This important new book by one of the world's leading political theorists boldly questions the moral justification for organizing our world as a territorial states-system and proposes major changes to states' sovereign powers.

Many political theorists today deny that citizenship can be defended on liberal grounds alone. Cosmopolitans claim that loyalty to a particular state is incompatible with universal liberal principles, which hold that we have equal duties of justice to persons everywhere, while nationalist theorists justify civic obligations only by reaching beyond liberal principles and invoking the importance of national culture. In Liberal Loyalty, Anna Stilz challenges both views by defending a distinctively liberal understanding of citizenship. Drawing on Kant, Rousseau, (...) and Habermas, Stilz argues that we owe civic obligations to the state if it is sufficiently just, and that constitutionally enshrined principles of justice in themselves--rather than territory, common language, or shared culture--are grounds for obedience to our particular state and for democratic solidarity with our fellow citizens. She demonstrates that specifying what freedom and equality mean among a particular people requires their democratic participation together as a group. Justice, therefore, depends on the authority of the democratic state because there is no way equal freedom can be defined or guaranteed without it. Yet, as Stilz shows, this does not mean that each of us should entertain some vague loyalty to democracy in general. Citizens are politically obligated to their own state and to each other, because within their particular democracy they define and ultimately guarantee their own civil rights. Liberal Loyalty is a persuasive defense of citizenship on purely liberal grounds. (shrink)

18 November 2019CH: Thank you for agreeing to do this. The prompt for the interview was to talk about your recently published book, Territorial Sovereignty, but I thought before we got into that you could say something about your earlier work and how that led you to be interested in this particular project that you deal with in the book.

This article discusses two normative questions raised by cases of colonial settlement. First, is it sometimes wrong to migrate and settle in a previously inhabited land? If so, under what conditions? Second, should settler countries ever take steps to undo wrongful settlement, by enforcing repatriation and return? The article argues that it is wrong to settle in another country in cases where one comes with intent to colonize the population against their will, or one possesses an adequate territorial base somewhere (...) else, lacks an urgent interest in moving, and seeks to settle in a new place under conditions where settlement would severely harm the practices of prior occupants. It also argues for a presumption of repatriation and return in the first generation of wrongful settlement and holds that these remedies may be extended to second and higher generations in some – but not all – cases. (shrink)

This article evaluates the theory of boundary legitimacy put forward in A John Simmons’s recent book Boundaries of Authority. I believe Simmons is correct to hold that questions about the legitimac...

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

While John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness is ambitious, provocative, and does much to reinvigorate debate about economic justice, his argument for market democracy is not compelling. I discuss two objections. First, I offer doubts about whether “thick” economic freedom is a condition of democratic legitimacy. While Tomasi raises the intriguing possibility that liberal commitments may justify a somewhat more expansive list of economic rights than traditionally recognized, he fails to give a well-worked-out account of these rights. Instead, he argues for (...) unfettered economic liberty without adequately connecting it to citizens' self-authorship, or showing how it could feasibly be protected alongside other basic liberties. Second, I argue that a concern for citizens' agency and economic self-authorship should lead us to endorse a social-democratic regime, not a market-democratic one. Market democracy leaves out or heavily revises key aspects of justice as fairness as developed by Rawls, including fair equality of opportunity and the fair value of the political liberties. Moreover, while Tomasi claims that social democracy rests on a perfectionist prioritizing of citizens' status over their agency, I argue that social democracy is best defended on agency-based grounds. (shrink)

This paper examines Cécile Fabre’s cosmopolitan reductionist approach to war. It makes three main points. First, I show that Fabre must ‘thin down’ justice’s content in order to justify the cosmopolitan claim that the same rights and duties bind people everywhere. Second, I investigate Fabre’s account of the values at stake in national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Can cosmopolitanism explain why it is permissible to fight in defense of one’s political community? I doubt it. I argue that Fabre’s reductionist approach (...) cannot justify national self-defense in many cases. Finally, I explore the role that authoritative institutions play in specifying the rights and duties we have under cosmopolitan justice. I believe Fabre takes an overly simple view of the relationship between rights, duties, and authoritative institutions. A more complex account may leave less space for private war on the part of individuals than she does. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This essay replies to three critics of my book Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. First, in response to Kit Wellman, I defend the claim that states sometimes have a right against external interference even when their decisions depart from the requirements of social justice. This “right to do wrong” is grounded in respect for a legitimate procedure of collective self-determination, in which the state's members have an important interest. Second, I reply to Michael Blake's concern that there is an inconsistency (...) in my treatment of people's actual wills in politics. I clarify that my view places weight on the actual wills only of “cooperators”, and that cooperators’ actual wills matter because they have claims against alien rule. There is no inconsistency in treating political annexation differently from immigration since immigrants rarely threaten to impose alien rule on cooperators. Finally, I address Adom Getachew's concerns about the imperial dimensions of the states system, arguing that my book contains resources for theorizing remedial claims to land in settler colonial societies and other reparative duties of global justice. (shrink)

International law holds that states are holistically responsible for their acts. Yet what does the ascription of responsibility to the state imply about the responsibility of its citizens? This article argues that most citizens in a representative democracy bear culpability in association with their state's wrongful acts. Most democratic citizens can be blamed for empowering representatives to act on their behalf, and then failing to adequately oversee and dissent from the specific wrongful decisions their representatives made. This gives culpable citizens (...) duties that go beyond compensation, especially duties to foster a reparative social ethos towards state victims. (shrink)

Christine Hobden’s Citizenship in a Globalised World argues that we have outward duties of citizenship, owed to foreigners and their states (Hobden, 2021, p. 45). Certain duties of global justice s...

The laws of armed conflict draw a sharp distinction between combatants and civilians. According to the principle of discrimination, intentionally attacking civi.

This paper critically assesses Chiara Cordelli’s Kantian theory of the legitimacy of public administration. I argue, first, that Cordelli’s understanding of Kantian legitimacy offers an insufficiently robust defense of democracy: it leaves too much scope for rule by epistocrats, individuals who are wiser than others in ascertaining the demands of justice. Second, I argue that Cordelli should be open to the eventual abolition of bureaucracy, through the increased involvement of ordinary citizens in public administration. Once we begin to worry about (...) the problem of bureaucratic unilateralism, it may be hard to avoid the conclusion that it is democratically necessary to abolish the bureaucratic state. (shrink)

Gillian Brock’s Justice for People on the Move is an important contribution to the migration literature. While I agree with many of Brock’s arguments, I focus here on a few key points of difference between us. I press three interrelated concerns about Brock’s view: first, the practical implications of her assessment of the state-system’s current illegitimacy remain too unclear. Second, Brock’s human rights-based theory neglects the importance of citizens’ democratic agency, in a way that may have paternalistic implications. Third, Brock’s (...) view is tolerant of inequalities of wealth and power that may enable relations of exploitation, as we see by examining her advocacy of guestworker schemes. The article draws attention to those places where Brock’s view faces hard questions, and explains why I might have answered some of these questions differently. (shrink)

Gillian Brock’s Justice for People on the Move is an important contribution to the migration literature. While I agree with many of Brock’s arguments, I focus here on a few key points of difference between us. I press three interrelated concerns about Brock’s view: first, the practical implications of her assessment of the state-system’s current illegitimacy remain too unclear. Second, Brock’s human rights-based theory neglects the importance of citizens’ democratic agency, in a way that may have paternalistic implications. Third, Brock’s (...) view is tolerant of inequalities of wealth and power that may enable relations of exploitation, as we see by examining her advocacy of guestworker schemes. The article draws attention to those places where Brock’s view faces hard questions, and explains why I might have answered some of these questions differently. (shrink)

Not in Their Name: Are Citizens Culpable for Their States’ Actions?, by Lawford-SmithHolly. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. viii + 185.

Catherine Lu’s recent book argues that we should conceive colonial wrongs not as unjust interactions between individuals or states, but rather as structural injustices of the international system. I review her book and raise some questions about her approach.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.