In his remarkable paper Formalism 64, Robinson defends his eponymous position concerning the foundations of mathematics, as follows:Any mention of infinite totalities is literally meaningless.We should act as if infinite totalities really existed. Being the originator of Nonstandard Analysis, it stands to reason that Robinson would have often been faced with the opposing position that ‘some infinite totalities are more meaningful than others’, the textbook example being that of infinitesimals. For instance, Bishop and Connes have made such claims regarding infinitesimals, (...) and Nonstandard Analysis in general, going as far as calling the latter respectively a debasement of meaning and virtual, while accepting as meaningful other infinite totalities and the associated mathematical framework. We shall study the critique of Nonstandard Analysis by Bishop and Connes, and observe that these authors equate ‘meaning’ and ‘computational content’, though their interpretations of said content vary. As we will see, Bishop and Connes claim that the presence of ideal objects in Nonstandard Analysis yields the absence of meaning. We will debunk the Bishop–Connes critique by establishing the contrary, namely that the presence of ideal objects in Nonstandard Analysis yields the ubiquitous presence of computational content. In particular, infinitesimals provide an elegant shorthand for expressing computational content. To this end, we introduce a direct translation between a large class of theorems of Nonstandard Analysis and theorems rich in computational content, similar to the ‘reversals’ from the foundational program Reverse Mathematics. The latter also plays an important role in gauging the scope of this translation. (shrink)

Reverse mathematics is a program in the foundations of mathematics founded by Friedman and developed extensively by Simpson and others. The aim of RM is to find the minimal axioms needed to prove a theorem of ordinary, that is, non-set-theoretic, mathematics. As suggested by the title, this paper deals with two RM-phenomena, namely, splittings and disjunctions. As to splittings, there are some examples in RM of theorems A, B, C such that A↔, that is, A can be split into two (...) independent parts B and C. As to disjunctions, there are examples in RM of theorems D, E, F such that D↔, that is, D can be written as the disjunction of two independent parts E and F. By contrast, we show in this paper that there is a plethora of splittings and disjunctions in Kohlenbach’s higher-order RM. (shrink)

We study the logical and computational properties of basic theorems of uncountable mathematics, including the Cousin and Lindelöf lemma published in 1895 and 1903. Historically, these lemmas were among the first formulations of open-cover compactness and the Lindelöf property, respectively. These notions are of great conceptual importance: the former is commonly viewed as a way of treating uncountable sets like e.g. [Formula: see text] as “almost finite”, while the latter allows one to treat uncountable sets like e.g. [Formula: see text] (...) as “almost countable”. This reduction of the uncountable to the finite/countable turns out to have a considerable logical and computational cost: we show that the aforementioned lemmas, and many related theorems, are extremely hard to prove, while the associated sub-covers are extremely hard to compute. Indeed, in terms of the standard scale (based on comprehension axioms), a proof of these lemmas requires at least the full extent of second-order arithmetic, a system originating from Hilbert–Bernays’ Grundlagen der Mathematik. This observation has far-reaching implications for the Grundlagen’s spiritual successor, the program of Reverse Mathematics, and the associated Gödel hierarchy. We also show that the Cousin lemma is essential for the development of the gauge integral, a generalization of the Lebesgue and improper Riemann integrals that also uniquely provides a direct formalization of Feynman’s path integral. (shrink)

We investigate the connections between computability theory and Nonstandard Analysis. In particular, we investigate the two following topics and show that they are intimately related. A basic property of Cantor space$2^ $ is Heine–Borel compactness: for any open covering of $2^ $, there is a finite subcovering. A natural question is: How hard is it to compute such a finite subcovering? We make this precise by analysing the complexity of so-called fan functionals that given any $G:2^ \to $, output a (...) finite sequence $\langle f_0, \ldots,f_n \rangle $ in $2^ $ such that the neighbourhoods defined from $\overline {f_i } G\left$ for $i \le n$ form a covering of $2^ $. A basic property of Cantor space in Nonstandard Analysis is Abraham Robinson’s nonstandard compactness, i.e., that every binary sequence is “infinitely close” to a standard binary sequence. We analyse the strength of this nonstandard compactness property of Cantor space, compared to the other axioms of Nonstandard Analysis and usual mathematics.Our study of yields exotic objects in computability theory, while leads to surprising results in Reverse Mathematics. We stress that and are highly intertwined, i.e., our study is holistic in nature in that results in computability theory yield results in Nonstandard Analysis and vice versa. (shrink)

Elementary Recursive Nonstandard Analysis, in short ERNA, is a constructive system of nonstandard analysis with a PRA consistency proof, proposed around 1995 by Patrick Suppes and Richard Sommer. Recently, the author showed the consistency of ERNA with several transfer principles and proved results of nonstandard analysis in the resulting theories (see [12] and [13]). Here, we show that Weak König's lemma (WKL) and many of its equivalent formulations over RCA₀ from Reverse Mathematics (see [21] and [22]) can be 'pushed down' (...) into the weak theory ERNA, while preserving the equivalences, but at the price of replacing equality with equality 'up to infinitesimals'. It turns out that ERNA plays the role of RCA₀ and that transfer for universal formulas corresponds to WKL. (shrink)

We study the logical and computational properties of basic theorems of uncountable mathematics, in particular Pincherle's theorem, published in 1882. This theorem states that a locally bounded function is bounded on certain domains, i.e. one of the first ‘local-to-global’ principles. It is well-known that such principles in analysis are intimately connected to (open-cover) compactness, but we nonetheless exhibit fundamental differences between compactness and Pincherle's theorem. For instance, the main question of Reverse Mathematics, namely which set existence axioms are necessary to (...) prove Pincherle's theorem, does not have an unique or unambiguous answer, in contrast to compactness. We establish similar differences for the computational properties of compactness and Pincherle's theorem. We establish the same differences for other local-to-global principles, even going back to Weierstrass. We also greatly sharpen the known computational power of compactness, for the most shared with Pincherle's theorem however. Finally, countable choice plays an important role in the previous, we therefore study this axiom together with the intimately related Lindelöf lemma. (shrink)

Elementary Recursive Nonstandard Analysis, in short ERNA, is a constructive system of nonstandard analysis with a PRA consistency proof, proposed in around 1995 by Patrick Suppes and Richard Sommer. It is based on an earlier system developed by Rolando Chuaqui and Patrick Suppes. Here, we discuss the inherent problems and limitations of the classical nonstandard framework and propose a much-needed refinement of ERNA, called , in the spirit of Karel Hrbacek’s stratified set theory. We study the metamathematics of and its (...) extensions. In particular, we consider several transfer principles, both classical and ‘stratified’, which turn out to be related. Finally, we show that the resulting theory allows for a truly general, elegant and elementary treatment of basic analysis. (shrink)

Cantor’s first set theory paper (1874) establishes the uncountability of ${\mathbb R}$. We study this most basic mathematical fact formulated in the language of higher-order arithmetic. In particular, we investigate the logical and computational properties of ${\mathsf {NIN}}$ (resp. ${\mathsf {NBI}}$ ), i.e., the third-order statement there is no injection resp. bijection from $[0,1]$ to ${\mathbb N}$. Working in Kohlenbach’s higher-order Reverse Mathematics, we show that ${\mathsf {NIN}}$ and ${\mathsf {NBI}}$ are hard to prove in terms of (conventional) comprehension axioms, (...) while many basic theorems, like Arzelà’s convergence theorem for the Riemann integral (1885), are shown to imply ${\mathsf {NIN}}$ and/or ${\mathsf {NBI}}$. Working in Kleene’s higher-order computability theory based on S1–S9, we show that the following fourth-order process based on ${\mathsf {NIN}}$ is similarly hard to compute: for a given $[0,1]\rightarrow {\mathbb N}$ -function, find reals in the unit interval that map to the same natural number. (shrink)

The uncountability of$\mathbb {R}$is one of its most basic properties, known far outside of mathematics. Cantor’s 1874 proof of the uncountability of$\mathbb {R}$even appears in the very first paper on set theory, i.e., a historical milestone. In this paper, we study the uncountability of${\mathbb R}$in Kohlenbach’shigher-orderReverse Mathematics (RM for short), in the guise of the following principle:$$\begin{align*}\mathit{for \ a \ countable \ set } \ A\subset \mathbb{R}, \mathit{\ there \ exists } \ y\in \mathbb{R}\setminus A. \end{align*}$$An important conceptual observation is (...) that the usual definition of countable set—based on injections or bijections to${\mathbb N}$—does not seem suitable for the RM-study of mainstream mathematics; we also propose a suitable (equivalent over strong systems) alternative definition of countable set, namelyunion over${\mathbb N}$of finite sets; the latter is known from the literature and closer to how countable sets occur ‘in the wild’. We identify a considerable number of theorems that are equivalent to the centred theorem based on our alternative definition. Perhaps surprisingly, our equivalent theorems involve most basic properties of the Riemann integral, regulated or bounded variation functions, Blumberg’s theorem, and Volterra’s early work circa 1881. Our equivalences are alsorobust, promoting the uncountability of${\mathbb R}$to the status of ‘big’ system in RM. (shrink)

An important open problem in Reverse Mathematics is the reduction of the first-order strength of the base theory from IΣ1IΣ1 to IΔ0+expIΔ0+exp. The system ERNA, a version of Nonstandard Analysis based on the system IΔ0+expIΔ0+exp, provides a partial solution to this problem. Indeed, weak Königʼs lemma and many of its equivalent formulations from Reverse Mathematics can be ‘pushed down’ into ERNA, while preserving the equivalences, but at the price of replacing equality with ‘≈’, i.e. infinitesimal proximity . The logical principle (...) corresponding to weak Königʼs lemma is the universal transfer principle from Nonstandard Analysis. Here, we consider the intermediate and mean value theorem and their uniform generalizations. We show that ERNAʼs Reverse Mathematics mirrors the situation in classical Reverse Mathematics. This further supports our claim from Sanders [19] that the Reverse Mathematics of ERNA plus universal transfer is a copy up to infinitesimals of that of WKL0. We discuss some of the philosophical implications of our results. (shrink)

The representation of mathematical objects in terms of (more) basic ones is part and parcel of (the foundations of) mathematics. In the usual foundations of mathematics, namely, ZFC set theory, all mathematical objects are represented by sets, while ordinary, namely, non–set theoretic, mathematics is represented in the more parsimonious language of second-order arithmetic. This paper deals with the latter representation for the rather basic case of continuous functions on the reals and Baire space. We show that the logical strength of (...) basic theorems named after Tietze, Heine, and Weierstrass changes significantly upon the replacement of “second-order representations” by “third-order functions.” We discuss the implications and connections to the reverse mathematics program and its foundational claims regarding predicativist mathematics and Hilbert’s program for the foundations of mathematics. Finally, we identify the problem caused by representations of continuous functions and formulate a criterion to avoid problematic codings within the bigger picture of representations. (shrink)

The program of Reverse Mathematics (Simpson 2009) has provided us with the insight that most theorems of ordinary mathematics are either equivalent to one of a select few logical principles, or provable in a weak base theory. In this paper, we study the properties of the Dirac delta function (Dirac 1927; Schwartz 1951) in two settings of Reverse Mathematics. In particular, we consider the Dirac Delta Theorem, which formalizes the well-known property \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} (...) \begin{document}$${\int_\mathbb{R}f(x)\delta(x)\,dx=f(0)}$$\end{document} of the Dirac delta function. We show that the Dirac Delta Theorem is equivalent to weak König’s Lemma (see Yu and Simpson in Arch Math Log 30(3):171–180, 1990) in classical Reverse Mathematics. This further validates the status of WWKL0 as one of the ‘Big’ systems of Reverse Mathematics. In the context of ERNA’s Reverse Mathematics (Sanders in J Symb Log 76(2):637–664, 2011), we show that the Dirac Delta Theorem is equivalent to the Universal Transfer Principle. Since the Universal Transfer Principle corresponds to WKL, it seems that, in ERNA’s Reverse Mathematics, the principles corresponding to WKL and WWKL coincide. Hence, ERNA’s Reverse Mathematics is actually coarser than classical Reverse Mathematics, although the base theory has lower first-order strength. (shrink)

Constructive Analysis and Nonstandard Analysis are often characterized as completely antipodal approaches to analysis. We discuss the possibility of capturing the central notion of Constructive Analysis (i.e. algorithm, finite procedure or explicit construction) by a simple concept inside Nonstandard Analysis. To this end, we introduce Omega-invariance and argue that it partially satisfies our goal. Our results provide a dual approach to Erik Palmgren's development of Nonstandard Analysis inside constructive mathematics.

In nonstandard mathematics, the predicate ‘x is standard’ is fundamental. Recently, ‘relative’ or ‘stratified’ nonstandard theories have been developed in which this predicate is replaced with ‘x is y -standard’. Thus, objects are not standard in an absolute sense, but standard relative to other objects and there is a whole stratified universe of ‘levels’ or ‘degrees’ of standardness. Here, we study stratified nonstandard arithmetic and the related transfer principle. Using the latter, we obtain the ‘reduction theorem’ which states that arithmetical (...) formulas can be reduced to equivalent bounded formulas. Surprisingly, the reduction theorem is also equivalent to the transfer principle. As applications, we obtain a truth definition for arithmetical sentences and we formalize Nelson's notion of impredicativity. (shrink)

Reverse mathematics is a program in the foundations of mathematics founded by Friedman and developed extensively by Simpson and others. The aim of RM is to find the minimal axioms needed to prove a theorem of ordinary, that is, non-set-theoretic, mathematics. As suggested by the title, this paper deals with the study of the topological notions of dimension and paracompactness, inside Kohlenbach’s higher-order RM. As to splittings, there are some examples in RM of theorems A, B, C such that A (...) ↔, that is, A can be split into two independent parts B and C, and the aforementioned topological notions give rise to a number of splittings involving highly natural A, B, C. Nonetheless, the higher-order picture is markedly different from the second-one: in terms of comprehension axioms, the proof in higher-order RM of, for example, the paracompactness of the unit interval requires full second-order arithmetic, while the second-order/countable version of paracompactness of the unit interval is provable in the base theory RCA 0. We obtain similarly “exceptional” results for the Urysohn identity, the Lindelöf lemma, and partitions of unity. We show that our results exhibit a certain robustness, in that they do not depend on the exact definition of cover, even in the absence of the axiom of choice. (shrink)

Reverse mathematics is a program in the foundations of mathematics. It provides an elegant classification in which the majority of theorems of ordinary mathematics fall into only five categories, based on the “big five” logical systems. Recently, a lot of effort has been directed toward finding exceptional theorems, that is, those which fall outside the big five. The so-called reverse mathematics zoo is a collection of such exceptional theorems. It was previously shown that a number of uniform versions of the (...) zoo theorems, that is, where a functional computes the objects stated to exist, fall in the third big five category, arithmetical comprehension, inside Kohlenbach’s higher-order reverse mathematics. In this paper, we extend and refine these previous results. In particular, we establish analogous results for recent additions to the reverse mathematics zoo, thus establishing that the latter disappear at the uniform level. Furthermore, we show that the aforementioned equivalences can be proved using only intuitionistic logic. Perhaps most surprisingly, these explicit equivalences are extracted from nonstandard equivalences in Nelson’s internal set theory, and we show that the nonstandard equivalence can be recovered from the explicit ones. Finally, the following zoo theorems are studied in this paper: Π10G, FIP, 1-GEN, OPT, AMT, SADS, AST, NCS, and KPT. (shrink)

Kohlenbach's proof mining program deals with the extraction of effective information from typically ineffective proofs. Proof mining has its roots in Kreisel's pioneering work on the so-called unwinding of proofs. The proof mining of classical mathematics is rather restricted in scope due to the existence of sentences without computational content which are provable from the law of excluded middle and which involve only two quantifier alternations. By contrast, we show that the proof mining of classical Nonstandard Analysis has a very (...) large scope. In particular, we will observe that this scope includes any theorem of pure Nonstandard Analysis, where 'pure' means that only nonstandard definitions are used. In this note, we survey results in analysis, computability theory, and Reverse Mathematics. (shrink)

Elementary Recursive Nonstandard Analysis, in short ERNA, is a constructive system of nonstandard analysis proposed around 1995 by Patrick Suppes and Richard Sommer, who also proved its consistency inside PRA. It is based on an earlier system developed by Rolando Chuaqui and Patrick Suppes, of which Michal Rössler and Emil Jeřábek have recently proposed a weakened version. We add a Π₁-transfer principle to ERNA and prove the consistency of the extended theory inside PRA. In this extension of ERNA a σ₁-supremum (...) principle 'up-to-infinitesimals', and some well-known calculus results for sequences are deduced. Finally, we prove that transfer is 'too strong' for finitism by reconsidering Rössler and Jeřábek's conclusions. (shrink)

The aim of Reverse Mathematics (RM for short) is to find the minimal axioms needed to prove a given theorem of ordinary mathematics. These minimal axioms are almost always equivalent to the theorem, working over the base theory of RM, a weak system of computable mathematics. The Big Five phenomenon of RM is the observation that a large number of theorems from ordinary mathematics are either provable in the base theory or equivalent to one of only four systems; these five (...) systems together are called the ‘Big Five’. The aim of this paper is to greatly extend the Big Five phenomenon as follows: there are two supposedly fundamentally different approaches to RM where the main difference is whether the language is restricted to second-order objects or if one allows third-order objects. In this paper, we unite these two strands of RM by establishing numerous equivalences involving the second-order Big Five systems on one hand, and well-known third-order theorems from analysis about (possibly) discontinuous functions on the other hand. We both study relatively tame notions, like cadlag or Baire 1, and potentially wild ones, like quasi-continuity. We also show that slight generalizations and variations of the aforementioned third-order theorems fall far outside of the Big Five. (shrink)

Reverse Mathematics (RM hereafter) is a program in the foundations of mathematics where the aim is to identify theminimalaxioms needed to prove a given theorem from ordinary, i.e., non-set theoretic, mathematics. This program has unveiled surprising regularities: the minimal axioms are very oftenequivalentto the theorem over thebase theory, a weak system of ‘computable mathematics’, while most theorems are either provable in this base theory, or equivalent to one of onlyfourlogical systems. The latter plus the base theory are called the ‘Big (...) Five’ and the associated equivalences arerobustfollowing Montalbán, i.e., stable under small variations of the theorems at hand. Working in Kohlenbach’shigher-orderRM, we obtain two new and long series of equivalences based on theorems due to Bolzano, Weierstrass, Jordan, and Cantor; these equivalences are extremely robust and have no counterpart among the Big Five systems. Thus, higher-order RM is much richer than its second-order cousin, boasting at least two extra ‘Big’ systems. (shrink)

Creative encounters, appreciating difference: an introduction -- Appreciating difference : encountering, moving, naming -- Moving beyond place -- Territory -- I don't want to be a mystic! : on self-moving and religious experience -- Not by any name -- Creations of encounter -- Mother earth and numbakulla -- Storytracking the arrernte through the academic bush -- Mother earth : an American myth -- Aesthetic of impossibles -- Myth and an aesthetic of impossibles -- Tomorrow's eve and the next gen study (...) of religion -- Gesture -- Gesture posture prosthesis -- They jump up of themselves -- As prayer goes so goes religion -- Play -- No place to stand : Jonathan Z. Smith as homo ludens, the academic study of religion sub specie ludi -- To risk meaning nothing : Charles Sanders Peirce & the logic of discovery -- Creative encounters -- Creative encounters. (shrink)

Set in 2029, The Education of Sam Sanders tells the story of an 8th grader searching for meaning in his school experiences. In a public school system beset by the finality and rigidity of standardized tests and curriculums, Sam Sanders, with the help of his teacher and mother, defies the system and creates something new: a curriculum that enlightens rather than categorizes students. In this hopeful yet frightening look at an educational future not too far from our own, (...) we encounter the high cost of inquiry-oriented learning and the even higher cost of a system that suppresses it. (shrink)

Susanne Langer was a student at Radcliffe College between 1916 and 1926---a highly transitional period in the history of American philosophy. Intellectual generalists such as William James, John Dewey, and Josiah Royce had dominated philosophical debates at the turn of the century but the academic landscape gradually started to shift in the years after World War I. Many scholars of the new generation adopted a more piecemeal approach to philosophy---solving clearly delineated, technical puzzles using the so-called “method of logical analysis”. (...) Especially at Harvard, the intellectual climate rapidly changed. The department hired several philosophers who had contributed to the development of symbolic logic---H. M. Sheffer, C. I. Lewis, and A. N. Whitehead---and Harvard quickly began to be viewed as a central hub for analytic philosophy in the United States. This chapter contextualizes Langer’s earliest work by reading it through the lens of this shifting academic environment. Though Harvard did not allow women to take its courses until 1943, Langer is one of the most significant fruits of this period. Her dissertation “A Logical Analysis of Meaning” and her first publications are all illustrations of the approach that came to dictate the American philosophical conversation. By exploring the increased focus on the logical-analytic method and Langer’s attempts to expand the new approach to what she later called “non-discursive” symbolisms, I situate her publications in the intellectual context of the 1920s. (shrink)

Robert Sinclair’s *Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction* persuasively argues that Quine’s epistemology was deeply influenced by C. I. Lewis’s pragmatism. Sinclair’s account raises the question why Quine himself frequently downplayed Lewis’s influence. Looking back, Quine has always said that Rudolf Carnap was his “greatest teacher” and that his 1933 meeting with the German philosopher was his “first experience of sustained intellectual engagement with anyone of an older generation” (1970, 41; 1985, 97-8, my emphasis). Quine’s autobiographies contain only a (...) handful of biographical references to Lewis and he regularly soft-pedaled the latter’s influence in private correspondence. In this note, I discuss some archival evidence that helps us better understand Quine’s reluctance to acknowledge Lewis’s influence. I contextualize the relation between Lewis and Quine and argue that the latter viewed his teacher as a retrograde force in modern epistemology, impeding the more rigorous approach that Carnap had been developing in Europe. Next, I briefly discuss Lewis’s contribution to the development of scientific philosophy in the United States and argue that Quine underestimated his teacher’s role in this process. In doing so, I hope to show that Quine’s zealous commitment to Carnap’s approach negatively affected his assessment of Lewis’s influence, thereby supplementing Sinclair’s praiseworthy reconstruction with an explanation of why Quine himself underestimated Lewis’s role. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have argued in favour of extended simples on the grounds that they are needed by fundamental physics. The arguments typically appeal to theories of quantum gravity. To date, the argument in favour of extended simples has ignored the fact that the very existence of spacetime is put under pressure by quantum gravity. We thus consider the case for extended simples in the context of different views on the existence of spacetime. We show that the case for (...) extended simples based on physics is far more complex than has been previously thought. We present and then map this complexity, in order to present a much more textured picture of the argument for extended simples. (shrink)

The author argues that there is no such thing as a unique and general taxonomy of non-at-issue contents. Accordingly, we ought to shun large categories such as “conventional implicature”, “F-implicature”, “CI”, “Class B” or the like. As an alternative, we may, first, describe the “semantic profile” of linguistic devices as accurately as possible. Second, we may explicitly tailor our categories to particular theoretical purposes.

In this enlightening book, Sam Harris argues that free will is an illusion but that this truth should not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom; indeed, this truth can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.

We develop a new version of the causal theory of spacetime. Whereas traditional versions of the theory seek to identify spatiotemporal relations with causal relations, the version we develop takes causal relations to be the grounds for spatiotemporal relations. Causation is thus distinct from, and more basic than, spacetime. We argue that this non-identity theory, suitably developed, avoids the challenges facing the traditional identity theory.

In this chapter we argue that our concept of time is a functional concept. We argue that our concept of time is such that time is whatever it is that plays the time role, and we spell out what we take the time role to consist in. We evaluate this proposal against a number of other analyses of our concept of time, and argue that it better explains various features of our dispositions as speakers and our practices as agents.

One of the major difficulties facing presentism is the problem of causation. In this paper, I propose a new solution to that problem, one that is compatible with intrinsic, fundamental causal relations. Accommodating relations of this kind is important because (i) according to David Lewis (2004), such relations are needed to account for causation in our world and worlds relevantly similar to our own, (ii) there is no other strategy currently available that successfully reconciles presentism with relations of this kind (...) and (iii) resolving the problem of causation by accommodating intrinsic, fundamental causal relations provides the presentist with a far more general solution to the problem of causation than those currently on offer. (shrink)

Work in quantum gravity suggests that spacetime is not fundamental. Rather, spacetime emerges from an underlying, non-spatiotemporal reality. After clarifying the type of emergence at issue, I argue that standard conceptions of emergence available in metaphysics won’t work for the emergence of spacetime. I go on to consider spacetime functionalism as a way to make sense of spacetime emergence. I argue that a functionalist approach to spacetime modelled on mental state functionalism is not a viable alternative to the standard conception (...) of emergence in metaphysics. I go on to consider an alternative: ‘partial’ functionalism, whereby certain aspects of spacetime are functionalised, rather than spacetime as a whole. (shrink)

Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the normality (...) of error. Sometimes, it is more normal for reality and appearance to diverge than to match. We show that this simple idea has dramatic consequences for the theory of knowledge and justification. Among other things, we argue that a proper treatment of The Preface requires a departure from the internalist idea that epistemic justification supervenes on the appearances and the widespread idea that one knows most when free from error. (shrink)

A Lost Book from J. Oswald Sanders Now Re-Released with a Beautiful New Cover "The complex strains and problems which the Christian encounters in the contemporary world find their answer, not in tranquilizers or stimulants, but in a correct understanding and application of scriptural principles." -J. Oswald Sanders, from the introduction J. Oswald Sanders (best known for his book Spiritual Leadership, which has sold over a million copies), touched hundreds of thousands of lives in his lifetime and (...) continues to inspire Christians today. His books Spiritual Leadership, Spiritual Maturity, and The Incomparable Christ are beloved and well-read to this day. But there are two of his books that readers haven’t had access to in over 30 years. A Spiritual Clinic is one of them. Life wears on us, we go through seasons of fatigue, strain and tension that take their toll, and we can easily fall into apathy. Sanders prescribes a powerful tonic of scriptural principles that lead to recovery and growth. For anyone who feels worn out from their Christian life and could use a little spiritual doctoring, A Spiritual Clinic is for you. (shrink)

Suppositional theories of conditionals take apparent similarities between supposition and conditionals as a starting point, appealing to features of the former to provide an account of the latter. This paper develops a novel form of suppositional theory, one which characterizes the relationship at the level of semantics rather than at the level of speech acts. In the course of doing so, it considers a range of novel data which shed additional light on how conditionals and supposition interact.

Bestselling author Sam Harris dismantles the most common justification for religious faith-that a moral system cannot be based on science.

This chapter contains sections titled: Lactational Burkas, Lactational Burdens Breastfeeding as Obscene The Intimacy of Breastfeeding “Breast is Best” Milkmen Conclusion Notes.

According to dialetheism, there are some true contradictions. According to the A-theory, the passage of time is a mind-independent feature of reality. On some A-theories, the passage of time involves the movement of the present. I show that by appealing to dialetheism one can explain why the present moves. I then argue that A-theorists should adopt this explanation. To do this, I defend two claims. First, that the dialetheic explanation is an improvement on the only other explanation available for why (...) the present moves and, second, that adopting the explanation is better than leaving the motion of the present unexplained. Assuming that A- theorists should adopt the best available version of their view, it follows that they should adopt a dialetheic explanation of why time passes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Our goal in this paper is to extend counterfactual accounts of scientific explanation to mathematics. Our focus, in particular, is on intra-mathematical explanations: explanations of one mathematical fact in terms of another. We offer a basic counterfactual theory of intra-mathematical explanations, before modelling the explanatory structure of a test case using counterfactual machinery. We finish by considering the application of counterpossibles to mathematical explanation, and explore a second test case along these lines.

The present article reviews modern research on the psychology of emotion regulation. Emotion regulation determines the offset of emotional responding and is thus distinct from emotional sensitivity, which determines the onset of emotional responding. Among the most viable categories for classifying emotion-regulation strategies are the targets and functions of emotion regulation. The emotion-generating systems that are targeted in emotion regulation include attention, knowledge, and bodily responses. The functions of emotion regulation include satisfying hedonic needs, supporting specific goal pursuits, and facilitating (...) the global personality system. Emotion-regulation strategies are classified in terms of their targets and functions and relevant empirical work is reviewed. Throughout this review, emotion regulation emerges as one of the most far-ranging and influential processes at the interface of cognition and emotion. (shrink)

“If anthropology and history once begin to collaborate in the study of … societies, it will become apparent that the one science can achieve nothing without the help of the other,” said Claude Levi-Strauss. This statement is so immediately sensible in a plain, common-sense way, that only an examination of historical and anthropological practices reveal that such a collaboration is neither as frequent nor as complete as it ought to be.Anthropologists traditionally studied preliterate societies, historians, literate ones. Preliterate societies lack (...) written documents (or such documents are rare and often unreliable since they are usually written by untrained observers from outside the culture) and anthropologists found themselves with only oral traditions from which to reconstruct the past. Oral traditions, myths, tales, legends and so on are part of every culture; but the value of such traditions as a source of historical information was considered doubtful by most anthropologists, and historians seemingly had no need of them. The functionalist school of anthropology contributed to our understanding by recognizing the value and importance of oral histories in terms of the functions such tales fulfill in a given society. (shrink)