'Nadeau and Kafatos supply plenty of food for thought: the apparently recondite concept of non-locality, they suggest, has consequences everywhere.'--Publisher's Weekly.

Many methodologists are firmly convinced that Popper's arguments concerning the status of the rationality principle (RP) are incoherent or incompatible with the essentials of falsificationism. The present essay first shows that the accusation of incompatibility of situational logic with falsificationism does not hold up to scrutiny but then shows that Popper's arguments are nonetheless flimsy if not indefensible. For it seems that one can distinguish between two different versions of the RP in Popper's writings. If the first version is plainly (...) "objectivist" and can be characterized with Popper as empirically false, the second one is rather "subjectivist" and is not falsifiable as such. The essay shows that this second reading of the RP is the one that Popper finally adopts but that, unfortunately enough, this formulation of the RP looks more like a metaphysical statement than like an empirical law. It could then be held to be a priori valid as such, by analogy with Popper's line of argument concerning the principle of causality. If this is correct, then Popper's thesis on the empirical status of the RP is confuted. (shrink)

Throughout his writings, Hayek has emphasized that a "scientistic prejudice" is working as a bad steering factor in the research for sound theories in the general field of social sciences, and especially in economics. Notwithstanding Hayek's criticism, most contemporary economists still think that they must imitate methods of physical and biological sciences in order to do good and valid science. While Hayek was first vehemently reproving this methodological choice in his early writings (for example, Hayek 1952), he was afterwards convinced (...) by Popper, as he himself acknowledges (see Hayek 1967) that the scientific method social scientists sought to transpose into their own research field was mere illusion. Consequently, Hayek rejected the confirmationist approach to economic theories and adopted a strict falsificationist one (this is very clear in the Nobel Memorial Lecture: see Hayek 1974). (shrink)

1.- Introduction: articulating Hayek’s evolutionary argument with his socialist calculation dispute I completely agree with Bruce Caldwell (Caldwell 1988b: 74-75; Caldwell 1988a) that it is precisely within the conceptual and theoretical framework of the debate on the possibility of socialist calculation that Hayek definitively breaks with the standard static equilibrium approach to the market economy and finds out that the central problem of economics is related to the complex question of social coordination. From the Hayekian standpoint, this problem cannot be (...) solved without articulating a genuine theory about the role and the use of knowledge in society.1 This forms the hard core of what I will call the Hayekian theoretical argument. But one can find a much different kind of argument in Hayek, i.e. an evolutionary argument. I will characterize this argument as the Hayekian empirical argument. Hayek first exposed the essential elements of this genuine argument systematically in Law, Legislation and Liberty (see especially Hayek 1973). But in Hayek’s last book (Hayek 1988), socialism is still analyzed from this evolutionary standpoint , and as such socialism is considered by Hayek to be the major problem not only of economic theory but also, more globally, of Western civilization itself. In that book, published the year before the Soviet Union collapsed, Hayek showed himself to be absolutely confident that economic analysis could prove that socialism was not only a social blunder and a political failure, but above all a formidable scientific error. My reading of Hayek’s work is that this evolutionary argument has to be linked to the first one, which is of a more theoretical nature as far as economics is concerned. Indeed, while the evolutionary argument puts forward a completely different conceptual framework tightening the theoretical argument, it first of all displaces the gist of Hayek’s claim against socialism.. (shrink)

The concept of spontaneous order is an important framework in many fields of research in the natural and social sciences today, and it bears heavily on methodological problems related to economics in particular. In fact, all domains of scientific and philosophical research where it can be maintained intelligibly that an undesigned but nevertheless effective order has emerged solely through the interaction of the constituent parts of a given system and also through the interaction of this system as a whole with (...) its environment fall under what is now often preferably called the "paradigm of auto-organization". This paradigm can be traced back to Leibniz (Dobuzinkis 1989, p. 245) or even to the Spanish Jesuits of the Salamanca School of the XVIth century (Lepage 1983, p. 347), and a lot of scientific work has now been done from within its conceptual framework, for instance Varela & Maturana's theory of "autopoiesis", Heinz von Foerster's second generation cybernetic models, Ilya Prigogine's thermodynamics of open systems and dissipative structures, and chaos theory. In economics, the concept of social spontaneous order is intimately linked with Friedrich Hayek's work, and Hayek has himself insisted on the effective kinship of such approaches (Hayek 1979, p. 158). One can say that there is today in economics a full-fledged Theory of Spontaneous Order (TSO) which articulates four distinct arguments. (shrink)

A good way of characterizing what is usually called the 17th-century “revolution of modern science” is to focus on Galileo Galilei’s theory of explanation. As is well known, he set aside three of the four Aristotelian causes (material, formal and final causes) in order to base all sound scientific explanations in terms of efficient causes. In the second half of the 19th century a new scientific revolution occurred, with Darwin’s theory of evolution. As it has been stated repeatedly, Darwinism also (...) has something to do with the abandoning of teleology in science, as speciation is explained without any appeal to final causes. But in the last quarter of the 19th century a third scientific revolution occured, this time in the social sciences. Many philosophers of science fail to notice or understand this intellectual event. This third scientific revolution is usually called the “marginalist revolution.” The transformation of political economy into pure economics, and progressively, into mathematical economics had at least two distinctive features. First, this revolution broke out simultaneously but independently in three different European countries: with Carl Menger (1840- 1921) in Austria, with William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) in England, and with Léon Walras (1834- 1910), who, in 1870, was the first to hold the Chair of Political Economy at the University of.. (shrink)

1. In general we agree to recognize the existence, if not the methodological fertility or epistemological legitimacy, of a "rationalist model," at least when we refer to what economists do when they offer explanations.1 However two remarks must be made about this. First, it must be emphasized that this model is not unique, but generic: in fact, it is more a family of models of which the fundamental theoretical suppositions are susceptible to large variations. There are here, as it were, (...) several possible axiomatic bases. One formulation is, for example and to use von Mises's term, praxeological (axed on means/end relation). Another emphasizes the preference/constraint relation (Harsanyi). Other contrasting models are those putting forward the maximization of expected utility (von Neumann-Morgenstern) and those making the satisficing hypothesis (Simon). Second, however, it must also be said that philosophers of science do not really agree on what is asserted by the "principle of rationality" or on what is its status. For example, Popper (1982) made it a minimal empirical hypothesis, or practically empty, and denied, furthermore, that it was a universally valid psychological law. Hempel (1965) did not hesitate, in contrast, to make it a law of experimental psychology which would play an implicit or explicit role in any adequate and complete explanation of behaviour or action in social sciences or history. Dray, to cite another classic author (cf. Dray 1957), made this principle the base for the explanations of historians, but denied it the status of a nomological proposition. In consequence, it is difficult to proceed as if there were a theoretical consensus among researchers when they base their explanatory arguments on the rationality of agents. This is clearly not the case. However, Raymond Boudon is right to consider the "rationalist model" an extension to all the social sciences of the model of explanation which is found at the base of what has been called the "marginalist revolution" in economics.. (shrink)

"S'il devait un jour n'être plus possible pour les observateurs scientifiques de s'entendre au sujet des énoncés de base, cela équivaudrait à l'échec du langage comme moyen de communication universel. Cela équivaudrait à une nouvelle ‘‘Tour de Babel’’, la découverte scientifique s'en trouverait réduite à une absurdité. Dans cette nouvelle Babel le haut édifice de la science tomberait bientôt en ruines.".

La Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophic comprend maintenant un ouvrage où l'on trouve la traduction française de quatre textes importants pour l'historien du savoir. Le texte central est celui du Collogue Cassirer-Heidegger qui eut lieu à Davos en mars 1929, où les deux philosophes confrontèrent leur lecture de Kant. Les trios autres textes ont pour but de mettre un peu mieux en lumière le sens de cette confrontation: il s'agit1. du résumé anonyme des « Conférences du Professeur Martin Heidegger sur (...) la Critique de la Raison Pure de Kant et sur la tâche d'une fondation de la Métaphysique » et du résumé des « Conférences du Professeur Ernst Cassirer »;2. du compte rendu fait par Cassirer du Kant-Buch de Heidegger;3. du compte rendu fait par Heidegger du deuxième volume de la Philosophie der symbolischen Formen de Cassirer. (shrink)

It has already been argued by Frazer and Boland (1983) that, interpreted in an instrumentalist fashion, Milton Friedman’s well known and much criticized 1953 paper on “The Methodology of Positive Economics”1 proved to be convergent with Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science2. I think that this comparison is flawed. For one can assuredly contest this interpretation in view of the fact that Popper always opposed any kind of instrumentalist philosophy of science3. It is not even clear that what Friedman has to (...) say on the intricate question of the status of theories and on the function of tests has anything to do with what Popper criticizes under the general category of “instrumentalism”. What I will do here is not so much to directly challenge the Frazer-Boland interpretation as to replace it with a completely new comparison of both methodologies in order to get a new look at Friedman's methodological stance. Of course, one has to focus only on the arguments that really are comparable and leave aside those that could easily be proved to be fundamentally different, if not plainly incompatible. But, as I will try to show, the exercise is worthwhile, for this new comparison will force us to reinterpret, at least partially, what seem to me to be the two central tenets of Friedman's methodological doctrine. Of course, in order to find convergence between Friedman's and Popper's views on economic methodology, we have to read.. (shrink)

Hayek is, with Mises, one the prominent Austrian economists who took part in the historical “socialist calculation debate” of the 1930s. After recalling precisely what Mises’s crucial argument against socialism was (socialism means the abolition of market prices which are necessary for real rational economic decisions to be taken in production), this paper goes on to show what Hayek’s main argument was (state planning of the economy is impossible because no super-brain can have all the necessary knowledge to be economically (...) efficient). I will further show that, while this last argument is theoretical, Hayek has also an argument about the preeminence of competitive economy from an evolutionary standpoint, which is an empirical question and thus forms a less conclusive argument. In the second part of this paper, I will summarize how Myrdal explains in his 1960 book, and from a completely different angle, how state intervention and planning historically occurred—and continues to work—in our Western Capitalist Welfare States. Myrdal’s account is explicitly presented by him as having empirical import, but also strong normative content. Hayek, on the contrary, argues that the efficiency of state planning is a problem for economists to solve on exclusively scientific grounds. My purpose is to show important divergences between these two economic viewpoints and to sketch a philosophical appraisal of both. (shrink)

Of the many twentieth-century Austrian intellectuals who have left an indelible mark, Friedrich Hayek is without a doubt one of the most multidimensional, and for this reason also one of the most difficult to comprehend. Who was he, in fact? He presented himself as a fourth-generation economist trained in the famous “Austrian School” which Carl Menger had founded in 1871. Indeed, Hayek may well be its last representative, given his own opinion that after him the Austrian School had more or (...) less ceased to exist. (shrink)

What is typical of Hayek's challenge concerning socialism is that he always maintained that this question was for economic theory to decide. Sketching the historical background of what has come to be known as the "socialist calculation debate" (section 1), I try to link this debate with the Menger-Wieser Zurechnungsproblem and show that the Pareto-Barone approach has determined the theoretical form of this economic controversy. I then go on to explore Hayek's 'inapplicability' argument (section 2) and try to show how (...) it is related to Mises' 'logical impossibility’ argument. This is followed by an examination of Hayek's second argument (section 3), which I refer to as 'the evolutionary argument'. I display what is the specific gist of this argument and connect it tightly to the first one. I then discuss certain methodological issues (section 4) pertaining to the allegedly radical difference between Mises' arguments and Hayek's tentative refutation of socialism. Here I challenge the received view that Mises' based his case on the 'impossibility in principle' of socialism, whereas Hayek's own position was to challenge the 'possibility in practice' of a centrally planned economy. This reading (especially by Willem Keizer) of Hayek's contribution to the debate seems to me misguided and unwarranted. I attempt to propose, on the contrary, that both lines of reasoning involve the same kind as arguments since both of them should be interpreted as impossibility theorems. Finally (section 5) I try to give an appropriate and adequate answer to the question raised in the title of this paper. (shrink)

Une analyse minutieuse du dernier ouvrage de Hayek publié quatre ans avant sa mort, soit en 1988 , permet de mettre au Jour les tenants et aboutissants de la perspective évolutionnaire épousée par Hayek en matière d'économie politique. Examinant d'abord le concept d'ordre spontané, exposant ensuite le fonctionnement de Véconomie marchande comme système en expansion continue, je montre alors comment s'articulent pour Hayek compétence économique et compétence épistémique d'un côté, puis coordination économique et compétence morale de l'autre. L'analyse fait apercevoir (...) que, fondamentalement, l'optique de Hayek est évolutionnaire parce qu 'elle est résolument populationnelle, ce que les commentateurs de Hayek ont plutôt ignoré jusqu'ici, ce qui fournit l'occasion de passer en revue les critiques adressées par Hayek au principe de population de Malthus .Four years before his death, Hayek published a book in which he particulates the main reasons for adopting an evolutionary point of view in economics. This paper tries precisely to systematize these reasons as clearly as possible. I begin by a systematic discussion of the concept of spontaneous order. I then look at what mainly defines the catallaxy as a still extending market order. Following this line of theoretical argument, I then try to show how for Hayek economic competence and epistemic competence are to be seen as developing together in a free market economy. Furthermore, 1 try to show how for Hayek economic coordination and moral competence are to be seen as the unintended results ofrule-governed individual dimensions of behaviour mutually. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Qu'attend-on réellement en économie ou en sociologie d'un modèle d'évolution par sélection? C'est essentiellement un mode irremplaçable de présentation pour la convergence d'un processus pour lequel on ne dispose pas d'un schéma déterministe. Il y a là un paradoxe si l'on considère que Darwin a constamment critiqué tous les schémas de convergence relatifs au vivant et n'a jamais proposé d'en fournir un équivalent. Le secret de ce paradoxe pourrait bien résider dans un appoint trop peu reconnu, mais bien présent, (...) du darwinisme : celui du premier schéma informationnel proposé pour la pensée des événements qui constituent une évolution. ABSTRACT What is really the meaning of the manifold purposes the scientists ascribe to evolutionary patterns in social sciences? Indeed the most plausible answer may be summarized by the idea of converging processes. If we consider the darwinian criticism about such converging processes, this answer is nevertheless paradoxical. We must therefore look for another point of view. I suggest that this informational conception of events is the actual implement we can find today in evolutionary patterns. (shrink)

S'il fallait identifier le champ de la réflexion philosophique qui a pris le plus déampleur au cours de la dernière décennie, sans doute faudrait-il dire: la philosophie de l'économique, appelée le plus souvent «méthodologie économique». Mais qu'entendre par «méthodologie «conomique»? Le signe le plus tangible peut-être de l'ébullition que connaît ce domaine a l'heure actuelle est que son identite meme fait l'objet d'âpres disputes. Tenter d'en fournir une caractérisation qui ferait consensus rélèverait de l'étourderie et se révélerait sans doute une (...) perte de temps complète. Comment, alors, dois-je m'y prendre pour présenter le domaine qui fournit son thème au prèsent numéro deDialogueEn y allant d'une réflexion qui aura peut-être davantage l'allure d'un discours a bâtons rompus que celle d'un exposé systematiqué, puis en illustrant mon propos d'exemples tirès des diverses contributions au présent numéro plutôt qu'en tentant de d'finir strictement ce champ de recherches. (shrink)

En 1962, Thomas Kuhn fait paraître l'ouvrage qui allait le rendre célèbre, à savoir La Structure des révolutions scientifiques. Il visait à produire en philosophie des sciences ce quil appela une « gestalt switch ». Il entendait, en effet, mettre en cause le « paradigme épistémologique cartésien » et proposer que l'analyse logico-méthodologique cède définitivement la place à une approche historique et psychologique des sciences . Mon propos est de faire voir que, bien que les premiers critiques de Kuhn se (...) soient le plus souvent fourvoyés, en proposant ce virage radical, Kuhn a amplifié sinon induit une crise profonde dans la philosophie des sciences post-positiviste. Car, ni l'histoire, ni la sociologie des sciences ne sont adéquatement outillées pour répondre aux questions spécifiquement logico-méthodologiques que la connaissance scientifique suscite.In publishing his 1962 book on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn became world famous. He wanted to provoke what he called a "gestalt switch" in philosophy of science. After having characterized the "Cartesian Paradigm" as the most prominent failure of our epistemohgy, Kuhn finally proposes that we switch from logic and methodology to history and sociology of science. I would like to show that, even if we grant that Kuhn's first critics were out of focus, in taking the Kuhnian turn, philosophy of science and epistemohgy runs into crisis. For, using exclusively historiographical and sociological concepts and types of investigation, epistemological and methodological analysis are no longer adequatly feasible. Transformed into historians and "metahistorians" of science, philosophers of the new Kuhnian persuasion are no longer apt to give proper treatment to those still legitimate concerns related to the strictly logical and methodological dimensions of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Fear can be a crippling disease, and there is no more fearful prospect for most of us than nuclear war. Following recent popular accounts of ...

Hayek is, with Mises, one the prominent Austrian economists who took part in the historical “socialist calculation debate” of the 1930s. After recalling precisely what Mises’s crucial argument against socialism was (socialism means the abolition of market prices which are necessary for real rational economic decisions to be taken in production), this paper goes on to show what Hayek’s main argument was (state planning of the economy is impossible because no super-brain can have all the necessary knowledge to be economically (...) efficient). I will further show that, while this last argument is theoretical, Hayek has also an argument about the preeminence of competitive economy from an evolutionary standpoint, which is an empirical question and thus forms a less conclusive argument. In the second part of this paper, I will summarize how Myrdal explains in his 1960 book, and from a completely different angle, how state intervention and planning historically occurred—and continues to work—in our Western Capitalist Welfare States. Myrdal’s account is explicitly presented by him as having empirical import, but also strong normative content. Hayek, on the contrary, argues that the efficiency of state planning is a problem for economists to solve on exclusively scientific grounds. My purpose is to show important divergences between these two economic viewpoints and to sketch a philosophical appraisal of both. (shrink)

Like Mises before him, Hayek challenges the validity of socialism as a centrally planned economic regime typically characterized by state ownership of all means of production. What is typical of Hayek's challenge is that he holds that this question is fully theoretical in nature and that it has consequently to be raised and decided as a scientific question. Sketching the historical background of the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s and 1930s, I first show how this debate is linked with (...) the Menger-Wieser Zurechnungsproblem, which indeed constitutes the very topic of Hayek’s 1923 Ph. D. dissertation. I recall that the Pareto-Barone approach based on General Equilibrium Theory (GET) has determined the conceptual framework of this controversy. I then go on to explore Hayek's impracticability argument against market socialism and try to show how it is related to, but different from, Mises’s logical impossibility argument. I argue that the contexts of discussion were completely different in both cases: if Mises was criticizing the possibility of rational economic decisions in a moneyless economy, Hayek was debating against the Lange-Dickinson-Lerner model of market socialism where the prices of first order goods were supposedly fixed following a GET simulation of the competetive market process. The core of Hayek’s line of reasoning is shown to be related to a clever analysis of the notion of ‘data’: the data on which a Central Planification Board is suppose to work out a production and distribution schema for the whole economy are simply unavailable to him because this kind of economic knowledge (which Michael Polanyi calls “tacit knowledge”) cannot be accumulated and stored up anywhere in society, as if the global economy could be directed by a super-brain possessing complete knowledge of every particular situation and able to compute a perfect solution to any economic problem whatsoever.. (shrink)

The Road to Serfdom (Hayek 1944)2 is without a doubt the book that made Friedrich Hayek world famous. But one must immediately add that Hayek the trained economist was far from being satisfied with this situation, at least at the beginning. “I have long resented”, writes Hayek, “being more widely known by what I regarded as a pamphlet for the time than by my strictly scientific work.” But he adds immediately: “After reexamining what I wrote then in the light of (...) some thirty years’ further study of the problems then raised, I no longer do so” (Hayek 1976: xxiv-xxv). (shrink)