The aim of this paper is to compare different conceptions of the role of (normative) coherence in the legal field. More precisely, it aims to deepen Neil MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning, in which coherence is essentially considered an interpretative tool, and Ronald Dworkin's legal theory, in which coherence occupies a more crucial place. The main results of this paper can be summarized in two points. A) For Dworkin, coherence is not just an interpretative standard but constitutes the hard core (...) of his theory of law. B) As a consequence of A, Dworkin's reflections on coherence (as an interpretative standard) cannot be separated from his theory of law grounded on the concept of integrity. (shrink)

This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick's theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The first point concerns MacCormick's gradual break with legal positivism, and more specifically the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick's acceptance (...) of the one-right-answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent, however, is not only to describe this change in MacCormick's thought, but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we find in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. (shrink)

It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment “propagates” from (...) the crucial objection to the hypothesis. In this paper I study under which conditions this phenomenon occurs, and discuss its significance for the topics of skepticism, scientific realism, and peer disagreement. (shrink)

In situations where we ignore everything but the space of possibilities, we ought to suspend judgment—that is, remain agnostic—about which of these possibilities is the case. This means that we cannot sum our degrees of belief in different possibilities, something that has been formalized as an axiom of non-additivity. Consistent with this way of representing our ignorance, I defend a doxastic norm that recommends that we should nevertheless follow a certain additivity of possibilities: even if we cannot sum degrees of (...) belief in different possibilities, we should be more confident in larger groups of possibilities. It is thus shown that, in the type of situation considered (in so-called ‘classical ignorance’, i.e. “behind a thin veil of ignorance”), it is epistemically rational for advocates of suspending judgment to endorse this comparative confidence; while on the other hand it is shown that, even in classical ignorance, no stronger belief—such as a precise uniform probability distribution—is warranted. (shrink)

El término nuestroamericano —utilizado por Horacio Cerutti— tiene sus fundamentos en el concepto "Nuestra América". Este hilo conductor de pensamiento tiene como hecho ineludible el hacerse cargo de la realidad en que se vive y del lugar en donde se está, hecho expresado en un permanente interés en la identidad cultural y nacional, como también por una lectura crítica y explicativa del desarrollo de las ideas. En el caso de Chile, a nuestro juicio, la memoria filosófica nuestroamericana ha tendido a (...) ser borrada, olvidada, siendo obnubilada por un fuerte eurocentrismo, lo que ha dado como resultado un escaso número de filósofos preocupados por "lo latinoamericano". Así, este trabajo indaga sobre los orígenes de la vertiente latinoamericanista en la filosofía chilena en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. A modo de conclusión, proponemos que no es sino hasta los años ochenta cuando, desde el Círculo de Filosofía de la Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, se genera un punto de inflexión con la tradición filosófica chilena, dando origen de forma más nítida a la vertiente nuestroamericana que, antes de esto, solo habría tenido pequeñas huellas dispersas. (shrink)

El presente artículo interroga de la naturaleza semiótica de la educación inclusiva y sus problemas de regulación ontológicos, visuales y epistémicos. Este problema comienza a evidenciarse cuando, buena parte, de la consciencia heurística de la educación especial se toma literalmente como la lengua natural de un espacio intelectual en blanco pero altamente generador en la transformación del conocimiento pedagógico. Tal transferencia, devino en la cristalización de un modelo semiótico universal que alcanza su efectividad a través de la castración de la (...) identidad semiológica de lo inclusivo, lo que afianza un sistema de edipización de sus signos y, con ello, coloca de manifestando un sistema de desviación sobre sus propiedades ontológicas implícitas. Producto de esta operación, es que, sus diferentes tipos de agenciamientos de enunciación son objeto de confusión y tervigersación, especialmente, sobre sus unidades semiológicas auténticas. Estamos en presencia de una operación estratégicamente intencionada que contribuye a castrar la pregunta por los signos de lo inclusivo y, por consiguiente, a instalar un sistema de edipización sobre su objeto. El método empleado es el de revisión documental crítica. El trabajo concluye que, al imponer el rostro de la educación especial como parte del corazón de la educación inclusiva se omite la intención de colocar en conexión sus dos tipos de representaciones, las que, también pueden ser interpretadas como formaciones particulares del poder, por medio de las cuales, se designa un modo particular de funcionamiento que es afianzado a través de un sistema de descodificación generalizada de sus signos y flujos semióticos. (shrink)

This paper presents a bivalent extensional semantics for positive free logic without resorting to the philosophically questionable device of using models endowed with a separate domain of "non-existing" objects. The models here introduced have only one (possibly empty) domain, and a partial reference function for the singular terms (that might be undefined at some arguments). Such an approach provides a solution to an open problem put forward by Lambert, and can be viewed as supplying a version of parametrized truth non (...) unlike the notion of "truth at world" found in modal logic. A model theory is developed, establishing compactness, interpolation (implying a strong form of Beth definability), and completeness (with respect to a particular axiomatization). (shrink)

INTRODUZIONE 2 1. POVERA E NUDA VAI, FILOSOFIA… 19 1.1 TRA SCIAMANI E CALCOLATORI 20 1.2 AUTOCASTRAZIONI E DINTORNI 25 1.2.1 Debes, ergo potes 26 1.2.1.1 Scienze della natura e scienze dello spirito 27 1.2.1.2 Orizzonti di responsabilità 32 1.2.1.3 Ritrovare la saggezza 36 1.2.2 Potes, ergo debes 37 1.2.2.1 Disintegrando la frammentazione 40 1.2.2.2 Disarticolando lo smembramento 51 1.2.2.3 Oltrepassando l’autosuperamento 58 1.3 IL (MIO) PUNTO DI VISTA 62 2. GLOBALIZZAZIONE E UNIVERSALISMO 70 2.1 PENSARE LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE 73 2.1.1 (...) Una civiltà universale? 73 2.1.1.1 Quale cultura? 74 2.1.1.2 Singolare e plurale 78 2.1.2 Scontro delle civiltà? 85 2.2 CERCANDO UN’ETICA GLOBALE 89 2.2.1 Il minimalismo morale 92 2.2.1.1 Un confronto con il liberalismo neo-contrattualista 96 2.2.1.2 La quercia, la ghianda e la foresta 100 2.2.2 L’etica mondiale 102 2.3 RIFLESSIONI CRITICHE 107 3. RELATIVISMO 112 3.1 LE RAGIONI DEL RELATIVISMO 114 3.1.1 Ragioni della politica 116 3.1.1.1 Multiculturalismo e neutralità etica 116 3.1.1.2 Antifondazionalismo e democrazia 121 3.1.2 Ragioni dell’antropologia 125 3.1.3 Ragioni dell’ermeneutica 130 3.1.4 Ragioni dell’epistemologia 135 3.1.5 Ragioni dell’etica 143 3.1.5.1 Nel regno della necessità 145 3.1.5.2 In regime di cieca obbedienza 146 3.1.5.3 Il piacere e l’interesse 151 3.1.5.4 Intuizioni, emozioni, prescrizioni 153 3.1.5.5 Accordo, consenso e permesso 159 3.1.5.6 Etica della ragione 166 3.2 LA RAGIONE PRATICA 170 3.2.1 Oltre l’ansia cartesiana 171 3.2.2 Autenticità e ragionamento 176 3.2.3 Ragioni della diversità e ragioni del riconoscimento 181 4. FIGURE DI RAZIONALITÀ PRATICA 185 4.1 UTILITARISMO 186 4.1.1 Cosa è «migliore»? 187 4.1.1.1 Piacere, felicità, bene 188 4.1.1.2 L’atto e la regola 191 4.1.2 Conta solo il risultato? 194 4.2 CONTESTUALISMO 197 4.2.1 Recupero della phrónesis 198 4.2.2 Recupero della prâxis 204 4.2.3 Recupero dell’éthos 208 4.3 ETICA DEL DISCORSO 217 4.3.1 Dalle pretese di validità del discorso al principio di un’etica universale 218 4.3.2 Universalità e formalismo 224 4.3.3 Limiti dell’etica del discorso 226 4.4 ETICA DELLA RELAZIONE 231 4.4.1 Relazione versus rappresentazione 232 4.4.2 L’umanità dell’altro uomo 236 4.5 UN BILANCIO 241 ALCUNE PROSPETTIVE. POSTILLA 245 . (shrink)

If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on (...) many grounds ever since it was first proposed. In place of equiprobability, recent formal models represent the doxastic state of total ignorance as suspension of judgment. In this paper I revisit the cosmic coincidence objection to Humean laws by assessing which doxastic state we should endorse. By focusing on specific features of our scenario I conclude that suspending judgment results in an unnecessarily weak doxastic state. First, I point out that recent literature in epistemology has provided independent justifications of the principle of indifference. Second, given that the argument is framed within a Humean metaphysics, it turns out that we are warranted to appeal to these justifications and assign a uniform and additive credence distribution among Humean mosaics. This leads us to conclude that, contrary to widespread opinion, we should not dismiss the cosmic coincidence objection to the Humean account of laws. (shrink)

Insurgent Universality offers a novel attempt to access history through a problematisation of the notion of universalism. Its main argument is based on three notions articulated in revolutionary events: temporalities, universality and insurgency. In this article we review their theoretical aspects, comment on their limitations, and outline potential reformulations.

Using the Chinese Ring Puzzle (Kotovsky & Simon, Citation1990; P. J. Reber & Kotovsky, Citation1997), we studied the effect on rule discovery of having to plan actions or not in order to reach a goal state. This was done by asking participants to predict legal moves as in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1) and by asking participants to make legal moves as in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Our hypothesis was that having a specific goal state to reach has a dual (...) effect on rule discovery. The first effect is positive and related to feedback from moves done in order to attain the goal: generalising the results of action and associating them to the conditions in which they were obtained allows discovery of the rule and learning it. The second effect is negative. In attempting to reach a specific goal, participants first tend to reduce the distance that separates the current state from the goal state (hill climbing) and so neglect the kind of exploration that facilitates rule and procedure discovery because this would seem to be a detour from the goal. Results show that having to plan actions improved performance in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1), yet it impaired performance in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Although implicit learning and problem solving are based on rule discovery, and entail noticing regularities in the material, in both cases, rule discovery processes appear to be task-dependent. (shrink)

Gathers the pre-Sand Country Almanac writings of Aldo Leopold, showing that he was not born an ecologist, but evolved over time through experimentation and thought.

The algorithm has become an increasingly important concept in understanding human behavior in recent years. In the case of sport, human bodies are seen as superficial to the driving force of the algorithm, whether it be genetic, behavioral or surveillance-technological algorithms (Harari Citation2015, 2020; Zuboff Citation2019). However, the French mathematician and philosopher Michel Serres (1930–2019) structurally relate algorithms to sports and bodily experience at multiple places in his oeuvre. According to Serres, sport actually enables us to reprogram and rewrite our (...) behavior, moods and thoughts, and therefore modifies our algorithmic status (Serres Citation1999, Citation2019). Against deterministic conceptions of the body, Serres argues that human bodies possess a ‘metamorphic’ nature that is similar to the procedural character of computer programs. This paper investigates the relationship between the algorithm and bodily existence through a reading of both Harari and Serres on sport. It will be argued that, against deterministic conceptions of the algorithm, the algorithm can actually broaden an understanding of the role of sports and physical activity. (shrink)

Can stable regularities be explained without appealing to governing laws or any other modal notion? In this paper, I consider what I will call a ‘Humean system’—a generic dynamical system without guiding laws—and assess whether it could display stable regularities. First, I present what can be interpreted as an account of the rise of stable regularities, following from Strevens [2003], which has been applied to explain the patterns of complex systems (such as those from meteorology and statistical mechanics). Second, since (...) this account presupposes that the underlying dynamics displays deterministic chaos, I assess whether it can be adapted to cases where the underlying dynamics is not chaotic but truly random—that is, cases where there is no dynamics guiding the time evolution of the system. If this is so, the resulting stable, apparently non-accidental regularities are the fruit of what can be called statistical necessity rather than of a primitive physical necessity. (shrink)

In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the (...) latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed. (shrink)

v. 1. Il pensiero filosofico e pedagogico dai Greci alla scolastica.--v. 2. Il pensiero filosofico e pedagogico dall'umanesimo al criticismo kantiano.--v. 3. Il pensiero filosofico e pedagogico dall'idealismo postkantiano all'esistenzialismo.

Este artigo apresenta uma abordagem inicial sobre a caracterização do campo meta-teórico de pesquisa em educação inclusiva e, em particular, examina as forças que produzem seu discurso na pesquisa documental. É reconhecida a necessidade de avançar na exploração de uma perspectiva epistêmica que permita superar o absentismo teórico enfrentado pela educação inclusiva em tempos complexos. O desenvolvimento atual da pesquisa em educação inclusiva é alimentado por vários campos de confluência fora da pedagogia, o que resultou na cristalização de um discurso (...) crítico e não crítico sobre si mesmo. As diferenças entre as perspectivas crítica e acrítica residem na ausência de raciocínio para politizar a discussão sobre a inclusão como mecanismo de transformação de todos os campos da vida do cidadão. Isso confirma a presença de políticas de produção de conhecimento que impõem fundamentos intelectuais binários e poucos pontos de fuga para problematizar as relações estruturais da desigualdade. Soma-se a isso as fortes raízes de padrões que impõem modelos epistêmicos quebrados para pensar nas opressões objeto das diversas identidades que chegam ao espaço escolar e demarcam novas formas de expressão cidadã. Conclui-se com base em um modelo pré-construído de tipo normativo para refletir sobre as questões fundamentais do desenvolvimento humano e cidadão. É necessário promover um processo de descolonização em todos os campos da Ciência da Educação, bem como uma crítica genealógica dos fundamentos híbridos que este modelo propõe, dada a uniformidade de seu discurso em todos os ciclos e níveis de ensino. Palavras-chave: educação inclusiva, políticas de produção de conhecimento, epistemologia, identidades e temas educacionais. (shrink)