the rarely commented-on chapter I.12 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle’s goal in this chapter is to prove that human happiness belongs to the class of prized goods, also characterized as divine goods, whereas virtue ranks lower, being a merely praiseworthy good. It is not easy to see why this chapter is placed at the end of Aristotle’s general discussion of the highest human good in Book I or why he included it at (...) all. My goal is to show that it does make a contribution to the architecture of the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole by helping to prepare the ground for one of the main argumentative strategies in the treatise X.6–8 on scientific contemplation as the key component of supreme happiness. To this end, I analyze each step of the argumentation in I.12, drawing also on relevant material from other Aristotelian texts, and then demonstrate the connection with some of the arguments in X.6–8. (shrink)

Starting from an abstract sketch of scenarios for philosophical reception stimulated by disagreement and school rivalry, part one of this chapter highlights the case of an older, marginalized position that tries to reinsert itself into the debate through radical modernization of its terminology and argumentative strategies and thereby triggers various forms of orthodox response. Part two discusses examples for this scenario extracted from some of the remains of the Peripatetic ethical literature of the late Hellenistic era (Critolaus, Arius Didymus). Challenging (...) the traditional picture of contamination and decline in the development of the Peripatetic school, the chapter demonstrates how the reception of Stoic concepts and strategies by Peripatetic modernizers and the subsequent more orthodox approaches created an intellectually fruitful dynamic exemplifying different styles of reception. (shrink)

This study analyses the theoretical connections between the conception of happiness, the theory of the good, and an ethical-practical conception of human nature in Aristotle's Ethics and his late-Hellenistic followers. The further development of Aristotelian views in the late Hellenistic context is a long-neglected field of research. The Aristotelian view is further developed systematically in the final chapterthrough an exploration of the relationship between prudential and moral rationality.

This essay addresses the role of aporetic thinking and aporetic dialogue in the early “Socratic” dialogues of Plato. It aims to provide a new angle on why and how puzzlement induced by Socrates should benefit his interlocutors but often fails to do so. After discussing criteria for what is to count as an aporetic dialogue, the essay explains how and why Socrates’ aporia-inducing conversations point to a conception of virtue as grounded in a form of self-transparent wisdom. In combination with (...) a knowledge criterion that requires the ability to articulate and successfully defend one’s views under critical examination, this conception of virtue entails that failure under Socratic examination is an indication of not just intellectual but also ethical deficits. I then show (against a still prevailing view among scholars) that at least the grown-ups among Socrates’ interlocutors in these dialogues fail to realize that their aporia is a proof of ignorance. Laches, for instance, thinks that his failure under Socratic examination has been caused by his inexperience with debates, while Meno blames it on Socrates’ alleged trickery. In the Euthydemus, Plato aims to blunt the charge of sophistry by contrasting “sophistic” trickery with Socrates’ philosophical exhortation. Yet, as I argue, the most important difference between sophistic and Socratic examination lies in the underlying ethos, not in the argumentative techniques, as these are partly similar. The final section of the essay analyses the intellectual and ethical benefits of aporia-inducing discourse for those who do fully acknowledge their ignorance and follow the urge to overcome ignorance. (shrink)

Die ethischen Herausforderungen der Gegenwart haben die Grenzen der gegenwärtig dominierenden Regel- und Prinzipienethik gezeigt, weshalb Ansätze zu einer Ethik der Tugenden und des guten Lebens international wieder an Bedeutung gewonnen haben. Dadurch erlebt auch die Frage eine Renaissance, welche Rolle der Reflexion auf die menschliche Natur für die Ethik zukommt. Der Band vereint philosophiehistorische Untersuchungen namhafter amerikanischer, britischer und deutscher Forscher zur antiken und mittelalterlichen Tugend- und Glücksethik mit Beiträgen zur zeitgenössischen Ethikdebatte.

In this response I consider the implications of Jan Szaif’s suggestion that there is a tight “conceptual affinity” between Books I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics. I argue against one view which could claim such a thesis as an ally: the view which maintains that the Nicomachean Ethics is based upon the kind of conceptual cohesion supplied by a supposed metaphysical foundation for claims about happiness.

It can be tempting to think of affect as a matter of the present moment – a reaction, a feeling, an experience or engagement that unfolds right now. This paper will make the case that affect is better thought of as not only temporally extended but as saturated with temporality, especially with the past. In and through affectivity, concrete, ongoing history continues to weigh on present comportment. In order to spell this out, I sketch a Heidegger-inspired perspective. It revolves around (...) two claims. The first is that we should understand what Heidegger calls 'Befindlichkeit' (findingness) as radical situatedness. Affectivity is a matter of 'finding oneself' constellated – thrown – into the world in ways that outrun what an individual or collective might grasp and process. The second claim is that the temporal dimension, as a relatedness to the past, takes precedence in affect's situatedness. Key to affect is the way in which the past continues to hold sway over present comportment, collectively and individually. In order to articulate this perspective, it is important to overcome the idea that affect must be understood mainly in terms of feeling or experiential states of other kinds. Better suited to grasp the idea of findingness is the concept of 'disclosive posture', as proposed by Katherine Withy. I suggest that this notion should be put at the fore of a phenomenological approach to situated affectivity. (shrink)

Epigenetics is currently one of the fastest-growing fields in the sciences. Epigenetic information not only controls DNA expression but links genetic factors with the environmental experiences that influence the traits and characteristics of an individual. What we eat, where we work, and how we live affects not only the activity of our genes but that of our offspring as well. This discovery has imposed a revolutionary theoretical shift on modern biology, especially on evolutionary theory. It has helped to uncover the (...) developmental processes leading to cancer, obesity, schizophrenia, alcoholism, and aging, and to facilitate associated medial applications such as stem cell therapy and cloning. Above the Gene, Beyond Biology explores how biologists in this booming field investigate and explain living systems. Jan Baedke offers the first comprehensive philosophical discussion of epigenetic concepts, explanations, and methodologies so that we can better understand this "epigenetic turn" in the life sciences from a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

The paper examines the interplays between logic and politics in the Polish School of Logic starting from 1914. The Polish School of Logic flourished between 1920 and 1939. Philosophically, it was influenced by Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938). For Twardowski logic is fundamental for every kind of human activity, professional and private and this means that every argument should be formulated and proceed by correct inferential rules. These rules involve semiotics, formal logic and methodology of science. The paper shows how this position (...) was shared by Twardowski’s students, including Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Tadeusz Kotrabiński, as well as by the next generation of logicians and philosophers and especially by Alfred Tarski. These authors considered logic, philosophy and science as completely neutral with respect to politics and ideology but they also considered logical skills as indispensable in political activities. (shrink)

Higher-order logic, with its type-theoretic apparatus known as the simple theory of types (STT), has increasingly come to be employed in theorizing about properties, relations, and states of affairs—or ‘intensional entities’ for short. This paper argues against this employment of STT and offers an alternative: ordinal type theory (OTT). Very roughly, STT and OTT can be regarded as complementary simplifications of the ‘ramified theory of types’ outlined in the Introduction to Principia Mathematica (on a realist reading). While STT, understood as (...) a theory of intensional entities, retains the Fregean division of properties and relations into a multiplicity of categories according to their adicities and ‘input types’ and discards the division of intensional entities into different ‘orders’, OTT takes the opposite approach: it retains the hierarchy of orders (though with some modifications) and discards the categorisation of properties and relations according to their adicities and input types. In contrast to STT, this latter approach avoids intensional counterparts of the Epimenides and related paradoxes. Fundamental intensional entities lie at the base of the proposed hierarchy and are also given a prominent part to play in the individuation of non-fundamental intensional entities. (shrink)

By and large, the conditional connective in three-valued logic has two different functions. First, by means of a deduction theorem, it can express a specific relation of logical consequence in the logical language itself. Second, it can represent natural language structures such as "if/then'' or "implies''. This chapter surveys both approaches, shows why none of them will typically end up with a three-valued material conditional, and elaborates on connections to probabilistic reasoning.

International institutions such as UNESCO are deliberating on a new standard setting instrument for neurotechnologies. This will likely lead to the adoption of a soft law document which will be the first global document specifically tailored to neurotechnologies, setting the tone for further international or domestic regulations. While some stakeholders have been consulted, these developments have so far evaded the broader attention of the neuroscience, neurotech, and neuroethics communities. To initiate a broader debate, this target article puts to discussion twenty-five (...) considerations and desiderata for recognition by a future instrument. They are formulated at different levels of abstraction, from the big picture to technical details, seek to widen the perspective of preparatory reports and transcend the narrow debate about “neurorights” which overshadows many richer and more relevant aspects. These desiderata are not an exhaustive enumeration but a starting point for discussions about what deserves and what requires protection by an international instrument. (shrink)

Evidence-Based Medicine has little consideration for mechanisms and philosophers of science and medicine have recently made pleas to increase the place of mechanisms in the medical evidence hierarchy. However, in this debate the notions of mechanisms seem to be limited to 'mechanistic processes' and 'complex-systems mechanisms,' understood as 'componential causal systems'. I believe that this will not do full justice to how mechanisms are used in biological, psychological and social sciences and, consequently, in a more biopsychosocial approach to medicine. Here, (...) I propose, following (Kuorikoski, 2009), to pay more attention to 'abstract forms of interaction' mechanisms. The present work scrutinized review articles on depression and medically unexplained pain, which are considered to be of multifactorial pathogenesis, for their use of mechanisms. In review articles on these disorders there seemed to be a range of uses between more 'abstract forms of interaction' and 'componential causal system' mechanisms. I therefore propose to expand the notions of mechanisms considered in medicine to include that of more 'abstract forms of interaction' to better explain and manage biopsychosocial disorders. (shrink)

This book provides for the first time a complete history of the doctrine of the transcendentals and shows its importance for the understanding of philosophy in the Middle Ages.

We introduce a cyclic proof system for the two-way alternation-free modal μ-calculus. The system manipulates one-sided Gentzen sequents and locally deals with the backwards modalities by allowing analytic applications of the cut rule. The global effect of backwards modalities on traces is handled by making the semantics relative to a specific strategy of the opponent in the evaluation game. This allows us to augment sequents by so-called trace atoms, describing traces that the proponent can construct against the opponent’s strategy. The (...) idea for trace atoms comes from Vardi’s reduction of alternating two-way automata to deterministic one-way automata. Using the multi-focus annotations introduced earlier by Marti and Venema, we turn this trace-based system into a path-based system. We prove that our system is sound for all sequents and complete for sequents not containing trace atoms. (shrink)

Niels Bohr and Philosophy of Physics: Twenty-First Century Perspectives examines the work, influences and legacy of the Nobel Prize physicist and philosopher of experiment Niels Bohr. While covering Bohr's groundbreaking contribution to quantum mechanics, this collection reveals the philosophers who influenced his work. Linking him to the pragmatist C.I. Lewis and the Danish philosopher Harald Høffding, it draws strong similarities between Bohr's philosophy and the Kantian way of thinking. Addressing the importance of Bohr's views of classical concepts, it discusses how (...) his interpretation of quantum mechanics now compares with a variety of issues that have arisen only since his lifetime, including decoherence and other non-collapse arguments. Balancing historical themes with contemporary ideas, Niels Bohrs and Philosophy of Physics reveals Bohr's on-going contribution to the philosophy of science and confirms his place in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat--when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby (...) prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited. (shrink)

Forms of understanding -- Understanding as organized beliefs -- On interpretation -- Representations -- Scientific explanation -- Causal explanations -- Other types of explanations -- The pragmatics of explanation -- Not just why-questions -- A rhetorical approach to explanation -- Pluralism and the unity of science.